



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

KI

18993

91.5-4
meal

vol 4

www

W. Cameron Forbes



Philippe Comte de Paris

IMPERIAL INDIAN

THE ONLY

43

THE ONLY

THE ONLY
PORTER & CO. LONDON.

HISTORY
OF THE
CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA.

BY
THE COMTE DE PARIS.

PUBLISHED BY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THE AUTHOR.

VOLUME IV.

PHILADELPHIA:
PORTER & COATES.



Philippe Comte de Paris

THE WAR OF 1812

THE BATTLE OF PLATT

1812

JOHN & CO.

KF 18173 (4)



Copyright, 1888,
BY PORTER & COATES.

EDITOR'S NOTE.

THE volume now presented to the American reader contains, without abridgment, the seventh volume of the French Edition, and so much of the eighth volume as was contained in the manuscript which the distinguished Author carried with him when he was banished from France. Previous to the promulgation of the decree of banishment a speedy completion of the work was hoped for, but political responsibilities, and an enforced absence from the collection of books and manuscripts at Château d'Eu relating to the Civil War of 1861-65, have not justified this hope.

JOHN P. NICHOLSON.

PHILADELPHIA, *April, 1888.*

CONTENTS OF VOL. IV.

BOOK I.—EASTERN TENNESSEE.

CHAPTER I.

TULLAHOMA.

Situation at the North, July 1, 1863.—The Peace Party.—Mr. Pierce, Mr. Seymour.—The conscription.—Preparations for resistance.—Riot in New York, July 23.—The authorities powerless.—The rioters masters of the city.—The Regulars carry the barricades.—Order restored.—Riot in Boston, July 15.—The belligerents in Kentucky.—Plans of Bragg and Morgan.—The latter takes the field, July 2.—Taking of Columbia, July 3.—Engagement at Tebb's Bend, July 4.—Capture of Lebanon, July 5.—Morgan escapes the Federals.—He crosses the Ohio, July 8.—His plan.—Engagement at Corydon, July 9.—The Federals concentrate at Cincinnati.—Morgan passes through the outskirts.—The Federals pursue him.—Morgan at Buffington.—The Federals overtake him.—The rising of the river stops him.—Rout of the Confederates, July 18.—Pursuit of Morgan.—He is captured at New Lisbon, July 26.—Results of this expedition.—Morgan in the Columbus penitentiary; his escape.—Mr. Stephens' mission.—Situations of Rosecrans and Bragg.—Their inaction.—Plateau of the Cumberland.—Rosecrans' plan.—Demonstrations on his flanks, June 23.—The army on the march, June 24.—Surprises of Bragg.—The Federals pass Hoover's Gap.—Engagement at Beech Grove.—Engagement at Liberty Gap, June 24 and 25.—Rosecrans' march on Manchester, June 26.—Movement of the Federal right, June 27.—Engagement at Guy's Gap.—Engagement at Shelbyville.—Rout of Wheeler.—The Federals masters of Duck River.—They meet at Manchester, June 29.—Wheeler's expedition.—Concentration of the Confederates at Tullahoma, June 27.—Bragg's retreat, July 1.—Bad weather.—The Confederates cross Elk River, July 2.—The Federals arrive in front of this river.—They halt

▼

in front of Cumberland Gap, July 4.—Distribution of the Union Army.....	Page 1
---	--------

CHAPTER II.

CUMBERLAND GAP.

Situation of the two armies.—Rosecrans cannot advance alone.—Inaction of Grant and Burnside.—Rosecrans and Burnside take the field, August 16.—East Tennessee.—Burnside's forces.—His plan.—Difficulties of the route.—They march in five columns.—Occupation of Knoxville, August 30.—Buckner's retreat.—Triumphal entrance of Burnside, September 3.—Cumberland Gap.—Capitulation of Frazer, September 9.—Engagement at Limestone Station, September 7.—Burnside's position.—His march on Jonesboro', September 13.—He is recalled by Halleck to support Rosecrans.—His return to Knoxville, September 24.—Arrival of the Ninth corps.—Lookout Mountain and Walden's Ridge, Dalton, and the Chickamauga.—Difficulties of the campaign undertaken by Rosecrans.—His plan.—Movement of the left.—Movement of the right.—Wilder in front of Chattanooga, August 21.—Bragg's position.—His weakness.—Rosecrans crosses the Tennessee, August 29 to September 3.—The Federals in Will's Valley, September 4.—The Federal left follows the rest of the army.—Bragg's inaction.—He evacuates Chattanooga, September 8.—He summons Buckner to his assistance.—The Federals at Lookout Mountain.—They occupy Chattanooga, September 9.....	Page 42
---	---------

CHAPTER III.

DAVIS' CROSS-ROADS.

Rejoicing in the North.—Illusions of Halleck and Rosecrans.—Plan of the latter.—He passes Lookout Mountain.—His left crosses the Chickamauga.—Perilous position.—Bragg at La Fayette.—His forces.—Longstreet's corps is sent to him.—His plan.—The Federals at Dug Gap and at Pea-Vine Creek, September 10.—Fight at Davis' Cross-roads, September 11.—Crittenden at Ringgold.—Rosecrans at last sees the danger.—He attempts concentration.—Crittenden recrosses the Chickamauga.—Tardiness of Bragg.—Polk disobeys him.—Position of the two armies, September 13.—Movements of the Federals.—They are all behind the Chickamauga, September 17.—Granger in front of Ringgold.—Bragg's movements from September 13 to 17.—Arrival of Hood.—Chickamauga Valley.—Bragg's plan.—His forces.—Movement of his right, September 18.—They cross the Chickamauga.—Movement of the centre.—The Southern cavalry on the Chickamauga on the evening of September 18.—The Federal army closes on the left.—The right at Gordon's Mills, the left at Kelly's farm.—Halleck's tardy efforts to save Rosecrans.....	Page 72
---	---------

CHAPTER IV.

CHICKAMAUGA.

The battlefield.—Advance of Thomas on the morning of September 19.—The Confederates continue their movement.—Their position.—Their centre stationary.—Fight at the sawmill.—Brannan breaks through the Southern cavalry.—The latter receive assistance.—The fight ceases about noon.—Bragg's mistakes.—He reinforces his right.—Efforts of Rosecrans to form a line of battle.—Walker attacks and breaks through Baird's division.—Palmer in turn repulses him.—At one o'clock Cheatham falls into line.—Bloody struggle between Thomas and Bragg's right.—The two parties are successively reinforced.—Check of the Southerners on their extreme right.—Van Cleve routs Cheatham's left.—Rosecrans summons all his forces to the left.—Bragg engages his centre.—Stewart attacks Van Cleve.—Davis assists the latter.—Defeat of Van Cleve.—Stewart passes the road.—Hazen and Reynolds resist on the right and left.—Stewart is held in check.—Fight at Vineyard farm.—Hood breaks through Davis' forces.—Wood falls into line.—Hood's success.—Critical moment for Rosecrans.—Bragg sends Cleburne to his right.—The Federal centre and right reorganize.—They resume the march.—Sheridan holds Hood in check.—The fighting ceases on the line.—Cleburne attacks Thomas.—Indecisive struggle.—Night puts an end to the fighting.—Mistakes of the Confederates.—Situation of both sidesPage 99

CHAPTER V.

KELLY'S FARM.

Disposition of Rosecrans' forces.—He reinforces Thomas and brings his right back to the rear.—Bragg rectifies his position.—Longstreet is to command the left.—Polk is to take the offensive.—His inaction causes a loss of four hours.—Bragg's impatience.—Negley's delay.—Movements of the Federal right.—The Southern right attacks Thomas.—Breckenridge's movement against his extreme left.—He is repulsed.—Attack and check of Cleburne.—New assault against Thomas.—Walker is repulsed.—Fierce struggle around Kelly's farm.—Disposition of Longstreet's forces.—Cleburne's attack on his right.—Thomas resists victoriously.—Stewart's attack.—Longstreet effects a conversion on the right.—Rosecrans weakens his right.—Weakness of this line.—Wood's mistake.—Longstreet attacked at half-past eleven.—Hood is stopped and is wounded.—Rout of Wood.—Johnson attacks and breaks Davis' line.—The Southerners come out of the woods.—Hindman attacks Sheridan.—His success.—At half-past twelve the entire Union right wing is routed.—The centre resists with difficulty.—Its new dispositions.—Brannan rallies the remains of his right on the Horseshoe Ridge.—He intercepts the Southerners.—Flight of the right *via* Villetoe.—Negley returns toward the right.—He is carried away by it.—Rosecrans leaves the battlefield.—Granger's march with artilleryPage 132

CHAPTER VI.

HORSESHOE RIDGE.

Inaction of Polk.—Horseshoe Ridge.—Longstreet is obliged to reorganize the Southern right.—At half-past two he attacks Horseshoe Ridge.—He is repulsed.—Renewed general attack supported by Hindman and Preston.—Timely arrival of Granger.—He drives back Johnson.—Repulse of Longstreet.—Hazen goes to the assistance of the Federal right.—Hindman's and Preston's renewed assault.—They are repulsed after a bloody struggle.—The fight ends before five o'clock.—Polk makes new preparations.—His success against Thomas' extreme left.—Thomas gives orders for retreat.—Reynolds repulses Walker.—Thomas' difficult retreat.—It is safely accomplished.—Retreat of the right.—The Federals at Rossville.—Operations of the cavalry of the two armies during the battle.—Halt of the Confederates.—Losses on both sides.—Mistakes on both sides.—Results of the battle.—How Bragg might have availed himself of them.—His plan and Longstreet's.—Forrest pursues the Federals.—Bragg marches upon Red House Bridge.—His mistake.—The Federals retreat to Chattanooga.—Bragg resolves, too late, to follow them.—McLaws and Forrest close upon Chattanooga.—Bragg invests Rosecrans on the left bank of the Tennessee.—Lookout Mountain.—Prominent point occupied by the Southerners.—News of the battle in the North.—Departure of Hooker.—Reinforcements are sent from all quarters to Rosecrans.—Burnside's situation.—Halleck compelled to remain inactive.....Page 162

BOOK II.—SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA.

CHAPTER I.

WAUHATCHIE.

Situation of Grant's army.—Delay in the arrival of Halleck's orders.—Grant's projects.—He renounces them to assist Rosecrans more effectually.—Departure of Sherman.—On October 11 the entire Fifteenth corps has left Memphis.—Hooker at Bridgeport.—He cannot proceed as far as Chattanooga.—Fight at Charleston.—Forrest in disgrace.—Wheeler's raid.—He crosses the Tennessee, September 30.—Fight at Anderson's, October 2.—Taking of McMinnville.—Fight at Thompson's Cove.—Wheeler unable to surprise Murfreesborough.—He retreats.—Fight at Farmington, October 7.—Wheeler recrosses the Tennessee at Rogersville, October 9.—Exhaustion of his troops.—Positions of the cavalry of the two armies.—Sherman at Collierville.—Suffering in Chattanooga.—President Davis visits Bragg.—Grant commands the division of the Mis-

Mississippi and Sherman the Army of the Tennessee.—Thomas succeeds Rosecrans.—Grant at Chattanooga, October 23.—Situation of the Army of the Cumberland.—General W. F. Smith.—Reconnoissance of Brown's Ferry.—Description of the ground.—Grant's plan.—Difficulty of its execution.—Laying the bridge, October 27.—Hooker's movements.—Inaction of the Confederates.—Hooker in Will's Valley, October 28.—Jenkins attacks Geary at Wauhatchie by night.—Schurz comes to his assistance.—The fighting spreads.—The Confederates are repulsed.—Chattanooga no longer cut off.....Page 193

CHAPTER II.

KNOXVILLE.

Bragg's situation.—Various plans.—His forces.—He sends Longstreet against Burnside.—Situation of the latter.—Fight at Blue Springs, October 10.—Surprise of Glasgow, October 4.—Fight at Philadelphia, October 20.—The Confederate forces on the north of the Hiawassees.—Ransom on the Watauga.—Fight at Rogersville, November 5.—Retreat of Willcox.—Longstreet starts with insufficient force.—Cheatham and Stevenson recalled by Bragg.—Burnside's preparations.—He marches to meet Longstreet, who is at Loudon.—Wheeler on the left bank of the Holston.—Longstreet crosses the Tennessee, November 14.—Fight at Lenoire.—Retreat of the Federals.—Fight at Campbell's Station, November 16.—McLaws' attack.—He is checked.—Jenkins endeavors to outflank the Federals.—He is repulsed.—Timely retreat of Burnside.—Fight at Marysville, November 14.—Engagement at Rock Creek, November 15.—Wheeler halts in front of Knoxville.—Burnside enters the city, November 17.—Fight in front of this town, November 18.—Death of Sanders.—Defences of Knoxville.—The town invested, November 20, but is not cut off.—First operations of the siege.—The Confederates draw up to Knoxville.—They are reinforced.—Longstreet has sixteen brigades, November 26.....Page 223

CHAPTER III.

LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN.

Sherman receives Grant's orders at Iuka.—He crosses the Tennessee at Eastport.—He organizes new reinforcements for Chattanooga.—Grant's plan to supply the town.—Concentration of the rolling material.—Sherman crosses the Elk River at Fayetteville.—He is at Bridgeport on November 13, and visits Grant on the 15th.—Situation of Bragg, November 15.—The holding of Lookout Mountain useless and dangerous.—Bragg's inaction.—His forces.—Weakening and discouragement of his army.—Missionary Ridge.—Grant's plan.—Sherman's rôle.—Thomas' troops.—Their

rôle.—The Federal cavalry.—Sherman does not reach Brown's Ferry until November 20.—Dangerous delays.—Damages to the bridge at Brown's Ferry.—Howard at Chattanooga, November 22.—Grant believes Bragg to be retreating.—The works at Chattanooga.—Deploy of the Army of the Cumberland, November 23.—Grant's project.—Indian Hill.—Granger's movement.—Surprise of the Southerners.—Taking of Indian Hill.—Sherman has reached the pass.—Bridge at Brown's Ferry carried.—New rôle assigned to Hooker.—Bragg's trying position.—Walker's division sent to the right.—Lookout Mountain.—Positions of the Confederates.—Hooker's plan.—The Confederate works.—Grose attacks Walthall on the morning of the 23d on Lookout Creek.—Geary forces the pass.—Rout of Walthall.—Fight at Craven's house.—Fog.—Defeat of the Confederates.—Hooker halts.—Carlin joins him.—Stevenson abandons Lookout Mountain.....Page 246

CHAPTER IV.

MISSIONARY RIDGE.

W. F. Smith throws a bridge over the Tennessee.—Sherman crosses it.—He meets Howard.—He marches forward into the plain.—He occupies the first hill.—His disappointment.—Position of the Confederates.—Night comes.—Grant's mistake.—His orders.—Bragg's situation.—He reinforces his right and extends his left.—The Federal flag on Lookout Mountain.—New orders sent to Grant.—Hardee's position on the Confederate right.—Description of the ground.—Sherman's preparations.—His first attack on three points is repulsed.—He awaits Thomas' movement.—Grant reinforces him against his wish.—John E. Smith's attack.—He is driven back in disorder by Gist.—Hooker's march.—He crosses Chattanooga Creek.—He takes possession of the Rossville Gap.—Grant does not see him.—His anxiety.—Orders given to Thomas.—Movement of the Army of the Cumberland.—Occupies the first line of breastworks.—Spontaneous movements continue.—Surprise of Grant and Bragg.—General assault at Missionary Ridge.—Nothing can stop it.—The Confederate line is broken.—Rout of the centre.—Bragg is drawn into it.—Hardee's position.—He intercepts Baird.—Disasters to Breckinridge on the right.—Hooker joins the Army of the Cumberland.—The Federals halt, except Sheridan.—He pursues and attacks Bate.—Bragg's mistakes.—Grant's losses.—Long's expedition.—Grant organizes the pursuit.—Sherman crosses the Chickamauga.—He follows Hardee as far as Graysville.—Hooker's movement.—He is delayed at Red House Bridge.—He pursues the bulk of Bragg's army.—Fight at Graysville in the evening, November 28.—Disorder of Bragg's army.—Cleburne arrives in time to cover it at Ringgold.—Osterhaus attacks him in the morning of November 27.—Description of the ground.—The Federals are intercepted.—They endeavor in vain to outflank Cleburne's right.—Hooker is compelled to halt.—Total of Grant's losses.—He ceases the pursuit.....Page 280

BOOK III.—THE THIRD WINTER.

CHAPTER I.

FORT SANDERS.

Grant's anxiety concerning Burnside.—He prepares to assist him.—He sends Granger and Sherman.—Longstreet decides upon making an assault.—His situation.—Preparations.—Fort Sanders.—Attack by night.—Fierce fighting.—Slaughter of the Confederates.—McLaws is repulsed.—News received by Longstreet.—His plan.—Sherman's movement.—Sufferings of his soldiers.—He halts in front of the Tennessee.—Howard crosses it at Davis' Ford, December 4.—The rest of the army crosses at Morgantown.—Longstreet raises the siege on the morning of December 5.—Sherman arrives at Knoxville.—Burnside's situation.—He retains only Granger.—Parke pursues Longstreet.—Willcox's movements.—Longstreet's retreat.—He halts at Rogersville.—Engagement at Morristown.—Offensive return of Longstreet.—Fight at Bean's Station, December 14.—Defeat of Shackelford.—Longstreet halts and withdraws.—Fight at Mossy Creek, December 29.—End of the campaign in the entire Valley of the Tennessee.—Sherman's return.—Breaking up of Grant's armies.—Positions of the Southern army.—Hardee, and then Johnston, have the command of it.—Forrest in Mississippi.—S. D. Lee's cavalry.—The Federal forces.—Forrest's expedition.—He forces his way by railroad and waits for Jackson.—The Federals endeavor to surround him.—His departure.—Engagements near Estenaula and Miffin, December 24.—Fight at Summerville, December 25.—Forrest crosses Wolf River at La Fayette, December 27.—He escapes the Federals.—Fight at Charleston, December 28.....Page 316

CHAPTER II.

CHARLESTON.

Coast blockade.—Capture of the *Kate*, *Hebe*, and *Venus* at Wilmington.—Expedition up the Pamunkey River.—Destruction of the *Alexander Cooper*.—River reconnoissances.—Blockade of Charleston.—Siege of the city decided on.—Beauregard's force weakened; he enlarges and completes his defensive works.—DuPont's inaction.—Gillmore's effective strength; his possible points of attack.—He decides on co-operation with the fleet.—Morris Island as a base; its position.—Gillmore concentrates his forces at Hilton Head and Folly Island.—Vogdes' brigade constructs batteries at Lighthouse Inlet.—Beauregard suspects a design on Morris Island; warns his government.—Gillmore removes obstructions in Folly River.—Strong's brigade embarks.—Dahlgren's monitors protect the flotilla.—Occupation of Morris Island.—Confederates retreat to Fort Wagner.—Terry menaces Beauregard from James Island.—Colonel Higginson's expedition a failure.—Monitors open fire on Fort Wagner.—Seymour's division

attempts to storm the fort.—The navy gathers inside Charleston bar.—Position of Fort Wagner.—Beauregard, reinforced, demonstrates near Grimball's plantation.—Gillmore recalls Terry.—Federal batteries open on Fort Wagner.—Dahlgren co-operates.—Fort Wagner is silenced.—Second assault on the fort.—Death of General Strong and Colonels Shaw, Chatfield, and Putnam.—Confederate burial of negro troops.—The reduction of Fort Wagner conceded to be but a question of time.—Gillmore determines to reduce Fort Sumter.—The "Swamp Angel;" its location and construction.—Opening of third parallel against Fort Wagner.—Firing on Fort Sumter.—Monitors and the *New Ironsides* assist.—"Swamp Angel" fires on Charleston; bursts at the thirty-sixth round.—Fort Sumter in ruins.—Resumption of operations against Fort Wagner.—Capture of Confederate sharpshooters.—Difficulties encountered by the besiegers.—Combined artillery and naval fire.—Beauregard decides to evacuate Fort Wagner.—Gillmore occupies the fort.—Charleston closed to blockade-runners.—Errors of the Confederates.—Victory due to the Federal navy.—Gillmore and Dahlgren determine to capture Fort Sumter.—The naval attack fails.—Gillmore repairs Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg.—Opens fire on Fort Sumter.—Monitors disabled.—The torpedo defence of Charleston.—Submarine torpedo-boats.—Mr. Hunley perishes in the boat of his own invention.—Captain Lee's spar-torpedo boat.—Failure of his attempt to destroy the *New Ironsides*.—Lieutenant Glassell's attempt in the *David*.—Glassell captured.—Loss of the *Weehawken*.—Action near Legaréville.—Minor operations of the blockading vessels.—Destruction of salt-works by East Gulf squadron.—Operations of West Gulf squadron.....Page 346

CHAPTER III.

THE FAR WEST.

The Mississippi opened.—Grant contemplates Mobile as a base for a new campaign; reinforces Banks.—The project abandoned.—The Government orders an invasion of Texas; reasons for this.—French occupation of Mexico.—The Federals determine to reconquer Texas.—Difficulties of the enterprise.—Halleck's recommendation to Banks.—Banks' preferences.—Sabine Pass the landing-place.—Description of the harbor.—Banks' anticipations.—The Nineteenth corps formed.—Franklin commands it.—Corps d'Afrique organized.—Banks' strength; his plan of campaign.—Defective transports.—Franklin's observations unheeded.—The fleet sails September 5th.—Sights Sabine Pass, September 7th.—Failure of the navy to obtain information.—Lieutenant Crocker decides to wait for the troops.—They arrive on September 8th.—Many vessels unable to pass the bar.—Crocker reconnoitres.—The fleet advances.—Confederates open their batteries.—The *Sachem* disabled.—Crocker, in the *Clifton*, attempts to silence a battery.—The *Clifton*, disabled, strikes her flag.—The *Sachem* follows.—The *Arizona* runs aground.—The Confederates fail to reap their full harvest.—The expedition abandoned.—Franklin returns to New Orleans.

—Banks determines to try the land-route.—The Nineteenth corps sent to Brashear City.—The Thirteenth corps follows.—Banks ascends Bayou Têche.—Lack of boats.—Franklin skirmishes at Vermillionville.—Banks decides that further progress is impossible; his reasons for this conclusion.—Confederates surprise Herron near Morganzia.—Banks, having received seaworthy vessels, revives the naval expedition.—Herron's division sent to New Orleans.—Franklin demonstrates toward Opelousas.—Dana's expedition sails October 26th.—Franklin reaches Carrion Crow Bayou, November 1st.—Burbridge's brigade halts at Bayou Bourbeux.—Franklin extends his lines.—Preparations for voting interrupted.—Taylor unites with Green; surprises Burbridge.—The Federals scattered.—Washburne arrives with McGinnis' division.—The Confederates halt and retire.—Federal losses in the action.—Banks plants the flag in Texas.—Disasters encountered by the fleet.—Description of the Texan coast.—Banks lands at Brazos Island, November 2d; seizes mouth of Rio Grande, November 3d; occupies Brownsville, November 6th; Point Isabel, November 8th.—Advantages of Federal position.—General Ransom seizes Mustang Island.—Reinforcements from Thirteenth corps arrive.—Fort Esperanza invested; evacuated by the Confederates.—Vindictiveness of General Halleck.—Banks returns to New Orleans.—Operations west of the Mississippi.—The Army of the Frontier.—Colonel Phillips attacked at Cabin Creek.—General Blunt joins Phillips.—Action at Honey Springs.—Blunt returns to Fort Gibson.—Quantrell's guerillas; their pillage of Lawrence, Kansas.—The inhabitants slaughtered and the town burned.—Indignation of the North.—Quantrell censured by the Confederates.—Pursued by Federal soldiers, his band disperses and he escapes to the Indian Territory.—General Thompson captured by Federals at Pochontas.—Blunt defeats Cooper at Perryville; routs Cabell at Devil's Backbone.—Colonel Cloud scatters the Confederates at Dardanelle, September 9th.—Federal rule e-established in Western Arkansas.—Colonel Coffee routed at Neosho River, September 15th.—Colonel Shelby attacks Moffat's Store, September 27th; is joined by Coffee and Hunter.—Action at Booneville, October 12th and 13th.—Shelby is defeated.—McNeil fails to intercept him.—Quantrell reorganizes his band.—Attacks Baxter's Springs; disperses General Blunt's escort; moves southward.—Blunt is relieved of his command; McNeil succeeds him.—The Cherokee Nation submit; their country ravaged by Quantrell.—Halleck ignores Grant's advice.—A detachment of his army sent, under Steele, to Arkansas.—Steele's expedition to Little Rock.—Sterling Price's strength.—Steele establishes a dépôt at Devall's Bluff.—Davidson defeats Marmaduke's cavalry at Prairie Bayou; occupies Brownsville.—Marmaduke occupies the line of Bayou Metoe; is dislodged by Glover.—Steele arrives and examines position; determines to turn Price's right.—His army moves *via* Ashley's Mill.—Bridges the Arkansas River.—Price evacuates Little Rock.—Marmaduke surprises Steele's advance at Bayou Fourche.—Occupation of Little Rock.—Marmaduke attacks Pine Bluff, October 25th; is repulsed.—Indian troubles.—General Sibley sent to quell them.—Expedition under

Generals Sibley and Sully.—Sibley attacks the Sioux at Big Mound; is attacked near Dead Buffalo Lake and at Stony Lake.—Sully unable to join Sibley; surprises the Indians at White Stone Hill.—The Indian campaign ended.—Fort Halleck attacked, July 21st; the assailants repulsed.....Page 391

BOOK IV.—THE WAR IN THE SOUTH-WEST.

CHAPTER I.

FORT PILLOW.

Commencement of 1864 west of the Mississippi.—Situation on the river in January.—Effect of furloughs on the Federal army.—Grant's plans.—Sherman's designs.—Mobile threatened.—Preparations for an expedition against Meridian.—Sooy Smith's column.—Sherman's troops move on February 3d.—He abandons his communications.—The first attempt.—The convoy.—Confederate cavalry of S. D. Lee.—Federals occupy Jackson, February 5th.—March resumed on the 7th.—Destruction of the railroad.—Sherman occupies Decatur on the 12th.—Polk evacuates Meridian on the 14th.—Fears of the Confederates for Mobile.—Johnston receives orders on the 17th.—Sherman accompanies Sooy Smith.—Methodical destruction.—Sherman resumes the route to Vicksburg on the 20th; at Canton on the 26th; at Vicksburg on the 28th.—Good condition of the troops.—Mistakes and delays of Sooy Smith.—Waring's hard march.—S. Smith accompanies him.—He does not move till February 11th.—Slowness of his march.—McMillen's expedition up the Yazoo.—Forrest leaves him to anticipate S. Smith.—Engagement at Wyatt on the 12th.—Forrest's celerity.—Grierson occupies New Albany on the 14th.—Waring's slowness.—Forrest on the Tombigbee.—The Federals at Okolona, February 18th.—S. Smith divides his forces on the 19th.—Forrest's dispositions.—Description of the country.—The Federals in difficulty.—S. Smith decides to retreat; does not attempt any disguise.—His movement on the 21st.—Immense convoy.—Fugitive slaves.—Forrest tries to hold the Federals; counts on the arrival of S. D. Lee.—Combat before Okolona.—Forrest's sharp attack on the 22d.—Smith's mistakes.—The hasty march.—His troops discouraged.—McCrillis defeated at Okolona.—Forrest's dispositions.—New attack.—Death of Colonel Forrest.—Retreat of the Federals; their disordered column.—Fight at Joy's Farm; a hard struggle; end of the fight.—Federals reach New Albany on the 23d.—Sad condition of the column.—Forrest halts.—Federal expedition up the Yazoo.—Engagement at Liverpool, February 4th.—Coates at Greenwood.—Forrest marches against him.—Fight at Yazoo City, March 5th.—Forrest repulsed.—Coates retreats on the 7th.—Situation in the Valley of the

Tennessee.—Vance's expedition.—Federals capture him, January 15th.—Union demonstrations in Will's Valley and before Ringgold.—Positions of the two armies.—Weakness of the Confederates.—Thomas' movement against Dalton.—Crow Valley or Tunnel Hill.—Johnston reinforced.—The two armies prepare for combat, February 23d.—Federal movements on the 25th.—Hindman's dispositions.—Description of the country.—Fight at Mill Creek Gap.—Palmer's retreat on the 26th.—Farragut before Mobile.—The Federals in West Tennessee.—Forrest on the march, March 15th; at Jackson, March 20th.—Union City surrenders, March 24th.—Forrest before Paducah, March 25th; he occupies the city; attacks Fort Anderson.—Bloody repulse.—Demands and threats.—Situation of Federals under Hicks.—Forrest's retreat on the 26th.—He disbands his army.—Engagement at Bolivar, March 29th; at Somerville, April 2d.—Fort Pillow.—Forrest's preparations.—Buford again attacks Paducah.—Forrest invests Fort Pillow on the 12th.—Description of the position.—Very great development.—The enceinte redoubled.—Weakness of means of defence.—Forrest's reconnoissance; his dispositions.—Investment narrowed.—Hopeless position of garrison.—The *New Era*.—Truce.—The fight resumed.—Forrest carries the fort by assault.—Rout of Federals.—Rage of Confederate soldiers.—Bloody massacre.—The prisoners; the wounded.—Fire.—The truth about the cruelties of Forrest.—Indignation in the North.—Inquiry.—Forrest at Jackson, April 14th.—He returns to Mississippi, May 2d.....Page 430

CHAPTER II.

MANSFIELD.

The South-west.—Halleck wishes to operate by land.—Schemes for the conquest of Upper Louisiana.—Arkansas.—The Red River.—Steele and Banks.—Sherman at New Orleans.—A. J. Smith's corps.—Rendezvous at Alexandria for March 15th.—Steele's opposition.—Electoral campaign.—Mistakes of the Federals.—Description of Red River Valley.—Roads and rivers.—Grand Écore, Natchitoches, Shreveport, Alexandria.—Rising of Red River.—Various plans of campaign.—Part assigned to the fleet.—Difficulties; possible results.—Banks' scheme.—He is overruled.—Motives.—Dealings in cotton.—Strange negotiations.—Illusions of Banks.—Speculators.—Course prescribed for the army.—What the Confederates hear of this theory.—Tacit agreement.—The navy in ignorance of it.—Kirby Smith's movements; his forces and their positions.—Prince de Colignac.—New Mexico.—The Navajoes ineffectually attack Fort Sumner, January, 1864.—Kit Carson scatters them.—Polignac attacks Vidalia, February 7th; is repulsed.—The Federal war-ships ascend Black River.—Occupy Trinity and Harrisonburg.—Departure of A. J. Smith and Porter's entire fleet.—Entrance of the Atchafalaya.—No rising of Red River.—Landing at Simsport, March 13th.—Taylor abandons Alexandria.—Walker retreats before Smith.—Fort de Russy taken by storm on

the 14th.—Occupation of Alexandria on the 15th.—Promptness of Smith and Porter.—Banks fails at the rendezvous; his delays.—Franklin marches on the 13th; reaches Alexandria on the 25th.—Banks precedes him by water.—Taylor withdraws by the Shreveport road.—Mower scatters the Southern cavalry of Vincent at Henderson's Mills on the 21st.—The Red River rises very slowly.—Porter's impatience.—Movements in advance of the Federals.—Smith at Cotile on the 27th.—Franklin marches on the 28th.—The political farce.—Cotton speculators seized by the navy.—Complaints of Southerners.—They burn the cotton.—Taylor retires to Pleasant Hill, April 1st.—Lee's Federal cavalry occupy Natchitoches, March 31st.—Smith at Grand Écore, April 3d.—Banks' plan; he conceals the promise made to Grant; his imprudence and mistakes.—Route to Mansfield.—Major reinforces Taylor.—Skirmishes on the way to Mansfield.—Taylor at Mansfield.—Green's arrival.—Position of Mansfield.—Good and evil chances on both sides.—Churchill reinforces Taylor.—Somewhat unmilitary march of Federal cavalry; the infantry.—Lee at Pleasant Hill, April 7th.—Qualities of Green's cavalry.—Engagement at Wilson's Farm.—Difficult march of the Federals.—Banks' first errors.—Franklin, arriving, leaves Pleasant Hill.—Taylor's dispositions for defence.—Sabine Cross-roads.—Slow march of the Federals.—Franklin at Bayou St. Patrice.—First engagement at the cross-roads.—New mistakes of Banks.—Pause.—Banks' imprudence.—Taylor outmarches him.—General attack by the Southerners.—They are checked on the left; death of Mouton.—Their success on the right.—Cameron arrives too late.—Federals routed.—Frightful disorder.—Franklin wounded.—Trophies and results of the victory of Sabine Cross-roads.—Emory saves the army; he stops the Southerners.—Bloody struggle.—Retreat to Pleasant Hill.—Position of the Federals.—Dispositions of Banks and Taylor.—Confederate attack at 9 P. M.—Churchill's first success; his mistake; his continued success.—Churchill is repulsed.—Bee's mistakes.—Ineffectual efforts of Major and Polignac.—Confederate confusion; their retreat; losses.—Results.—Necessity for the retreat of the Federals.—Their discouragement.—Banks' last error.—Retreat to Grand ÉcorePage 484

CHAPTER III.

ALEXANDRIA.

The Federals acknowledge defeat.—Kirby Smith rejoins Taylor.—His reproaches; his plan.—Grave strategic error.—Banks at Grand Écore, April 11th.—Perils of the fleet.—Cannonade.—Death of Green.—Banks unwilling to help the fleet.—Saved by Shaw, it reaches Grand Écore on the 13th.—Banks blocked.—Discontent of his soldiers.—Kirby Smith marches against Steele on the 16th.—Position of the fleet.—Banks evacuates Grand Écore.—The road to Alexandria.—Useless demonstrations.—Precipitate march of the Federals on the 22d.—Fight at Monet's

Ferry on the 23d.—Bee dislodged.—Emory crosses Cane River.—Bee's mistakes.—Banks at Alexandria on the 28th.—Retreat of the fleet.—Loss of the *Eastport*.—Fight on 26th.—Loss of the *Two Champions*.—The fleet arrested at Alexandria.—Recriminations.—Intervention of Grant.—Banks allows himself to be blocked.—He leaves on March 24th.—His forces.—He reaches Alexandria on the 28th.—Steele's campaign.—Price's weakness.—His dispositions.—Steele's plan.—Crossing the Little Missouri.—The Federals unite on April 9th.—Fight at Prairie d'Âne on the 11th.—Steele's manœuvre.—Price evacuates Camden.—Steele enters on the 15th.—Learns of Banks' defeat, and halts.—Kirby Smith's march.—He, in turn, halts.—Steele's dangerous position.—Fight at Marks' Mill on the 24th.—Steele's retreat.—He takes the advance.—Fagan's mistake.—Price follows Steele.—Fight at Sabine River.—Churchill repulsed.—Walker checked.—Steele crosses the river.—Retreat of Kirby Smith.—His campaign is lost.—He cannot repair his error.—Steele at Little Rock.—Minor operations.—Engagement at Fitzhugh's Wood.—Roseville, March 4th.—The Union fleet at Alexandria; kept there by the rapids.—Banks thinks of abandoning it.—His forces.—Colonel Bailey; his services; his project.—Franklin encourages it, and Hunter approves.—Work on the dikes.—Military inaction.—Banks blocked.—Destruction of the *City Belle*, May 2d.—Loss of the *Warner* and the *Signal* at Dunn's Bayou.—Federal losses.—Complete blockade.—Progress of the dam.—Activity of the Federals.—Extraordinary view.—The dam closed, May 8th.—Four ships pass through.—The dam breaks.—Passage of the *Lexington*; three others follow.—The remainder of the fleet stopped.—Resumption of the work.—Finished on the 11th.—The whole fleet passes over on the 13th.—It goes down the Red River.—Evacuation of Alexandria.—Fire.—Fight at Mansura on the 14th; at Prairie d'Avoyelles on the 15th.—Banks at Simsport on the 16th.—Strange bridge of boats crossed on the 19th.—Fight at Yellow Bayou on the 18th.—End of the campaign.—Smith holds Vicksburg on the 23d.—Banks at New Orleans.—Operations on the Atlantic coast.—Florida expedition.—Gillmore departs February 6th.—Occupation of Jacksonville.—Southerners surprised near Baldwin on the 9th.—Description of the country.—Federals at Olustee on the 11th.—They return to Baldwin and Jacksonville.—Gillmore leaves on the 13th.—Seymour's unwise expedition.—At Barber's Station on the 19th.—Very quick march.—Finnegan's position.—Battle of Olustee on the 20th.—Defeat of Unionists.—Their losses.—Return to Jacksonville.—Seymour recalled.—His troops remain in Florida.....Page 536

APPENDIX TO VOL. IV.

	PAGE
NOTE A.....	583
NOTE B.....	583
ADDENDA BY THE EDITOR.....	585

 MAP.

EAST TENNESSEE, MIDDLE TENNESSEE, CHICKAMAUGA, AND CHATTA- NOOGA-ROSSVILLE CAMPAIGNS, 1863.....	43
--	----

•

THE
CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA.

BOOK I.—EASTERN TENNESSEE.

CHAPTER I.

TULLAHOMA.

IN the opening lines of his *Divina Commedia* the great poet of the Middle Ages depicts, in a few energetic words, the glance that the traveller rescued from the storm casts at the "perilous waters" which he has just crossed.* The people of the Northern States in the early days of July, 1863, could thus cast a long retrospective look at the experiences which they had just encountered, like the shipwrecked voyager who, landing upon the shore, turns to glance at the angry billows which break impotent at his feet. The events which closely followed the two-

* " . . . Come quei che, con lena affannata,
Uscito fuor del pelago alla riva
Si volge all' acqua perigliosa, e guata;
Così l'animo mio, ch' ancor fuggiva,
Si volse 'ndietro a rimirar lo passo
Che no lasciò giammai persona viva."

" . . . As he, who, with distressful breath,
Forth issued from the sea upon the shore,
Turns to the water perilous and gazes;
So did my soul, that still was fleeing onward,
Turn itself back to re-behold the pass
Which never yet a living person left."

Longfellow's Translation.

fold victory at Gettysburg and Vicksburg enabled the North to take in the whole extent of the misfortunes that would have befallen them if Lee had planted his flag upon the slopes of Cemetery Hill and Johnston had succeeded in breaking Grant's lines.

In the preceding volume we did not wish to interrupt the long recital of the campaign which led the armies of the Potomac and of Northern Virginia from the Rappahannock to the heart of Pennsylvania, and finally brought them back to their starting-point.

Near the banks of the Mississippi River, on the contrary, military operations having been interrupted by the annihilation of one of the two contending parties, we discontinued the recital of these operations at the beginning of July. Before resuming our narrative it is necessary to speak of the insurrection which stained with blood the principal cities of the North-east, and also of the invasion which threw consternation into the cities of the Middle States at the very moment when the fortune of arms was declaring in favor of the Federal Government.

Elsewhere we have told how the Peace party, sympathizing with the Southern cause, had seen its ranks swell at every new success achieved by the Confederates. Proportioning their boldness to the assumed weakness of the Federal power, the leaders of the Peace party kept themselves within the limit, at times difficult to be defined, which divides on the one hand open treason, and on the other violent opposition made in time of war to a national government. They had not dared actively to co-operate with Lee, but they waited only for his first victory upon the soil of the free States in order to shake off the authority in the White House, ensure the dismemberment of the Union, and cause the recognition of the independence of the South. Already anticipating such a victory, they were making innumerable harangues at the moment when the rest of the nation were rushing to arms. Their chief adversary, Mr. Lincoln, on the day of his inauguration had made allusion to the mystic "chords of memory" which united all patriotic hearts. One of his predecessors, Mr. Pierce, the most noted among the partisans of peace, anxious, no doubt, to surpass him in the allegorical style, announced to his auditors that, on their side, they would construct "a great mausoleum of hearts,

to which men who yearn for liberty will, in after years, with bowed heads and reverently, resort as Christian pilgrims to the sacred shrines of the Holy Land." A man of true talent, the new governor of New York, Horatio Seymour, disdaining so high a strain, was more precise as well as more practical. He was invited to address his constituents on the Fourth of July. Twice already, in 1861 and 1862, the great national holiday had been celebrated amid mourning and defeat. It seemed as if the return of this date should once more bring misfortune to the Union cause, the destiny of which was going to be decided by the issue of the battle begun since the first day of July. Therefore, Mr. Seymour, counting upon a fresh disaster, exclaimed in the presence of an excited assembly, "We were promised the downfall of Vicksburg, . . . the probable capture of the Confederate capital, and the exhaustion of the rebellion. Where are these victories?"

At the same moment the telegraph brought him the response that the campaign of the Peace Democrats had failed. The leaders held their tongues or changed their speeches. But they had roused passions which could not be allayed at their bidding. They needed only an opportunity to burst forth. This opportunity was foreseen, and was not long delayed: it was the draft, or conscription. Although authorized for the last four months in the law of March 3, 1863, compulsory service had not yet been put in force. The Federal Government wished to allow the several States time to dispense with the draft by voluntary enlistment. But all extensions of time had expired, and most of the States having failed to furnish a complete contingent, it became necessary to enforce it. The enrolling-offices had been organized under Federal authority: the rolls were ready. Victory having restored to him strength and confidence, the Secretary of War ordered the provost-m Marshals to begin work on Saturday, the 11th of July. This tribute of blood was the hardest, the most unpopular, of all levies, yet at the same time it was the most necessary to continue the war. The partisans of peace had therefore a double motive to attack it. Their programme was to declare the draft unconstitutional, to appeal to the courts of judicature, and, pending their decision, to oppose the enforcement of the draft.

This resistance, prepared long in advance, was to find powerful

elements in the cities of New York and Brooklyn, which were burdened with a heavy requisition, together having to furnish seventeen thousand five hundred men, while the poor among their inhabitants wanted neither the draft which abolished the premiums on enlistments nor the emancipation which would bring to the North the liberated blacks as formidable competitors. However, having neither head nor director, the population of these cities did not get excited on the first day of the draft. But the intervening Sunday having given every one time for reflection, minds became heated and bold, ringleaders were improvised. On Monday, the 13th, crowds were collected; they rapidly increased in size, and soon one of them broke into one of the enrolling-offices. The Federal officers, rudely interrupted in their duties, escaped with difficulty. The rioters demolished everything; then, throwing turpentine on the floor, set fire to the building. The firemen, who had come in haste to extinguish it, were violently driven away.

The rising had commenced by conflagration; it was going to continue by murder. The chief of police, Mr. John A. Kennedy, arriving on the ground, is set upon and left for dead. In an instant the rumor is spread throughout the city that the draft has been stopped by force. The other enrolling-offices are prudently closed, and, this news imparting boldness to the most timid minds, an immense crowd is added to the first rioters. This crowd is divided into groups which march in the different thoroughfares, carrying everywhere mischief and terror. The mob is not armed; but no matter, since neither the civil nor the military authorities could find in the great city a thousand soldiers to oppose it. The organized militia has not yet returned from Pennsylvania, where it was sent to reinforce Couch. Old General Wool, to whom had been given, as a sort of retirement, the command of the Federal forces in New York, has under his orders only two companies of regulars, occupying Fort La Fayette; a company of marines is watching the arsenal at Brooklyn. About fifty of the latter are called up in haste to disperse a crowd, but on account of a very inopportune sentiment of humanity the officers dare not order the soldiery to fire upon an unarmed mob, and a discharge of blank cartridges follows the ordinary summons to disperse. At the report of the

muskets the crowd falls back, but seeing that it produces only smoke, with shouts and jeers it rushes upon the hapless soldiers, who are routed, trampled under foot, and beaten with clubs. The mob, drunk with blood, is seized with a blind fury ; women and children incite the men and march pell-mell with them. On their route all shops, stores, and windows are closed ; the frightened citizens hide in their houses, and soon the city presents the aspect of being deserted wherever the riot is not raging.

General Harvey Brown, second in command, has gone to get his troops from the different forts in the harbor, but the greater part of the day elapses before he has had time to bring them into the city.

Meanwhile, the Board of Aldermen assembles, but without a quorum ; General Wool issues useless orders, and appoints lieutenants who have no more soldiers than he ; the policemen, efficient, but in too small a number, group themselves so as to resist the assailants, and, armed simply with clubs, defend as best they can the posts entrusted to them. The rioters are masters of the rich city : fortunately, if they follow ringleaders, they have no head-chiefs capable of directing them. The bands or gangs, mixed with thieves, who largely profit by so good an opportunity, wander at random. Their dominant passion is promptly awakened ; they have forgotten the draft to fall upon the negroes, who are the objects of their particular hatred. This unfortunate class of people is pursued, ill-treated, and some of them are butchered. A magnificent charitable institution, the Colored Orphan Asylum, which sheltered more than seven hundred children, was sacked and burned to the ground. Elsewhere the Government arsenal was captured and pillaged, despite the resistance made by the police. Several places were set on fire, but as soon as the incendiaries had withdrawn, the firemen, always brave, came to extinguish the flames. Nowhere are the rioters organized on a military footing, nor do they establish either posts or barricades. Hence toward midnight a hard rain is sufficient to disperse them.

On the following morning, however, after a few hours of rest, they come together again. Mr. Seymour, having returned from the country, does to that ignoble gathering the honor to address

it from the balcony of the City Hall. This manifestation of a yielding spirit brings him plaudits, but disarms neither the assassins nor the pillagers. Indignant at so many excesses, he decides to proclaim martial law—a vain proclamation, for the power is wanting to enforce it.

Happily, more efficient measures are going to be resorted to. The regulars and a certain number of volunteers, well organized, form into a body of about five hundred men—too weak to repress a city of one million inhabitants, but which, skilfully employed by General Brown to keep open certain thoroughfares, prevents the rioters from finally taking possession of the whole city. One of the volunteers, Colonel H. J. O'Brien, is massacred, but there is no delay in avenging him. The regulars from Fort La Fayette, although only one hundred and fifty strong, having encountered a mob that opposed them, respond to a volley of stones with a fire by platoons which strews the street with dead and wounded. This vigorous act is imitated by other detachments, and promptly cools the ardor of the rioters. The soldiers take advantage of this to concentrate, and then to attack them in the very heart of the city. Four barricades erected between Twenty-ninth and Thirty-fifth streets are carried by assault. Night comes on, and the news of the approach of the regiments recalled from Harrisburg adds to the feeling of discouragement among the rioters. On the 15th, as early as daybreak, calls for assistance are addressed from all parts to the various officials who, with little co-operation, have undertaken to pacify the city. The small detachments which they can dispose of are sent in different directions. Instead of profiting by this dispersion of the soldiers, the weary rioters seem inclined to scatter also. In the evening, after another day of violent acts, there remain in the streets only a few groups of plunderers, who before the arrival of the police are seeking to make the best of their absence. On the ensuing day order is restored. Only one band is still tramping through certain outlying quarters of the town, but a few squads of soldiers are sufficient to disperse it.

Among the military there were about ten killed and eighty wounded. The dead among the rioters and the victims of the riot exceeded four hundred and fifty. In place of General Wool, Mr.

Lincoln substituted General Dix, a very energetic politician who had already attracted attention in connection with the government of the city of Baltimore. The temporary triumph of the insurrection must needs have a telling effect in other cities. In Boston, where the draft had been accomplished without trouble, the news that New York had victoriously resisted the process created on the 15th a great commotion among the people. The agents of the Federal Government were insulted ; groups were formed, they pillaged shops where arms were sold, and finally collected in the evening to carry the armory of a battery of artillery. The rioters had already forced open the doors when a case-shot gun was fired among them. This single discharge, which knocked down seven or eight men, proved sufficient to put an end to the onset. In the night regular troops and militiamen collected, and occupied in force all the strategical points : the revolt was thus checked before it had time to increase.

The cities of Troy in the State of New York, of Portsmouth in New Hampshire, and some villages in Holmes county, Ohio, were also stained with blood while resisting the draft for military service. In many other places this resistance, without developing into an insurrection, was organized with the connivance of well-nigh the entire population and seriously impeded the operation of law.

In New York the enforcement of the draft had been, in fact, suspended. Mr. Seymour wished that, before resuming it, the Government should accept the arbitrament of the tribunals, failing which he could not, he alleged, answer for the public safety. Mr. Lincoln declined to submit to so strange a pretension, and would not allow that a simple court, setting up for a legislature, should pass judgment upon the law instead of enforcing it. He prudently waited some time, and consented to lighten the burdens, truly excessive, imposed upon the State of New York ; afterward, in the course of the month of August, when Lee had recrossed the Rappahannock, he concentrated in the great city nearly twelve thousand men, under the immediate command of General E. R. S. Canby, detached from the Army of the Potomac, and the proceedings, resumed on the 18th under the protection of this formidable force, were concluded without disorder.

We have finished with the insurrectionary attempts which characterized the summer of 1863, and come back to military events, and first to those of the same period, which we were obliged to set aside in the preceding volume.

While a powerful Confederate army was entering into Pennsylvania, the Southern standard was also crossing the Ohio River, and bold horsemen were bearing it into the State of the same name under the lead of Morgan. The time and the motive for this raid were well chosen. Bragg's army, brought to a halt at Tullahoma, could not resume in 1863 the bold march which in the preceding year had caused Louisville and Cincinnati to tremble. Rosecrans was preparing to attack him. On the southern frontier of Kentucky, General Hartsuff, with Burnside's three best divisions, comprising twenty-four thousand men and united under the designation of the Twenty-third army corps, was ordered to support Rosecrans' movement by marching into East Tennessee. The small army gathered by Buckner in Knoxville could not long defend that town against such forces. Chattanooga and Knoxville, the two gates to the Alleghany Mountains on the south and the east, were then in a few weeks to be for ever lost to the Confederacy.

In order to disconcert his adversaries and check Burnside's movements, Bragg resolved to throw upon his rear Morgan's cavalry. He wished that the cavalry should advance so as to present itself before Louisville, and even try to capture the city if that were possible. Morgan had still higher and more audacious aims. The Federals were accustomed to the raids of their adversaries into Kentucky; they no longer took any alarm at these inroads. It was probable that on receiving the news of Morgan's approach the Federals would confine themselves to putting Louisville and Covington in a good state of defence, without interrupting elsewhere their offensive movements. To throw confusion into their councils, embarrass Rosecrans, and paralyze Burnside it was necessary that the Confederates carry war and desolation into the very heart of the enemy's country; they must needs cross the great Ohio River. Besides, the State of Ohio, hemmed in on the south by the stream of the same name and on the north by Lake Erie, was the only link between the Eastern

section of the Union and the Western. Lee was then marching toward Pennsylvania. If the Army of the Potomac were conquered, Washington City invested, New York and Baltimore given over to the insurgents, a few thousand mounted men would suffice to isolate Grant's and Rosecrans' armies, which, being far away in the South, depended for their supplies entirely upon the dépôts at Cincinnati, Louisville, St. Louis, and Cairo; they would suffice to ensure the dismemberment of the Union, either by occupying the State of Ohio or by reaching Pittsburg in advance of Lee's victorious army. This dream, fantastical in appearance, had in it, however, nothing unlikely. Therefore, Morgan insisted that Bragg should authorize him to cross the Ohio. The permission to do so having been denied, he determined to dispense with it. He purposed rapidly to reach the banks of the river, so as to cross it below Louisville, and then to go up on the right bank as far as the vicinity of the Pennsylvania State line, in order to join Lee in that commonwealth. In case a reverse should befall him, he would make for Western Virginia by crossing the Ohio near its confluence with the Great or the Little Kanawha, where it is ordinarily easily fordable and inaccessible by armed steamers. The attack upon the cities and their occupation would depend upon the political situation. Since the peace demonstrations which Mr. Vallandigham had provoked in Ohio the Confederates flattered themselves able to number many partisans among the inhabitants of that State.

In the middle of June, Morgan, leaving, with a great part of his forces, the positions which he occupied in advance of Bragg's left wing, had gone into Kentucky on the upper Cumberland River to watch Burnside's preparations against Knoxville. But a few days thereafter he returned to Casey Fork, either to dissimulate his plan of invasion or to respond to the demonstrations made by Rosecrans' cavalry. On the 27th of June he set out from Sparta at the head of two brigades and one battery of artillery, in all 2460 mounted men and four guns. On the evening of July 1st he reached the Cumberland River opposite Burkesville. The flowing stream was very high. The Federals, regarding it as an insuperable obstacle, and being aware that Morgan had re-entered Tennessee, were not watching along the course of

the river. Their cavalry had been scattered through the country, so as to give the men and their horses the means of recruiting. It was divided into two brigades. The first, belonging to Judah's division of the Twenty-third army corps, had its headquarters at Tompkinsville, near the Tennessee line; the headquarters of the second brigade, under General Carter, had remained at Somerset since the recapture of that village. Colonel Wolford, with a considerable detachment, had been stationed by Carter, on the 27th, at Jamestown, but he could not, single-handed, form a connection between the two brigades.

On the 2d of July, early in the morning, Morgan crossed the Cumberland, notwithstanding untold difficulties. Having been able to collect together only small boats, he fastened them side by side, covered them with boards, and thus formed a kind of raft which enabled his men to pass over, while the horses, secured behind the raft, swam across the stream. The first brigade had hardly passed over when the approach of the Federals was signalled. Chance is bringing that way a detachment of Judah's cavalry: it advances without suspicion, and falls into an ambush prepared at the entrance to Burkesville. The Unionists fall back in disorder, and Morgan pursues them with two hundred mounted men as far as the middle of the camp which they had occupied in the morning. The news of this affair throws into a state of excitement all the Federal cavalry in Kentucky; but while the cavalry are gathering Morgan rapidly advances toward the north. On the 3d, in the afternoon, he reaches the town of Columbia, toward which Wolford, on his side, is marching. Captain Jesse M. Carter arrives first with the Union vanguard, but a few moments later, about three o'clock, his troops are attacked by Morgan. Wolford, after having tried to recapture the town, recognizes the superiority of the enemy and promptly retires. In the morning Morgan is already on the banks of Green River, pursuing his march toward the north. The bridge on the highroad, at Tebb's Bend, is occupied by a small guard of two hundred men under the orders of Colonel Orlando M. Moore. On the approach of the enemy, whose summons to surrender he spurns with haughtiness,* Moore barricades

* In his reply to Morgan's demand, Moore said, "The Fourth of July is no day for me to entertain such a proposition."

himself behind an *épaulement* forming the head of the bridge, and awaits with determination the six hundred troopers whom Morgan, in haste to open a passage for his men, has very imprudently hurled against him. A deadly fire checks the Confederates, a desperate struggle ensues upon the bridge itself; the Unionists fire upon their adversaries at close quarters; Colonel D. W. Chenault, who leads the charge, falls riddled with bullets, together with several of his officers: the assailants are repulsed, leaving behind them about sixty men dead or wounded on the field. After this useless fight, Morgan, making a slight turn, fords the Green River and comes up, on the 5th, before the little town of Lebanon, then occupied by five hundred men of the Twentieth Kentucky regiment of infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Charles S. Hanson, brother to a Confederate general of that name killed at Murfreesborough. After an honorable resistance, Hanson, assailed on all sides in an open town, is obliged to capitulate. The attack had been a costly one: Thomas, a brother of Morgan, had been killed, and the latter, departing for the nonce from his custom of humanity, treated with harshness his prisoners, whom, after all, he was constrained to release at the end of a few days, imposing upon them a parole which, as everybody knew, was not binding. He continued his march in the direction of Louisville, and, passing through Bardstown, reached, in the course of the day on the 6th, at Shepherdsville, the Nashville Railroad, which he destroyed after having pillaged a passenger-train. He was only seventeen miles distant from the great Kentucky city. Hence the Federals were making forced marches to arrive at the same time with him under its walls. Hobson's cavalry brigade, while following in Morgan's footsteps, was to serve as a nucleus to the movable troops which the telegraph would summon from every corner in Kentucky. Meantime, Judah, with three regiments and one battery, kept at a distance behind Morgan, so as to intercept him if he should retrace his steps. However, Hobson, after having collected four regiments of cavalry under the orders of General Shackelford, joins Wolford, who was the first to start in pursuit of Morgan, and arrives in the evening of the 7th on the railroad near Shepherdsville; at the same time Judah was reaching the road, more to the south, at Elizabethtown. In fine, a brigade which had

come hastily from Central Kentucky was despatched in the direction of Cincinnati, in order to stop the way if Morgan should threaten that commercial city. But instead of continuing their march northward, the Confederates had suddenly turned to the west and reached the left bank of the Ohio, down which they were moving in the direction of Brandenburg. This move baffled the calculations of the Federals. Hobson, being obliged to allow his men to rest, could not resume his march before the 8th in the morning; Judah, instead of following the chord of the arc which Morgan had just described, went to wait for him at Litchfield.

The Confederate vanguard, having reached Brandenburg in the evening of the 7th, had the good fortune to capture two large steamboats, which would enable all the cavalry quickly to cross the river. On Morgan's arrival on the 8th, in the morning, all was ready to transport the men and horses to the soil of Indiana. From the Brandenburg side of the Ohio it is easy to effect a landing on the opposite shore; the right bank of the river has recently been reconnoitred by that band of partisans of whom only a few have succeeded in regaining the Kentucky shore. A deep and rapid sheet of water, two-thirds of a mile wide, separates the Confederate troops from the free States. Morgan's soldiers are burning with impatience to make the inhabitants of these States feel at last the whole weight of the war, while the leaders, on the contrary, wish to go among these Northerners in order to get accomplices. But to obtain their co-operation the Confederates must present themselves as liberators, adding the prestige of disinterestedness to the influence of courage and boldness. Unfortunately for their cause, these Southern horsemen are incapable of comprehending and enacting such a part. In Kentucky—which they consider, however, as a friendly country—their progress has been marked by rapine and incendiarism, and such is their insubordination that officers, having sought to repress it, have been murdered by these troopers under Morgan's own eyes. What will they not do when once within the rich States of Indiana and Ohio? The partisans of peace at any price will be disgraced on the day when the people shall be able to reproach them with having called in such friends. It may be inferred that Burnside foresaw the political advantage which might be derived from this

invasion, and that, seeing his offensive moves suspended on account of the necessity of pursuing the hostile troopers, he found it wise to let them penetrate into the free States. Besides, he thus facilitated the task of his soldiers and rendered more probable the capture of the hostile cavalry. His lieutenants made no serious effort to prevent Morgan from penetrating into Indiana.

On the morning of July 8th a thick mist was hanging over the river. When it had dissipated the two steamboats, loaded with troopers, were ready to cast off their lines; but some Federal militiamen having shown themselves on the right bank with a piece of artillery, it was necessary that Morgan's artillery should open fire to disperse them. About eight hundred men, without their horses, had already landed on the opposite bank, when a Federal gunboat was espied coming down the river. It was a serious case, for the two steamers could not be risked within reach of her guns: the interruption of the passage during the course of the day would be sufficient to give Hobson and Judah time to overtake Morgan, while troops brought from Louisville would surround the Confederate detachment cut off on the right bank. But, although she was escorted by another vessel, the gunboat was content to exchange a few shots with the enemy's artillery. Judah did not go beyond Litchfield; Hobson reached Brandenburg only at night; and in the evening Morgan's entire division was in Indiana. If Burnside desired this consummation and wished to facilitate it, his calculation was right from a political standpoint, but it had a disastrous influence on the military events that followed. If he did not desire this consummation, then he was very badly served.

At the news of the appearance upon her soil of a Confederate military body, the importance of which was magnified by the voice of the public, the entire State of Indiana was thrown into commotion: everywhere the militia began to organize. Morgan, on his side, had just heard of the capitulation of Vicksburg and the defeat of Lee: these tidings gave a fatal blow to his designs. The point in question was no longer to cut railways, to destroy the supply of provisions belonging to the enemy's army, nor to levy a contribution on the large cities. But a display of audacity was required, and Morgan was yet able to promote his cause

by making as long as possible the pursuit which condemned to inactivity the whole of Burnside's army. In order to elude an enemy much superior in numbers, and avoid the daily fights which would soon have exhausted his troops, Morgan had to proceed very rapidly, arrive at each place suddenly, and slip away on the first show of resistance. For the accomplishment of his purposes he divided his forces into three detachments, which were to meet at certain points after having deceived the enemy as to the general course taken by the troops. Once on the northern side of the Ohio, being unable to recross the river under the fire of the gunboats, he was obliged, in order to rejoin the Confederate armies, to make his way to the upper part of the river by ascending its right bank. The Federals knew this as well as he, and this knowledge rendered easy the performance of their part.

On July 9th, Morgan appears early in the morning before Corydon: it is the first Indiana town in his line of march. Affecting to disdain the militia gathered in a hurry, he hurls his cavalry on a gallop through the town; but before taking possession of it they leave on the ground about twenty of their men dead or wounded. The lesson will make Morgan more prudent. Passing by Salisbury, Palmyra, and Salem, he reaches at Vienna a telegraphic line, by means of which he gathers useful information concerning the troops summoned in haste to meet him. He flanks Vernon, which he finds well protected, and causes his column to move on Dupont and Versailles, while he beguiles the hostile militia with vain parleys. At last, in the morning of July 13th, he reaches at Harrison the Ohio State line. He has left Louisville behind him, and approaches Cincinnati; he must now proceed beyond this city, near which the principal forces of the enemy are concentrating.

On the 8th, in the evening, Hobson had got as far as Brandenburg, guided by the light from the burning of the two steamers, which Morgan had destroyed before striking inland. On the morrow Hobson was in pursuit of Morgan, and on the 13th, in the morning, he arrived at Versailles, being yet ten or twelve hours in the rear of the Confederates. Judah, in another direction, had returned from Litchfield to Elizabethtown, and thence by railway to Louisville, where he had embarked his troops

on steamboats. The other brigade, after forced and useless marches in the valley of the Kentucky River, had finally reached the Ohio at Westport, and, also getting on board of transports, it had ascended the river in hopes of being able to land at some point ahead of Morgan, so as to cut him off. But, having found itself distanced at Madison, and afterward at Lawrenceburg, it had continued its course until it stopped abreast of Cincinnati on the evening of the 13th, at the same time with Hobson.

Meanwhile, Morgan has before him the Miami River, which flows from Hamilton to Lawrenceburg. In order to deceive Burnside he makes a vigorous demonstration on his left against Hamilton, then clears the river much lower down, and moves straight on Cincinnati. His stratagem has succeeded: the small number of available troops which happened to be in the city have been forwarded to Hamilton to prevent the crossing of the Miami, and in the morning of the 13th, on the approach of the Confederates to Cincinnati, Burnside is constrained to evacuate its suburbs. That is all Morgan wants. He rapidly traverses these suburbs in the night without allowing his horsemen time to halt for an instant, and daybreak finds him with his entire column on the eastern side of Cincinnati. After this bold march it is necessary to give some rest to men and horses broken down with fatigue. The night from the 14th to the 15th, which the Confederates pass at Williamsburg, is the only one when they can enjoy unbroken sleep.

The Federals feel that they have been fooled, and swear not to allow Morgan to escape another time. Hobson on the evening of the 13th, having arrived at Harrison, continues the pursuit by land, but he must gain eighteen hours before he can overtake Morgan, owing to loss of time in recovering his trail. Elsewhere, Judah has embarked, in the morning of the 15th, on other steamers, with twelve hundred horse and one battery of artillery; he ascends the Ohio while endeavoring to keep abreast of the enemy. Several gunboats go before him and watch the right bank.

The first rapids which in summer generally impede the navigation of the Ohio are found a few thousands yards above its

confluence with the Great Kanawha River. Morgan counts upon the protection afforded by this obstacle to cross the ford at Buffington's Island, which is equidistant from the mouths of the two Kanawha rivers and seven miles and a half to the eastward of Pomeroy. On leaving Williamsburg on the 15th, in the morning, he moves in the direction of that ford. But his march becomes more and more difficult. The militia, having had time to organize, obstruct the roads and seize upon every occasion to fire some shots at the Confederate column, without, however, exposing themselves too much. If some of them are made prisoners; it is found expedient to release them. By means of a demonstration toward Chillicothe, Morgan succeeds in crossing, without resistance or firing a gun, near Piketon, the Scioto River, and arrives at last, on the morning of the 17th, at Jackson, after an almost uninterrupted march of forty-eight hours. His soldiers, worn out with fatigue, fall asleep in their saddles; the watches and ceaseless lookout for danger have exhausted the endurance of the most robust men; the jaded horses now step only with difficulty. However, they cannot halt: the decisive moment has arrived. The ford is only thirty-seven miles away, and it must be reached at any cost, for the pursuing columns of the enemy are reported alike in the rear and on the flanks. Indeed, on the 17th, Hobson crossed the Scioto at Piketon, and in the evening of the same day he will arrive at Jackson. Judah, having learned, on the 16th, at Portsmouth, that Morgan is moving eastward, has landed to avoid a great bend in the river and to try and head him off at Pomeroy by a march during the night. On the 17th a conflagration kindled by the Confederates at Jackson, and the smoke from which rises far above the horizon, reveals their progress and stimulates the ardor of their adversaries.

Morgan has not yet lost all his distance in advance. Passing by Wilkesville, he arrives first, in the forenoon of the 18th, at Pomeroy, and after a short rest pushes as far as Buffington. His troopers, it is true, can no longer hasten the gait of their horses as in the beginning of the campaign, and night overtakes him on the road. At last he touches the approaches to the ford which is to ensure his safety by opening to him the entrance to Virginia. But a bitter deception awaits him at the moment when he believes

he has attained the end of his troubles. The rising of the Ohio, which generally occurs in June after the melting of the snows on the Alleghany Mountains, has been delayed this year, and the stream, ordinarily very low at this season, is still flowing with brimful banks. The Federal gunboats will easily pass the rapids, while the ford at Buffington is almost impassable. In vain do the skirmishers sound all the crossings eight or twelve miles above and below this point. Finally, Morgan, after several fruitless attempts, orders his troops to bivouac somewhat above the ford. Notwithstanding the threatening danger, his men, before all, must have rest. On the return of daylight they will seek anew for the means to reach that Virginia shore which they discern, like the Promised Land, by the doubtful light of the moon in her first quarter.

Fatal delay! For Judah, who has spared his men and horses by forwarding them on steamboats, allows neither bad roads nor the obscurity of night to halt him. A squadron of picked men, sent by him in advance under the orders of Captain O'Neil, has fastened upon the flanks of the Confederate column and contributed to retard its progress. Himself having arrived in the evening of the 18th at Pomeroy, he immediately started on the tracks of the enemy, and reached, on the 19th at daybreak, a hill which overlooks the Ohio River and the ford at Buffington. The mist of July 8th has reappeared: it overspreads the river and fills the valley. Not a single enemy is in sight. The Union general persuades himself that Morgan has gone to seek higher up a less difficult ford, and without precaution he descends, with his artillery and vanguard, into the narrow road which leads to the water's edge. The mist vanishing at this moment, he is suddenly left in the presence of about five hundred Confederates, who spring upon him after a deadly discharge of artillery. The Federals, briskly brought up, lose a piece of artillery and many men made prisoners. Judah himself escapes with difficulty. But he promptly recovers and causes his reserves to advance, while O'Neil, following the brink of the river, gives the order to attack the enemy. The hills on the right bank border the Ohio closely on the north, and receding somewhat on the south, thus form, above the ford, a small plain having the figure of a triangle, at the

upper part of which the road that goes up toward Troy is hemmed in between the river and precipitous steeps. In this plain are collected all Morgan's forces: they are waiting for the rising of the mist to attempt the crossing of the river. Judah's force is inferior to them in number. But the spectacle of the swollen waters of the Ohio has caused great discouragement among the Confederates: they feel that they are lost, and will defend themselves only to save their reputation. The ground which they occupy is bad for a fight: they must get out of this pocket. Morgan decides to withdraw toward the north. Judah is close on his heels, captures two pieces of artillery, and recovers the piece which he had lost; but, not strong enough to attack Morgan, he is content to follow him, when the arrival of numerous combatants deprives the Confederates at bay of their last chance of escape. The gunboat *Moose*, following closely the mounted troops of the two hostile parties, had cast anchor in the evening of the 18th below the rapids at Buffington, and was waiting only for daylight to clear this dangerous pass. Having been delayed by the mist early in the morning, she was at last coming up to take a part in the struggle, and a few shells which she fired at the Confederates in retreat began to throw disorder into their ranks. Almost at the same time a sharp fusillade announces to them that another enemy is in their way.

Hobson left Jackson on the 18th early in the morning, and, proceeding *via* Chester toward Troy, camped on the banks of Shade Creek to the northward of Buffington. On the morrow, at dawn, he commences to march toward the south, and arrives on the left flank of the Confederate column at the moment when it crowds in the narrow passage which alone offers it an outlet. The Confederates, pressed on all sides, make haste to follow Morgan, who has already passed beyond the point menaced by Hobson. The wagons, loaded with booty, huddled up in a heap with the artillery on the road, catch into and upset one another: the way is blocked. The horsemen form only a compact mass of fugitives who strive to outstrip each other. Henceforth no resistance is possible. Hobson and Judah, whose united forces amount to nearly five thousand men, encompass the enemy on all sides. A thousand men, with three colonels, lay down their arms; the cannon

without ammunition and the whole Confederate train become the spoils of the victors.

However, Morgan has been enabled to escape with seven or eight hundred men who were at the head of his column. While the Federals were gathering their prisoners he gained the ford at Belleville Island. Nearly one-half of his force had already crossed the river when the *Moose* came to interrupt the passage. About three hundred and fifty men, having arrived at the left bank, thus escaped the fate of their comrades. So fortunate as to avoid the Federal brigade which General Scammon had brought as far as the banks of the Ohio, they managed to reach Knoxville, and related to the Confederate armies the disaster of which they had been witnesses.

The capture of Morgan and his companions being only a matter of time, General Shackelford is chosen to pursue him with the most able-bodied men in his brigade and in Wolford's: the rest of the Union forces return to Cincinnati. The Confederate chief must follow the Ohio, so as to seek a good place to cross, but the course of the river leading him northward, every step will diminish his chances of escape. On the 19th, in the daytime, he arrives at a new fording-place called Blennerhassett, a short distance below Parkersburg; but here, again, a Federal steamer comes to prevent his crossing. From this time his progress is only a desperate run to the northward, and everywhere the militia is posted to meet him. However, he finds means to cross the Muskingum River, notwithstanding all the measures taken by the Federals to guard its course, and advances during six days into the very heart of a region loyal to the Union with a handful of exhausted men, without his adversaries having been able to overtake him. On the 25th, beyond Steubenville, an ambush is skilfully laid; but a Federal detachment falls into it before the advent of Morgan: the noise produced by the fusillade between the two friendly bodies of soldiers warns him of the danger that he must avoid. At length, on the 26th of July, he is in the vicinity of Salineville, near the Pennsylvania line. Several regiments of infantry from that State, having come by the railway, at last succeed in halting the Confederates before the town, while Colonel Bristow and the Ninth Michi-

gan regiment overtake the fugitives and charge them. Most of them surrender. Their force is dispersed. Morgan, with a few men, reaches Wellsville, and thence dashes suddenly to the northward in the direction of New Lisbon. General Shackelford pursues him vigorously, does not give him time to take his bearings, and, having caught up with him about two o'clock in the afternoon, runs him to the top of a steep knoll which offers no means of escape for the fugitives.

Morgan surrenders with his few companions. He was only thirty-seven miles from the city of Pittsburg. During the twenty-four days which had elapsed since the crossing of the Cumberland River he had travelled over more than six hundred and twenty-five miles. His troopers had not all been able to get fresh horses, for it was ascertained that they took away, altogether, only two hundred and ninety horses. They had not interrupted the traffic on a single railway nor destroyed a single *dépôt*. Far from enlisting under their banner any partisan, they had succeeded in exasperating the most lukewarm defenders of the Union and had for ever ruined the prospects of the peace faction. After a fantastic run, the fine division which under Morgan believed itself to be invincible had wholly disappeared. It was a cruel loss to the Confederacy; but, however, as we have already intimated the fact, this loss was more than offset by the result obtained at the price of such a sacrifice. Burnside, who had very skilfully directed the pursuit and made sure the final success, had been in Kentucky; the troops which had not followed Morgan had remained inactive; the Federals' whole plan of operations had been changed; and by this means Bragg had escaped from a disaster which would perhaps have proved irreparable.

Colonel Streight and the higher officers of his command having been, as the reader has already seen, treated like criminals by the Confederate authorities, Morgan and his men were, by way of retaliation, shut up in the penitentiary at Columbus, Ohio. On the 27th of November, 1863, Morgan and some of his men, after having dug a tunnel under the thick walls of their prison, escaped, despite the sharp surveillance exercised over them, traversed the entire States of Kentucky and Tennessee through the midst of the Federal lines, and, after a hundred strange adventures, finally

succeeded in joining Bragg's army. In the first days of February, 1864, Streight managed, in his turn, to open, with upward of a hundred Federal officers, a passage under the foundations of the Libby prison at Richmond, and rejoined the Federal lines. Thus these two leaders, equally bold, equally unfortunate, recovered their liberty in the same way. It seemed as if there was between them a singular emulation.

We have shown how the insurrection in New York and the invasion of Ohio might have accomplished the destruction of the Union if Lee had been victorious on the 3d of July. To prove how much the authorities at Richmond were counting upon this victory, and with what forecast they had calculated its possible consequences, we shall say one word concerning an incident which occurred almost without being noticed, but which reveals to the attentive observer the political thought that engaged the attention of the Confederate Government. On the Fourth of July—it is important to notice the date—a small Confederate steamer was coming down from Richmond flying a white flag, and cast anchor in the waters of Newport News. It had on board the second personage in the Confederacy, Vice-President Stephens, the very same who, as we have said, had offered to Mr. Davis to bear words of peace to Washington City ere another military hecatomb should stain with blood the soil of America. His offer had been accepted, but with views entirely different from those intended in his simple thought of humanity. He was provided with a letter from the President to Mr. Lincoln, accrediting him as commissioner extraordinary to regulate the difficulties which had just arisen in reference to the exchange of prisoners. His powers of attorney were under two different forms, drawn up so that their reception would imply indirectly a recognition of the Southern Confederacy.

Mr. Stephens asked of Admiral S. P. Lee, who commanded the Federal squadron at the mouth of the James River, permission to proceed immediately in his little steamer to Washington, in order to carry out his mission. This mission, which was nowise explained, and was far below the official position held by the envoy, was evidently designed only for a pretext. The Richmond Government wished to have at Washington one of its most influ-

ential members at the juncture when the destiny of the Union was going to be decided. Mr. Stephens, when only a few steps distant from the White House and the Capitol, on the receipt of the first news of a Federal defeat would easily be able to go and propose terms of peace to Mr. Lincoln, confer with the diplomatic body, and treat individually with the principal members of Congress. An alliance with the Central and the Western States might, as we have already indicated, have closely followed the recognition of the Confederacy, and offered to the South for the price of her victories the supremacy which the election in 1860 had lost to the Slave party. Nobody was better fitted than Vice-President Stephens for the accomplishment of such a task, for he had been among the last to declare secession from the Union, and his opponents themselves recognized the elevation of his character, of which he gave a new proof by returning, after the war, to the Federal Senate without grudge and without illusion.

The request of Mr. Stephens, transmitted to Washington by the admiral, got there a few hours after the news of the final repulse of General Lee. Hence the answer was an easy matter: it was peremptory. The accredited agents were sufficient to settle the question of exchanges, and the commissioner extraordinary was not recognized nor allowed to proceed to Washington. Mr. Stephens understood the situation: he did not insist, but returned to Richmond.

We left, about the 20th of June, Rosecrans and Bragg on the banks of Duck River. After six months of preparation a new campaign is to begin: the time has come for us to follow it. Since the battle of Murfreesborough different motives have imposed the same reserve upon the two adversaries. The season has not allowed Rosecrans to advance beyond the theatre of that bloody struggle. Later, thanks to the arrival of Van Dorn, the Confederates have been able, on one hand, to inflict upon their antagonists two serious discomfitures—at Thompson's Station and on the banks of the Coosa River; and, on the other hand, they have been able to remain masters of the fertile districts lying to the southward of Duck River—the only districts that can feed a numerous cavalry. It is in vain that Rosecrans has wearied the government at Washington by his

repeated requisitions for horses; a difficult maintenance of outposts alone takes as many as are sent to him. Vainly does he explain to General Halleck that to live upon the country it is necessary that his cavalry should be very numerous, because then it might wrest from the enemy regions of country rich in forage: he is answered, as was McClellan, with general considerations on the classic proportion of the various arms of the service. In a word, instead of allowing him the means of taking the offensive, an effort is made to silence his demands by the promise of a commission as major-general in the regular army if he would win a victory before Grant and Hooker—a humiliating offer which he rejects with contempt.

When he is at last enabled to oppose about six thousand cavalry to the eight thousand horse of the enemy's army, some motives of another sort, which we have already set forth, still keep him back. After having repulsed Bragg beyond the banks of the Tennessee, he fears if he does not follow him up that Bragg will slip away and join Johnston on the Mississippi. He is also apprehensive lest, if drawn away in the pursuit of Bragg so long as the fate of Vicksburg is not decided, a reverse to Grant might enable all the Confederate armies in the West to concentrate against him. Therefore, before putting his own army in motion Rosecrans waits until Pemberton's capitulation has become inevitable. One cannot blame Rosecrans for his prudence, for it has much contributed to cause the government at Richmond to commit the greatest military fault with which impartial criticism can reproach it since the beginning of the war. As we have said, Johnston, with the marvellous sagacity which has raised him above all the other generals and politicians of the South, had felt that the Confederates would be lost if they attempted to defend at one and the same time the two banks of the Mississippi and the two sides of the Alleghany Mountains; and he had declared that the army which covered the central point of Chattanooga was the true shield of the Confederacy. No attention had been paid to his views. Bragg, weakened and having been unable to win the battle of Murfreesborough, had been forced to assume a defensive attitude. His strong cavalry was used only to hold the enemy in check. As fast as he received fresh recruits, organized brigades

were taken away from him in order to create the new army which was to attempt the rescue of Vicksburg. These troops, as the reader has seen, were lost alike to Bragg and to Pemberton. If Rosecrans in the month of May had vigorously attacked Bragg and pushed him beyond the Tennessee, the government at Richmond, being obliged to relieve him, would no doubt have paid less attention to Pemberton and concentrated all the available forces to crush the Federal Army of the Cumberland. The defeat of this army, involving the loss of Tennessee and Kentucky, would have caused the raising of the siege of Vicksburg more assuredly than would a Confederate victory in the State of Mississippi. But Bragg's army in the middle of June was weaker than ever. Polk's army corps comprised about eighteen thousand infantry and artillery, while Hardee's command had twelve thousand only; the departure of Morgan's division had reduced the cavalry to about six thousand. There were then only thirty-six thousand combatants whom Bragg could oppose to Rosecrans. This time the Federals were aware of the numerical inferiority of their opponents, and it was a rare and serious thing for the Confederates. Rosecrans did not exaggerate, as was the custom of most of the Union generals, the strength of his adversary. Bragg, it is true, was occupying excellent defensive positions which might perhaps compensate for his numerical inferiority.

We shall commence with a rapid description of the country in which the two armies are going to operate for some days.

The Cumberland Mountains, the foot-hills of which extend, in the direction of Nashville, within about nine miles from Murfreesborough, present table-lands forming a succession of levels, the highest of which abruptly terminates to the eastward in steep declivities. It is, in fact, separated from the principal chain of the Alleghany Mountains by a deep and perfectly straight valley which stretches from the north-east to the south-west over an expanse nearly one hundred and sixteen miles in length, and is watered from Pikeville to Jasper by the Sequatchie River, and from Jasper to Guntersville by the Tennessee. Gradually diminishing in height toward the north-west, the chain recedes and is lost in the rich plains of Middle Tennessee. The mass of stone

which supports these different levels of argillaceous soil is brittle. Heavy rains have furrowed the rocky formations with narrow ravines, deep cut and winding, to which has been given the Spanish designation of *cañons*, and which become broader as they approach the plains, so that the last foot-hills are divided into separate spurs and isolated knobs, alone indicating to which geological strata they belonged. The subsoil, being impervious, allows no spring of water to rise to the surface of these plateaus, and prevents, for the same reason, any natural drainage. Therefore the ground, parched up during the heat of summer, remains thoroughly wet after a heavy rain. A species of rough grass, rebellious under the teeth of animals, with here and there tufts of stunted oak trees, covers this desolate region. The wayfarer finds not a drop of water in summer; he runs the risk in the fall of the year of losing himself in sloughs, and in winter of disappearing under the snow drifted by the terrible blasts from the north-west. Near the point where the Tennessee comes in abruptly to wash its base the principal level of this table-land ceases to bear the name of Cumberland; it is somewhat less high, spreads out, and its slope is cut up into ravines, the waters of which flow southward toward the river. The two most important ravines are that of Battle Creek, which empties below the town of Jasper, and that of Big Crow Creek, a stream which, after having crossed the plateau almost entirely, falls into the Tennessee at Stevenson.

The most elevated part of the second level of table-land consists, between the sources of Elk River, Duck River, and Caney Fork, of a tract of timber which has been very properly called the Barrens, or sterile lands. Diverging from it toward the west there is a long narrow stretch of like barrens which under the name of Elk Ridge separates the first stream from the second, of which it borders the left bank for a long distance. To the south of Elk River the foot-hills of the great plateau extend to a lesser distance than in some other directions. This river after a short course empties into the Tennessee. Another ramification of pine barrens, beginning at the same point with the first, hemmed in at the commencement between Duck River and Caney Fork, extends north-west to the plains, and comes to an end almost in sight of

Murfreesborough. The population, very sparse in these regions, hardly occupies any other part of the country than the edges of the rivers, where it finds a less ungrateful soil and motive-power to work its mills. Winchester and Fayetteville in the valley of Elk River, Manchester and Shelbyville in that of Duck River, and McMinnville on the Caney Fork, are the most important towns. The town of Tullahoma almost alone is situated far from any watercourse and in the very heart of the Barrens.

The railway from Memphis to Charleston, which runs along the Tennessee from Tusculum as far as Chattanooga, is connected at Stevenson with the Louisville and Nashville Railroad by a branch passing through Murfreesborough. The section comprised between this last point and the river traverses the various levels of table-lands which we have just described. It presented the only practicable route to the belligerent armies, each of which held one extremity of it. Following the route from the north-west to the south-east, one meets near Fosterville a first line of heights, stretching on the south-west as far as the little neck of Guy's Gap on the road from Murfreesborough to Shelbyville; at the Bellbuckle narrow pass the route crosses another line of heights, called Horse Mountain, extending above the town of Bellbuckle. Beyond these heights there meanders a branch railroad which connects Shelbyville with the Wartrace Station. Farther on the railroad passes over Duck River at Normandy, ascends the grade of the Barrens, touches at Tullahoma, descends into the valley of Elk River, which it crosses at Estell Springs, and meets again at Decherd the line to Fayetteville. Then, following from Cowan the gorge of Boiling Creek, it goes through a tunnel under a dividing ridge between the head-waters of streams flowing in opposite directions, and runs toward Stevenson through the Big Crow Valley, where are found the villages of Tantallon and Anderson.

The Elk River Valley is narrow and poor in resources. That of Duck River, on the contrary, offers all the means of support necessary to an army. Shelbyville is the central point whence diverge all the roads which intersect the country comprised between this river and the valleys of Harpeth and Stone's rivers, occupied by the Federals; that is to say, on the north-east the

road to Fairfield on Garrison Creek at the beginning of the elevated plains, and on the north and north-west the roads to Murfreesborough and Nashville. These roads—which, it is true, are not properly kept in repair—also connect Shelbyville with Manchester on the east, Winchester on the south-east, and Fayetteville on the south. The roads leading to the last two towns offer good passage-ways across Elk Ridge.

Bragg has established his dépôts and head-quarters at Tullahoma, an important station, but for good reasons he did not wish to gather the bulk of his army in the surrounding sterile region. He posted it at some distance from Duck River. Being in a position where it can easily be supplied with stores and provisions by the railway, the army has behind it first a fertile country which offers it some resources, and then the plateau, the approaches to which can easily be defended in case of a retreat to the Tennessee River. Hardee, on the right, occupies Wartrace and extends his lines as far as Fairfield; large detachments of infantry are watching the routes which lead to Murfreesborough; farther to the north the right is covered by General Pegram, with whom Morgan, on leaving Sparta, has left a part of his cavalry. Outside of these few roads troops would not look for a way across the Barrens. Hence Bragg, without uneasiness for his right, has applied himself to the taking of defensive measures for his left, which is easier of access. Polk's eighteen thousand men are ranged *en echelon* along the railway from Wartrace to Shelbyville: a line with intervals composed of a succession of redans crowns the heights of Horse Mountain and rests on the bank of Duck River near Shelbyville. Wheeler, the commander-in-chief of all the cavalry, has concentrated the greater part of his force on that side. The two small divisions commanded respectively by Wharton and Martin cover the approaches to Shelbyville on the Nashville and Murfreesborough roads, at Eagleville, Rover, Unionville, and Middleton, while Forrest remains at Spring Hill, thus defending the extreme left in the direction of Columbia. In the rear of his army Bragg has established at Tullahoma a vast camp with intrenchments which protect his dépôts and constitute the centre of his entire system of defence.

Two macadamized roads traverse the plateau that covers the

Confederate right: the McMinnville route *via* Readyville and Woodbury, and the Manchester route *via* Beech Grove. The Federal army cannot take the first without exposing Murfreesborough; the second offers special facilities for defence. Before reaching the village of Beech Grove it crosses a defile called Hoover's, or Hoover's Gap, nearly three miles in length; beyond this village the route winds in the gorge of Matt's Hollow, which is hardly wide enough for the passage of a vehicle, and after about two miles it reaches the plateau which overlooks Manchester. Two cross-roads complete the wide-apart meshes of this network. One of them, in a very bad condition, running across quagmires and over rocky beds, connects the two macadamized routes as it leads diagonally from Woodbury to Manchester, *via* Bradyville. It intersects the Fairfield and McMinnville route, near Pocahontas, at a point designated on some maps as Lumley's Stand. The other road, more practicable, lies to the westward of the preceding ones; it crosses, beyond the village of Millersburg, the first line of highlands through a defile like that at Hoover's Gap, and called Liberty Gap. Before crossing the second line of highlands it meets, at Bellbuckle Gap, the route which runs along the railway. No serious obstacle is encountered on the routes which open on the Confederate left. There are, first, the Shelbyville Railway, which crosses, south of Fosterville, the insignificant neck of Guy's Gap; then, in the lowlands, two county roads which lead to the same town of Shelbyville, the one from Salem *via* Middleton, the other from Lizzard *via* Unionville and Versailles. If this left wing appeared to be more exposed, it was in reality perfectly posted for defence, because it could easily recross Duck River and fall back on Tullahoma while checking the advance of the assailants on the acclivities of Elk Ridge.

Rosecrans, who was a skilful tactician, well understood this fact, and resolved to cause all Bragg's measures of defence to fall to the ground by outflanking his works through the northern routes, although these were in appearance the most difficult. The Manchester route, the only one which was in a proper condition for the passage of a large army, and debouched on the right flank of the enemy, was chosen as the central line of attack. Thomas, with

the Fourteenth corps, much more numerous than the others, was to follow this line so as to force the passage of Hoover's Gap and Matt's Hollow. The Twentieth corps, under McCook, was to make a feint to the right of Thomas on the Shelbyville road, and then draw near him to take the Liberty Gap defile. Crittenden, after having left Van Cleve's division in the intrenched camp at Murfreesborough, had received orders to advance with the rest of the Twenty-first corps and Minty's brigade of cavalry, of more than two thousand sabres, as far as Bradyville, and to cause Palmer's division immediately to occupy the gorge which follows the Lumley's Stand road to the plateau. He was to keep his command, thus ranged *en échelon*, somewhat in the rear of the rest of the army and ready to form the extreme left of it. But in order to ensure the success of this movement it was necessary to deceive the enemy as to the direction taken. This task was entrusted to Granger's cavalry and Reserve corps. General Mitchell with a division of cavalry was vigorously to attack the posts established by Wheeler on the road from Eagleville to Shelbyville, and to drive them before him until he met the enemy's infantry. Meanwhile, General Stanley, with the remainder of the Federal cavalry, except Minty's and Turchin's brigades, would follow the Shelbyville road, and afterward fall back on the right to aid Mitchell, and attack, in concert with him, the town of Middleton, where the main part of Wheeler's force was concentrated. Granger was designated to second this movement with his infantry: Brannan's division of the Fourteenth corps, which had occupied Triune together with Granger, remained temporarily posted under his orders to aid him in case of need, and had orders to join Thomas after having covered McCook's right flank. The object of this great demonstration was to attract Bragg's attention on his left. In order the better to mask the movement against Hoover's Gap, Rosecrans directed Crittenden, whose march was to be slower, to send Turchin's cavalry beyond the town of Woodbury on the road to McMinnville: he was counting upon Bragg seeing in this movement a feint intended to cover a serious attack on the other extremity of the line. The troops were massed at the entrance to the routes which they should follow, and the most minute precautions were taken to enable them to pass through the

desolate region into which they were about to venture. Following in the rear there was to be a supply-train of full rations for twelve days, one half of the meat being salt, and the other on the hoof.

On the 23d of June, while Granger was coming from Triune to take his position at Salem near to the other corps, the demonstrations ordered by Rosecrans were being made at the two extremities of the line. Turchin, on the left, advanced toward Woodbury; Palmer and Minty took the direction of Bradyville, and kept themselves in readiness to support Turchin. On the right Mitchell vigorously attacked the Confederate outposts, dislodged them from the villages of Eagleville, Rover, and Unionville, and threw them back on Middleton. In the morning, it being the 24th, the entire army was in motion: the heads of columns belonging to the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps started at four o'clock, and the rear division of each corps at ten o'clock. The entrance to the two defiles which they were to seize being only thirteen miles distant from Murfreesborough, and occupied only by the supporting skirmishers of the Confederate line of outposts, a few hours of march gained upon the enemy were sufficient to reach these positions in advance of Hardee's troops, the nearest of which were encamped at Fairfield.

Bragg, either because he was deceived by Mitchell's manœuvres or allowed himself to be lulled by the long inaction of his adversaries, did not give warning to Hardee, and on the 24th the latter had not taken any measures to contest with the enemy the possession of the passages which gave access to his front.

Reynolds' division leads the march of the Fourteenth corps. Colonel Wilder, with his brigade, composed of mounted infantry, moves in advance of the main body; he encounters, toward nine o'clock in the morning, about seven miles and a half from Murfreesborough, the Confederate outposts, and promptly pushes them back upon Hoover's Gap. Wilder had orders to halt and wait for the rest of the division before penetrating into the defile; but finding before him only a feeble detachment of cavalry, he quickly drives in this small troop, and does not leave it time to rally within a series of works raised at a distance of nearly two miles from the entrance. Passing

beyond the enemy's works, Wilder reaches the other extremity of the defile at the point where the route debouches above Fairfield in the valley of Garrison Creek. His boldness and promptness spare to the army which must follow in his tracks bloody battles and delays that would have allowed Bragg to baffle Rosecrans' entire plan of campaign. If he had tarried on the road even a few hours, this good occasion to defeat the enemy would have been lost. In fact, two Confederate brigades come from Beech Grove to meet him, and Wilder, ordering his men to dismount, has time only to form them in line of battle to receive the attack. He takes a position above the village of Beech Grove, and occupies a partially-timbered crest of hills on the right. The Confederates, full of confidence in their numbers, attack him with enthusiasm. The first volley checks them, but they soon rally and outflank the Union line, so as to turn its right, favored as they were by the woods in which the Federal advance had entered. It appears as if this manœuvre should succeed: meanwhile, the rest of Reynolds' division, whose march has been hastened by the sound of the battle, arrives double-quick, deploys to the right, and checks the progress of the assailants. At night the Federals, who have lost sixty-three men, remain masters of the field.

Meanwhile, McCook from another direction has approached the gorges of Liberty Gap. The Shelbyville route being covered by Brannan's division of the Fourteenth corps, he has moved his three divisions to the left, so as to strike again the road to Millersburg. Sheridan and Davis have halted near this village, while Johnson, who is at the head, continues his march toward the defile. His column is preceded by a regiment of mounted infantry, the Thirty-ninth Indiana, Colonel Thomas J. Harrison. But, either because the détour prescribed to the Twentieth corps has allowed the enemy more time to take bearings than at Hoover's Gap, or the defenders of the pass are better prepared, the Union vanguard, and after it Willich's brigade, are halted at the first steps. Miller brings up his brigade, and, outflanking the lines of the Confederates, climbs a height whence he opens upon their rear an oblique fire. The Confederates beat a retreat, but ere long are reinforced and defend themselves, contesting every foot

of ground. The shades of night soon come to interrupt the fight, and leave each of the two contending parties in possession of one end of the defile.

In the afternoon of the same day Mitchell, advancing from Versailles upon Middleton, has encountered the bulk of Wheeler's force and hotly pressed it, without being able to break its lines. Rosecrans, being informed of this resistance, has immediately sent Minty the order to quit the left and bring to Mitchell's aid the co-operation of his large brigade. Crittenden's and Granger's troops have taken, without encountering the enemy, the positions which had been assigned to them.

Even as early as the first day of the campaign Rosecrans has thus made sure of the pass which is the most important to his army. The latter is massed and confronts the right wing of the enemy. There is nothing left but to continue the movement so well begun. The fight at Hoover's Gap, and also that at Liberty Gap, preclude from Bragg's mind any doubt as to the intentions of his adversaries. He is aware of their numerical superiority, and knows that he cannot long dispute with them the right bank of the Tennessee River. But before abandoning it some resistance must be made, as much to cover the retreat if it become inevitable as to seize upon the occasion, if it present itself, of suddenly attacking one of the enemy's columns in the midst of the country, beset with difficulty, through which they are going to pass. It is necessary, above all, to cause the left wing to fall back on Tullahoma, while the right shall check the advance of the enemy. On the 25th, Forrest receives orders to abandon Spring Hill and bring his division by Columbia below Duck River. Polk sets out for Tullahoma, leaving at Shelbyville only his rear-guard covered by Wheeler, who still holds the defile at Guy's Gap. Hardee, who has before him the whole Federal army, has tried to impede its advance. His right is posted at Beech Grove to protect against Reynolds the passes of Garrison Creek. Although the latter has been reinforced by two brigades of the Fourteenth corps, he confines himself, on the 25th, to the extension of his left, so as to command the Manchester route, and waits until the rest of that corps, retarded by the narrowness of the route, has passed through Hoover's Gap. Hardee, leaving his right well

posted back of Garrison Creek, takes advantage of this respite to attempt an offensive movement against McCook. Master of the outlet of Liberty Gap, he wishes to drive back the columns which on the previous day had entered that defile. In the afternoon of the 25th he makes a determined onslaught on the front of Willich's and Miller's brigades. Being repulsed in this first assault, he imitates the manœuvre which had succeeded so well with these brigades, and, gaining the height which overlooks the route, he outflanks their right. The Federals, sharply pressed, are about to be dislodged when Carlin's brigade, opportunely sent over by General Davis, comes to help check the progress of the Confederates. The latter are thrown back beyond the defile, and retire in the direction of Bellbuckle after having sustained serious losses. On the side of the Federals the losses amount to two hundred and thirty-one men killed and wounded.

Rosecrans cannot, without exposing himself to an attack on his flank, continue his march on Manchester so long as Hardee remains posted in the valley of Garrison Creek. He proposes to dislodge him in the course of the day on the 25th by a general attack of the Fourteenth corps on Beech Grove, while McCook shall be making a demonstration at the outlet of Liberty Gap. There being no branch road between the two routes which cross the two defiles, he cannot make use of the Liberty Gap pass to bring the Twentieth corps to Manchester, and intends to make that corps resume the road, now open, which takes through Hoover's Gap. But the Fourteenth corps having been delayed, McCook alone can carry out his orders, and the attack is put off until the following day. In the evening there comes a very heavy rain which will last more than fifteen days. Nevertheless, on the 26th, toward ten o'clock in the morning, Thomas has taken a position with his four divisions. While Reynolds and Negley, engaging the enemy at Beech Grove, shall uncover the Manchester route, Rousseau and Brannan will extend their lines to the left on this route; they will outflank the enemy, take Matt's Hollow, and push on, if that is possible, as far as Manchester by continuing the flanking movement around the enemy's right. On the other hand, Crittenden has received, since the 25th, an order to take the cross-road from Bradyville to Lumley's Stand, so as to

aid Thomas to the east of Beech Grove. On the right Granger and the cavalry confine themselves to watching Wheeler on the roads leading to Shelbyville.

As early as eleven o'clock in the forenoon Thomas gives the order of attack. Reynolds advances directly against the centre and the right of the enemy at Beech Grove. The Confederates occupy, with their infantry and artillery, a commanding position protected by a deep gully. They open an oblique fire on the Federals, who, not daring to approach them in front, endeavor to turn their flank. But Brannan and Rousseau, clearing Garrison Creek higher up, have deployed their lines on the Manchester route. Their first two brigades, under Walker and Coolidge, vigorously attack the Confederates, who are forced to fall back on Fairfield, whence they reach Tullahoma, where the remainder of Bragg's army, covered by his artillery and cavalry, has already arrived without being troubled by the Unionists. Thomas halts Rousseau and Brannan at a short distance from Fairfield, with their right resting on Garrison Creek, while Reynolds moves on Manchester. The latter is still preceded by Wilder's mounted infantry, which, riding in advance during the engagement at Beech Grove, has taken possession of the important defile at Matt's Hollow without firing a gun. The route to Manchester is then open to the army: it is going to concentrate along this thoroughfare some time on the 27th. Wilder has occupied it since eight o'clock in the morning: the rest of Reynolds' division is not long in joining him; Rosecrans soon arrives with his headquarters. Negley, who brought up the rear of the Fourteenth corps in the line of march, and Rousseau and Brannan, who were posted at Fairfield in the morning, all reach Manchester in the night. Crittenden set out as early as the 26th, but the rain has rendered muddy the bad road which will take him, through the Barrens, as far as Manchester. McCook, not in motion on the 26th, receives in the evening orders also to move on Manchester, and, there being no direct route leading to Beech Grove, he is obliged to retrace his steps across Liberty Gap to resume the road at the entrance to Hoover's Gap. It will require two days for the Twentieth and the Twenty-first corps to execute these movements.

However, Granger and the Federal cavalry, having remained on the watch up to the 26th in the evening, had received orders to resume the offensive. In front of them, at Guy's Gap, Wheeler was covering the evacuation of Shelbyville with Martin's division and a part of Wharton's. These divisions having a very small effective force, he had summoned Forrest, who was at Bigbyville, to the south of Columbia; but the Federals did not give him time to wait for this reinforcement. On the 27th, in the morning, after a sharp skirmish in front of Guy's Gap, Minty charges the Confederate cavalry, who have dismounted, and captures the passage-way. Wheeler is hotly pressed, and retreats across an open country: isolated, without infantry to support him, his position is critical. Finally, he rallies his men behind the abatis which forms the first line of defence a few miles in advance of Shelbyville. But notwithstanding the support received from a battery of artillery, his resistance is not of long duration. The Confederates, attacked in front and in flank at the same time, are dislodged, and they lose many prisoners. Near the approaches to Shelbyville, Wheeler strives once more to stand before Minty: his artillery, being well posted, checks for a moment the Unionists. But this respite is fatal to Wheeler, for Mitchell, coming up with a part of his troops, invests the town on the south and reaches the bridge over Duck River, and thus cuts off retreat in that direction. Wheeler at the first sound of cannon, seeing himself flanked, endeavors to gain with his cavalry a bridge a few miles up the river, toward which the Federals are already moving. The greater part of his troops had crossed the river without mishap when the Federals arrived at a gallop, driving before them a multitude of fugitives who rush to the bridge and crowd it. Wheeler and Martin make their way through with difficulty: the First regiment of Confederate cavalry is captured almost entire, and about a hundred men are drowned. This fight has cost only twenty men to the Federals; they have captured six hundred and twenty-nine prisoners and three pieces of artillery. Meantime, Forrest, after having passed Duck River, was moving toward Guy's Gap. But all of a sudden he hears, more to the south, the sound of the second engagement. Despite his zeal, he arrives only in time to encounter Mitchell's column. Then he sought in

vain to meet Wheeler at Shelbyville. Once more distanced, he deems himself fortunate to find, about four miles farther down, the bridge at Warner's, which enables him to regain the left bank of Duck River.

The Federals were then masters of the whole line of that stream. Bragg was waiting for them at Tullahoma, where Forrest had just arrived. In order to dislodge Bragg from this small place, all that was necessary was to continue the flank movement so happily commenced. But the army must be concentrated near Manchester, and the different corps must be enabled to obtain a fresh distribution of provisions. The incessant rains which softened the ground along the routes delayed McCook and Crittenden on their march: they could not reach Manchester before the 28th, some time in the day. Being constrained to wait for them, Rosecrans determined to worry Bragg in the mean while by hurling upon his rear Wilder's active mounted infantry. The railway, which between Tullahoma and Stevenson crosses deep gorges, was easy to destroy, and tearing it up would oblige Bragg either to abandon his intrenched camp or else to detach a considerable part of his army to protect the road against new incursions. In the morning of the 28th, Wilder proceeds to Hillsborough in company with Beatty's brigade of infantry, which will await his return in that village. A few hours later he crosses, not without trouble, the swollen waters of Elk River by means of improvised floats, and detaches to the right Colonel Monroe with one regiment, directing him to destroy the railroad-bridge built across that stream near Estell Springs, while he (Wilder) moves toward Decherd. Monroe cannot carry out the instructions given him: a brigade belonging to Withers' division, brought up by the railroad, having reached before him the crossing-place on Elk River, he falls back upon Hillsborough. Wilder is more fortunate. At eight o'clock in the evening he arrives at Decherd, puts to flight the guard which defends the post, and immediately undertakes to destroy the railroad track. But toward midnight he is interrupted by the arrival of the troops which have opposed Monroe. He must yield the ground to them. However, wishing to prosecute his work of destruction, he retreats into a neighboring mountain to descend into the valley of the Big Crow Creek, where he is in hopes of being

able again to cut the railway. Checked, for the first time, on the 29th by infantry before the town of Tantallon, he as vainly presents himself at Anderson: the entire line is guarded and Wheeler's cavalry is pursuing him. Skilful manœuvring is required to escape. Wilder strikes out on the Chattanooga road, where, having reached a desert place in which the rocky soil, washed by the rain, cannot show the tracks of his horses and reveal to the troops sent after him the direction which he has taken, he suddenly wheels to the left and takes a cut across the mountains. Although he is without guides, he fortunately reaches the road leading from Tracy City to Pelham, and returns on the 30th, by way of Hillsborough, to Manchester, without having lost a man.

Bragg, having concentrated on the 27th all his forces at Tullahoma, is making ready to receive the attack of his adversary. In the mean time he sends reconnoitring-parties out on the roads by which the enemy might approach. A regiment of cavalry despatched on the 28th to Hillsborough encounters Beatty's brigade, and Withers reports at Decherd the presence of Wilder. These circumstances do not yet reveal any serious movement on the part of the enemy. In fact, it is only on the 29th that McCook's and Crittenden's corps, after untold efforts, find themselves near Manchester. It was necessary to give the men some rest and issue to them provisions and ammunition. On the other hand, Granger has halted at Guy's Gap to secure the communications of the army with Murfreesborough; the cavalry occupies the environs of Shelbyville. On the 29th, in the evening, Rosecrans at last gives orders for the simultaneous advance of his three corps against Tullahoma: the Fourteenth shall take a position in the centre, at Concord; Rosecrans shall have the Twentieth on his right, and the Twenty-first, with two lines, shall support his left. On the 30th, while the army is thus forming in line under a beating rain which checks its movements, strong reconnoitring-parties, composed of Bradley's and Steedman's brigades, together with two regiments detached by Reynolds and Negley, advance on the different routes which lead to Tullahoma and the banks of Elk River. They soon run against Forrest's cavalry, which Bragg, uneasy on account of the apparent

inaction of his adversaries, has sent out on most of those roads in order to discover the intentions of the enemy. The Confederates fall back everywhere without engaging in fight, except Starnes' brigade, which, being opposed by Steedman, resists him as well as it can. But after a somewhat spirited struggle, during which its chief is mortally wounded, this brigade also is driven back upon Tullahoma. This time the movement of the Federals is distinctly marked out. Bragg cannot with impunity allow himself to be isolated in this place, nor can he long maintain the campaign in the desolate country which surrounds him. A last reconnoissance, conducted by Forrest in person across the line of the Federals' outposts, having proved to him that the latter already menace his communications and cannot be attacked in separate bodies, he comes to the conclusion on the evening of the 30th to beat a retreat. His *matériel* and magazines having been previously forwarded to Chattanooga, the evacuation is accomplished in a few hours. Hardee with his corps and reserve artillery takes, to the northward of the railway, a route which crosses Elk River over the bridge called Bethpage, about two miles above Estell Springs, and gains at University the summit of the Cumberland plateau; Polk follows the railroad. However, on the 1st of July, in the morning, the whole Federal army, being deployed, is preparing to begin across the plateau of the Barrens a march in line of battle with serried columns of divisions suddenly to invest the works of the enemy. At the same moment some inhabitants of Tullahoma come out to the outposts and communicate the departure of the Confederates. The game is won without having been played: it is a compensation for the long inaction which followed the battle of Murfreesborough. The bad weather continues, the roads are heavy, the streams swollen; in a word, the provisions distributed at Manchester are exhausted. Nevertheless, Rosecrans has promptly taken every measure to follow up the enemy.

At midday the three divisions of Sheridan, Brannan, and Reynolds occupy Tullahoma: they will resume their march on the ensuing morning, and also Davis' division belonging to the Twentieth corps. Crittenden, with his two divisions, sets out on the same day for Hillsborough, so as to head off the enemy's columns at Tracy City if they attempt to reach the valley of the Sequatchie

River. The direct and immediate pursuit is entrusted to Thomas with Negley's division, closely followed by Rousseau.

On the other hand, the Confederates, who started twelve hours before, make haste by forced marches to gain the banks of Elk River, lying some six miles from Tullahoma, but the division trains and the long columns of artillery impede their progress. Fortunately for them, Rosecrans allows four-and-twenty hours to elapse ere he despatches on their tracks Mitchell and Stanley, who had arrived, however, on the previous day at Manchester. The Southern cavalry is more active. Forrest, near the bank of the upper Elk River, will strive to retard Crittenden so long as Hardee shall not have crossed the defiles in the vicinity of Cowan. Wheeler brings up the rear of the army. The latter has to pass Elk River at three points: Hardee above the railway at Bethpage Bridge; Polk below the railway, at the Rock Creek Ford: the reserve artillery and a part of the trains shall cross at Estell Springs between the two other points. But Negley and Rousseau having both taken, in the rear of Hardee, the so-called military road, Wheeler, who soon becomes aware of this fact, concentrates the greater part of his forces in order to protect Hardee. A little over four miles before reaching Bethpage Bridge the military road slopes down the plateau by the wild gorge of Spring Creek. Wheeler waits for the enemy in this defile, and, despite his numerical inferiority, he makes so stubborn a resistance to Negley that night comes without the latter having been able to debouch in the valley of Elk River. That was all Wheeler wanted. While the Federals, not daring to advance in the obscurity of night, are bivouacking, Hardee clears the Bethpage Bridge—to which the Confederate cavalry subsequently sets fire—and establishes himself on the left bank behind light breastworks which command the passage of the bridge. During the night the artillery and Polk's corps have likewise cleared the river, the waters of which are hourly swollen by the rain. Therefore, Bragg, feeling that he is henceforth secure from any earnest pursuit, leaves at the Elk River only rearguards of cavalry, and before the close of day the Confederate columns will have entered the gorges of the Cumberland plateau.

The entire Federal army has also been put in motion. Bran-

nan and Reynolds leave Tullahoma in the morning, and rejoin, beyond Spring Creek, the rest of the Fourteenth corps, which then descends to Bethpage Bridge. But, finding the bridge destroyed by fire, the water high over the ford, and the enemy well posted on the left bank, Thomas is constrained to go up as far as Jones' Ford, where he halts with three divisions, while Negley proceeds to seek higher up the crossing used for the road from Manchester to Winchester. This last point is occupied by a detachment from the enemy's troops. Jones' Ford, on the contrary, is without any protection, but the crossing is so difficult that one brigade only is able to clear it before dark. On the right, McCook, following with two divisions the route from Tullahoma to Winchester, has arrived at Rock Creek Ford, where he has met with the same difficulties encountered by Thomas. He has not been able, on the 2d, to set foot upon the left bank, that was defended only by a small body of cavalry, but on which it was hard to land on account of the rise in Elk River. It was only near to the source of this stream that the Federals have been enabled to surmount this difficulty. Turchin's Federal brigade of cavalry, proceeding on the road from Hillsborough to Hookersville, has found the ford at Morris' Ferry protected by a part of Forrest's troops. Mitchell, with his division, soon joins Turchin's command, and after a brisk engagement the former compels the Confederates to beat a hasty retreat. But this movement occurs too late for Bragg to be seriously concerned about it.

Indeed, his columns attain on the 3d the gorges the access to which can be closed with a simple rearguard to the whole army of the enemy, while the latter is yet engaged in executing, amid untold difficulties, the passage of Elk River. Brannan clears this stream at Jones' Ford, with the vain hope of capturing the enemy's cavalry posted near Bethpage. Negley restores the bridge at this point, and the Fourteenth corps advances toward the mountains; McCook, having crossed at Rock Creek Ford, follows up in a parallel direction. But the Federals, although there is left before them only a curtain, as it were, of cavalry, do not arrive at the entrance to the defiles before the 4th, owing to the bad condition of the roads. Worn out with fatigue and short of provisions, they cannot think of entering the passes. The Confederate

army is already in the Tennessee Valley. Hardee, preceded by Armstrong's brigade of cavalry, followed by that of Dibrell, the successor to Starnes, has reached successively the town of University, then the village of Jasper at the mouth of the Sequatchie, and proceeds up the right bank of the river as far as Kelly's Ford. Polk, coming down toward Stevenson through the gorges of the Big Crow Creek, has crossed this stream over the railroad-bridge at Bridgeport. A few days thereafter the Confederate army is gathered at Chattanooga.


Rosecrans, reinforced by Van Cleve's division, which was thenceforth useless at Murfreesborough, halted at the base of the Cumberland plateau between Cowan and Hookersville. Some detachments from his cavalry pushed on as far as the banks of the Tennessee River to take the defiles, but the greater part of them, not being able to subsist in that sterile country, went to seek in the approaches to the Elk River, between Winchester and Salem, a district richer in forage, where everything was made ready for a new expedition. The Federal infantry was posted between Winchester and McMinnville pending the time when it might continue the campaign so auspiciously commenced. Within ten days, thanks to the skill of its commander, it had reconquered an important part of Tennessee lost a year before. It had occupied the Cumberland plateau with its gorges and rivers, thrown Bragg back on Chattanooga, and captured one thousand eight hundred and thirty-four prisoners, eight field-pieces, and much war material, while its losses amounted to only five hundred and sixty men.

CHAPTER II.

CUMBERLAND GAP.

THE authorities at Washington reproached Rosecrans for not having pursued Bragg beyond the Tennessee River, and they ceased not to urge him to resume the offensive. The moment was favorable, it is true: Lee was leaving the field of Gettysburg, Vicksburg had just capitulated, and Johnston's small army was still detained near Jackson, Mississippi, in consequence of Grant's movements. In fine, desertions were thinning the ranks of Bragg's army; the soldiers of Tennessee did not wish to leave their native State, and, led by their officers, were returning to their homes to carry on a partisan warfare. They were not to be counted upon for the prosecution of the great operations which were to decide the fate of the campaign, and by this withdrawal many a regiment in a few weeks was reduced to one-half of its regular number.

However, immediate pursuit was impossible. In order to seek Bragg before Chattanooga, Rosecrans had to operate on the sterile Cumberland plateau; it was then necessary to establish a centre of supplies at Stevenson, situate not far from the Tennessee River, at the junction of two railway lines. But to connect this point, *vid* Huntsville, either with Corinth on the west or Franklin on the north, it was indispensable to restore one hundred and sixty-seven miles of railroad track, or at least one hundred and eighteen miles, taking for a starting-point Tusculumbia on that part of the river which is always navigable. The line from Murfreesborough to Stevenson is some seventy-eight miles in extent: its numerous bridges had all been destroyed. It was this short line, the shortest and the easiest to protect, that Rosecrans was obliged to reconstruct before again setting his command in motion. The delay was unfavorable, but inevitable; the occa-



sion was good, however, to assure Rosecrans that when he next took the field means would be given him to render the campaign decisive.

Washington City was henceforth safe and the free course of the Mississippi was finally secured to the Federals. As we explained the matter at the beginning of this history, between the great river and Richmond the Confederacy, being protected either by chains of mountains or extensive tracts of country sparsely settled and devoid of railways, was vulnerable at one point only, and this point was Chattanooga. It was around this point that the two adversaries were going to play at quits or a double game for the battle at Gettysburg and the discomfiture of the South at Vicksburg. It was Rosecrans' turn to strike a decisive blow. But if he advanced alone to the north-west angle of Georgia, he had to detach more than one-third of his active forces to guard the two hundred and seventy-nine miles of railway left behind him; and by this he seemed to invite the enemy to concentrate all his troops to crush out his army thus reduced in number. Buckner, who had twenty thousand men near Knoxville, and Johnston, who had thirty thousand under his orders between Meridian and Mobile, might without any uneasiness have furnished Bragg a contingent which would have doubled the effective force of his army. To prevent or compensate for this possible concentration, Rosecrans requested that his two wings be strongly supported. While Rosecrans was restoring the track from Murfreesborough to Stevenson, Burnside should at last have undertaken the conquest of East Tennessee, so as to be able to advance from Knoxville and help the Army of the Cumberland at the time when it should resume the offensive. A considerable part of Grant's army, having no longer any enemy confronting it on the Mississippi, should have advanced, rebuilding the track as it proceeded, along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, so as to cover Rosecrans' right, and open, by way of Tusculum, a second road for the replenishment of his commissariat. One month would have sufficed if the direction of these manœuvres had been entrusted to one head only, and not to three generals under the pedantic and annoying control of the small aulic council at Washington.

Burnside, absorbed in his chase after Morgan, no longer thought of delivering East Tennessee, and to the four weeks during which the Southern partisan had kept all of Burnside's troops on a rush, two were to be added to bring these troops back to the Cumberland Valley. Burnside would have liked to wait for the return of his old corps, the Ninth, sent to the assistance of Grant in the first days of June; but this body, detained at first on account of the brief campaign against Johnston, and subsequently by inexplicable delays, was being uselessly decimated by fever and dysentery on the sickly banks of the lower Mississippi. Grant's army also was wholly in like circumstances. In consequence of great and prolonged fatigue in a debilitating climate, it had been seized throughout its ranks with a feeling of weariness. It no longer had before it a serious enemy to stimulate its ardor. It would have promptly recovered this ardor if it had received orders to go on other battlefields to seek new adversaries; but such orders, which the fortunate victor of Vicksburg could not yet issue, came neither from the White House nor from the War Department.

With the exception of details as laborers on the railroad which were relieved from time to time, Rosecrans' infantry remained inactive. In the mean while his cavalry made an expedition south; but instead of seeking the enemy to fight him, it was content to subsist on the country, to pick up horses, and enroll in its ranks runaway negroes. Two columns, started from the neighborhood of Salem near Winchester, repaired on the 12th and the 13th of July, the one to New Market, the other, *via* Fayetteville and Pulaski, to Athens, where it met some of the enemy's cavalry, and the two columns united under the orders of General Stanley at Huntsville in Alabama. On the 23d they had returned to their quarters. The strict orders issued by Stanley to forbid pillage on the part of his soldiers would lead one to believe that their previous conduct rendered such orders necessary.

The authorities at Washington took no notice of Rosecrans' requests. Grant and Burnside not only did not prepare to support him, but he was receiving no reinforcement either from the army on the Mississippi or the camps of instruction. The superiors of General Rosecrans even denied him the authority to raise,

among former discharged volunteers, a body of cavalry for the Army of the Cumberland. Therefore, believing that he was an object of particular ill-will on the part of the War Department, he hesitated to resume the offensive under circumstances which appeared to him dangerous.

The railway had been opened on the 13th of July as far as Elk River, and on the 25th as far as Bridgeport, opposite to the débris of the large bridge which had been built across the Tennessee. Sheridan's division had immediately occupied the short section along the river: trains of provisions, forage, ammunition, and materials of every kind were forwarded to Stevenson. Without waiting until the dépôt thus formed was completed, the army might have received from it provisions for some days and started on the road: the men were rested and in high spirits, and the cavalry had gathered forage near Huntsville. Halleck, if he did not satisfy the demands of Rosecrans, did not spare despatches pressing him to open the new campaign. He was right this time: since it had to be undertaken solely with the forces which then composed the Army of the Cumberland, it was necessary to begin as early as possible, so as not to give the enemy time to concentrate his troops. But, despite positive orders received in the first days of August, the Union general yet delayed some ten days. He would not at any cost take up the line of march before the ripening of the corn which is raised in abundance in the Tennessee Valley, and upon which he counted to feed his mules and horses. Every pretext stood him in good stead. On the 8th the magazines at Stevenson were full: he wanted to form an additional dépôt at Tracy City, where, however, it was not intended that the army should pass. It became necessary to repair the narrow-gauge road which leads to that village and procure for its service a special locomotive. It came on the 12th. It was only on the 16th that Rosecrans left Winchester and at last set his army in motion.

Burnside took the field on the same day. As his operations were less important, we shall follow him first. Ever since the Federals had become masters of Kentucky they had projected an expedition into East Tennessee. It is known that this region, always opposed to slavery, had remained loyal to the Union: it

was represented in the Senate by an orator of great influence, Andrew Johnson. If it belonged *de facto* to the Confederacy, it owed this fact to its geographical position and not to the sentiments of its inhabitants. The secession chiefs, after having broken the Federal compact, had not allowed the East Tennessee people to invoke in their turn the very principle upon which the Secessionists rested their claims, and to separate from the insurrectional government of Tennessee. They had, on the contrary, cruelly oppressed them, enforcing with vigor the conscription law, pursuing all as deserters who fled to escape service in a cause which they detested, and persecuting even the families whom the fugitives left behind. The refugees from this fine region of country spread over the Northern States. The Washington Government had naturally to think of the deliverance of a district which manifested so much attachment to the national cause. It was a way to answer the Confederates, who were fighting, as they said, only to shake off an oppressive yoke. Besides, the valley of East Tennessee possessed, as we have shown, great military importance. Flanked by two broad chains of mountains, it formed an extensive passage-way connecting Virginia with the South-west, and protected the South-eastern States. The railroad running through it was one of the principal arteries of the Confederacy. Hence policy and strategy alike were agreed to recommend the projected expedition, but the authorities were not agreed as to the object which should be assigned for sending it. Policy dictated that East Tennessee be released from Confederate domination. Therefore, after having penetrated into that section of country, it would be necessary to expel all hostile troops and occupy the whole of it with large bodies of soldiers—a lost army so far as active operations were concerned. Strategy, on the contrary, suggested that after having taken possession of Knoxville the general charged with the undertaking should leave there a strong garrison to interrupt the travel on the railway, and, abandoning the rest of that section to the roving bands of Confederate guerillas, he should march on Chattanooga with the main part of his army. True military interest was sacrificed to the desire of securing a politic result which might be praised by the newspapers and applauded by the multitude.

Early in the year 1862 the Federals had taken the defile of Cumberland Gap, the principal door to East Tennessee; but, drawn into the pursuit of their adversaries in other directions, they had very wisely renounced proceeding beyond the gap, and shortly thereafter the Confederates had retaken the defile. In 1863 the rôle of liberator of East Tennessee was reserved for General Burnside: it was an honorable compensation accorded to the unfortunate but gallant soldier vanquished at Fredericksburg. Two divisions of the Ninth corps designated to undertake this campaign having been, on June 4th, sent to the aid of Grant, it became necessary to commence new preparations. The scattered troops in Kentucky, several regiments recruited in that State or composed of refugees from East Tennessee, and a part of fresh levies made in Ohio and Indiana, formed the Twenty-third corps, under the orders of General Hartsuff. At the end of June, as we have said, this little army was in readiness to move, when Morgan started on his raid. Six weeks were lost. It was the beginning of August. The Ninth corps was coming back from Vicksburg. But the men, worn out by the climate, had need of rest. Burnside could not wait for them. As soon as they had got near the limits of his lines he determined to obey Halleck's pressing injunctions. The forces of the expedition were composed of two divisions, Hascall's and White's, forming the Twenty-third corps, and of Shackelford's division of cavalry, comprising Carter's, Wolford's, and Foster's brigades—in all, some twenty thousand men. To these forces the Confederate general Buckner, who had been sent to Knoxville some months before after the death of General Donelson, could oppose about the same number of combatants. Between Knoxville and Kingston were two divisions of infantry, a part of which, it is true, was ill-armed and poorly equipped. Besides, General Frazer occupied the intrenched post of Cumberland Gap with about three thousand men and fourteen pieces of artillery, while General Samuel Jones, commanding troops of all arms, was guarding the most elevated section of the railway between Jonesborough, Tennessee and Wytheville, Virginia. In the latter days of July, Buckner had received from Bragg an important reinforcement of cavalry. Forrest's corps, after having rested and been remounted near Chattanooga, had taken up a

position at Kingston: he was charged with watching the entire line of Walden's Ridge to the south-west of that town, and to open communications between the two armies which respectively occupied Knoxville and Chattanooga.

Buckner being in a position to arrest for an indefinite length of time the advance of his adversary at Cumberland Gap, the latter concluded to make a flank movement around the defile by traversing more to the south, in the State of Tennessee, the high table-land which on that side, bears the designation of Cumberland plateau. The roads which Burnside would have to cross were long and difficult to travel, and that portion of the country was little known, besides being bare of resources; but the very difficult character of the roads warranted the belief that the Confederates would be illy prepared for defence in that region. No precaution was neglected to ensure the success of this laborious and perilous march. The greater part of the infantry was provided with horses, so as to enable the head of each column rapidly to gain the most important strategic points; the weak men and horses were left at the dépôt. The heavy train-wagons were replaced with pack-trains—a change contrary to usages in the American armies, but which was rendered necessary on account of the character of the campaign about to be inaugurated. In order to avoid crowding and to facilitate the distribution of provisions the army was divided, on leaving, on the 16th of August, Camp Nelson near Lexington, into four columns of infantry and one of cavalry, which, collecting some reinforcements on the way, formed in line on the 21st, to the north of the Cumberland Valley, on the different routes which each was appointed to take. To the first column on the right, which had the longest way to go, was assigned the best and surest route: it was entrusted with the heaviest part of the train. Leaving Glasgow, it made, *via* Tompkinsville and Livingston, for the village of Jamestown, where it was merged, on the 28th of August, with the second column, which had come from Columbia *via* Creelsborough and Albany. The two others, much more numerous than the preceding, united at Chitwood's on the 26th, the one having started from Somerset under the orders of Hartsuff, and the other, under the immediate direction of Burnside, having followed, after leaving Crab Orchard,

the route that was the most difficult and exposed to attacks from the enemy, that which passes by Mount Vernon, London, and Williamsburg. The infantry again set out, on the 29th, on two converging lines, and reached on the ensuing day the town of Montgomery. In the mean while, the left of the army was covered by the fifth column, composed of cavalry, which moved directly to the south of Williamsburg on Walker's Gap, and, supported by a detachment from the fourth column, occupied Jacksborough on the same day. The movements of these different columns had been executed with great precision: the infantry had helped the artillery in the worst places on the road, the long lines of pack-mules had followed the army without detention and ensured its subsistence, while the enemy had not lain in wait for the advance in the difficult gorges which slope down the Cumberland plateau into the Tennessee Valley. Forrest's cavalry barely showed itself to fire a few shots near the village of Emory.

One can understand with what joy the Federals, after eleven days of toilsome march, entered the rich valley, a kind of promised land, which stretched out before them. Public rumor had greatly exaggerated their numbers. Burnside's division of the army had impressed the Confederates with a mistaken idea as to its effective force, and Bragg, fearing with reason lest by its flanking movements it should separate him from Buckner and then fall upon Chattanooga, had sent his lieutenant an order to evacuate Knoxville. Buckner, following the railway, had immediately marched his two divisions, numbering about ten thousand men. Covered by a part of Forrest's cavalry, he reached the great bridge on the Tennessee at Loudon, while Burnside was coming down upon Kingston and Foster was entering Knoxville without firing a gun. Buckner's troops were thus cut in two. Jones, faithful to the task which had been assigned to him long before, was falling, to the northward, upon Abingdon, in order to guard the entrance into Virginia. Frazer had received orders to join him, but having assured Buckner that he (Frazer) could hold his ground for an indefinite length of time in the Cumberland Gap, he was, on the 31st of August, authorized to remain there. Shackelford's Federal cavalry had hardly descended into the val-

ley when they pushed on, on September 1st, as far as Loudon in hopes of preserving the bridge for their army and of preventing the enemy's rearguard from having access to it. They came too late to save it from the flames. After having exchanged a few cannon-shots with Scott's brigade of cavalry strongly posted on the left bank, the Unionists recognized that it was useless to attempt to cross over. Scott continued to occupy Loudon, while Buckner was falling back on the other side of the Hiawassee River, and a few days thereafter, without having been further disturbed, Scott effected a junction with Bragg.

Burnside, having joined Minty's cavalry, which Rosecrans had pushed as far as the vicinity of Kingston, left that town on the 2d with his army, and on the 3d made a triumphal entry into Knoxville. There he found important dépôts of provisions and a considerable amount of railway material, which Buckner in his precipitate retreat had neglected to destroy. East Tennessee was finally rescued, after two years and a half, from Confederate domination. According to the testimony of eye-witnesses, the joy of the people was beyond description. Innumerable Federal flags which had been preserved in secret were displayed at the windows in the towns and villages. Several regiments of the Twenty-third corps, being composed of refugees, met many acquaintances and relatives. The other Federal soldiers, accustomed in Kentucky to the hostility of a large part of the population, were carried away by this unanimous welcome. However, to finish his conquest Burnside had to be master of the road which traverses Cumberland Gap and to drive Jones' troops into Virginia. That was his first care. Courcy's brigade, in order to cover Kentucky, had already occupied the outlet of the road on the north-west slope of the mountains. Shackelford went with his cavalry to flank Frazer, so as to completely surround him. On the 7th, Burnside followed him with infantry and artillery by taking as far as Morristown the railway, which the enemy had not destroyed. Thence, by a forced march of forty-three miles in one day and a half, he arrived on the 9th before the enemy's works. Frazer, who had an abundance of munitions, and rations for forty days, had taken no notice of the summons made by Courcy and Shackelford. They had con-

fined themselves to besieging him while waiting for their chief. However, Frazer's situation was beset with difficulties. The pass lies at a point where the great chain of the Cumberland Mountains abruptly becomes depressed and merges into the plateau of the same name, the surface of which, although broken, no longer presents, like the chain, a continuous obstacle to passage. The pass is then quite approachable: four roads cross one another there, and the commanding heights in the neighborhood are not inaccessible. The engineers having charge of the fortification of that pass had made on too large a scale the plan of the works, which after eighteen months of labor were not yet finished, and were devised for a garrison of ten thousand men. Although the area was nearly two miles in extent, the Kentucky road, from which they had always expected assailants to make the attack, was the only road completely swept by the mounted cannon; the other roads could be reached to a distance of only about four hundred yards, and on the south side several points less distant were not within range of the fire from the batteries: nearly a mile and a half from these was an unfinished block-house mounted with one gun only. Frazer, in spite of the distance, had deemed it necessary to occupy this block-house, because it faced the works. Autumn fogs, coming early in these elevated regions, often enveloped the pass with a thick veil favorable for *coups-de-main* or surprises to an enemy. Hence, Frazer had given very imprudent assurances to his chief. He has sought to exonerate himself by saying that he expected an attack from the Kentucky road only, and counted upon his rear being protected. It was a vain excuse, for the very order to evacuate the pass proved that all East Tennessee was going to be abandoned. Buckner himself, knowing the strong and the weak points of the position and the effective force of the garrison, should have maintained that order.

When Frazer learned the loss of Knoxville, he might yet have reached Virginia through the valley of Powell's River; but Jones, himself being imprudent, sent word to him to hold his ground and promised prompt assistance. Six hundred troopers sent out to meet Frazer encountered Shackelford, who drove them back in the direction of Abingdon. Instead of the ex-

pected help, the Federals appeared on the southern road. When the Confederate general received from Burnside a summons to surrender, he was disconcerted. He had hoped that Buckner would detain in the Tennessee Valley the forces of the enemy. Seeing himself isolated and surrounded, he did not think of defending himself, and without firing a single shot he surrendered to the enemy by a shameful capitulation the two thousand men and all the *matériel* which had been entrusted to him. By a singular coincidence, among these men were many soldiers from North Carolina, whom Burnside had already made prisoners in the preceding year on Roanoke Island.

Two days before, the Confederates had achieved on the confines of Virginia a success which could not, it is true, compensate for the disaster which had occurred to Frazer. On receipt of the news of the invasion of East Tennessee, General Jackson, leaving the banks of the upper Kanawha, where we have left him, had come to reinforce Jones between Bristol and Abingdon. In another direction, Burnside, as soon as he had arrived at Knoxville, had sent out a large detachment of infantry toward Abingdon to threaten its salt-works and destroy the railway as far as possible. The road being clear, four hundred Federals got on a train and proceeded as far as Carter's Dépôt, ninety-three miles from Knoxville, where they found the bridge over Watauga River occupied by the enemy. Hearing of this bold dash, Jackson set out to cut off their retreat. He reached Jonesborough on the 7th. The Unionists, going back on the same train which had brought them, had passed beyond that town, but they had stopped at a short distance, thinking, no doubt, that they were pursued only by an insignificant body of Confederates. After having vainly tried to cut the track behind them, Jackson drove them as far as Limestone Station, where, finding a good position, they determined to fight him while the train returned to Knoxville for reinforcements. But this expected aid was not destined to reach them. After a stubborn resistance, surrounded by Jackson's superior troops and crushed by his artillery, the Federals, about three hundred strong, were obliged to surrender. Foster's brigade was immediately sent out to avenge this defeat, but the Confederates, satisfied with their success, had already fallen back upon Watauga,

and Foster, without more troops, did not venture to go so far to seek them.

The conquest of East Tennessee was accomplished: the Ninth corps, which on its arrival at Cincinnati on August 20th, numbered only six thousand men, almost all ill or worn out with fatigue, had rested and reorganized on the elevated plateaus of East Kentucky. The veteran soldiers had regained their health, new recruits had refilled the ranks of the first two divisions, while the third, under General Willcox, which had not accompanied them to Vicksburg, had joined them. The effective force of the corps was more than doubled, and toward the 10th of September this body was preparing to cross the mountains to swell Burnside's army.

What was going to be done with this army? We have said true military interest required that it should be sent without delay after Buckner: the cavalry would have covered Knoxville while waiting for the Ninth corps, which, in turn, would have taken the same road, leaving one division behind it. But General Halleck had other plans. As will be seen farther on, Chattanooga had fallen into the power of the Federals on the same day with Cumberland Gap: Rosecrans, dazzled by this great result so easily obtained, and deceived by the intelligence sent from Washington, had entertained illusions which Halleck, although he must have been better informed, had hastened to share. The latter, considering Bragg's army as out of the question, wrote on the 11th of September to Burnside that Rosecrans was going to occupy at Dalton the entrance to the great notch in the Alleghany Mountains. After having recommended to Burnside to put his cavalry in communication with that of the Army of the Cumberland, Halleck assigned to him the double task of occupying the passes in the Blue Ridge which lead into North Carolina and to close the upper part of the Holston Valley to the enemy's troops stationed in Virginia. That done, he added, it shall be decided whether the available forces of the two armies shall be directed against Georgia and Alabama or against Virginia and North Carolina. This last plan, which, if carried out, would have spared the vital parts of the Confederacy to bring the Union armies back to the most mountainous regions, was not adopted, fortu-

nately for the Federals. But Halleck appeared to think much of it, and his instructions, instead of causing Burnside to draw nearer Chattanooga, had a tendency to remove him farther from it. The tidings which Burnside was receiving from Rosecrans were reassuring. He therefore thought only of executing with promptness the formal orders sent out by their common chief. Leaving one brigade at Knoxville, he moved the rest of his army on the 13th and 14th of the month on Jonesborough, whence he expected to advance against Jones and Jackson, to drive them into Virginia, and push on perhaps as far as Abingdon. But this last movement was hardly accomplished when a cry of alarm succeeded to the complacent messages hitherto despatched from Washington. News from the Army of the Cumberland and the information tardily received in regard to the concentration of the Confederate forces have at last opened Halleck's eyes: he already beholds Bragg masking the notch at Dalton and advancing from the side of Huntsville with an army twice as large as before to sever Rosecrans' communications with Nashville. He forthwith orders Burnside to strip the posts in Kentucky and march with all his available forces on Chattanooga, so as to either reinforce or relieve the Army of the Cumberland.

This message reached Knoxville only on the 16th in the evening. As the reader shall see in the sequel, it was too late to succor Rosecrans. Burnside straightway issued an order to the Ninth corps to come by forced marches to meet him, and he himself set out by railroad on the morrow to disengage and quickly bring back to the rear the expeditionary corps which he had just despatched toward the north-east. There were troops remaining in the vicinity of Morristown; they were sent to Loudon, the extreme terminus toward the south of the railway line. All the other troops which were placed *en échelon* along the Jonesborough route were likewise set in motion. The vanguard was confronting the enemy on the banks of the Watauga River. It had to be withdrawn without betraying the retrograde movement of the army, which it had masked until then: the betrayal of this movement would have called up before Knoxville all the Confederate troops in South-western Virginia. Burnside arrived on the 21st near Carter's Dépôt, where he found the enemy strongly posted within

works forming the head of the bridge on the left bank of the Watauga. He at the same time received from the President an order directing him to start for Chattanooga, without losing a moment, with such troops as he had around him. He made ready to obey, but only after having attacked the enemy on the following morning at daybreak, so as to destroy, if that were possible, the bridge at Watauga. The Confederates, apprised of his arrival, saved him this trouble. They evacuated their works in the night and burned the bridge. While Foster's brigade, despatched in pursuit of the Confederates, was coming up with them near Blountsville and capturing, together with one cannon, some sixty prisoners, Burnside, thenceforth undisturbed on that side, was finishing the destruction of the bridge and resuming the road to the south. Thanks to the railway, he arrived on the 23d at Morristown, where he encountered the head of the column of the Ninth corps coming down from Cumberland Gap. On the 24th he was at Knoxville: there he heard news of the battle lost four days previously by Rosecrans on the banks of the Chickamauga.

The moment has then come for us to return to the Army of the Cumberland and to narrate the campaign the face of which was suddenly changed by the operations of this battle.

When giving to Rosecrans a positive order to assume the offensive, Halleck had left him free to form his own plans: this was reserving to him the choice of the difficulties which had to be overcome. A brief description of the country which Rosecrans had to cross will suffice to show what were these difficulties. We have said that the Cumberland plateau is bounded on the east, in its southern part, by the Tennessee River, and in its northern part by the dale, fifty miles long and three miles wide, watered by the Sequatchie River. Between this dale and the Tennessee Valley, above Chattanooga, there is a rocky elevation with a sterile soil, of long extent, abruptly terminating on the east and called Walden's Ridge. A simple notch, through which rush the waters of the Tennessee, separates this ridge from a double chain of parallel mountains which prolong the ridge in its general direction from the north-east to the south-west. These mountains, by their height, their small width, straight and uniform summit-line, call to mind the great links in the mountain-chains of Virginia. These two

ranges, which enclose the long and narrow valley designated as Will's Valley, are, on the west, Raccoon Mountain, which extends along the left bank of the Tennessee from Shell Mound to Gunter'sville; and on the east, Lookout Mountain, the crest of which rises twenty-six hundred feet above the level of the sea, and forms an admirable point of view whence, it is said, the eye can take in parts of seven States. Lookout Creek is a large stream which empties into the Tennessee a mile or two above Chattanooga. It flows northward through Will's Valley from the borders of Georgia and Alabama. In this last State the dip is southward, and rills form the Big Will's Creek, which, coursing around the extremity of Lookout Mountain, empties at Gadsden into the Coosa River: we have already alluded to this district in reference to Streight's expedition. Between Lookout Mountain and the Blue Ridge on the east about thirty-one miles will cover the breadth of the great depression which, from the banks of the Susquehanna, separates this range from the Alleghany Mountains, properly speaking. Where Lookout Mountain lies the district is covered in part with small parallel spurs. The first on the west is Missionary Ridge, a succession of big knobs like shelves detached from the mountain. Gradually separating from the mountain and trending northward, this spur forms the small valley of Chattanooga Creek, which gives its name to the town situate near to its mouth. Pigeon Mountain, soldered as it were to the southern part of Missionary Ridge, is at first higher, but its altitude diminishes within a short distance, and the mountain terminates in small hills between two of the branches of the Chickamauga Creek. The westernmost branch, West Chickamauga, waters the valley called McLemore's Cove; the other, named Middle Chickamauga, runs along the foot of Taylor's Ridge, a somewhat high, abrupt, and rocky spur which extends to the northward under the appellation of Oak Ridge, and to the southward forms, with Pigeon Mountain, the valley of the Chattooga, an affluent of the river Coosa. One of the last links of the chain, named Chattooga Mountain, encloses, on the east of Taylor's Ridge, the waters of the East Chickamauga branch, which, after having cut a deep passage between this last crest and that of Oak Ridge, mingles successively, sixteen and six miles from the Tennessee River, with

the two other branches of the Chickamauga. Between the Chattooga Mountain and the slopes of the Blue Ridge there stretches, over a breadth of more than thirteen miles, a tract of country with but little undulation and presenting no serious impediment in the way: it is the door or entrance to Georgia. The streams which water this region are separated from the basin of the Tennessee by an almost insensible rise of ground, and flow to the south, under the designation of Connasauga River, down to the neighborhood of Resaca, where they empty into the Oostanaula, which itself farther on takes the name of Coosa River.

Chattanooga, lying above the gorges through which the Tennessee River winds and rolls its tumultuous waters, was, as we see, perfectly protected against any enemy that might approach from the north-west, the west, or the south-west. In order to follow in the first direction, Rosecrans had to cross the two plateaus of Cumberland and Walden's Ridge and clear between the two the valley of the Sequatchie. There were only three routes across these almost uninhabited regions: the first, from McMinnville to Washington in Tennessee; the second, from McMinnville to Poe's Store; and the third, from Manchester *via* Altamont to Dallas. They crossed the Sequatchie respectively at Pikeville, Dunlap, and Anderson. The nature of the country, over an extent of nearly sixty-two miles, was such as to present insurmountable difficulties to an army of large size. Once arrived in the valley of the Tennessee, Rosecrans would not have found, like Burnside, a region without defensive preparations and offering abundant resources to its liberators. It would have been impossible for him to procure forage from a distance and to have his supplies brought by wagons from McMinnville.

The pass in the mountains through which the Tennessee runs from east to west, instead of opening a way to the armies, opposed to them insuperable obstacles. No road, nor path even, followed closely the course of the river through this narrow defile. To approach Chattanooga from the west there were only two routes—those which Hardee and Polk had taken in the first days of July; that is to say, on the north the route from Tracy City to Jasper, and thence, along the right bank, to Kelley's Ferry, where it crossed the water to reach Chattanooga; and on the south the

railroad along the left bank from the bridge at Bridgeport, *via* Shell Mound, Whitesides, and Wauhatchie in Will's Valley. The first route ran around the extremity of Walden's Ridge, the other cut through the end of Raccoon Mountain; both passed together at the foot of the high cliff which abruptly terminates the extension of Lookout Mountain above the Tennessee River, and is crowned with the summer resort called Summertown. A third route, running diagonally, connected the other two. Descending from Tracy City by Battle Creek, it went up the right bank to a point opposite Shell Mound, where it again met the railway. These thoroughfares were so easy to guard that there was no thought of taking them by force.

To approach the enemy's army it was then necessary to manœuvre to the southward. The difficulties presented on that side were also great. The Federals would have to encounter first that formidable obstacle the Tennessee, the narrow valley of which, encumbered with masses of rock and covered with brushwood, was as barren as the neighboring plateaus; then they would have to encounter in succession the different spurs and outcroppings just mentioned, and which were all lying across the way that they had to follow. There were only three routes leading through these mountains: the one, very bad, led from Bridgeport to Trenton, a large town situate on Lookout Creek; two others, starting from Caperton's Ferry opposite to Stevenson, came out, the one at Johnston's Crook and the other near Valley Head on the Big Will's Creek. They crossed Lookout Mountain through the passes of Frick's Gap, Stevens' Gap, and Winston's Gap. The first two, separated from each other only by a knob not quite one mile and a fifth in length, are distant some twenty-five miles from Chattanooga, and the third forty-three miles. The distance to Winston's Gap must have rendered perilous the march of the army, obliged as it was to clear at once these different passes in presence of an adversary free to move on the opposite eastern slope of the mountain. The two railroads which run out of Chattanooga in an eastern direction intersect each other, and then continue to run apart, the one to Cleveland on the north, and the other to Dalton on the south on the direct line between Knoxville and Atlanta. As this last line passes away from Chattanooga, Dalton is the cen-

tral point which opens or closes the entrance to the rich districts of the south. The southern branch follows the East Chickamauga Creek by Ringgold and the cut made between Taylor's Ridge and Oak Ridge. The centre of the network of routes that traverse the country to the eastward of Lookout Mountain is La Fayette, a town lying about twenty-five miles from Chattanooga and at an equal distance from Pigeon Mountain and Taylor's Ridge. The first of these routes are those leading to Ringgold, Dalton, Resaca, and the villages of Summerville and Broomton in the Chattooga Valley: the last two routes come together at Alpine and enter a little more to the west Winston's Gap. The other routes are the Stevens' Gap road, which crosses Pigeon Mountain through the pass at Dug Gap; the road leading to Frick's Gap and Trenton *via* Catlett's Gap in Pigeon Mountain and the head-waters of Pond Springs in McLemore's Cove; and, finally, the Chattanooga road. This last crosses West Chickamauga Creek at the ford of Gordon's Mills, and the extremity of Missionary Ridge through the pass at Rossville, where it meets with the Ringgold road. Several roads over which wagons can pass in summer connect, besides, La Fayette with the valley of McLemore's Cove. The most important on the south are the Sulphur Springs road by the pass of Bluebird Gap in Pigeon Mountain, and more to the northward the Crawfish Springs road through a pass near Catlett's Gap. The scarcity of the roads, the lack of water, and the altitude of the defiles made the passage across Raccoon Mountain and Lookout Mountain very difficult; but it was necessary to cross them so as to reach McLemore's Cove, for it was only through that way they could approach Chattanooga. This plan was adopted by Rosecrans, notwithstanding its difficulties. It gave him, to procure supplies of provisions, the use of the railway as far as Bridgeport, which did away with the first obstacle—that is to say, the Cumberland plateau. The adoption of this plan enabled him also to threaten the communications of the enemy, whom he could force to leave the shelter of the Chattanooga gorges to come and defend Dalton. The want of a railway and the danger of exposing the base of operations of the army precluded the possibility of a more extended flanking movement—as far as Gadsden, for instance—which would have avoided the double chain of mountains.

If the Federals had found the enemy's army posted on the left bank of the river and the slopes of Raccoon Mountain, they would have been obliged either to make an attack as foolish as was that on Fredericksburg, or to return to their encampments, quitting the field without having fought a battle. Therefore, the first thing necessary was that Rosecrans should deceive Bragg in regard to his designs. He directed Crittenden to make a diversion on Bragg's right flank, so as to make him believe that the whole army was preparing to cross Walden's Ridge. Burnside's march on Knoxville would render that supposition likely.

The two other corps were to cross the river at the foot of Raccoon Mountain, taking Stevenson as a base of operations. In order to cover his right the Union general had sent Mitchell's division of cavalry, under Colonel E. M. McCook, to Huntsville as early as the 11th of August. McCook occupied the railway section which connects Huntsville with Stevenson, and established posts of observation along the whole right bank of the Tennessee from Bridgeport to Whitesburg. Crittenden's camp, on the left of the army, extended from Hillsborough and Manchester up to McMinnville. He took up the line of march on the 16th in three columns: Wood, on the right, leaving Hillsborough and Pelham, made for Tracy City, whence he proceeded upward to the north as far as Purden, where he entered the Altamont and Anderson road; Palmer, who was at Manchester, reached at Irvine College, by a like movement, the Dunlap road; Van Cleve, who was posted at McMinnville, leaving a garrison of one brigade in that town, marched upon Pikeville with the two other brigades. The roads were narrow and difficult; however, Rosecrans' instructions were exactly followed, and on the 19th of August the Twenty-first corps was, every man of it, in the valley of the Sequatchie, of which it occupied the various passes. It was to remain in this position while strong reinforcements would push on, across Walden's Ridge, as far as the Tennessee to complete the demonstration. Minty's troopers, who were near McMinnville, had given the signal of the movement on the north side. They had confronting them for several days past a part of Dibrell's Confederate brigade, which Forrest had been obliged to send to Sparta because

most of the soldiers, being natives of that district, wished to avail themselves of their proximity to visit once more their families. Already, on the 8th of August, a Union detachment, drawn into an ambush to the north of Sparta, had been roughly handled by Dibrell's command. Having been recently reinforced, he was waiting for Minty, who was going to Crossville to command the entrance to the Sequatchie Valley and descend through it into the Tennessee Valley. Minty, who had proceeded up the right bank of the Calf-Killer River, found, about seven miles and a half above Sparta, General Dibrell, who resisted his progress during the whole of the 17th. The Confederates, having fallen back during the night, were sharply pursued. Dibrell gained Crossville, whence he was soon recalled. On the 22d, hearing the news of the simultaneous movements of the Federal armies of the Cumberland and of the Ohio, Forrest had received orders to concentrate his forces at Kingston. Some days later, as we have said, he was covering Buckner's retreat and lining with soldiers the left bank of the Tennessee from the burned bridge at Loudon to the environs of Chattanooga.

The remainder of the Union army had commenced to move at the same time with Crittenden. The Fourteenth corps had advanced in two columns: on the left, Reynolds, followed by Brannan, had come down from the town of University, by the vale of Battle Creek, as far as the vicinity of the mouth of that stream, taking care, however, not to show his strength on the banks of the Tennessee; on the right, Negley, and Baird after him, had marched along the railway by Tantallon, and had come to a halt between Anderson and Stevenson. Davis' division of the Twentieth corps, striking through the mountain, had come to meet, near Stevenson, Sheridan's division; farther to the right, Johnson, having started from Salem, had moved down by Larkin's Ford to Bellefonte. These movements were finished on the 20th of August. Granger's reserve corps, composed of three divisions, was guarding the lines of communication between the different bodies of the army: a part of that corps was posted at Shelbyville and at Wartrace; the remainder occupied Murfreesborough, Nashville, Carthage, and, still more in the rear, Gallatin, Clarksville, and Dover.

The first step has been taken: the army has crossed the Cumberland plateau. Walden's Ridge is abandoned by the Confederates. Crittenden is going to threaten their right beyond that ridge. Hazen's brigade of Palmer's division advances up to a point opposite Harrison on the Tennessee River; Wagner's brigade, detached from Wood's command, will follow the road leading from Anderson to Chattanooga; some batteries of artillery accompany these troops. On the left, Minty appears near Kingston on the west side of Clinch River. On the right, Reynolds detaches Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry and sends it on the same route with Wagner, ordering that it should promptly occupy the heights which, running across Tennessee, command the city of Chattanooga.

All these movements are accomplished without delay; but Wilder, whose men are mounted and who has the shortest road to travel, reaches first the position that has been assigned to him. On the 21st of August, Chattanooga lies at his feet. He is separated from it only by an abrupt declivity and the tortuous course of the river. He immediately announces his presence by throwing a few shells into the town. Bragg was hardly expecting to see the enemy appear so near to his dépôts and headquarters. The commotion was great, and, the firing becoming more and more accurate, there soon ensued a general panic. The dépôts of supplies, and, above all, of ammunition, which were within range of the enemy's shells, were removed; the rolling stock belonging to the railway was sent away. The Confederates did not have even a bridge which would enable them to reach the right bank of the river and dislodge these troublesome visitors. Not for a moment had they believed in the possibility of this offensive movement so suddenly revealed by Wilder. It is true that gangs of slaves were at work to fortify Chattanooga on the south side, but the works were not yet mounted with guns. Anderson's brigade of Withers' division had alone been placed in a strategical position at Bridgeport; the rest of Polk's corps had concentrated at Chattanooga. Hardee's corps was camping still more in their rear, at Tyner's Station on the Knoxville Railroad. Forrest, watching at Kingston the eastern part of Tennessee, was too far for his out-

posts or reconnoitring-parties to be of any service to Bragg's army; Roddey was still farther, at Tuscumbia, where he was watching the Corinth road. Wheeler, with a view to rest his troopers, had led them into the peaceful valley of the Coosa. His two divisions, under Wharton and Martin, were near Rome in Georgia and at Alexandria near Jacksonborough in Alabama—the one seventy-four miles and the other one hundred and five from Bridgeport. The first had detached a regiment to guard the entire bank of the Tennessee River from Bridgeport to Gunter-ville. Another regiment, sent by Martin, kept open his communications with Roddey's outposts near Decatur. The front of the Confederate army was therefore effectually covered only by a brigade of infantry and a regiment of cavalry. This army, as we have said, was much weakened; it had not yet received any of the promised reinforcements. Bragg, seeing himself separated from Rosecrans by an obstacle which he deemed to be insurmountable, had proposed, on the 17th of July, to Johnston to transport all his forces into the State of Mississippi and to combine them with Johnston's to crush Grant. Johnston, who had just evacuated Jackson, had answered him, with good reason, that it was too late: a part of his small army had been brought back to Mobile. This important port, which would have furnished for a campaign in Georgia a base of operations as good as Chattanooga, appeared to be greatly threatened by the fleet. If a landing was effected to attack the place, General Dabney Maury would be able to oppose only two thousand men to the besiegers. But the completion of the most important works of defence, the arrival of a certain number of recruits, and the news that the Federal expedition had been abandoned allowed Johnston to remove troops from Mobile. He was preparing to return to Bragg most of the troops which the latter had sent him at the end of May: these troops were, on the one hand, Liddell's, Ector's, and Gist's brigades, besides Walthall's, all placed under the orders of General Walker, and on the other hand Breckinridge's division. Walker started for Chattanooga in pursuance of a despatch from Bragg, received on the 22d of August, announcing the shelling of that city. Walker's arrival a few days thereafter brought, according to the reckoning of the general-in-chief, the number of effective

combatants in his army to a little more than thirty-five thousand soldiers—say nearly thirty-nine thousand men, all told. His four divisions of cavalry being composed each of about fifteen hundred sabres, he therefore had under his command some forty-five thousand men, leaving out the seven brigades—say about ten thousand men—which Buckner might bring to him in a few days from Knoxville, with something like forty pieces of artillery. Breckinridge was closely to follow Walker and resume his place in Hardee's corps, which his departure two months before had reduced to an effective force of five brigades.

Wilder, after having cannonaded Chattanooga during the whole of the 21st, had not waited until the enemy, with the pontons made fast on the left bank of the Tennessee, should come and seek him upon the opposite heights. Bragg had recalled to Chattanooga, Anderson's brigade, which, posted in front of Bridgeport, could alone oppose the crossing of the Tennessee projected by Rosecrans. Hence the latter could, quite at leisure, prepare for this difficult performance. The small number of his boats enabled him to throw only one bridge across this large river. The place chosen for his bridge was the ferry at Caperton's, near Stevenson. As this bridge could not suffice for the entire army, Sheridan undertook, as early as the 21st, to construct at Bridgeport another bridge of trestles. Brannan, at the mouth of Battle Creek, was preparing rafts to transport his infantry to the other side of the river, while Reynolds, who had advanced to a point in front of Shell Mound beyond the mouth of the Sequatchie, was collecting for a similar purpose all the boats he could find on the river. These works, and especially the building of the bridge at Bridgeport, which involved the construction of a landing or platform more than two hundred and sixty-five yards in extent, without counting the central part floating upon boats, required a certain time for their accomplishment. Notwithstanding all the precautions that were taken, these works could not escape the attention of Bragg: if the troopers who were watching the right bank did not perceive them, it was impossible to disguise them to the observers stationed upon the crests of Raccoon Mountain, more than three hundred yards high, which overlooks the course of the Tennessee. These observers must have

perceived even all the movements of troops going on in the valley, and it is incredible that the Confederate general was not promptly informed of the presence of the enemy's army below Chattanooga.

Bragg's attention is attracted higher up by Hazen, who, in front of the town of Harrison, has made a feint to force the crossing of the Tennessee, and also by the news which he receives concerning Burnside's movements. The Confederate general sends a part of Hardee's corps to guard the river above Chattanooga. Meanwhile, Rosecrans has finished his preparations, and on the 27th Sheridan begins to build the bridge at Bridgeport, while Davis launches the pontoons at Caperton's Ferry. Bragg is at last warned: he calls back Wheeler's two divisions and places Martin at Trenton in Will's Valley, and Wharton behind him near Chattanooga. But the very positions which he assigns to them prove that he does not yet know from which side the attack will come, and his infantry, which alone might defend the passes in the Raccoon Mountain, remains inactive. On the 29th the bridges are finished; Davis, crossing the river, makes the Caperton ferry-boat fast to the left bank, while the cavalry, passing a little lower, meets the Confederate vedettes in front of the landing-place and drives them away: five hours later the infantry begins to cross. Sheridan finds nothing confronting him, but an accident causes the breaking of the trestle-bridge at Bridgeport, and notwithstanding assiduous work to repair it the troops can cross over only on the 2d of September.

During all this time, Bragg, although he is only twenty-two to twenty-five miles distant, makes no effort to stop the crossing of the enemy nor to dispute, after the crossing, the possession of the pass in the Raccoon Mountain. He avowed, without being able to explain the fact, that he was ignorant up to the 31st of August of Rosecrans' movements. It is said that the first news of these movements was brought to him at Chattanooga by a resident of Caperton's Ferry, who was an eye-witness to the crossing of the troops. He did not yet understand, however, that the demonstrations made on his right were only feints, and he persisted in the belief that the Federal armies of the Cumberland and of the Ohio would endeavor to effect a union above Chattanooga. This

apprehension was the reason why Bragg did not go out to meet Rosecrans. The latter, in order to deceive the enemy still more, on the 3d of September gave to the valiant and able general Hazen the command of Wagner's, Wilder's, and Minty's brigades, which with his own had crossed Walden's Ridge about seven thousand strong, and directed him to make a show of crossing the Tennessee. Hazen perfectly executed this order. Bringing back to the south Minty, who no longer had any enemy confronting him, he made a feint with his troops simultaneously at several crossing-points, ordered the repetition of the sound of trumpet along the lines of the various regiments and the increase in number of bivouac-fires, caused his artillery to move to and fro, and did so well that the Confederates in that neighborhood believed they had a whole army before them.

However, Davis' and Johnson's divisions crossed over the pontons, the first on the 29th and the second on the 31st of August. On the 30th, in the evening, Davis occupied on the summit of Raccoon Mountain the routes from Trenton and Valley Head. But for the entire army to get in motion the bridge at Bridgeport must be such as to enable Thomas and Sheridan to transfer their heavy artillery and trains to the other shore. On the 2d of September, after Sheridan had crossed with his infantry, a length of more than two hundred and sixteen yards of trestle-work broke down. Fortunately, at the time of the accident the bridge was free and nobody went down with it. Thanks to incessant labor, the crossing was restored in less than two days, and on the 4th, in the morning, Baird's division, followed by all the artillery and the wagons of the Fourteenth corps, filed over. Brannan and Reynolds in another direction crossed the river on the 1st of September, the one at the great bend of the Tennessee, and the other at Shell Mound. Negley, following Johnson at Caperton's Ferry and immediately going up on the left bank, bivouacs near Taylor's Store: he has thus passed in the rear of Sheridan, who proceeds from Bridgeport to Trenton in order to effect a junction with the two other divisions of the Twentieth corps. On the same day McCook sends down into Will's Valley, Davis, whom Johnson has relieved on the summit of Raccoon Mountain.

On the 3d, despite the crowding on the roads, each division

makes a movement forward : on the left, Brannan and Reynolds, having effected a meeting at Shell Mound, proceed up the Nickajack Valley—which derives its name from a grotto very precious to the Confederates, for it furnished them with quantities of saltpetre—and follow a difficult road which leads to the edge of Lookout Creek. Negley toils up the slopes of Raccoon Mountain. On the right McCook's three divisions occupy the eastern declivity of that mountain and descend into Will's Valley between Trenton and Johnson's Crook.

On the 4th, at the time when Baird's last troops are crossing the Tennessee, two divisions of the Fourteenth corps are near Trenton with Sheridan, and the third division bivouacs above that town, while McCook, climbing, on the right, the side of Lookout Mountain, already causes Davis to occupy the pass of Winston's Gap, and Johnson the approaches to Stevens' Gap at Johnson's Crook. Lastly, the six brigades which, since the departure of Hazen and Wagner, compose Crittenden's corps, have, by a rapid flank movement, gained the edge of the Tennessee, and already crossed the river without accident. As soon as Rosecrans saw the completion of his preparations to cross he recalled Crittenden. This order was received on the 31st of August: the Twentieth corps, covered by the forces posted beyond Walden's Ridge, has descended into the valley of the Sequatchie as far as Jasper, and reached, on the 1st and the 2d of September, the edge of the Tennessee; the trains and the artillery have gone toward the bridge at Bridgeport. Three brigades have passed at Shell Mound between the 3d and the 4th in the morning; the other three, finding at Battle Creek the rafts still used by Brannan, have not been able to reach the left bank before the 4th, some time in the day. In the evening the corps is gathered in the vicinity of Shell Mound. The entire Union army, with the exception of Hazen's four brigades, has therefore cleared the Tennessee, crossed or turned around the chain of Raccoon Mountain, and is collected upon the eastern side of that mountain. It is true that the formidable steeps of Lookout Mountain still rise before the Federals and offer to the Confederates, if they wish to arrest the progress of the enemy, some impregnable positions.

Bragg, troubled and undecided, had remained until then inactive. He had not tried to imitate the tactics of Lee at Chancellorsville and to throw the Unionists back beyond the Tennessee River. His cavalry had observed their march without even molesting them. But on learning that they occupied Will's Valley, and especially the pass at Winston's Gap on the road to Rome, he at last understood the danger. He already beheld the Federal army advancing, by La Fayette and Alpine, on the Dalton and Atlanta Railway, which alone connected him with the rest of the Confederacy. However, it was yet easy for him to stop the advance of the enemy. In the absence of its two chiefs, Mitchell and Stanley, the one ill and the other on furlough for his health, the Union cavalry had not been pushed forward as Rosecrans would have desired. On the 4th of September it yet held neither Frick's Gap, Stevens' Gap, nor the outlet of Winston's Gap on Little River. A road running along the eastern side of the mountain-chain allowed Bragg to occupy the first two passes without separating himself from Chattanooga. If he had summoned Hardee and Buckner to join him for the defence of the approaches to that city on the two sides of the Tennessee, he might still, on the 2d of September, have sent Polk to Frick's Gap and Stevens' Gap, concentrated his cavalry in Winston's Gap, and thus closed against Rosecrans all the passes in Lookout Mountain. The Federal army would have been obliged promptly to fall back upon its bridges, so as to get out of these deep and narrow valleys, which seem to have been made purposely to prepare new Caudine Forks for vanquished forces.

Instead of availing himself of the means of defence offered him by nature, Bragg, on the 1st of September, concluded to wait for his adversary on the plain stretching out to the eastward of Lookout Mountain. Only one serious motive could justify this plan: it brought him nearer to the reinforcements that were promised him, and by delaying the struggle gave them time to arrive. But it involved the evacuation of Chattanooga, which was a necessary sacrifice if Stevens' Gap was abandoned to the enemy. Long trains carried to Atlanta all the *matériel* accumulated in Chattanooga for two years, but the general-in-chief did not yet set his troops in motion.

In the mean time the Federals were advancing very slowly. The columns still wedged in narrow roads, the artillery which was to join them, and the wagons in the rear required three days to come down the slopes of Raccoon Mountain. At last, on the 6th of September, the Twentieth corps was grouped on the right between Winston's Gap, Valley Head, and the Eureka mines. On the morrow two divisions of the Fourteenth corps were at Trenton, a third at Johnson's Crook, and Negley, with a fourth, had, without firing a gun, taken a position at Stevens' Gap. The Twenty-first corps had also arrived in Will's Valley: two divisions had come to a halt above the road between Trenton and Wauhatchie; Wood's division occupied this last village, and one of his brigades had been sent out as a reconnoitring party on the slopes of Look-out Mountain, which is crowned with the village of Summertown. General Harker, in command of the brigade, soon found himself in the presence of the outposts of Cheatham's division, and retired after having ascertained that the enemy, posted upon commanding ground, appeared to be disposed to make a vigorous resistance. It was the first time in this campaign that the Federals encountered his infantry. But this Confederate demonstration was only a curtain, so to say, intended to mask the definite evacuation of Chattanooga, which had been commenced on that very morning.

The soldiers of Polk had taken the line of march in the direction of La Fayette on a dusty road and during a spell of oppressive heat. On the 8th the rearguard was leaving the works which had been so laboriously thrown up around Chattanooga: on the ensuing morning the whole corps was halting at Gordon's Mills on the banks of the West Chickamauga River. Walker's four brigades, separated into two small divisions under Liddell and Gist, and Breckinridge's troops, that had arrived a few days after them, had already effected a junction at La Fayette. Hardee, who had been called to Demopolis to take command of Pemberton's soldiers liberated on parole, had for his successor Lieutenant-general D. H. Hill, whom we have seen figuring first in Lee's army and subsequently in North Carolina. His corps had fallen back, on the 3d, from Tyner's Station to Ringgold, after having sent a brigade of infantry to the banks of the Tennessee in order to mask this movement.

Bragg's movement must involve Buckner's and ensure the junction of the two corps. Buckner had been on the left bank of the Hiawassee River two days only when, on the 7th of September, he received orders to start out at once on the road to the south. Bragg gave him at the same time a rendezvous in McLemore's Cove. Marching over forty-four miles in eight-and-forty hours, Buckner arrived on the 9th on the banks of the Chickamauga, and posted himself a few miles above Polk's corps on Anderson's farm, between Gordon's Mills and Crawfish Spring; Forrest had ordered Pegram's division to defend as long as possible the banks of the Tennessee from Harrison to Chattanooga and to cover the retreat of the army. He himself had proceeded with Armstrong's division into the valley of the Chattooga, where Wheeler was just arriving from another direction. To the three divisions of cavalry thus collected was assigned the task of delaying McCook's march.

Rosecrans, shut up within a narrow valley, did not yet suspect the movements executed by his adversaries behind the high wall which separated him from them. Having found Bragg in force on the 7th before Summertown, he concluded therefrom that Bragg intended to hold his ground in Chattanooga. As he could not approach him directly, he resolved to threaten his communications by driving the heads of the columns in his centre and on his right beyond the mountains upon the roads which intersect the Dalton and Atlanta Railway. In the morning Negley was occupying Frick's Gap and Stevens' Gap; on the 9th, some time in the day, he was going beyond the slopes of Missionary Ridge and posting himself in McLemore's Cove, at Rodgers' farm, near to the banks of the Chickamauga. Baird was coming to take his place in the defiles, so as to be in a position to support Negley, but the two other divisions of the Fourteenth corps did not leave Trenton, where they had been for the last three days. A like movement was simultaneously accomplished by General McCook. On the 8th he was massing his corps in the vicinity of Valley Head, and the two brigades of Carlin and Heg of Davis' division were occupying the eastern side of Winston's Gap. Stanley, having resumed the command of the cavalry which had crossed at Caperton's Ferry on the 29th of August, was crossing Lookout Mountain and pene-

trating into the small valleys which empty their streams into the Chattooga River. On the next morning Carlin and Heg, closely following him, were occupying, the one Alpine and the other Broomtown. This double demonstration was useless, since the result which Rosecrans was expecting from it had been obtained even before the demonstration was accomplished.

As early as the 8th, Wagner, who was posted on the left bank of the Tennessee, and whose outposts were facing Chattanooga, had informed Rosecrans that the enemy appeared to be evacuating that place. He had immediately directed Crittenden to ascertain the fact. On the 9th, in the morning, Beatty's and Grose's brigades were climbing the acclivity of Lookout Mountain, the one by the road known as Nickajack Trace, and the other in the direction of Summertown. The Federals encountered only a few isolated troopers, and, having reached without difficulty the summit of the mountain, they perceived at their feet the city of Chattanooga. No flag was floating over its public buildings, the intrenchments which surrounded it were deserted, and the stations of the two railways were quite empty.

The news of the evacuation had already reached Rosecrans. He had received it in the night, and ordered Crittenden to push on with all his troops in the direction of Ringgold, leaving in that place one brigade only. The Twenty-first corps was closely following Grose and Beatty. At noon the Federals were in the city. But as the mountain-roads were in a very bad condition, Crittenden had been obliged to make the greater part of his troops, his artillery, and his wagons take the narrow route which winds between the Tennessee and the extremity of Lookout Mountain. This long column reached Chattanooga only in the evening. However, Crittenden was able before dark again to place on the road Palmer's and Van Cleve's divisions, which went out to camp near Rossville, a distance of five miles on the road to Ringgold.

CHAPTER III.

DAVIS' CROSS-ROADS.

THE news of the occupation of Chattanooga, carried by the telegraph to all the cities in the North, was hailed with enthusiasm : it was celebrated by demonstrations of joy equal to those witnessed on the report of the capitulation of Vicksburg. Bragg's army was forgotten. It must have been reduced to impotence ere it abandoned, without fighting, so important a post as Chattanooga. In the retreat of that army people saw the prelude to the dissolution of the Confederacy's military forces. The public was excusable for entertaining such illusions, for the example had been given by authorities the most competent to judge. Indeed, Halleck, replying on the 11th of September to Rosecrans' first despatch, directed him to halt at Dalton after having occupied in force the Atlanta Railroad. Halleck added that it would later be decided what direction Rosecrans should have to take beyond that point. Meantime, he lulled him with the prospect of the invasion of Georgia, while at the same date he was entertaining Burnside with the prospect of a campaign in North Carolina. Besides, the despatch from Halleck repeated the rumor, no doubt spread designedly by the Confederates, that a portion of Bragg's army had been transferred to Virginia in order to reinforce General Lee.

There was no less confidence among the leaders of the Cumberland Army. The more the obstacles which protected Chattanooga had appeared formidable to them, the more the easy conquest of that place, so long coveted, exalted their imagination. On the 10th of September, Crittenden was writing from Chattanooga to Burnside, under orders from Rosecrans, to the effect that the enemy was in full retreat toward Rome, and that the right wing, having already reached that town, would doubtless succeed in checking him. A ruse, very plain, however, on the part of his

adversary, causes Rosecrans completely to lose his habitual circumspection. Sham deserters, left at Chattanooga, had given to the Federals a fantastic description of the flight and discouragement of the Confederate army; some inhabitants, pretending to be in the confidence of Bragg, had related that the rendezvous of his army was in Atlanta.

Still, the Federals had no authority for placing any credence in so easy a success. It was evident that Bragg on going out of Chattanooga would rally Buckner's corps, gather his scattered forces, and become, for a few days at least, master at La Fayette of the only point to which converged the roads followed by the Federal columns. The flanking movement of the Union right across Lookout Mountain having succeeded, instead of turning this obstacle against them the Federals should have availed themselves of it to conceal from the enemy a march in a direction contrary to his, while bringing Thomas, then McCook, by Will's Valley to Chattanooga. This place having been put, meantime, in a state of defence, the army, thus united, might have debouched by Rossville and Chickamauga Station into the open country which extends as far as the Alleghany Mountains. If Bragg was waiting for it in that region, then a great danger had been avoided by this manœuvre. If he should retreat into the interior of Georgia, there was nothing to regret, for in no case could he have been reached. But the three Union army corps being masters of the only three passes in Lookout Mountain—at Chattanooga, at the twin defiles of Frick's Gap and Stevens' Gap, and at Winston's Gap—Rosecrans thought, on the 9th, only of urging them forward to catch up with his adversary, without reflecting upon the immense spaces which separated these passes and would not allow the three fractions of his army to support one another in case of attack. His right wing, the nearest to the railroad which he was in a hurry to reach, was to advance more rapidly than either of the two other corps. McCook had orders to strike for Alpine and Summerville on the Chattooga, preceded by Stanley's cavalry, which would not halt before having encountered the bulk of the enemy's forces. Thomas, in the centre, was to cause the advance of two divisions by the upper part of McLemore's Cove in the direction of La Fayette, while two other divisions would mass

in Will's Valley at the base of Stevens' Gap, ready to follow in the footsteps of the former. On the left, Crittenden, continuing with all his forces except one brigade the movement begun on the previous day, had for his objective point the town of Ringgold; it was hoped that he would thence gain Dalton in time to prevent Buckner from joining Bragg. Nothing impeded on the 10th the execution of this programme. McCook, leaving his trains with Post's brigade, on the summit of Winston's Gap, rejoined the rest of Davis' division at Alpine, while Johnson and Sheridan, starting out, the one in the morning and the other in the evening, crossed Lookout Mountain and reached the valley of Little River. Stanley, passing beyond Summerville, made reconnoissances in the direction of La Fayette, but halted in front of Wharton's cavalry, which was soon reinforced by Forrest with Armstrong's division. In the centre, Brannan and Reynolds massed at Johnson's Crook, and Baird went to bivouac at the entrance to Stevens' Gap, while Negley was advancing within sight of Dug Gap in Pigeon Mountain. His outposts having found the passage obstructed and occupied by the enemy, he took a position on the right bank of the Chickamauga, at the junction called Davis' Cross-roads, where the Gordon's Mills road separates from the La Fayette road. On the left, the last troops which were yet on the Walden's Ridge plateau crossed the Tennessee River and rejoined Crittenden. Wagner and Wilder had entered Chattanooga on the 9th. Minty's cavalry, which Pegram on the 8th had prevented from crossing the river at Harrison, reached that town on the ensuing day, as did also Hazen's brigade. The Twenty-first corps was then again complete. It began to march on the 10th, leaving Wagner's brigade at Chattanooga. But as the supply-train did not arrive before night, and the distribution of rations for five days, ordered by Rosecrans in view of a rapid pursuit, was thereby delayed, Crittenden was able to issue only a small allowance of provisions. Van Cleve and Palmer both halted in the valley of Pea-Vine Creek, the first five miles before reaching Ringgold, the second lower, on the Graysville road, which runs along the left bank of the East Chickamauga. Wood left Chattanooga in the morning, and encamped on the banks of the West Chickamauga near to the bridge called Red House Bridge.

By this forward movement the Federal army became divided into three columns without any link between them. The two wings were separated by a distance upward of fifty miles as the bird flies and upward of sixty-nine by the shortest travelled route. The roads followed by these three corps were leading them to the railway—the one to the Dalton Station, the other to Resaca, and the third to the neighborhood of Rome: the point nearest to their front at which they could concentrate without recrossing Lookout Mountain was La Fayette.

It is precisely this point which the enemy had very wisely chosen as the rendezvous for his army. The evacuation of Chattanooga was, in truth, only the beginning of the offensive campaign which the Confederates were going to undertake in order to drive the invaders back beyond the Tennessee River. This time the government at Richmond had not shrunk from any sacrifice which might enable them to bring back to their flag victory, which for some months had been faithless to the Confederate cause. The draft, enforced with increasing strictness, was the means of recruiting the depleted ranks of the regiments, while important reinforcements were promised. Since Johnston had divided his forces between Chattanooga and Mobile, Gregg's and McNair's brigades alone occupied the junction at Meridian and the neighboring camp at Enterprise. Meridian was the key to the network of railways which the Confederates still possessed in Mississippi and Alabama; Enterprise was the rendezvous for all prisoners liberated on parole, who, willingly or unwillingly, came to recompose under Hardee the old army formerly under the command of Pemberton. However, Johnston, learning on the 7th that Atlanta seemed to be threatened, immediately directed Gregg and McNair to move to that point. Their commands were replaced with the two brigades, yet prisoners on parole, under Adams and Featherston, while the Southern cavalry, waiting for the liberation of these brigades, made strong demonstrations in the direction of Jackson with the view of keeping the enemy away. Roddey, who had remained at Tusculum, also made similar movements on his side. The reinforcements thus furnished by Johnston had hardly arrived at Atlanta when they were led as far as Dalton, where their presence was to be more useful. However,

on this occasion, which was to be decisive, Bragg had to be supplied with a more important complement. Six months before, Longstreet's corps was detached for some time from the Army of Northern Virginia; the battle of Chancellorsville had been won in his absence. Mr. Davis asked General Lee again to dispense with Longstreet, so as to send him to fight Rosecrans. Laxity in the pursuit of the enemy after the battle of Gettysburg and the inactivity of Meade on the Rapidan justified the apparent boldness underlying this request. The bad condition of the Southern railways and the interruption of the direct Richmond line *via* Knoxville rendered the transportation of Longstreet's army corps a difficult performance. It was prepared in the greatest secrecy: the reader has seen that at the very time when this operation was taking place Halleck believed there was a contrary movement of the enemy's forces going on from the westward to the eastward. Meade had no suspicion. The artillery and wagons, which would have encumbered the trains, were left behind in Virginia.

Longstreet's fifteen thousand soldiers were bringing to Bragg a reinforcement more valuable than would have been twice that number of men picked up here and there in the recruiting-stations of the Confederacy. Indeed, the Army of Northern Virginia was then superior to all the others on account of its activity and ardor, the experience of its officers, and the confidence with which they inspired their men. The premature death of Albert Sidney Johnston, and the jealousy which had long kept his illustrious namesake [Joe Johnston] away from active command, had deprived the gallant soldiers of the West of the only two chiefs who could have trained them after the manner of Lee. Longstreet's corps, surrounded with all the prestige of victory, was going to give them some valuable examples. The reorganization of Pickett's forces, decimated at Gettysburg, had reduced this corps to two divisions. Hood's division set out first, toward the 4th of September; Longstreet, with McLaws' division, followed it six or seven days later.

The arrival of these troops would secure to Bragg some sixty thousand combatants. This was a greater number of men than Rosecrans could place in line, and almost equal to the number Lee had under his orders at Gettysburg. However, as their trip

was to occupy eight days, Bragg could not wait near La Fayette for the arrival of the last trains. It was necessary either to retreat as far as Resaca, so as to resume thence a new campaign, or attack the Federals before they had collected, beyond Lookout Mountain, their columns, whose movements the Southern cavalry had promptly reported to Bragg as early as the 9th in the evening. The occasion was favorable to attempt such an attack. Bragg lost it, as we shall see, on account of too great impatience.

As soon as he had learned of the presence of Negley with four or five thousand men in McLemore's Cove, he determined to throw him back on Stevens' Gap, which he perhaps regretted to have so easily abandoned to him. His entire army was gathered between the two branches of the Chickamauga River. Hill's and Walker's corps were in the vicinity of La Fayette; Johnson's brigade had been left by Buckner at Ringgold in order to cover the Dalton road on the right of Pegram's cavalry, whose outposts extended on the left as far as a point to the northward of Gordon's Mills. The headquarters were established at this village. Polk's corps also occupied it. Buckner's was hard by, at Anderson's. Wheeler was watching McCook's movements; Forrest, called back from the left with Armstrong's division, was during the night to take a position on the right of Pegram and in advance of Johnson.

The Confederates were thus in force on the two routes which intersect at Davis' Cross-roads. On the 9th, in the evening, Bragg gave orders to General Hill to move on the ensuing morning Cleburne's division from La Fayette to Davis' Cross-roads. In another direction General Hindman, the successor of Withers in the command of one of Polk's divisions, was starting in the night so as to early occupy the junction of the two roads. The two bodies, when united, were to advance toward Stevens' Gap until they found Negley. The latter, isolated in the presence of forces three times as numerous as his own, could not avoid being crushed. On the 10th, in the morning, Hindman got up to Morgan's farm in the neighborhood of Davis' Cross-roads. But Hill refused to execute the order of his chief, and alleged that Cleburne was ill, and that the pass at Dug Gap, being obstructed by abatis, prevented his troops from being punctual at the rendezvous. Bragg did not insist. When he received Hill's reply on the 10th, at

eight in the morning, he charged Buckner with his entire corps to reinforce Hindman; to do which he had only to follow the latter's tracks. But some hours elapsed ere he set out, and it was late in the afternoon when he reached Morgan's farm. During this time, as it has already been stated, Negley, not suspecting the danger which menaced him on the left, had advanced as far as Davis' Cross-roads, and his outposts were exchanging at Dug Gap musket-shots with Hill's skirmishers. Fortunately for Negley, he had not entered into that defile, Thomas having urged him to be prudent notwithstanding Rosecrans' pressing injunctions. Nevertheless, Hindman and Buckner had only to advance to take him by the flank and inflict upon him an irreparable loss before Baird, who was crossing the mountain, could come to his assistance. But the bold front presented by the Federals arrested the enemy. Hindman, who was on the first line, believing that he was confronted by large forces, hesitated, asked for fresh instructions from his superiors in authority, and finally postponed the attack to the next day. However, Bragg did not have to complain of this delay: on the 11th of the month he was going to have twice the opportunity to deal his adversary a decisive blow. Instead of one division only, the Federals had two in McLemore's Cove. Baird, summoned on the 10th in the evening by Negley, had started out at three o'clock in the morning, and despite the difficulties encountered on the road, he reached at eight o'clock the banks of the Chickamauga. But these two divisions, separated from the rest of the Fourteenth corps by the whole breadth of Lookout Mountain, might in a few hours have upon them one-half of the Confederate army, and the haste with which Baird had responded to Negley's appeal was running the risk of having accomplished nothing but aggravating the importance of their common defeat.

The policy was to let Negley enter Dug Gap, and then to make behind him, on Davis' Cross-roads, the principal effort in the attack. However, Bragg could do still better, for the left of the enemy, like the centre, was exposing itself imprudently to isolation and the attack of the Confederates. Indeed, the outposts established by Forrest on his arrival, so as to cover the two branches of the Chickamauga, had promptly advised him of the crossing

of Palmer's and Van Cleve's divisions over Red House Bridge. Pegram's cavalry had captured, without firing a gun, on the Pea-Vine Creek, about fifty men belonging to Palmer's advance. It was evident that Crittenden's corps was in motion from Chattanooga toward Ringgold; beginning at the bridge, his left flank was exposed to attack by the Confederate army, which was between him and all the rest of the Union forces. The reports received in the evening from Wheeler's cavalry left no room for any doubt about this matter, since it was known that the Twentieth corps was at Alpine and the Fourteenth on the La Fayette road. Crittenden had only nine brigades under his orders, and but seven on the Ringgold road. By leaving on the left Buckner, Hindman, and Cleburne—that is to say, four divisions—Bragg might in one day concentrate against Crittenden thirteen brigades of infantry and two divisions of cavalry, Gordon's Mills being distant only eight miles and La Fayette about nineteen from Red House Bridge. The farther Crittenden advanced on the 11th toward Ringgold, the more certain would have been his defeat on the following morning. This defeat would have involved consequences far more decisive than that of the centre or of the right wing of the Federals; for Bragg, pursuing as a conqueror the Twenty-first corps, would then re-enter Chattanooga, take possession of the extremity of Lookout Mountain, the slope of which on the side of the city is accessible enough, and by Wauhatchie he would threaten to capture Rosecrans' bridges before the latter could have had time to recross the Tennessee River.

But the Confederate general, following his design of attacking the heads of column of Thomas' command, brought Cheatham from Gordon's Mills to Anderson's in order to get him nearer to Hindman, and himself repaired to La Fayette. Cleburne, always eager for the fray, had overcome his physical infirmities, and led, in the course of the day, his division to Dug Gap. Bragg is counting upon concentrating crushing forces against the two Federal divisions which are in McLemore's Cove, and upon attacking them from the north and from the east at the same time. Hindman will open the fight, while Buckner will be ready to support him. Cleburne, who has cleared the defiles of all obstructions, will come down from Pigeon Mountain as soon as he shall hear the cannon

in the direction of Morgan's farm, and, breaking through the line opposed to him by Negley at the entrance to the pass, push on as far as Davis' Cross-roads; Bragg shall accompany him, and Walker's entire corps follow up to his support. In the mean time Breckinridge's division shall bear on the Alpine road to stop the progress of McCook. In regard to Crittenden, Bragg opposes to him only Forrest's cavalry and Johnson's brigade.

On the Federal side, Baird has moved up to Davis' Cross-roads in order to support Negley. Before resuming their forward movement these two generals have sent out reconnoitring-parties to discover what forces they have before them. This would be a good time to attack the Federals. But Hindman remains inactive; Cleburne waits in vain for the order which Hindman is to give, and does not dare to advance alone: a great part of the day is thus lost in inaction. Bragg has tried to throw upon Hindman all the responsibility for this inaction; but a despatch which he has suppressed in his report proves, on the contrary, that it must be traced to him. Really, instead of pressing Hindman by positive orders to attack, as he says he did, he wrote him on the 11th, at eleven o'clock in the morning, the following despatch, doubtless in reply to information given by his lieutenant: "If you find the enemy in such great force that it is not prudent to attack him, then fall back upon La Fayette through Catlett's Gap." Bragg must have known that there could be before him only the Fourteenth corps, and even if Thomas had been there with his twenty-four thousand men, the Confederates would still have had the advantage in point of numbers. Besides, there was nothing in the way to prevent the Southern general from causing the battle to commence under his eye by Cleburne and Walker. While he hesitates, Negley and Baird have at last recognized their danger, and determine to fall back *en échelon* up to the slopes of Lookout Mountain; they shall place their trains in safety in the defiles. This movement is difficult to accomplish, for it is necessary to cross a river and an open plain in the presence of forces superior in number. Leaving in front of Cleburne a simple screen of sharpshooters, Negley retires first, and takes position at the beginning of Missionary Ridge, while Baird deploys his skirmishers to protect his left. The latter afterward

brings his division back on the western shore of the Chickamauga, while Negley's artillery opens fire upon Hindman, so as to detain him. The operation is at last happily accomplished toward one o'clock. The Federals occupy in force the approaches to Stevens' Gap, and when, finally, the two Southern columns make a forward movement, they recognize, on meeting at Davis' Cross-roads, that their prey has escaped them. Bragg should not have been astonished at it, for he had halted Negley in front of Dug Gap, instead of inviting him to penetrate into that defile, and had allowed Hindman to remain during more than thirty hours on his flank without attacking him. By letting this day pass he had lost at the same time the best chance of surprising Crittenden in the position, yet more dangerous than that of Negley, which Rosecrans had assigned him.

Palmer and Van Cleve not having been able to proceed beyond Pea-Vine Creek on the 10th, the commander of the Twenty-first corps went and placed himself at their head on the next day to lead them on to Ringgold. In the evening of the preceding day General Wood, it is true, had sent him a negro who related with precision and assurance that Bragg in person, and at least a part of his army, were at Gordon's Mills. The news was very important, but the commander would not believe it, and merely sent Harker's brigade to make, *vid* Rossville, a reconnoissance in the vicinity of Gordon's Mills. Wood remained with the other brigade at the Red House Bridge. Forrest, who had hoped to see the whole Confederate army march upon that point to attack Crittenden, found himself, on the contrary, alone with his cavalry in front of Palmer and Van Cleve; these generals, having been rejoined by Hazen and Dick, had each three brigades: Wilder's brigade stood them instead of cavalry; Scott's brigade did its best in resisting Wilder. Dismounting in all favorable positions near to its flying batteries, it compelled several times the enemy's infantry to deploy, and thus delayed its advance. It could not, however, prevent Crittenden from occupying Ringgold in the afternoon. But Forrest, calling to him, from Dalton, Dibrell's brigade, and from his left Pegram's division, concentrated toward evening his entire corps on the heights of Tunnel Hill at the entrance to the Chattooga Mountain; and Wilder, at the sight of these troops sup-

ported by three batteries, retraced his steps, believing that he had encountered a whole Confederate division of infantry. Forrest, being without instructions, had done his duty well, but an abler chief than Bragg would have advised Forrest, instead of arresting the Union column, to draw it as much as possible to the eastward.

Meanwhile, Wood had moved toward Gordon's Mills, and Harker, marching in front, had met, at a short distance from that point, Cheatham's rearguard, which, as we have already said, was falling back upon Anderson's. The Federals, feeling that they were not in force, pressed the rearguard without breaking its lines, and camped in the evening at Gordon's Mills. Harker's and Wilder's engagements were sufficient to enlighten Crittenden upon the position of the enemy. He knew that two days had elapsed since Buckner had passed through Graysville, heading southward: his junction with Bragg must then have been an accomplished fact. He could no longer share in the illusions of his chief, who in a despatch which reached Ringgold shortly after midday ordered him to draw near Thomas if the enemy was still at La Fayette, and in the event of the contrary being the case he should push on toward Rome. Besides, these illusions were promptly dissipated by Negley's advices, which Rosecrans received at Frick's Gap. At three o'clock he sent to the Twenty-first corps an order to retire, in double-quick, back of the Chickamauga River, and to take near Gordon's Mills a defensive position which would enable the corps to communicate with Thomas by the western slope of Missionary Ridge.

The right wing had been directed with more prudence than the left and centre. If he had strictly followed his instructions, McCook on the 11th would have led the bulk of his army to Summerville; but the isolation of his troops and the energetic resistance made by Forrest caused him to decide not to venture so far as Summerville before Stanley's cavalry had reconnoitred the route. Soon, having learned that Thomas was yet very far from La Fayette, McCook sent back to Winston's Gap all his wagons, and, the enemy's cavalry having everywhere held its own against Stanley, he wisely decided to await new orders without proceeding beyond Alpine. He would not have to wait long for the expected orders. In truth, Rosecrans, already alarmed by the

resistance which Negley had encountered on the 10th and the 11th, had at last recognized his error on learning that Crittenden had found the enemy in force near to Gordon's Mills and before reaching Dalton. He understood all the gravity of his situation. This enemy, whom he believed to be in full retreat, was, on the contrary, in the midst of his massed troops, and enabled to pick out at pleasure any column which he chose to crush. The boldness with which Bragg was confronting Rosecrans was a positive proof that he had received strong reinforcements. The reader remembers the feelings of anxiety which Rosecrans disclosed to his government when he was directed to assume the offensive while all the other Federal *corps d'armée* remained inactive. Subsequent developments had justified his most sombre forebodings. But regrets were useless, and there was not a moment to lose while uniting his forces. However, he did not want to recross Lookout Mountain, lest he should appear to retreat, and he selected the valley of McLemore's Cove for the concentration of his troops. He directed Thomas to move Brannan and Reynolds beyond Frick's Gap, and McCook to gain by the shortest route, with two divisions, the head-waters of the Chickamauga, so as to take a position on the right of the Fourteenth corps, entrusting the Third division with the passes in the mountain. Besides, he confirmed the order already given to Crittenden to fall back upon Gordon's Mills. Fortunately for Crittenden, Bragg's slowness was going to surpass the imprudence of his adversaries.

Having seen Negley escape from him on the 11th, the Southern general at last thought on that evening of turning back upon the Twenty-first corps, of whose position he was apprised since the preceding day. The forces sent in the direction of Davis' Cross-roads, facing about with Polk on one side and Walker on the other, were going to be on the first line. These two generals had orders to march northward, the one going down the right bank of the Chickamauga as far as Gordon's Mills, and the other following, as far as Rock Spring Church, the route which leads from La Fayette to Rossville. Buckner and Cleburne were to come after them. On the 12th, while the Confederates were executing this movement, Crittenden was busy bringing over in great haste his forces to a point back of the Chickamauga. He had taken

apparently the most exposed route, but the shortest, and in reality the best; for there was nothing more dangerous than to defer the reunion of his corps under the protection of this river. Van Cleve moved in the direction of Dyer's Ford *via* Pealer's Mills, and Palmer in the direction of Reed's Bridge *via* Gilbert. Wilder, who was recalled in the night from Tunnel Hill, was ordered to cover this movement on the south by marching to the left of Palmer's column. If Bragg had adopted his measures earlier and his troops had marched rapidly, they would have arrived on the flank of that column and surprised Crittenden in the most dangerous operation that can be executed in the presence of the enemy. But they reached very late the positions which had been assigned to them, and the Unionists encountered on the road only Pegram's cavalry: Wilder undertook to keep them in check. A vigorous attack, in which the two parties fought with sabres, drove the Confederates back to the tannery called Leet's tanyard, near the Dalton and Gordon's Mills road, and the Union artillery soon dislodged them from this important position. This engagement cost Wilder about thirty men and Pegram nearly fifty.

Bragg, deceived by the reports brought in by his cavalry, had not been in a hurry to attack the Federals, believing that Crittenden, far from crossing the West Chickamauga, was advancing toward him at once from Ringgold and Gordon's Mills. He decided on the 12th, in the evening, to go and meet him, and enjoined Polk to take the direction of Pea-Vine Church to begin the fight, while Buckner and Walker should support him.

Although these orders, thrice repeated, were of a positive character, Polk believed, as Hill did, that he could disobey his chief. He replied to Bragg in the night that he had taken a strong defensive position, and requested to have reinforcements promptly sent to him. Bragg vainly renewed his injunctions, and when he arrived on the ground on the 13th, in the morning, he found his lieutenant inactive in the position which the latter valued so much. It is already known that the enemy expected by the one and sought by the other was quietly encamped upon the left bank of the Chickamauga: the Confederate skirmishers soon found that out. Still, the enemy was not beyond reach, although protected by the river, and his isolation made his position yet very precarious in

the presence of hostile forces superior in number. But after having lost four days in useless manœuvres, Bragg seems to have had his mind troubled by this last deception. Either because he apprehended a new move by Rosecrans on his left, or because he would not fight without the reinforcements that had been announced, he concluded to wait on the right bank of the Chickamauga until the enemy should manifest his intentions. This was gratuitously to renounce all the advantages he possessed and make the game easy for Rosecrans. The latter had need of this respite, and availed himself of it.

On the 13th, in the evening, Thomas' entire corps was in McLemore's Cove, on the roads leading from Stevens' Gap to Dug Gap and from Frick's Gap to Catlett's Gap. Massed within this narrow space, he had before him only Wheeler's cavalry, brought back by Bragg into the defiles of Pigeon Mountain in order to mask the concentration of his forces farther down near the West Chickamauga. Thirteen miles down the river Crittenden's three divisions were ranged on the left bank of that stream above and below Gordon's Mills. On the 12th, in the evening, McCook had received Rosecrans' order which recalled him north. Placing a brigade of each division under the orders of General Lytle, he charged him to escort the trains and guard the defiles, while he himself set out on the 13th, in the morning, with the rest of his corps. But no guide knew the direct road running along the eastern base of Lookout Mountain,—a road that really existed, and which the chief ordered to be taken. McCook therefore decided to recross the mountain, so as to get to Will's Valley again and follow the routes which had already been explored. Rosecrans bitterly reproached him with having imposed upon his troops this wearisome détour, and thus run the risk of not arriving in time for the battle which was preparing. However, McCook could not rush on a journey of discovery in a mountainous country which his cavalry had not explored; and, after all, this delay of his had no influence on the battle fought after he joined the rest of the army. On the 14th, in the evening, having reached Will's Valley the next day, he followed Sheridan on the road from Trenton to Johnson's Crock, while Johnson and Davis were taking, on the western side of Lookout Mountain, a direct road from

Valley Head to Stevens' Gap. On the 16th, toward night, the three divisions were united on the La Fayette road, and on the 17th they were going down to McLemore's Cove. In another direction Lytle, leaving a brigade with the train in Little Valley at the foot of Winston's Gap, entered with the two other brigades the direct road which he had reconnoitred, and halted at the pass of Dougherty's Gap near to the source of the Chickamauga.

On the 13th the Twenty-first corps had found the enemy in great force opposite Gordon's Mills: it was evident that he was massing on the La Fayette and Chattanooga road with the view of crushing the left wing of the Federals. Rosecrans, fearing lest Thomas might not be able to arrive in season to support him, directed Crittenden to bring Palmer and Van Cleve to the strong positions on Missionary Ridge, and to leave at Gordon's Mills only Wood's division, with orders to fall back slowly if attacked. During this time Thomas was deploying his corps on the left, in the direction of Gordon's Mills. Baird and Negley remaining at the foot of Stevens' Gap, Reynolds went to Pond Springs on the Frick's Gap road, and Brannan connected him with these two generals. Henceforth the Fourteenth and Twenty-first corps would be in juxtaposition. On the 10th, in the morning, the Twenty-first corps went back to the banks of the Chickamauga on the right of Wood, while Van Cleve occupied Crawfish Springs, and Palmer, farther up stream, was posted at Owen's Ford. The latter's outposts immediately established connection with Reynolds' outposts. Rosecrans already had two corps under his control; that very day he was counting upon the arrival of a third corps, and, expecting every moment an attack, McCook's delay caused him the greatest uneasiness for forty-eight hours. At last McCook appeared on the 17th, in the morning, notwithstanding Wheeler's cavalry, which vainly sought to delay his progress. Sheridan and Davis established themselves on the La Fayette road between Davis' Cross-roads and Dug Gap, and Johnson at Pond Springs. Reynolds and Brannan, who had drawn near Johnson, formed not far from that point the right of the Fourteenth corps. Baird was in the centre; Negley, farther down on the Chickamauga River, had relieved Palmer's division at Owen's Ford. The latter, passing behind Van Cleve, came to take a

position between his left and Wood's right, thus drawing closer the front of the Twenty-first corps, which appeared to be the most exposed. Lytle was on the road to rejoin McCook, and the cavalry, of which Mitchell had resumed the command in the place of Stanley, who was ill, holding itself on a parallel line with the Twentieth corps upon the eastern slope of the mountain, was approaching the head-waters of the Chickamauga. In fine, the army was going to receive an important reinforcement: new regiments having come from Columbia to relieve the garrisons at Wartrace, Shelbyville, and other posts, General Granger had been enabled at the beginning of September to unite these garrisons in order to bring them to Rosecrans. On the 11th he passed the Tennessee at Bridgeport with Daniel McCook's brigade and Steedman's division, which comprised two other brigades. These troops, after a rapid and difficult march, arrived on the 13th at Chattanooga, and encamped in the evening at Rossville. Rosecrans allowed them to remain in this important position, whence they could easily help Crittenden.

With his army brought together, he directed Granger to make a reconnoissance in force beyond the West Chickamauga to find the Confederate right and discover the motives for an inactivity which was beginning to astonish him. On the 17th, Steedman, with six regiments of infantry and one battery of artillery, at last encountered, after a long march, Scott's cavalry, which he drove to Ringgold. He was going to capture the town when a brigade, sent very opportunely by Johnson, with artillery, came to aid the Confederate cavalry. After having exchanged a few shots with the Southern artillery, seeing the cavalry strongly posted, he retreated and bivouacked seven miles and a half back of Ringgold. During the night Scott threw some shells among his troops, but he durst not attack him.

The four days from the 13th to the 17th, so well spent by the Federals, were lost by Bragg. This was a great fault, which in his report he seeks to dissimulate by keeping absolutely silent about it, as though his army had occupied as early as the 13th the positions which it took, in truth, only on the 18th. Indéed, when he became aware that the Federals had repassed the Chickamauga he was not satisfied to halt his army, but brought it to the rear, as

if he wanted to deliver a defensive battle in the vicinity of La Fayette. Polk's corps and Buckner's came back to near that town. From Ringgold, Johnson went to find at Catoosa Station, on the other side of Taylor's Ridge, the reinforcements which were landing at that point. Breckinridge remained on the Alpine road to watch McCook, who had slipped away for the last two days. Forrest, who should have pressed the enemy on the right, retired to Dalton. There remained near the Chickamauga only Wheeler on the extreme left in front of Davis' Cross-roads and Pond Springs; Cleburne's division farther down, opposite Owen's Ford; and Walker on the Rossville road, between Rock Spring Church and Gordon's Mills. Walker was somewhat far from the Chickamauga, the right bank of which was occupied by the Unionists.

However, the expected reinforcements arrived. On the 13th three brigades belonging to Hood's division had reached the station at Catoosa. These were the first soldiers of the Army of Northern Virginia to appear in the midst of the Army of the Tennessee: their new comrades saluted their arrival as being of good omen. These fresh soldiers had followed closely in the rear of Gregg's and McNair's brigades, which had come from Atlanta, and were united to Johnson's brigade, so as to form a new division under the orders of the latter general. Hood not having yet arrived, the Virginia troops were also entrusted for a few days to Johnson. His first care was to organize his new command around Catoosa.

A few miles below Gordon's Mills the bed of the Chickamauga, which is deep and narrow up to that point, becomes wider; the steep banks decrease in height, and the river is everywhere easy to cross. As one approaches nearer to Rossville and Red House Bridge the country becomes more open, the woods give place to cultivated fields, and the ground presents less obstacles to offensive manœuvres. Therefore, Bragg had every reason to pass the Chickamauga as far down as possible, and to promptly strike a decisive blow on Rosecrans' left. He would thus separate him from Chattanooga and throw him on defiles too narrow for the retreat of a vanquished army. At last he decided to try this flanking movement, which was conformable to the tactics that he

had already adopted, not without success, at Perryville and at Murfreesborough.

The field on which the two armies are going to meet is easy to describe, because it exhibits no great irregularities of surface. It is bounded on the west by the heights of Missionary Ridge: the principal crest is narrow and rather steep, not very high, and offers excellent defensive positions. Everywhere accessible by pedestrians, it presents only two passages for wagons—the one at Rossville, and the other, called McFarland's Gap, two miles and a half south of that town. This crest of the mountain is distant from the edge of the Chickamauga by a space about four miles wide. At Crawfish Springs the foot-hills of Missionary Ridge fill up that space; more to the northward their elevation and extent gradually diminish. Primeval woods still cover the greater part of the country; they form on the two sides of Missionary Ridge a compact mass, broken only by the grassy slopes of the principal height of land. Cultivation of the soil is centred near the banks of the river, where, however, it yet occupies only a third part of the ground. The calcareous soil rapidly absorbs moisture; it collects this moisture in subterraneous cavities, whence issue here and there cool and limpid springs of water, such as Crawfish Springs. But in the heats of summer the springs which flow on the surface dry up; the thirsty soldier finds no place to slake his thirst, and even the Chickamauga itself becomes fordable almost everywhere, and the crossings present no serious difficulty except where the river is deeply confined between steep banks. We have already stated that two routes diverge from Rossville—the one to the east, and the other to the south. The first leads to Ringgold by the Red House Bridge; the second to La Fayette by the ford at Gordon's Mills after running along the base of the hills of Missionary Ridge. Crawfish Springs are nearly two miles above Gordon's Mills; Owen's Ford is about five miles and a half, and Pond Springs a little over eight. Four roads branch off on the east from the Rossville and La Fayette route, and cross the river between Gordon's Mills and Red House. These roads are, along the course of the river, first the one that leads to the two fords at Dalton and Tedford, which are respectively one mile and a quarter and nearly two miles from Gordon's Mills; then, half-

way between Gordon's Mills and Rossville, the road to Leet's tanyard, which branches off at Kelly's farm and crosses the Chickamauga at the point designated as Alexander's Bridge. The two other roads, followed on the 12th, in a contrary direction, by Van Cleve and by Palmer, cross Reed's Bridge near Jay's sawmill, and also Dyer's Ford, and meet at Ringgold, the one by Gilbert and the other by Pealer's Mills. On the west of the main route the Rossville and Crawfish Springs road, called the Dry Valley road, after passing through the Jackson farm winds between the knobs which bound the valley. It goes through two small passes—the one near the house of Widow Glenn, the other at Villetoe's farm—and at last enters the valley of Chattanooga Creek through the gorge of McFarland's Gap. The Leet's tanyard road extends to the west of the main route, by Mullis' farm, as far as this gorge, where it unites with the Crawfish Springs road. A great number of other travelled roads, opened for farming purposes and the improvement of woodlands, would have facilitated the movement of the columns of infantry, but they were not all passable with artillery.

On the 17th, in the evening, Bragg's definite orders are issued to the different corps which must execute the flanking movement around the Federal left. This movement will involve a complete demi-conversion or change of front.

Johnson, who, on the extreme right, will occupy the marching wing, receives orders to move, with five brigades, from Catoosa Station upon Reed's Bridge, to force, at this point, if it is defended, the crossing of the Chickamauga, and once upon the other bank to proceed up-stream, so as to take by a flanking movement a position whence he may open an oblique fire upon Alexander's Bridge. Walker, who will march directly to that point, will then cross over to support Johnson's left, and together with him clear off obstructions some distance above the crossing at Tedford's Ford. Buckner, coming from La Fayette, will in turn pass over the river at this point, and his three generals, having not less than fifteen brigades under their orders—that is to say, one-half of the army—will make a vigorous attack on the Federal left wing on the Rossville road, while Polk's corps will hold back that wing by a front onset at Gordon's Mills. This corps being collected near La Fay-

ette, Cheatham's division goes on the 17th to camp upon the road at Rock Spring Church ; Hindman will follow the same direction on the 18th at daybreak. If they encounter a sharp resistance, they will bear to the right, so as to reach Dalton's Ford. General Hill will draw his two divisions nearer to the rest of the army to serve as a pivot. By his menacing attitude he will maintain the centre and the right of the enemy above Gordon's Mills, avoiding, however, to cross the river before Rosecrans' left has been thrown back to the south of the Chattanooga road. To this end, Breckinridge, who on the 17th was on the Alpine road, comes to encamp in the evening near Catlett's Gap, and on the following morning he will appear before Owen's Ford on the left of Cleburne ; the latter will bear to the right, so as to get close to Polk. Wheeler will continue to watch the upper Chickamauga River ; Forrest will go before Johnson and reconnoitre the country in advance of the marching right.

Bragg hopes that he will be able to engage the enemy, even perhaps to give battle and win the day, on the 18th. His army comprises fifty-eight thousand infantry and artillery, eight thousand five hundred cavalry, and about two hundred pieces of artillery. The arrival of two brigades from Longstreet's corps and one from Walker's will give Bragg altogether some seventy thousand men. The three corps with which Rosecrans has commenced the campaign make up an aggregate somewhat exceeding fifty-two thousand men ; Granger's three brigades swell Rosecrans' infantry and artillery to nearly fifty-seven thousand men, while he has wellnigh seven thousand five hundred mounted troops : his total effective force is sixty-four thousand men, with something like one hundred and seventy pieces of artillery. Bragg has therefore the advantage of superior numbers in all arms. Never before had the Confederates found themselves in such favorable condition.

On the 18th, at five o'clock in the morning, Johnson is on the road with four brigades ; General Law's brigade will follow him a few hours later ; Benning's command will wait until the ensuing day at Catoosa for McLaws' troops. An error in the direction taken causes him to lose several precious hours. At last, McLaws arrives on the banks of the Pea-Vine Creek, where Forrest has preceded him with Scott's brigade. Steedman's rear-

guard checks McLaws back of that stream and compels him to deploy ; after which it returns to the Red House Bridge, followed by Scott. The rest of the Confederate column moves to the left on Reed's Bridge, preceded by a part of Armstrong's division. Ere long the Southern cavalry encounters Minty's troopers, who for the last three days have been reconnoitring the right bank of the Chickamauga. The latter fall back, contesting every foot of the ground until the arrival of Johnson obliges them to recross the river. The Confederates capture the bridge, but the resistance made by Minty and Steedman has delayed their march, and it is three o'clock in the afternoon when they at last clear the Chickamauga. After having advanced as far as Jay's sawmill through the Federal cavalry, who harass him, Johnson concludes to give his soldiers a well-earned rest. But General Hood has in the mean time assumed command of the column. He brings, with his personal energy, the traditions of the Army of Northern Virginia. The programme for the day is not finished ; the sun is yet above the horizon. Hood gives orders to continue the march, for he is aware that often when the soldier is the most fatigued in consequence of the weariness of the road or of the battle, a last effort decides the issue of a campaign. Taking a road parallel with the river, he drives before him Minty's force, which is too weak to resist him, although it has been reinforced by two regiments from Wilder's brigade. Hood halts only two miles and a half beyond the sawmill on the road to Dalton's Ford. Notwithstanding the gathering shadows of night, his outposts and those of the enemy yet keep up a skirmishing fire for a long while. Forrest has remained in the rear in order to cover his right, which was threatened by fresh Federal troops. Steedman having returned at one o'clock to Rossville, Granger has immediately sent all his available forces on the Chickamauga to defend the course of the river. At the Red House Bridge, Whitaker's brigade, after an engagement which cost him about sixty men, has maintained in position Scott's cavalry posted on the right bank. McCook's brigade, closely followed by Mitchell, has not been able to reach Reed's Bridge, occupied by the enemy, but toward evening it took a menacing position on his right.

In the mean while the other Confederate columns have gained

the banks of the Chickamauga. Walker, who has the shortest road to travel, arrives, toward ten o'clock in the morning, about a mile and a quarter from Alexander's Bridge. Wilder's brigade defends with energy the approaches to the bridge against the assaults made by Walthall's brigade. Liddell, who commands the First division of the Southern corps, is obliged, in order to reach the river, to move forward Govan's brigade: he has lost much time and nearly one hundred men. The Federals, after having torn up the flooring of the bridge, so well cover with troops the steep shore of the left bank that Liddell cannot cross the Chickamauga, which is very deep at this point. Walker, being thus checked, causes his columns to deflect toward the right, and at last finds, about two miles farther down, the fording-place named Byron's Ford, which is not occupied by the enemy. Walthall crosses the river and advances some twelve or fourteen hundred yards in the direction of Gordon's Mills, but soon the darkness of approaching night causes him to halt. Coming behind him, Govan passes over after sunset, and Gist's division crosses only at midnight. No enemy troubles Walker, because Hood covers him completely.

Buckner, camped on the Gordon's Mills and La Fayette road, has followed Walker's long column, and the latter, having been halted at Alexander's Bridge before Buckner had time to debouch on the left in the Tedford's Ford road, he is constrained to await the close of the battle ere he can resume his march. He finally arrives, skirmishing, toward evening, on the Chickamauga River. Preston's division occupies, after a slight engagement, Tedford's Ford, and throws Gracie's brigade to the opposite shore. Pending this time, Stewart, striking to the left with his division, has arrived at Dalton's Ford, and Clayton's brigade, which marches in front, clears the ford without having occasion to fire a gun. The rest of the army corps will wait for daybreak before taking its turn to cross.

On the 18th, in the morning, Cheatham's and Hindman's divisions advanced toward Gordon's Mills, the one coming from Rock Spring Church, and the other from the point where the La Fayette road crosses the extremity of Pigeon Mountain, and about midday these divisions had driven Wood's outposts to the

river. But Polk, the chief over both Cheatham and Hindman, following the instructions sent to him, has confined himself to the making of strong demonstrations, and waits to force the passage till the movement of the right wing has been accomplished. Besides, a part of Cheatham's division, which is to take a position on the right, having encountered Buckner's column, has not been able before the close of the day to reach the approaches to Dalton's Ford. Breckinridge has placed himself on the upper Chickamauga to the left of Cleburne.

Bragg's orders have therefore been followed, but with delays which it had been easy to foresee. The decisive movement, which in order to succeed should be executed with rare precision, has been entrusted to the least homogeneous part of his army—to Walker's corps, said to be a reserve, which should not have been placed on the first line; to Buckner's command, made up of recruits who have never been under fire; and to Johnson's six brigades, which come, some from Virginia and others from the State of Mississippi. The least important part to play, that of pivot, is, on the contrary, assigned to the veteran Army of Tennessee, whose chiefs and soldiers have known one another for a long time. On the 18th, therefore, preparations have been made to fight, but the battle has not commenced. At nightfall there are only six brigades to the westward of the Chickamauga River: two of them have remained idle on the right bank; the four others, under Hood, are alone in presence of the enemy and in a very perilous position.

In another direction the Federal army has continued, back of the Chickamauga, the movement from right to left which it has been executing for the past few days. But Rosecrans, deceived by the inaction of his adversary, wished to allow some rest to his soldiers. Thomas started out only at four o'clock in the afternoon for Crawfish Springs, where he had to mass his corps in the positions occupied by Palmer's and Van Cleve's divisions of the Twenty-first corps. These divisions, coming down the valley, will place themselves, the first on the left, and the second on the right, of Wood, who will remain at Gordon's Mills. As soon as Thomas shall be on the road, McCook will also get in motion to come and occupy the ground which Thomas shall have left. But the Federals are hardly in motion when Rosecrans learns that the enemy's

forces are present all along the course of the lower Chickamauga. The reports brought in by Steedman, Minty, Wilder, and Wood leave no doubt in his mind as to the designs of his adversary. The latter has only one more step to take in order to cut Rosecrans' communications with Chattanooga. Fortunately, the close of day interrupts the accomplishment of his purpose, and gives the Federals some hours wherein to prevent the threatened danger. The Fourteenth corps is already marching; it is the largest, and perhaps also the best officered or directed. It is to this corps that Rosecrans assigns the task of confronting Bragg to arrest his progress. On arriving at Crawfish Springs, toward eleven o'clock at night, with the advance-guard of Baird's column, Thomas finds orders to leave at this point Negley's division, and lead in great haste the three other divisions to the left of Crittenden, passing by the Glenn house. He will not rest his troops before reaching the highroad leading to Rossville. His left will rest on Kelly's farm, which, situated upon an eminence in the midst of an extensive glade or opening, commands the roads to the two bridges. Meanwhile, Crittenden will cause Palmer to pass to the left side of Van Cleve, leaving Wood to the right, so as to be close to Thomas. Finally, McCook arrives, in the place of Thomas, to mass his troops at Crawfish Springs. Mitchell's cavalry will cover the river above this point; the trains will seek a safe shelter in the Chattanooga Valley. McCook before setting out was joined by Lytle and two of his brigades; Post's brigade had remained at Stevens' Gap to defend this pass. Overtaken by night, and finding in the vicinity of Pond Springs the road obstructed with Thomas' wagons, McCook ordered his corps to bivouac for the night.

It was there that he received, at midnight, Rosecrans' despatch calling him to Crawfish Springs; but he had to wait until the road was open on the following morning. Johnson passes first; Davis and Sheridan were given orders to follow him. Thomas cannot, like McCook, give to his troops a season of rest, which is, however, very necessary on the eve of battle; the orders, of which he understands the importance, do not leave him at liberty to accord the needed rest. At every halting-place along the road the soldiers kindle large fires to counteract the chilliness which at

this season of the year suddenly succeeds the heat of the day; then they leave to those who are coming behind the care of keeping up these fires, and hasten to build others a little farther on. The live coals, abandoned one after another, continue to glow through the dark foliage of the forest, thus marking the progress of the long Federal column; while the Confederates, deceived by these appearances, ask one another in astonishment what is this army whose bivouac-fires are extending, with short intervals, along such a great stretch of ground.

The day was beginning to break when Baird, who was marching in advance, reached the Rossville road. Thomas immediately posted him at a point forward of this road, facing to the east, with his right brought back *en potence*. Brannan's march had been delayed by Palmer's division, which, while passing in front of him at Crawfish Springs, had become entangled in the column of the Fourteenth corps, and so remained until it had turned to the right. However, Brannan was not long in coming to take position to the left of Baird in front of Kelly's farm and on either side of the roads to the two bridges. By prolonging his right along the road Thomas would have met Wilder's brigade, which for five weeks had been separated from Reynolds' division; but this division, which later was to connect Wilder's brigade with Baird's command, had remained at the Glenn house to keep open, by the Dry Valley road, the communications with Crawfish Springs. In spite of its absence, the object of the night-march had been attained. The highroad was occupied in force; the Confederate left was confronted no longer by two, but by six Union divisions, for Palmer, having toward midnight turned over to Negley the care of guarding Crawfish Springs, had come up to take position before daybreak on the left of Van Cleve.

The Federal army was thus accomplishing a complete change of front, and was forming, by inversion in line of battle, on Wood, who, without leaving Gordon's Mills, was by this arrangement going to find himself posted on the extreme right. There was a considerable space separating the Twentieth corps from the Fourteenth; but the Twenty-first corps was soon to fill it. Daniel McCook's brigade of Granger's corps covered Baird's left. A little before daylight this brigade, having advanced as far as

Reed's Bridge and finding the bridge poorly guarded, had burned it. The night had then sufficed for Rosecrans to make up in a great measure for his imprudent march across Lookout Mountain.

But Halleck, who was aware of Rosecrans' excessive confidence, could not so promptly correct the consequences of their common error. He had heard, on the 13th of September, of the concentration of Bragg's army in the vicinity of La Fayette; on the same day General Foster had reported to him an unusual activity on the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, which was a sure sign of the transportation of troops detached from Lee's army. Again, Meade, having received orders to ascertain, even at the cost of a battle, the situation of that army, sent word on the ensuing morning that Longstreet's entire corps had left it for parts unknown. This was more than was necessary to reveal to Halleck the danger which was menacing the Army of the Cumberland. He then understood that Meade by his caution had allowed Lee to disperse with a part of his army; that Grant could not detain Johnston, whose traces he had lost for the past two months; that Burnside by occupying Knoxville had only restored liberty to Buckner; and that Rosecrans, urged alone by himself into the heart of a hostile country, was about to be crushed by forces flocking from the four corners of the Confederacy. To respond to this concentration he had immediately ordered a general resumption of hostilities and the sending of strong reinforcements to the Army of the Cumberland. But all his activity was not sufficient to retrieve the time that had been lost. It has been seen that Burnside, notwithstanding his proper disposition, was unable in a few days to recall his scattered forces and lead them from Knoxville to Chattanooga. It was the same everywhere. Halleck, seeing Bragg ready to resume offensive movements, had imagined that the latter, instead of hurling his troops on the Army of the Cumberland, would leave it behind him and pass to the southward, in order to try and recapture Nashville or even Vicksburg. He wished in that case that Burnside should come to Chattanooga, so as to allow Rosecrans to follow up the enemy, and that Grant should take his troops by railway to meet Bragg as far as Tusculumbia. There was nothing practical except the last part of this

plan. Once at Tusculumbia, Grant would at last have been enabled to give Rosecrans the co-operation which the latter had so vainly demanded up to that time. But Hurlbut at Memphis had only a few troops, and could not lead them beyond Corinth. The rest of the army, commanded by Sherman in the absence of Grant, who was ill at New Orleans, was near Vicksburg, while the despatches, carried by steamboats, reached it only very slowly. On the 18th, Sherman received Halleck's orders: time was required to prepare for their execution. Reinforcements were also requested of Schofield, who had a command in Missouri, and of Pope, who was watching the Indians on the frontier of Minnesota. Besides, orders were issued in the States of Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky to collect the men at the posts and recruiting-dépôts, together with small detachments, and to move them upon Tennessee. All these measures will be the means, if the occasion occur, of compensating for the disaster which threatens Rosecrans, but they will not give him one additional man on the battlefield.

Verily, the decisive moment has come. For the Union chiefs the night from the 18th to the 19th has passed too rapidly. Day-light, piercing through the thick foliage of the forest, dispels fallacious shadows and restores to objects their true proportions. It is the still hour when the hunter tracks his prey, when the lone sentinel should redouble his vigilance, when two confronting armies seek, watch each other, and prepare for the blows which each will deal.

CHAPTER IV.

CHICKAMAUGA.

BEFORE coming to the engagement between the Federals and the Confederates it is necessary to add some topographical details to the sketch already given of the field on which the hostile forces are going to meet. The reader will have readily understood the importance attaching to the highroad from Chattanooga to La Fayette *via* Rossville and Gordon's Mills. This road offers to the Federals the only sure and easy way of communication with their true base of operations, which they have so imprudently exposed. The price of the battle to be fought is the possession of this road. Its tactical importance is not less than its strategical value. At the time of the settlement of the country it was the principal artery of colonization, and the earliest farms were established along its winding track through the wilderness. The cultivated fields now bordering on the road form an almost unbroken succession of openings, some wide, others narrow, which offer easy passage to troops; while the edge of the woods presents defensible positions, with a choice for the east or the west side according to the grade and trend of the road and the density of the woods covering these positions.

Between Gordon's Mills and Kelly's house, a mile and a quarter from the road, one meets at first the fields belonging to the Vineyard farm, which, supplied with water by two brooks, extends on both sides of the road, in one section to the eastward and in another to the northward as far as a small farm-house. Then appear on a knoll the neighboring houses of McManus and Brotherton. One hundred rods from the latter may be seen Poe's, situate to the eastward of the road, almost in the middle of an opening nearly half a mile long and only a quarter of a mile distant from Kelly's farm. Between Poe's house and Brotherton's

there is a valley that twice crosses the road to the northward and the southward of Brotherton's place. A wood fringing this valley on the north and extending to a ridge of timbered land completely surrounds on the east the fields of Kelly's farm, which on that side cover an area about a quarter of a mile wide and three-quarters of a mile long from north to south. This stretch of hills and groves forms a semicircle a mile and a quarter in diameter, and crosses the road on the north not far from McDonald's house. At a short distance is the junction of the main road with the road leading from Reed's Bridge to McFarland's Gap. Thus this long opening under cultivation divides in two sections the space included between Missionary Ridge and the Chickamauga. On the river-side, in the principal bend at the upper part of which is Tedford's Ford, may be seen Hunt's plantation, with its fields abutting on the bank of the river. To the northward there is a thick grove crowned with rocky knobs and traversed by two roads which meet on the edge of the wood. To the westward this grove extends to the Vineyard fields and covers with its thick mantle of green a slight rise of ground parallel with the road, from which it is separated by a few hundred yards. At the point where Brotherton's house stands this ridge dips to the east, and, continuing along the left bank of the little stream which has its source between that house and Poe's, gradually rises, and farther on slopes to form the chain of hillocks around Kelly's farm. From the highest elevation there diverge toward the east inclines so gentle that they resemble a kind of undulating plateau, in the centre of which is McDaniel's farm. This plateau, timbered everywhere else and nearly fifteen hundred yards wide, is bounded on the east and south-east by cultivated fields through which runs a rivulet. A little more to the northward, above Jay's Mill, this plateau ends in a rocky and commanding cliff occupied by the Confederates on the evening of the 18th, and afterward, on the morning of the 19th, by Daniel McCook. The country around the mill up to Reed's Bridge is open and pretty well tilled. To the north of Kelly's farm the spur parallel with the road rises again, and forms a considerable knoll covered on the south and south-west with thickets. On the north and west, on the contrary, it is bounded by a creek flowing through

meadows and cultivated patches of land, across which the road passes near McDonald's house.

Between this road and the inclines of Missionary Ridge the forest is less thick and the ground less undulating. Beyond the woody heights which bound on the west the Vineyard farm is found the Dry Valley road—a name very appropriate to the nature of the soil in that locality. In the vicinity of Brotherton's house the woods are nearer the road, and encompass a field divided into two parts by a narrow border of trees. A dense clump of pines growing in a ravine-like hollow over an area some four or five hundred yards wide lies between this field and an extensive estate irrigated by a rill, and the property of John Dyer, an orderly on the staff of the Confederate general Preston. The reader will understand of what advantage to the Southern generals must be the active and intelligent co-operation of men acquainted, like Mr. Dyer, with the natural difficulties of the locality. Dyer's land under crop extends on the west to the Dry Valley road, which runs along the base of a considerable chain of hills parallel with Missionary Ridge, the bare declivities of which measure about forty yards from top to bottom.

On the south the fields are separated by orchards, openings, and a dense forest, amidst which is situated the Glenn house, itself being commanded by the slopes along the Dry Valley road. On the north-east the fields almost reach Kelly's farm; on the north they stretch pretty far, are intersected by a fence made of heavy timbers, and are finally bounded by the edge of a wood. A few hundred yards from this edge, beyond a considerable rise and fall of ground, lies the glade contiguous to the Snodgrass property. This undulation is the prolongation, perpendicular to the main road, of a high and steep knob that under the name of Horseshoe Hill, given to it by the Federals, will prove to be an important figure in our narrative. This hill of irregular shape, with furrowed slopes and flattened top, is separated from the principal heights of Missionary Ridge, the crest of which rises above the Glenn house, by a deep and narrow neck crossed by Dry Valley road. At the entrance to this neck of land, toward Crawfish Springs, stands the Villette or Villette house. On the south-eastern declivity of the hill the slopes, covered with brushwood, are

gentle toward the upper part, steep and jagged toward the base, thus forming a series of lesser hills which command a valley without water. The crest, with several notches, inclines slightly to the northward, rises abruptly on the south-east, and unites in the north-west gore of Dyer's farm with a high knob which closes the valley. This valley, opposite the escarpments of Horseshoe Hill, is narrowed by two hills separated only by a neck. The hill on the east is woody; the other is included in Dyer's farm, which it overlooks on the west. Between McFarland's Gap and Villette Neck the traveller meets no more glades, with the exception of a few bare elevations which he can hardly descry through the thick foliage of the forest.

It is upon this difficult ground that the two armies will meet in conflict. The Federals avail themselves of the daylight to reconnoitre the field, for they have been marching, as it were, in the dark, so that Thomas and Crittenden are ignorant of each other's position. Crittenden, apprised by Wilder and Minty of the presence of hostile forces on the west of the Chickamauga, believes himself to be threatened on the left. Palmer, who has just taken a position on that side on the road a thousand yards from Gordon's Mills, orders Grose's brigade to make a reconnoissance toward Kelly's farm and Reed's Bridge. On the other hand, Daniel McCook, who has just burned the bridge at Reed's, hastens to Thomas in order to acquaint him with what has occurred. Near the river he has observed one hostile brigade, probably Wilson's, which has crossed the ford at Shaelan's, and which Walker has left in the rear to escort his train; he mistakenly believes that the brigade is isolated and that it would be easy to capture it, the bridge being destroyed. But this erroneous report inspires Thomas with a resolution bold as well as fortunate. Without losing a moment, he decides to try the movement advised by McCook. If the enemy is weak, the occasion is good to obtain over him a partial success; if he is in force, he must be stopped at all hazards by striking a sudden blow without considering his numerical superiority. The two divisions which Thomas has in hand are ordered to advance toward the Chickamauga. On the left Brannan will send Connell's and Van Derveer's brigades to Dufferin's Ford, and Croxton's brigade directly to Reed's Bridge. It will be covered

on the side of Alexander's Bridge by Baird's division marching with its left deployed and its right thrown back in column. If this movement succeeds, Reynolds will come up to lengthen the line of battle of the Fourteenth corps on the highroad and help Wilder, whose cavalry will put him in communication with the Twenty-first corps. Brannan and Baird, after having allowed their tired soldiers a brief rest, take up the line of march a little before nine o'clock in the morning. An hour has elapsed since Daniel McCook left them to join his command: he finds it engaged with Davidson's mounted brigade, which Forrest has recalled to occupy again Reed's Bridge, and which has advanced dismounted as far as Jay's sawmill. But, having received fresh instructions from Granger, McCook has retired northward without waiting for the assistance that Thomas has promised him, and without even informing him of the hostile force that Thomas is to encounter.

The Confederates, it is true, do not expect the storm which is gathering on their extreme right, and continue without hurrying the movement which night has interrupted. Walker, leaving, as we have said, Wilson at Shaelan's Ford, has resumed at daybreak his march in the direction of Gordon's Mills. It is only toward eight o'clock that, hearing behind him Davidson's guns, he halts his column at Alexander's Bridge. Johnson's troops, which have bivouacked a thousand yards from the main road in the woods to the north-east of Hall's farm, have been reorganized at daybreak. Law, as commander of the division, has resumed the direction of Robertson's and Benning's brigades, together with his own, which he had already so gallantly led at Gettysburg. Fulton's, Gregg's, and McNair's brigades, all three, have passed again under Johnson's direct orders: these two divisions constitute Hood's army corps. He immediately rectifies their position. Law is on the right, facing the road; Johnson prolongs his front by bringing back his left in the rear. Hood does not know whether the recesses of the forest on that side conceal friend or foe. It is without his knowledge that Buckner's two divisions have established themselves not far from there on the left bank of the Chickamauga. In the dawn of the morning Stewart's division is gathered upon this bank near Bend's and

Tedford's fords, and at seven o'clock it advances in columns by brigades toward the north-west, so as to get out of the bend of the river. A short time afterward Preston has formed, in the same way, his three brigades in the field on Hunt's farm; but, following in the direction of Gordon's Mills, his troops run against one another at the bend of the river. He then takes an oblique course to the right, and proceeds to extend his front on the north-west. Buckner's corps, massed in three lines, finds itself placed perpendicularly to Hood's corps. Their skirmishers meet and only await from the general-in-chief the order to fire. Meanwhile, Cheatham's division, the strongest in the army, clears the ford at Dalton's on Preston's tracks: the crossing commenced at seven o'clock: two hours later the five brigades composing the division have taken position behind Buckner's corps. As early as nine o'clock more than two-thirds of the Southern army are on the left bank of the Chickamauga. The greater part of these forces have only between one and two thousand yards to go to reach the main road. The Federals, on the contrary, in order to defend this important line of communication could oppose to them only two incomplete detached army corps which, even if united, would be inferior in number to the Confederates. But Bragg, instead of pushing all his men forward, halts to allow his left wing to finish the conversion which must place it perpendicularly to the mill. This wing is made up only of Pegram's mounted division and Walker's four brigades, and its march has already been interrupted by the sound of the few guns fired near the river. The battle begins on the flank of this wing, contrary to the anticipation of the general-in-chief, who expected to see it reach the highroad without resistance.

Immediately after the retreat by Daniel McCook, Forrest has summoned to the mill Colonel Scott, who commands Pegram's second brigade. But Scott, being constrained to leave a part of his forces at the Red House Bridge in order to watch Steedman's division, whose approach is announced, brings with him only three or four hundred men. Before his arrival, toward half-past nine o'clock, Croxton falls unexpectedly upon Davidson's left. The Federals, wishing to surprise the adversary they seek, send out skirmishers only for a short distance. The Confederate cavalry

have some trouble in aligning their ranks. At last they re-form behind the sawmill, thanks to the efforts of their officers, and begin on foot a vigorous struggle with their assailants. Croxton soon realizes that he has to contend against powerful opposition: he gains no more ground, his ammunition gives out, his ranks become thin. But soon reinforcements from both sides flock to increase the importance of the battle. Forrest has called for the co-operation of Wilson's infantry, which Bragg has placed at his disposal, and he sends word to Polk to despatch to him Armstrong, who, with the second division of his cavalry corps, has remained on the east side of the Chickamauga. Thomas, on his side, recalls toward the sawmill all the forces he had deployed to the right and left. Van Derveer and Connell, not having met the enemy, and having heard the sound of the battle behind their right, immediately move in that direction. They soon encounter the extremity of Forrest's line, and would have easily broken it if he had not massed all his troops against them, which the arrival of Wilson enabled Forrest to do. Wilson, hastening to the assistance of Forrest's left, bore upon a hill to the south-west of the road to Alexander's Bridge; then, taking the place of the Southern cavalry, he caused Croxton's tired soldiers to retire. But Baird, having given support on the left, brings to the right of Croxton's men King's regular brigade, which soon renews the fight. Meantime, Forrest, leaving the command to Pegram, has gone to bring the delayed reinforcements. He finds Ector's brigade, which forms the rearguard in the reserve, and takes the responsibility of sending it to the assistance of the cavalry. Dibrell, with one of Armstrong's two brigades, arrives on the battlefield at the same time with Ector. These opportune arrivals restore the advantage to the Confederates, who withstand the combined assaults by Brannan's three brigades. This is a precarious advantage, however, for Brannan moves forward his reserves, and, supported by King, presses the enemy on all sides. The Southern cavalry, stimulated by the sight of the infantry, who have often heaped upon the cavalry their raillery, vie with them in deeds of courage and daring; but at last they must yield. Forrest hurls betimes upon the victorious Federals two regiments, the Twelfth and the Sixteenth Tennessee, which have remained mounted. This vigorous

charge caused many a cavalryman to bite the dust ; others are promptly brought forward, but they have extricated the rest of the force, which falls back and re-forms upon the rocky foot-hills occupied in the morning by Davidson. The Federals, on their side, halt to take breath and restore their line.

It is about midday. The two armies in presence of each other have yet met in conflict only upon this narrow strip of ground.

General Bragg, behind Hood's corps, has vainly waited for the end of the demonstration which he fancied his right wing was about to make. The best hours of the morning have thus been lost. It was only toward eleven o'clock that he heard of the check inflicted upon him by the enemy, but a mind quicker than his would have easily discovered the advantage he could take of this new situation. The Federals were appearing in force near the Chickamauga, about three or three and a half miles below Gordon's Mills ; a part of their army, encamped near and above the mills, was visible from the Confederate lines : hence this army was either divided or deployed on a very extended front. Good fortune had massed between the two extremities of this front more than one-half of the Southern army ; these forces might occupy the main road between Kelly's house and Gordon's Mills, while the rest would mass in the bend which it already held in an impregnable position. The troops were waiting only for the order to move forward, and could have easily cut in two the Federal army. But Bragg thought of nothing better than to weaken his centre so as to strengthen his right. Walker, who was the nearest to Forrest, received at eleven o'clock the order to go to his aid with all his force. A like order was sent at the same hour to Cheat-ham's strong division, which, as we have said, was held in reserve on the left behind Buckner. Finally, half or three-quarters of an hour later, when the news from the right became more alarming, Bragg directed Buckner to move Stewart's division again toward the same point. Thus, out of the seventeen brigades which formed his centre, collected in the bend of the river at only one thousand or twelve hundred yards from the main road, he was sending eight to seek the enemy two or three thousand yards to the right on the ground chosen by the latter, and was leaving the other nine brigades to await in inaction the result of

this singular manœuvre. While making his principal demonstration on the extreme right, he felt, it is true, the need of collecting all the army on the left bank of the Chickamauga; but it was very late to gather his forces so imprudently scattered. It was necessary, however, not to neglect anything to bring before dark on the battlefield the left wing, thereafter of no use on the east side of the river. At that time this wing was composed of Hill's corps, whose two divisions, under Breckinridge and Cleburne, were posted above Gordon's Mills, the first at Glass' Mill, and the second somewhat above; and of Hindman's division, which occupied the La Fayette road, watching the ford at Gordon's Mills. Polk, who was near this division, received only at one o'clock the order to bring two of his brigades over on the left bank through Hunt's Ford; Anderson's brigade had to remain opposite Gordon's Mills until relieved by Breckinridge. The latter, in his turn, after having been ordered from Glass' Mill to the La Fayette road, was not advised before three o'clock of the new position which had been assigned to him. Cleburne was also called up by Bragg: the order to cross Tedford's Ford reached him at one o'clock, but the distance was such that he was not able, as we shall see, to take part in the battle before sunset.

The Federals, fortunately for them, have a chief whose mind is more flexible than that of the chief of their adversaries. Rosecrans, by his promptness in changing the front of his army, endeavors to repair the great fault which he had committed on the preceding days. Crittenden has received the orders to defend at any cost his position, which covers Gordon's Mills on the north and east, for it is the pivot for the entire army. He occupies a front line only one mile in length. On the west, Minty's cavalry has reported to Crittenden the presence of the enemy's outposts; it has even captured one of Bragg's orderlies, which is deemed proof that a great movement is preparing on that side. The commander of the Twenty-first corps, being uneasy, has recalled Grose's brigade, which he had sent to reconnoitre in that direction. The Twentieth corps, Negley's division of the Fourteenth corps, and Mitchell's cavalry are at Crawfish Springs. Toward ten o'clock Rosecrans, on leaving this point, has given to McCook, with the command of the right wing, the order to send Johnson's

division to the aid of Thomas: it will occupy the centre of the new Federal line until the whole Twentieth corps can place itself there and thus strongly bind the two wings together. Johnson, who was recalled in the night from the right bank of the Chickamauga, where he was watching above Owen's Ford the Catlett's Gap road, immediately set out for his new destination. Rosecrans has established his headquarters at the Glenn house. He keeps near him in reserve, but deployed, Reynolds' command, which had arrived after the beginning of the battle on the left. The information which Thomas transmits to him of this battle has quickly enlightened him. The fight will have commenced before he has accomplished his change of front, and to avoid a crushing defeat he must hurl as quickly as possible all his forces into the open space which separates Thomas from Gordon's Mills. He sends word to McCook to despatch Davis' division after Johnson's, and gets ready to call up a part of the Twenty-first corps. But Crittenden happily anticipates his orders. Toward eleven o'clock, hearing the increasing sound of the battle on his left, and believing that the enemy does not think of attacking him in front, he sends Palmer's division by the main road to aid Thomas. Rosecrans approves the movement, and directs him, besides, to send Minty's cavalry to the west of Kelly's farm to act as scouts for the extreme left of the army on the Rossville road.

However, the Confederate reinforcements will be the first to appear on the battlefield. At midday the fight which had commenced at the sawmill flagged somewhat, as we have said. Thomas supposes that he is protected on his left flank, for on that side his aides have reported to him the presence of Grose's scouts. Two hours before Grose had advanced as far as Baird's position without being aware of his retreat. He calls to the centre Starkweather's brigade, and thus exposes his right at the moment when a fresh adversary is preparing to attack him. Indeed, on Bragg's order Walker has rapidly moved to the assistance of Forrest, who, having already summoned Ector, has only one division left. Liddell, the commander of this division, deploys his two brigades, with Walthall to the right and Govan to the left, and thus advances toward the north. At fifteen minutes past noon Baird sights that long hostile line perpendicular to his which is

going to take him in flank and rear. He immediately strives to change his line of battle. King brings his right back to the rear, resting to the left on Brannan's right. Baird, having come up to Scribner, who is the most exposed, endeavors to form on the right, in line of battle, his regiments, which, marching by the flank, have considerably stretched out; but the wood which surrounds the Federals allows them neither to choose a defensive position nor to use their guns to keep their assailants off. Starkweather is not there to support Scribner's line. Before the latter has time to complete his dispositions Govan's soldiers, coming up on a run, fall upon him, capture his battery, rout his troops, and after a very short struggle drive them in the utmost disorder. King, who finds himself a little behind on the left, while changing front is likewise surprised some minutes later by Walthall. No forming of lines is possible. The regular infantry, assailed and entirely surrounded, group themselves by companies or regiments. They make a desperate fight: gunners are killed at their pieces; but resistance is useless. More than two hundred wounded and nearly five hundred prisoners are taken by Walthall; the remnants of the brigade are driven upon Starkweather, who has had time to place himself on the defensive. Liddell, who has suffered but little, encouraged by his success, concentrates his forces against Starkweather. Notwithstanding the example of the fugitives, whom Baird vainly endeavors to rally, Starkweather's soldiers hold their ground and begin a fight which this time is equal in slaughter. In the mean time, Walker, resuming the command of his two other brigades, has given them the order for a renewed attack on Brannan. The latter, no longer supported by King, sees his line broken in the centre and Van Derveer separated from Croxton. Connell's brigade is cut in two. Starkweather also begins to weaken. The situation becomes very grave for the Federals. Two Confederate brigades have in half an hour changed the face of the battle.

Hence, Palmer cannot come more opportunely. In pursuance of Crittenden's orders, he has followed the main road, and soon unites with Grose, who was coming back after having picked up some of Forrest's scouts. The increasing sound of the battle caused Palmer to move rapidly over the two or three thousand yards of

ground which separated him from McManus' house. Having reached this point, he forms on the right in line of battle, and, following the directions of Rosecrans, who amid the smoke of the conflict never forgets the theory of evolutions, he causes each brigade, formed in two lines, to make a quarter-wheel to the left, resting against the road. The three brigades are thus placed *en échelon*—Hazen on the left in front, Cruft in the centre, Grose in the rear—a hundred steps from one another, and are moved in an oblique direction, which will bring them on Liddell's flank in the woods south and south-east of McDaniel's house. Palmer, not wishing to risk his artillery upon such unfavorable ground, leaves it in the glades adjacent to the road. Hazen is naturally the first to meet the enemy. A little before one o'clock he falls abruptly upon Govan's flank and extricates Starkweather's brigade from the grasp of the enemy. At the same time, Brannan, on the extreme left, feeling no longer pressed by the enemy, has brought to the rear his divided forces, collected them, and, in obedience to orders from Thomas, he hurls Van Derveer upon the flank of Walthall's brigade. The Confederate lines, thus taken on both sides at one time, are soon shaken; the assailants capture most of the enemy's trophies, five pieces of the regular battery and all those belonging to Loomis' battery—a battery renowned in the Union army on account of its brilliant record and for having shared in Scribner's disaster. Liddell's division, unable to hold its own between two fires, gives way and quickly abandons the field. Brannan, fatigued, comes to a halt. Hazen, on the contrary, follows up Govan closely, while Palmer brings forward to his right his two other brigades. It is a little after one o'clock: Fortune seems to smile anew upon the Federals, who briskly push back their adversaries and take many prisoners.

At the moment when, reinforced by Cruft and Grose, they are preparing to issue from the wood which surrounds McDaniel's house, they come in conflict on the edge of the neighboring fields with Cheatham's first line. Cheatham has made forced marches, but the deployment of his five brigades on two lines in the middle of the woods has caused him to lose time, and he arrives too late to take advantage of Liddell's temporary suc-

cess. Instead of concentrating, as Liddell did, all his forces to strike an irresistible blow upon a narrow front, Cheatham wants to cover with the three brigades of his first line all the ground upon which Walker's two divisions have successively fought. This extension of Cheatham's lines weakens his forces by reducing their reserves. Jackson, on the right, passes beyond Ector's and Wilson's brigades, which, exhausted and decimated, had given up the struggle an hour before. He then advances against Brannan, whose soldiers are not less weary than their opponents. Preston Smith, in the centre, attacks Hazen through the corner of the wood with his wonted vigor: these two antagonists, worthy of each other, have inspired with their valor the soldiers under their command. Fields watered by a creek fringed with trees extend between the two hostile lines. Federals and Confederates have hardly come into the presence of one another when, boldly issuing from the shelter of the forest, they spring forward to gain this border of trees and thence advance against the opposite edge of the wood. But after a struggle all the more bloody because it took place upon open ground, neither of the two can hold its own near the creek, now red with blood. On the left, Wright faces Cruft's brigade, which is supported at a distance by Grose's brigade; the two, separated by the meadows which fringe the wood, exchange shots at long range without daring to come out of the copse. The Southern artillery, posted on the left upon the bare extremity of the little ridge which commands the fields to the southward, inflicts serious losses upon the Federals, whose guns are too distant to respond. Cheatham's second line, consisting of Maney's command on the right and Strahl's on the left, is far in the rear.

However, Van Derveer, threatened on his flank, has had time to wheel to the east. It is true that the fresh troops brought up by Jackson through the woods cause his ill-posted left to yield; but, taking the offensive with his right, he opens upon these troops an oblique fire which makes them pay dear for their first success. Brannan brings to his aid a part of Connell's brigade, and the fight is protracted with advantage for the Unionists, who are, besides, soon reinforced all along the line. Rosecrans has put Reynolds in motion in succession after Johnson as soon as the latter has passed the Glenn house. These two divisions advance rapidly.

Toward half-past one o'clock, Johnson, who has reached the high-road, appears on the field of Baird's late disaster, and relieves Brannan, who goes with Baird to re-form in the rear near Kelly's farm. Johnson's first two brigades, with Willich to the right and Baldwin to the left, drive Jackson before them. The third, under Dodge, which was in reserve, leaving its position, moves more to the north to aid Hazen, who withstands with difficulty the combined forces directed against him by Cheatham. The latter has brought up Strahl's brigade, which relieves the weary soldiers of Preston Smith. Jackson yields under Johnson's redoubled blows, but the timely arrival of Morrison with Armstrong's second mounted brigade enables Forrest to make a new effort to support Jackson. Hence the fighting is fiercely renewed throughout this field, already marked with blood. The two contending parties seek each other in the wood, where they can come to close quarters, avoiding the openings, where the grapeshot fire from the artillery posted on the edge of the wood renders the offensive equally dangerous to both.

Jackson, pressed on all sides, at last gives way. Fortunately for him, Cheatham, who still has in reserve Maney's brigade, makes it fall in line and checks the victorious march of the Federals. Maney has placed himself in advance of the position which Forrest continues to occupy, partly upon the extremity of the timbered height that forms this position, and, to the left, partly in the meadows near the sawmill. He vigorously attacks Johnson, whose troops upon a rise of ground on the west cover the edge of the wood behind abatis made probably the evening before by the Confederate soldiers. While Maney inaugurates with the Federals a hand-to-hand conflict, their left, making an irruption over his lines, threaten to double his rear. Forrest sends Dibrell's brigade to help him. But the dismounted cavalry on the extreme right, notwithstanding their good position and the support received from a battery, are soon and sharply pressed by the Unionists: they give way, and Maney, constrained to imitate them, deems himself fortunate when he sees his retrograde move covered by Dibrell's comparatively fresh troops. He falls back beyond the sawmill, and Johnson, feeling unsupported on the right, does not dare to follow him up so far.

Maney's retreat causes a like movement on the part of Strahl. The latter has already seen his left uncovered by the rout of its neighbor, Wright's brigade. Posted upon a slight elevation in a strong position, he might nevertheless have yet held out if, at the time when Jackson was giving way, Cheatham had not sent him orders to bear to the right so as to support Jackson. In the midst of this dangerous flank movement Strahl's right has come into collision with Johnson's soldiers on the ground where it expected to meet friendly troops. This unforeseen shock has thrown into confusion the entire brigade, which beats a hasty retreat, leaving more than two hundred dead on the ground. However, Strahl has been able to re-form his ranks and carry out the orders of his chief, thanks to the arrival of Maney, who covers his right. But the latter, after three-quarters of an hour's fighting, when he is in turn repulsed, sees himself obliged to follow Strahl in his retreat. Cheatham, in order to give the fugitives time to rally, again moves Jackson's and Smith's soldiers to the front. These troops, being hardly recovered from their recent reverses, need, fortunately, but little exertion to check the Unionists, who are themselves exhausted.

Wright, on the left, has suffered, as we have said, a still greater reverse than the rest of the division. In fact, the advent of new Federal forces has changed the face of the struggle which he was keeping up, with varying success, since one o'clock in the afternoon against Cruft and Grose. A little before eleven o'clock, Thomas, seeing the battle seriously commenced, and wrongly believing that Palmer was already in line beside him, had wished to finish closing to the enemy the breach which separated him from the Twenty-first army corps. He had asked Crittenden to take charge of this operation with a second division of that corps. The despatch had reached its destination about half-past eleven o'clock; Palmer was on the way, and Crittenden had waited only for the authority from the general-in-chief to respond to Thomas' request by sending to the left Van Cleve with two of his brigades. His haste was justifiable, for he had just learned that the messengers despatched after Palmer had not been able to overtake him; they had been halted by Wright's scouts: Palmer was then engaged with an enemy who

threatened to cut in two the Federal army, and there was a pressure of necessity to assist Palmer.

Van Cleve, having been put on the road a little before one o'clock, reaches about two o'clock the Brotherton house, and is arrayed, like Palmer, on the right in line of battle. Dick, on the right, and Samuel Beatty, on the left, cross the wood in line, notwithstanding its thickness, and fall abruptly upon Wright's left flank. The Confederates cannot stand the shock dealt by these fresh adversaries: after an unequal contest they retire from the field, and leave in the hands of the enemy the battery of artillery attached to the brigade, a flag or two, and a goodly number of prisoners. But the Federals, having bought their success at the price of many losses, are satisfied with repulsing the enemy on the left and clearing on the right the threatened road.

However, the two generals-in-chief vie with each other in activity to bring all their forces upon a field designated by the chance of a first encounter for the theatre of the decisive struggle. Rosecrans has stolen a march upon his adversary; besides, the causeway and the Dry Valley road, prolonged by Glenn's cross-road, offer him separate ways of communication, which, starting from the two points occupied in the morning by the bulk of the army, converge upon the battlefield. He avails himself of these advantages, and is anxious to retain them. Bragg endeavors to repair or retrieve his hesitations and to collect before night all his army upon the western shore of the Chickamauga. But his left wing is far away, and crossing the fords will delay it; his centre is bare and powerless, and he can no longer act offensively except by concentrating all his efforts on the right.

During all the forenoon Buckner's and Hood's corps have remained idle: Walker in beginning the fight on the extreme right has completely separated himself from Hood. Cheatham, while relieving the reserve corps, shall not be able to unite it with his neighbor on the left. To fill the gap thus formed, Bragg issues to Buckner, about noon, orders to send near Walker, Stewart's division, which is massed on the left in the fields belonging to Hunt's farm. These orders, although verbally repeated by the general-in-chief, are yet so vague that Stewart marches at random, following across the wood the direction indicated by the report of

the guns. He vainly looks for Polk, to whom Bragg has entrusted the command of the right, and at last arrives in the fields which stretch beyond Cheatham's left shortly after the reverse which Van Cleve has given him.

Rosecrans, upon the renewed entreaties of Crittenden, has directed him to send Wood's division and Barnes' brigade—that is to say, all the troops which he has kept with him near Gordon's Mills—to the succor of the two other divisions of the Twenty-first army corps engaged on the left. The reports of Crittenden and Wood do not agree as to the hour when this order was given. The former conveys the idea that it was before two o'clock; the latter indicates three o'clock. The truth, we believe, lies between the two conflicting statements, although the bitter criticisms against his chief with which Wood has filled his report naturally put us on our guard against him. At the very moment, so fraught with gravity, when Cheatham's left threatens to surround Palmer, Rosecrans has summoned to him all the rest of his army, thus sacrificing the defence of the Chickamauga above Gordon's Mills to arrest at any price the progress of the enemy on the left bank. Since the departure of Davis, who is going to fall into line on the right of Van Cleve, McCook has remained at Crawfish Springs with Negley's and Sheridan's infantry divisions and Mitchell's cavalry. These are the forces which Rosecrans calls up to oppose Bragg, who has directed his left wing to try and detain them by heavy demonstrations above Gordon's Mills. But Helm's brigade of Breckinridge's division alone has crossed the river at Glass' Ford with a battery about nine o'clock. It attacked only after eleven o'clock John Beatty's brigade,* placed by Negley somewhat back of the ford, and was recalled by Breckinridge after an insignificant skirmish. The cannonade, more slaughterous, begun across the river by Hill's artillery ceased toward noon, and nothing any longer detains McCook's troops opposite the positions already abandoned in part by their adversaries.

Before two o'clock, Rosecrans, who doubtless wishes to be able promptly to bring Wood back to the left, has determined to have him relieved at Gordon's Mills. He has entrusted the execution

* Care must be taken not to confound John Beatty's brigade of Negley's division with Samuel Beatty's brigade of Van Cleve's division.

of this movement to Sheridan, and has set Negley to guard Crawfish Springs. About half-past three o'clock these two last-named generals receive orders to fall in line. Negley, following the tracks of the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps, will arrive on the battlefield by the most direct route. Sheridan, leaving only Lytle's brigade, which had become the extreme right, to occupy Gordon's Mills, will rest on the left, with the two other brigades, to fight by the side of Wood.

If Rosecrans had delayed one hour to make these dispositions, his defeat would have been inevitable. Bragg, witnessing already four divisions of infantry and two of cavalry engaged on the right, and knowing that Cleburne had commenced crossing the river to unite with him, decided, without waiting any longer, to engage Rosecrans' centre.

Until now the numerous forces which he has collected at this point have allowed themselves to be amused by vain demonstrations. Since the departure of Stewart, Buckner's batteries and those of Wood exchange a cannonade but little destructive, and the encounter of the two opposing lines of outposts has caused only barren alarms. Toward half-past one o'clock a more serious attack has called to arms Johnson's Confederate division.* His skirmishers have been sharply repulsed upon Gregg's line, no doubt by Van Cleve's right, at the time when the latter was going to aid the Federal left. But while Gregg was re-forming his first line—which for a moment was shaken—the Federals moved away, following the general direction of their column. It is at this time, about half-past two o'clock, that Hood finally receives orders to assume the offensive. Law, who has yet no adversary before him, obliques to the right, and is guided by the sound of the fight waged against Van Cleve. Johnson orders his troops to follow this move, each brigade making a half-conversion.

We have left Stewart's Confederate division marching in line of battle, not without difficulty, across the woods in a northerly direction. At half-past two o'clock it has reached the edge of

* This Southern Confederate general is often designated by his first name, *Bushrod*, to distinguish him from his namesake [Richard W.], who commanded a division in the Federal army, and also from Edward Johnson, who served under Lee in the East.

the field beyond which Strahl and Preston Smith stand with difficulty against the redoubled blows dealt by Hazen and Dodge. When on the point of entering this field, Clayton, who forms the left, learns that the Federals are upon his flank: it is Van Cleve's first line, which is advancing perpendicularly to his front. To parry this danger he promptly forms his brigade in the rear in battle-array on his left, and, marching westward, soon encounters the remnants of Wright's troops, which the Federals drive before them as lively as they can through the thickness of the underbrush. Clayton's brigade consists entirely of raw soldiers. But they are numerous, well officered, and go under fire with the ardor which the ignorance of danger sometimes imparts. A fight, almost muzzle to muzzle, begins between them and Van Cleve's two weak brigades: the two opposing lines come in conflict, separate, close again, each new shock being marked by a train of dead and wounded, without a serious break in either line. While Clayton was thus changing front, Stewart, with a view of supporting Wright, ordered the rest of his division to perform a like manœuvre. It is thus formed nearly into a column of brigades, Brown in the centre and Bate in the rear. The fight having slackened at the north, Stewart holds his two brigades in readiness either to relieve Clayton or to cover his left; for it is on that side, as we shall presently show, that the battle is now waxing fiercer.

After three-quarters of an hour Clayton is exhausted; his untrained soldiers have commenced with a terrible experience: nearly four hundred of them are strewn upon the ground in the dense underbrush, the field of their first exploits. About a quarter-past three o'clock Brown takes their place and reaps the fruit of their efforts: he easily checks, then in his turn attacks, Van Cleve's two brigades, which have likewise sorely suffered. But the Federals also receive reinforcements. Reynolds, coming by another route, strikes the highroad more to the north than Van Cleve, and shortly after him King's brigade and Turchin's are with him. Reynolds finds on the ground Wilder's brigade, from which he has been separated since the commencement of the campaign. Turchin goes to relieve Hazen, whose ammunition is out; King and the division batteries remain near the artillery which Palmer has left on the road. Davis has followed Reynolds closely, meets

him on reaching that road, and, in accordance with his advice, turns to the south to go and post himself to the right of Van Cleve and cover him on the side of the Vineyard farm; for Van Cleve, hotly pressed, has called upon Reynolds for aid. A desperate struggle ensues between these tired troops and Brown's brigade in the wood where the latter has relieved Clayton. Resiniferous trees, dried by the great heat of summer, have ignited, and the pungent smoke of the conflagration, blending with the smell of powder, envelops the combatants with a thick cloud. Ere long, Law's right wing takes part in this struggle. The Federals under Dick cannot stand this last onslaught; they give way, and expose, on their left, Samuel Beatty, who is obliged to follow them. These two brigades, defending themselves step by step, draw near the road. Some pieces of artillery which have ventured with these brigades in the wood fall into the hands of the enemy. But when Brown wants to follow them in the fields to the east of the road not far from McManus' house, his right is struck obliquely by the Union guns which Reynolds has posted to the north, his front is battered by Palmer's artillery, and he is thrown in disorder into the undergrowth whence he had attempted to emerge. The Federal line, reinforced by Grose's brigade, which Palmer has just sent to its assistance, re-forms, gains the edge of the field, and posts itself in the woods. It is half-past three.

Meanwhile, Stewart has moved to the right of Brown his third brigade under Bate; falling unexpectedly upon Turchin, this brigade drives him back upon Cruft, and in less than ten minutes the Federals are dislodged from all their positions. However, this is a surprise from which they promptly recover. The American soldier, as we have often said, possesses the rare merit of not allowing himself to be carried away by those panics to which the best troops are sometimes exposed. Turchin and Cruft renew the fight and take some prisoners from Bate. But the latter, instead of waiting for their onset, inclines to the left and comes to take Brown's place opposite Van Cleve. Reynolds hastily despatches the greater part of King's brigade to aid Van Cleve. Grose unites with King's brigade. However, these are futile efforts. Van Cleve's soldiers, chased at the point of the bayonet, rush like a torrent toward the

road, and cross it between Palmer's and Reynolds' batteries, leaving in this tumultuous retreat King and Grose on their right and Hazen on their left.

It is four o'clock, and a critical moment, for Stewart cannot allow his adversaries time to recover. Clayton's soldiers, witnessing the flight of the enemy who had caused them such painful losses, return to the battle with fresh ardor. They soon form on the left of Bate, whose front inclines more and more to the right. Brown, who closely follows, aligns with them, but is checked by the fire from Hazen, who, resting his left against the McManus house, has made a quarter-wheel forward to his right, so as to command with an oblique fire the approaches to the road. On the other side, to the north of the Brotherton house, Bate comes in conflict with Grose's and King's troops, who receive his shock in good order and repulse his right after a very sharp contest. But during that time Bate's left, following up Van Cleve's soldiers, has entered the space lying between Reynolds and Hazen. Wilder's cavalry, which alone occupies this gap, is dispersed: the Confederates reach the road and proceed beyond it. They are masters of the long line against which the Federals have rested throughout the battle, drive them into the woods to the west of Brotherton's farm, and pick up a few pieces of artillery, with many prisoners. Availing themselves of this success, Bate and Clayton throw themselves forward, the one to the right, the other to the left, to double the rear of the two fragments of the enemy's line which they have just broken. Vainly do Grose and Hazen arrange their lines in the form of a T to resist Bate and Clayton. The Union army would infallibly have been cut in two if the artillery which had remained on the road instead of being, as the victors hoped, an easy prey, had not become for the Federals a supreme instrument of rescue. Reynolds has seen the danger to which are exposed his cannon posted rather distant from any support. He rallies a part of Van Cleve's men, and forms a nucleus which rapidly increases, so that when the Confederates spring forward to attack the opposing lines, the fourteen pieces, supported by musketry, receive them with a deadly fire, before which they fall back. This rough lesson is not enough for the Confederates. Unable to approach the enemy's artillery in

front, they try to turn it by the west of the road, where it has lost all support. But Reynolds, quickly removing the batteries, plants them upon the edge of the wood perpendicularly to the road. A fresh attack is repelled like the preceding; the Union line is consolidated and fugitives return to their ranks. Grose, falling back, comes to reinforce the Federals, while Cruft, who has suffered less, regains ground on the left.

Hazen, on his side, has had the same thought with Reynolds. Seeing Palmer's four batteries without support on the road, while the enemy comes immediately after Van Cleve, he leaves for a few moments his brigade, which cannot follow him, promptly joins these batteries, and places them in a commanding position. Meantime, Wilder's cavalry, collecting the stragglers who fill the glade, brings them back to the guns and forms behind them an imposing force. While Clayton, resting on the left, believes that he has only an easy victory to win, the twenty pieces, which by Hazen's orders have allowed him to draw near, open a volleying fire into his ranks, already thinned out. The Confederates, thus battered on their two flanks, can no longer advance through the breach which they have opened: most of those who have crossed the road are compelled to return, and Reynolds takes possession of it. Toward half-past four o'clock the battle dwindles into a simple fusillade: no more charges across fields to capture cannon; no more struggles at short range in the woods.

However, on either side the contestants make haste and seek to surprise one another. Thomas, to make amends for the disaster which came near separating him from the rest of the army, hurriedly strips his extreme left; Brannan, posted on Kelly's farm, is summoned near Reynolds; Baird, leaving the regulars alone on the Reed's Bridge road in positions which the enemy no longer threatens, will rest on the right with his two other brigades, to give help to Johnson and enable the latter to press close upon Palmer. But the artillery has not been able to completely arrest the stream of Confederates rushing past the road. The Southern troops which first caused Dick's line to give way have effected a breach between Davis' left and Hazen's right: these troops unite with those which have passed to the left of Hazen and advance westward, meeting with little resistance, for there is on that side

no organized Union force, except perhaps near Rosecrans' headquarters, where he keeps as a last reserve Negley's division, which arrived a few moments before.

We must now go back an hour or two to describe the battle on the Vineyard farm and in its vicinity. About three o'clock Davis reaches this extensive glade with two brigades, the third having remained at Stevens' Gap. Rosecrans urges him to seek the left flank of the enemy, whom Van Cleve engages in front. To this end, Davis deploys his troops in advance of the highroad, with Heg in the wood which bounds the farm at the north-east, Carlin at his right on the edge of the wood, and the artillery still more to the right upon a commanding point in the middle of fields. Carlin advances first; Heg will follow him at a distance, so as to place the brigades *en échelon* and be able, by a half-wheel, to bring the line obliquely upon the enemy's left wing. But this wing is in motion, and the conflict of the two commands prevents Davis from accomplishing his manœuvre. Hood, who has ordered his two divisions to perform a similar move to turn the rear of Van Cleve's right, is also interrupted pending this change of direction. On the left, Johnson has two brigades in front and one brigade on the second line, but his front is convex—Gregg, to the left, facing the south-west, and Fulton, on the right, looking to the west. The latter, in conformity to orders received, rests on the right and is contiguous to Law's division. Gregg wishes at once to follow Fulton's move and remain linked to Preston, who is motionless on his left: the front of the brigade lengthens out, becomes thin, and threatens to break. Before Gregg has time to draw closer the lines in the front of the brigade the fight suddenly begins with Carlin in the wood which separates Hall's place from the Vineyard farm, while Fulton, not having yet met Heg, continues on his march. Soon, however, the fight extends to these two commands. The Confederate artillery has not been afraid to penetrate into the thicket; it advances, and, firing by sections, sorely tries the Unionists. Davis resists, but is soon unequal to the contest. Law, who with two brigades has just dealt a finishing blow to Van Cleve, has allowed Stewart's division to pursue him on the right. Law advances toward the road, and his left brigade falls upon the extremity of

Davis' line, which is deprived of any support on that side and is already engaged with Fulton. The Federals are crushed ; the gallant Heg meets his death while encouraging his soldiers. Davis' right is not less involved. Johnson, seeing Gregg's line ready to break, in order to support it has caused McNair's brigade to advance : this brigade, taking a position in the centre, vigorously renews the fight. The break, it is true, is accomplished by this very move : two of Gregg's regiments follow Fulton to the right, the rest of the brigade leaning more and more to the left with McNair, who falls upon Carlin's right flank and forces it to give way. Thus, Davis' two wings are brought back to the rear. The centre escapes the attack, but will be able to maintain its position only through prompt assistance. Therefore, Barnes could not have arrived more opportunely than he did from Gordon's Mills with Van Cleve's third brigade. He took the road at the same time with Wood, and his position enables him to pass him. He forms to the right of Carlin on the edge of the wood, and checks Gregg and McNair, who already threaten the division artillery, which is supported by a single regiment.

Wood follows Barnes closely with his two brigades, having trusted Sheridan with the occupation of Gordon's Mills. In pursuance of Crittenden's orders, Wood was going to form on Barnes' right when he received a pressing call from Davis. Heg's men, who have just seen their chief fall, are in full retreat. Before manœuvring, this disaster must be arrested. Wood has only time to form Harker's troops behind Davis' left on the road ; he has hardly entered the wood when the crowd of fugitives, precipitating itself upon his left, makes it evident that he is too late to save Heg's brigade. He immediately faces about to receive the onset of Fulton, who is closely following up the routed Unionists. But while his right is advancing, his left, which has remained as a pivot on the road, is itself threatened, and he is obliged to bring it back to the rear, aligned in the form of a T on both sides of the road. In this position he commences a desperate fight with Fulton's left and that part of Gregg's brigade which has followed it. Farther north, Van Cleve's guns, rescued from his disaster, are removed back of the road. Although unsupported, they check Fulton's right and

annoy the detachments which on the south have turned Hazen's position. Wood's second brigade, commanded by Colonel Buell, was closely in Harker's train; Wood has placed it in the middle of the fields forward of the road, near the Vineyard farm, ready to support Carlin and Barnes. Both of the latter resist the repeated assaults by Gregg and McNair. Gregg falls wounded into their hands. Hood moves against them Robertson's brigade, until then held in reserve, consisting of choice soldiers whom he has himself led to the slopes of Round Top on the field of Gettysburg. Robertson comes upon Carlin, rescues Gregg, and carries everything before him. The Federals, routed, fall pell-mell upon Buell's men, who cannot return the enemy's fire lest they kill their comrades. They try to charge the enemy, but the mass of fugitives carries them away, without being able to fight, as far as the wood which bounds the farm, about two hundred yards to the west of the road. More to the right, Barnes has also been repulsed, and the batteries of Wood's division have hastily fallen back: one of them falls into the hands of the enemy.

This was at the point in the progress of events where we left off our narrative a little while ago—a critical moment for the Federals. True, their left, to which Bragg has directed his first and greatest efforts, has finally tired the assailants; but the centre has met with a reverse the consequences of which have been lessened only by the intervention of the artillery, while the right is in full flight. The road which forms the base of defence for the Union army is at several points occupied by the Confederates. These are, however, exhausted: they have worn themselves out on the left by fruitless attacks. To derive any benefit after so many sacrifices, Bragg should be enabled to renew the fight with fresh troops. He has in hand two divisions—Preston's, which on the left, near Gordon's Mills, exchanges shots with Sheridan; and Hindman's, which, having before three o'clock crossed the river more to the right, also receives the shot of the enemy without any good return in the position recently occupied by Johnson. These troops await only a signal to achieve the victory. Bragg does not give the signal. He only orders Preston to send Trigg's brigade to aid Johnson. He persists in his original design, and wishes to dislodge the enemy's left before following up his success

against the centre and the right of the Federals. Therefore he directs Cleburne, whose division has just finished crossing the river at Tedford's Ford, to go and relieve, on the extreme right, Walker and Cheatham : thus he causes Cleburne almost to turn his back upon the field, hard by, of the desperate and decisive battle engaged on the Vineyard farm, in order to send him by difficult ways, at twice the distance, to resume against a victorious and favorably-posted enemy a struggle in which have been worn out all the forces till then massed on that side. Until Cleburne can join it a new effort is imposed upon this wing, already so weary. While Jackson's brigade was the most sharply pressed, Polk ordered Liddell to support it on the right. Liddell, placing Walthall to the right of Govan, advances about four o'clock in a western direction to attack the enemy on the flank : he thus returns to the very field of his first battle in a position almost perpendicular to that which he occupied in the morning. But his troops have not the ardor they had then, while the spectacle of the dead and wounded who cover the ground discourages them all the more. Besides, Jackson has given up the fight before Liddell is seriously engaged. Walthall follows up a part of Willich's Federal brigade, which falls back by order from Johnson ; but, finding a good position, it makes a stand, and after ten minutes compels Walthall to retreat. Govan, to his right, has before him only the scouts of the regular brigade, but he does not succeed in even joining it. His left becomes confused. A Confederate battery, firing upon him by mistake, completes the disorder, and Liddell re-forms with difficulty his division, which this attempt has disorganized.

However, Bragg's fault soon bears fruit. Thanks to the respite he has accorded them, the Federal centre and right, which seemed lost, receive timely reinforcements. By sending Brannan from the extreme left to aid the centre, Thomas has given proof of that military instinct which in him was united to an indomitable tenacity. Croxton with a brigade of this division joins Reynolds at the very moment when the latter has checked the enemy by the fire from his artillery, and, turning to the left, he helps Reynolds regain possession of the road.

Rosecrans moves Negley's division against the hostile detach-

ments which have penetrated, as far as the vicinity of the Glenn house, into the wood which separates Dyer's farm from the cultivated fields near the road. Stanley's brigade, supported by Sirwell's brigade, easily repulses the Confederates, who feel that they are not supported. But instead of pressing them closely Negley remains with his division, as it were, lost in the thicket, and allows night to overtake him without having found either Reynolds and Palmer on the left or Davis and Wood on the right.

Fortune commences also to prove more favorable to Davis and Wood. Harker, assailed by superior forces, has gradually lost ground, but his left, thrown back beyond the road, finds a support with Heg's soldiers near the batteries, which cover the assailants with canister. His right still occupies, to the northward of the Vineyard farm, the woods which border this same road. However, opposite Harker, Fulton, believing that he was still supported on the left by Gregg, bears to the right and causes a part of his force, following a fringe of trees perpendicular to the road, to reach as far as behind the Federal cannon posted in a field to the north of this fringe. The Confederates spring upon this prey, which they believe assured to them; already the Unionists take away the wheels of their gun-carriages and abandon their cannon,—when Harker, bringing back his right along the road, debouches from the wood upon Fulton's rear. The latter is so taken by surprise that he advances without suspicion toward the enemy, and proceeds so near that he hears the Federal officers give the order to fire. This fire, playing obliquely upon his left, throws it into disorder. The panic spreads throughout the brigade, which runs away, leaving about one hundred prisoners in the hands of the assailants. Fulton has great difficulty in rallying the brigade. At last he restores its line with the right by the road, the left refused and facing the south. But soon, not being supported from any side, he returns to take position in the woods amid which he commenced the fight, and where Harker takes care not to seek him.

Meantime, a struggle no less obstinate occurs on the Vineyard farm. Buell's and Carlin's troops have suffered much in their precipitate retreat across these barren fields. But on the edge of the wood, to the westward, they have found one of Wilder's regi-

ments, which has dismounted and awaits the enemy in a good position. Buell's and Carlin's troops again hear to the right Wood's guns, which have been saved from McNair's charge, and they promptly re-form at the command of their chiefs. Ere long, seeing the Confederate lines shaken by the deadly fire to which they are in turn exposed without protection on the road, Wood causes the offensive to be resumed by the men who a little while ago were in full retreat. They bravely advance and force their adversaries to give way. The latter are already reaching the protecting shelter of the wood on the east of the road, when there comes out of this same wood, but somewhat more to the south, a new line of gray coats in the perfect condition which denotes fresh troops. It is Trigg coming on the battlefield. Bearing to the right so as to aid Robertson, he engages in open field the Federals, whose progress he suddenly checks. Soon he drives them back again beyond the road, and his left is already posted on the edge of the wood, which at this point crowns a slightly-elevated ridge. He is even preparing to attack the enemy's artillery, which he can easily approach under shelter of the trees, when it unexpectedly receives assistance. Sheridan, summoned by Rosecrans, follows the highroad with Bradley's and Laiboldt's brigades. Passing behind Barnes, he has been enabled to maintain himself to the east of the road, and arrives as far as Wood's batteries at the time they are about to fall into the enemy's possession. The cannon are dragged away by hand, and Bradley shortly afterward takes the offensive. Trigg himself is in a critical position, for Gregg and McNair are not there to support him. As soon as he has passed beyond them their weary soldiers have regained the woods; even the half of his brigade has left him, and, instead of crossing the road, has followed on the right Robertson, who has brought it to aid his own force. Thus isolated, Trigg's men are borne down and thrown aside. The battery of the Eighth Indiana, which Wood had just lost, is recovered. Bradley, pursuing his course, comes upon Robertson, and after a sharp contest repulses him likewise; but Bradley's brigade suffers heavy losses and its chief himself falls seriously wounded. Meanwhile, Sheridan, moving Laiboldt to the right, completely extricates Barnes.

It is five o'clock: inside of a half hour the Federals have

regained possession of the road wherever their adversaries had affected a lodgment. Masters of all the contiguous glades, they do not think of going to seek the enemy in the neighboring wood which shelters him in its recesses. Hence the fight ceases everywhere at the same time. The tumult of the battle is suddenly followed by a gloomy silence. Along the winding lines which mark the front of the two armies parties seek one another, call out, count one another; ranks are re-formed; positions are rectified; some trees felled crosswise answer for a support in case of attack; ammunition is distributed, and the cartridge-boxes of the slain are emptied of their contents. Here and there the conflagration kindled in the pine thickets crackles as it advances and puts to flight the most valiant. The sun goes down, the shadows lengthen: night will afford the soldiers a chance to assist their wounded comrades, to take themselves some rest, and to the chiefs an opportunity to prepare for the struggle of the morrow. Thomas, who has personally directed the entire defence of the Federal left, foreseeing that he shall have again to bear in this new struggle the main brunt of the enemy, orders Johnson and Baird to return immediately after sundown to take, behind the McDaniel house, a better and less extended position than that which they occupy. But at the same instant, toward a quarter to six o'clock, a fierce firing bursts upon the front of these two divisions. It is Cleburne, who, having at last accomplished the move directed by Bragg, makes a supreme effort to dislodge this left wing of Rosecrans, which is so strongly posted forward of Kelly's farm. He has deployed his three brigades, facing westward, on one line about a mile in length. Polk rests, on the right, against the sawmill; Deshler, to the left, adjoins Jackson's brigade; Wood is between the two. Nearly three hundred yards in front of Cleburne, Liddell's two brigades, and on their left Strahl's brigade, are lying in wait on the edge of the wood, exchanging with the enemy only an irregular skirmish-fire. Jackson, and Preston Smith on his left, face to the northwest, and their line thus forms an obtuse angle with Cleburne's line. They have received orders to support him.

Cleburne, proceeding beyond the troops which cover his front, leads his men with the energy and spirit of which he has already

given so many proofs and which have caused him to be surnamed "the Jackson of the West." To the right, in regard to the Federals, Johnson's line of battle is separated from the enemy only by two hundred yards of woods. It has been strengthened by some abatis, but the Unionists are already about to fall back when the Confederates suddenly arrive upon them. Dodge is the first to receive the shock. After a few moments of sharp resistance he falls back before Deshler, and thus exposes the two other brigades of the division—Baldwin's and, farther on, Willich's—which are formed in the shape of the letter T, or perpendicular the one to the other, on his right. Johnson orders them to follow Dodge's movement. The order is executed in time by Willich; but Baldwin, attacked in turn by Deshler, is killed before he can communicate the order to his colonels. His brigade, deprived of its leader, remains alone upon the ground, defends itself obstinately, and, being outflanked on all sides, extricates itself only after great sacrifices. The Confederate right easily advances upon the tracks of Baird's two brigades, which are already in retreat. They halt after having cleared the fields around the McDaniel house; but Cleburne's artillery, placing itself in this opening, covers the Federals with a fierce fire, and Wood's infantry immediately dislodges the enemy from the edge of the wood. Night has come. The combatants, who meet one another with their guns almost muzzle to muzzle, can aim only by the light of their adversaries' fire. Hence the firing makes more noise than it does harm. However, on Cleburne's left, Deshler, having come into conflict with Johnson, who has restored order in his division, is sharply pressed back upon Preston Smith. The latter advances upon Deshler's place, just vacated. Believing that he still has friendly troops before him, he neglects to send out skirmishers, and arrives unaware at the enemy's line. He falls, pierced with bullets, at the first discharge. A confused struggle immediately ensues in the thickest part of the wood between his men and Johnson's soldiers. Jackson, pursuing, like Smith, a direction which brings him nearer to Cleburne, unites his battalions with those of Cleburne. He presses on the right Wood's brigade, the left of which is outflanked by Polk. The chiefs, being able neither to guide their troops nor recognize their neighbors, dare not advance into the wood. The

Federals, on the defensive, easily recover, and avail themselves of their assailants' confusion to repulse them. Afterward they take, more in the rear, the positions assigned to them by Thomas, while the Confederates, no longer thinking of following them, get ready to spend the night on the ground which they occupy. The fight at this point ceased about eight o'clock. On the rest of the line the feeble attempts made toward seven o'clock in the evening, on one side by Negley to push back some hostile detachments, and on the other side by Hindman to dislodge Sheridan from the wood between Hall's place and the Vineyard farm, have alone disturbed since dusk the repose which the combatants, Federals and Confederates, have so well earned. In the evening the two generals-in-chief have called their lieutenants around them. Before fixing their plans it is necessary that they know exactly the position of their troops and the condition in which is found each corps after so desperate a struggle; for the nature of the field has not enabled them to estimate at a glance the general results of the battle.

Amid the confusion of this fight they must have regretted, on both sides, the bad distribution of their artillery. All of it is apportioned among the different divisions, even many brigades having a battery. It follows that the infantry drags behind it small detachments of artillery through thickets in which they are captured and recaptured, without having rendered effective service. The general-in-chief has on hand no organized reserve: however, the results obtained by Reynolds' and Palmer's batteries, well posted on the highroad, show what part a powerful artillery, collected upon a point or two favorable for action, can and must play in the middle of a very woody battlefield.

On the Confederate side grave faults have been committed. The first has been Bragg's obstinacy not to engage his centre before his right has carried out the programme which he has prescribed for it. His right was not equal to the task, and thus the general-in-chief has given his opponent time to unite his two wings, which had remained until three o'clock without any link between them. Bragg seems to have taken at hazard the troops which he has directed in succession to the right, without giving them precise instructions, without taking care to mass them so as

to strike somewhere a decisive blow. The divisions have been confounded, the army corps disorganized, their commanders deprived of general direction and replaced by improvised chiefs.

The preparation for attacks has been very slow, the commands having the greatest trouble in finding alignments in the woods. Liddell by hurling at once his two brigades upon Baird's flank, and Stewart by constantly renewing his troops on the front of a single brigade and by uniting afterward all his division for a last effort, have obtained the greatest results possible with the means at their disposal.

Forrest's cavalry, fighting on foot, has been eminently useful, and the number of cavalymen lying upon the ground, easily recognized by their spurs, has dispelled the prejudices which the infantry entertained against this arm of the service.

Cheatham and Hood have approached the enemy with fronts too extended—Cleburne at a time when he could not succeed. The capture of two flags, three pieces of artillery, and a few hundred prisoners does not compensate for the confusion thrown by the night battle among troops that should either have been engaged earlier or spared for the morrow. Preston Smith has been the victim of this movement, always imprudent, as Stonewall Jackson had been some months before at Chancellorsville.

Bragg has not been able to accomplish the manœuvre which he had prepared. Instead of placing himself between Chattanooga and his adversary, and throwing him back upon McLemore's Cove, he has not even wrested from him the Gordon's Mills road, and has allowed him time to take, in advance of Missionary Ridge, a position whence he will be able easily to retire upon Rossville. But there remain to the Southern general eleven brigades quite fresh: this is all that is necessary to win the battle on the following day. A Lee or a Joe Johnston would no doubt resume on the Rossville side the flank movement which could not be accomplished near Kelly's farm; but such an inspiration cannot be expected from Bragg.

Rosecrans has escaped from a danger the gravity of which he has understood as the struggle has become sharper on his left. Thomas' resistance and Bragg's blindness have allowed Rosecrans

to extricate his army by one of the manœuvres most difficult to execute in presence of the enemy—namely, a change of front forward on one wing. All his divisions found themselves inverted in this movement, but this was only a secondary inconvenience. The army, surprised on its flank, turns round in time, faces the enemy, rests on the hills, holds the main road, and even though it should lose this it will still be able by McFarland's Gap to gain the Chattanooga Creek Valley. It is therefore saved by the battle of the 19th, but it may lose that of the 20th. In fact, the entire army has been engaged except three brigades. Granger, it is true, occupies with three others the approaches to Rossville, but he cannot be brought upon the battlefield without running the risk of yielding to the enemy the door to Chattanooga. Besides, the numerous prisoners belonging to Hood's and Johnson's divisions revealed to everybody the presence of a portion of the armies of Mississippi and Northern Virginia on the banks of the Chickamauga. Every one reckons up in his own way the importance of these reinforcements which have come from the East and the West, but all infer from them a sinister presage for the struggle of the morrow. However, it is impossible to avoid this struggle by taking advantage of the darkness to regain Rossville, for most of the soldiers have walked twelve or fifteen hours before engaging in fight. They have already passed one night without sleep; it is absolutely necessary that they have rest. The wounded must also be gathered and cared for, the stragglers collected, and the regiments re-formed. A retreat in the night would disorganize the Union troops more than the most terrible defeat.

The night is cool; bivouac-fires are forbidden, but the soldiers, deprived of water after this fearful day, suffer still more from thirst than from cold. Slumber even is denied to a goodly number of them, for here and there they must be moved several times in order to rectify the lines.

CHAPTER V.

KELLY'S FARM.

AT midnight, Rosecrans had issued his instructions to his corps commanders. In battles fought in the woods there must be a combination of scattered troops with others formed on several lines *en échelon*. The need of holding at the same time Jay's Mills and Gordon's Mills until the army had finished wheeling had made of that extension on the 19th a necessity—a dangerous necessity which no longer existed on the evening of the battle. He therefore decides to concentrate his army by leaning on the left, which has resisted so well, and bringing the right to the rear as far as the foot-hills of Missionary Ridge, which will offer him good defensive positions. Rosecrans will thus rest his back on the defile of McFarland's Gap, his true line of retreat on Chattanooga. Thomas shall have under his orders the five divisions which the chances of battle have collected around him, and which maintain their positions. Baird, on the extreme left, places in the night each of his three brigades on two lines: he occupies in the woods very near the cultivated fields on Kelly's farm a crest which extends to the eastward of the highroad and in a parallel line with it. The regular brigade, which terminates the line, being left in disorder, is brought back *en potence*, facing to the north, in the wood which separates Kelly's farm from McDonald's. Scribner is in the centre and Starkweather on the right: the artillery belonging to the division is reduced to four pieces. Johnson, who has caused Willich to fall back as a reserve, remains in a position between Baird and Palmer. The latter has drawn his lines closer in front, which is formed by Hazen on the right and Cruft on the left, each on two lines: the front is placed in a recess of the field running north-east and south-west, which the road

crosses on the south of Poe's house. Grose is in the rear, with his regiments massed in double columns. Reynolds, on his right, is on both sides of the road near the fork of the Poe and Dyer road: Turchin is in front, with King behind him. Brannan, leaning his left against Turchin, between the road and Dyer's house, had deployed his right as far as the foot-hills of Missionary Ridge; he receives orders to move forward this wing, so as to aid Negley, who is situated, as the reader knows, between the road and the Glenn house. Thus, Negley connects the four divisions composing the right to the five collected under Thomas' orders. This distribution of troops will soon be altered to the advantage of the left; for Rosecrans, being informed in the night that Baird has not been able to extend his lines as far as the Reed's Bridge road, through which the enemy may turn Thomas' flank, authorizes the latter to recall Negley in order to cover his line on that side. Thus the left forms, on the woody crest which to the eastward surrounds Kelly's farm, a semicircle the two extremities of which rest on the road. Detachments from each brigade work all night felling trees and throwing up in front barricades made with their trunks piled one upon another.

The reinforcements sent by Rosecrans to Thomas leave with his two other lieutenants only four divisions in all. McCook is on the right with Sheridan and Davis, whose troops during the fight at the Vineyard farm have become mixed with Wood's command. Wood remains under the orders of Crittenden with Van Cleve, who has re-formed back of Brannan's, Dick's, and Beatty's brigades, while Barnes remains between Davis and Sheridan. The retreating movement ordered by Rosecrans on his right withdraws this confused mass of brigades and regiments from rather bad positions, and will allow each detached portion to rejoin its corps. McCook brings Sheridan's division from the extreme right as far as the Glenn house: almost the entire night is taken up in executing this march by the flank, each of the three brigades passing successively from the right to the left behind the line formed by the two others to protect it. Lytle posts himself in the rear of Glenn's house; the two other brigades are posted in a very strong position somewhat in the rear and on his right. Sheridan's left is masked partly by Negley's right, which is on the first line, and by

half of Wilder's brigade. The rest of that brigade is posted on the right of Sheridan with his artillery. Crittenden's two divisions having had the most to go through, Rosecrans would like to spare them. Wood, having been recalled with Barnes' brigade, places himself on the right of Van Cleve, back of Sheridan's left, on a line with Davis' division. The movement of the right wing is fortunately accomplished before daybreak. In order to mask it the main skirmish-line has remained on the ground, and will slowly withdraw while delaying the progress of the enemy.

Bragg's army is still more broken than Rosecrans', and after the battle it will be necessary to displace most of the brigades, so as to collect the divisions and form similar lines. But the general disposition of the troops remains the same, and Bragg calls his lieutenants in the evening only to prescribe to them anew the execution of the plan which he had so unfortunately adopted on the 19th. Among the officers who gather toward eleven o'clock at night around his bivouac-fire there is noticed a newcomer of tall stature in the centre of a group: it is Longstreet. If only a few soldiers have served with him in the regular army, his face is known from one end of the Confederacy to the other. Having got out at the Catoosa Station in the afternoon, he has come here without halting, although misled by his guides, and hastened in the direction of the cannon's roar, which was calling him with a voice more and more pressing. Bragg immediately entrusts to him the command of his left wing, in which are the troops from Virginia, and which is the last to engage in the coming battle: this will allow him a few hours to survey the ground and study the position. It is, in fact, the right, still under Polk's command, which will open the fight, and, as on the preceding day, each division receives orders to engage the enemy only after the division on its right. But some fresh troops are required to inspire with confidence the soldiers who had been repulsed by Thomas on the previous day. Breckinridge brings them. Recalled from Gordon's Mills in the afternoon, he cleared the river at Alexander's Bridge about ten o'clock at night, finishing very late, it is true, notwithstanding his diligence, the concentration of the army on the left bank of the Chickamauga. Thus placed behind the right wing, he is ordered to go and take a position at the end of

the line on the extension of Cleburne's front, so as to outflank on the north the Federals' front. Before daylight the three brigades of Breckinridge's division are deployed, with Helm by the side of Cleburne, Stovall in the centre, and Adams at the extreme right, on both sides of the Reed's Bridge and Kelly's farm road. Hill's corps is thus collected together. Forrest will support the attack on that side by dismounting a part of his cavalry, as on the previous day. Cleburne, and behind him Walker's two small divisions, and also farther on their left the two lines of Cheatham's division, confine themselves to the rectifying of their lines. There are yet left to Longstreet Buckner's and Hood's corps and Hindman's division, Wheeler's cavalry having remained above Gordon's Mills to watch the upper Chickamauga. A gap about a half a mile wide has been made between the two brigades of Wright and Clayton in consequence of the retreat of the former and forward movement of the latter. This gap separates the two wings of the Confederate army. The right of the troops entrusted to Longstreet is formed by Stewart's division. The latter, finding himself in the evening menaced on two sides, has posted Clayton to the right, facing north, in a position perpendicular to the road and in front of the Federals under Reynolds. Bate is on the left in a line parallel with the same road; Brown is back of Clayton and Bate. Hood's division, the command of which Law has taken and will keep, being on the second line, Johnson's division joins Stewart's left: Fulton's brigade has been brought about five or six hundred yards to the rear, and has left near the road only a fringe of outposts. McNair has gone to take a position on the right of Fulton, with Gregg behind him. Room must be made for Hindman, who has passed up to the front line and after the feeble attack made by him has posted himself between Preston and Johnson. Deas' brigade, on the right, is in a position to aid Johnson's command; Manigault's brigade is on the left of it, while Anderson is in the rear. Preston, having only Trigg on the front line, preserves the formation of brigades in one column which he adopted on the 19th, in the morning.

The illustrious lieutenant to whom Bragg has just entrusted one half his army has not brought to it merely his prestige and his experience: he has announced the arrival of three fresh brigades,

which got out of the cars at the Catoosa Station a few hours before him. One of these brigades is commanded by Kershaw, and another by Humphreys, the successor to the gallant Barksdale, who was killed at Gettysburg. These two brigades belong to McLaws' division and come with him from Virginia; they left Ringgold after a few hours of rest, crossed the Chickamauga at Alexander's Bridge about two o'clock in the morning, and are going immediately to reinforce Hood's corps. The third brigade, under Gist's orders, arrives from Meridian and belongs to Walker's corps: it was moved in the direction of Alexander's Bridge, with a train which it escorted, and crossed the river in the evening. Gist, leaving the command of this brigade to Colquitt, united it with Ector's and Wilson's brigades to form the second division of the reserve corps. The presence of these fresh troops, coming from so great a distance and so opportunely, is for the Confederates a new pledge of success. Hence, despite their fatigue, they await with impatience the signal to begin the struggle. The whole night long the sound of axes striking the trees of the forest has warned them that their adversary was preparing to defend his positions with energy. The breastworks thrown up in front of the Confederates are useless, since they must take the offensive, and everything prompts them to do so without delay.

However, day breaks and silence continues. In the flats and lowlands near to the Chickamauga Creek a thick fog still broods over most of the Confederate bivouacs, but it does not prevent the sun from diffusing a light which enables the soldiers to recognize one another. They are under arms on both sides. If the Federals are surprised at the respite granted to them, the Confederates ask one another with impatience what is the cause of this fatal delay. There is no other cause than a great disorder in the commands given. The improvised distribution of the Southern forces cannot but delay the transmission of orders, while it yet complicates the service of the staff, already so defective in the Army of the Tennessee. Hill, being on the extreme right with all his forces, should open the fight at daybreak, but he has not yet received any instructions. On the 19th, in the evening, he walked over the field until midnight in search of Bragg; then, learning that Bragg had placed him under the orders

of Polk, he went in quest of the latter, but without any more success, and saw the day dawn without being informed of the duties assigned to him. In the mean time, his new chief was quietly spending the night on the right bank of the Chickamauga, and, instead of giving him the orders to attack, was transmitting them directly to his division commanders, Cleburne and Breckinridge. Hill, having joined his two lieutenants at the time when they were getting in motion in pursuance of orders sent out without his knowledge, halts them, alleging the necessity of making a distribution of rations before resuming the fight: it may be believed that, wounded in his feelings on account of the violation of the rules of precedence in rank, he seized upon this pretext to assert his authority, which was for the moment ignored. Walker and Cheatham, who were on the second line behind Hill, were holding themselves in readiness for the battle; but Polk has assumed to give them the signal, and, instead of coming personally to watch the execution of the plan of battle, he has remained on the other side of the river. In regard to Forrest, as his command was not incorporated with either of the two wings, he looks directly to Bragg for orders, but the latter has not yet transmitted instructions to him.

Time wears on, and the desultory shots which the sharpshooters exchange on the side of the Confederate right do not announce any movement. Longstreet has already inspected all the troops which were so suddenly placed under his orders; Bragg, mounted with all his staff since early dawn, vainly awaits, on the ground of his choice for the fight, the first cannon-shots which are to be the signal for the right wing to move. We may imagine what were his feelings of just irritation when he learned that Polk personally was still beyond the Chickamauga. While a sharp message calls Polk to his post on the battlefield, Bragg rushes to the right with a view of retrieving lost time. Hill receives orders to move forward the six brigades of his army corps on a single line of battle. This line extends right and left beyond that of the four Federal brigades posted behind the protection of felled trees facing eastward, but the denseness of the woods prevents the assailants from reconnoitring at a distance these positions. It is already half-past nine o'clock.

The Federals have had nearly four hours of daylight to get ready; Rosecrans has availed himself of this time to reconnoitre and rectify the positions taken by his right during the night. On that side his line, extended in a hurry, without solid supports, is not yet definitely formed. Through an unaccountable accident, Negley, whom Thomas since midnight has called to the extreme left, has not received any order at daybreak, and still occupies a somewhat advanced position between Brannan and Davis. Toward eight o'clock only an officer whom Thomas has sent in search of Negley brings to the latter the instructions intended for him. He immediately moves toward the left wing Beatty's brigade, which was held in reserve, and makes ready to follow it with the rest of his troops. But at that moment the Southern skirmishers, in order to cover a movement to the right of Stewart's division, engage in a sharp fusillade with those of the Federals who have remained to the eastward of the highroad. Rosecrans, attracted by the noise, expects a serious attack, and enjoins on Negley not to commence marching before having been relieved by other troops. He has become aware that the distance from the Glenn house to Brannan's position on the edge of the woods fringing on the east Dyer's farm is much greater than he had supposed. McCook, whose right already extends considerably to the westward of the Glenn house, cannot alone fill up that space. Crittenden will then cause Negley to be replaced by Wood's two brigades and that of Barnes, while the Twentieth corps will close up with them on the left, so as to shorten the line of battle.

These movements are intricate and fraught with danger; for it is almost nine o'clock and the attack by the enemy can be delayed no longer. Besides, if the right of the Unionists is strongly resting against the slopes of the Glenn house, their positions on the Dyer farm and in the wood which separates it from the road are bad. As soon as he displaces this wing, Rosecrans should bring it up about a mile and a quarter farther on the crests which may be easily defended, limit on the north-west Dyer's farm, and command the Dry Valley road as well as the main road. On a bad field the instructions of a general are rarely followed to the letter, each corps commander being inclined to seek the position which appears to him to be the best, rather than sacrifice himself

by taking that which appears to be the most exposed. Therefore, the orders of Rosecrans are illy executed. At a quarter to ten o'clock only Crittenden moves forward one of Wood's brigades. As it cannot occupy the entire front of Negley's division, the latter, in order to fill up the gap through which the enemy's skirmishers are going to penetrate, leaves behind him Sirwell's brigade and moves toward the left with Stanley's brigade. Wood, bringing up his second brigade and Barnes', enables Sirwell to follow in the footsteps of his chief. Davis, passing up, like Sirwell, to the front line, has come to place on his right at first Heg's brigade, which is deprived of its chief, and then, a little farther, Carlin's brigade. Although he has deployed them on the woody slopes to the south-east of Dyer's farm, he cannot join Sheridan, who has massed his brigades into columns of regiments, and with Wilder occupies the Glenn house in pursuance of orders from Rosecrans. The breach which separates them renders useless this strong position, and endangers the situation of Davis, who is isolated in the woods. The three brigades of the Twenty-first corps, under Barnes to the left, Harker in the centre, and Buell to the right, are each formed on two lines, the first deployed and the second composed of battalions massed in double columns and supported by the artillery, as also by Dick's brigade and Samuel Beatty's. At a quarter-past ten o'clock these arrangements are hardly accomplished; the troops have not been able to reconnoitre the ground nor make any preparation for its defence.

The battle is already earnestly begun at the other end of the line. At the sound of Bragg's voice his right wing has commenced to move. Breckinridge has deployed to the right of Cleburne his three brigades, with Helm on the left, Stovall in the centre, and Adams beyond the McDonald house and Reed's Bridge road. Breckinridge advances first, and proceeds some seven hundred yards, driving the Federal skirmish-line before him through the woods. Then Helm's left comes into collision with the broken line which Scribner's brigade forms in the centre of Baird's division. Meanwhile, Helm's right, and likewise Stovall and Adams, continuing their movement without encountering any serious resistance, become separated from him and reach the vicinity of the main road.

The Unionists, posted behind strong protections, have suddenly checked Helm's march. Vainly does he endeavor to surround the salient angle of the enemy's line, vainly does he bring his men back to charge the Unionists through the thick underbrush swept with a shower of bullets: separated from the rest of his division and from Cleburne, who has not yet followed him, and deprived of any reserve force, his isolation condemns him to a sure discomfiture. Still, he dashes in and out among his officers, and soon sets them the example of a glorious death. At the time when he falls, struck down only a few steps from the Federal breastworks, the fight has extended along the entire line of the right wing. Breckinridge has reached the Chattanooga road and captured several pieces of artillery which had been imprudently exposed on that side without sufficient support. It is an easy victory, which the reconnoissances made by Forrest already enabled the Confederates to consider as being assured. They must make the most of it without delay, so as to take on the flank the enemy's left wing, the extremity of which Adams and Stovall have evidently doubled and thus put an end to all the defences of the Federals. Breckinridge immediately causes his two brigades to half wheel to the left, and advances in a southward direction, forming a line of battle perpendicular to the road, with Stovall on the left and Adams and his artillery on the right of this high-road of travel.

The movement is bold, well-designed, and dangerous to the Federals. But Thomas is not taken unawares. Having brought his left *en potence* to the rear, he counts upon Negley to fill the space which separates the brigade of regulars from the main road. It is known that Negley has unfortunately been detained with two brigades; but J. Beatty's brigade has come up on the left before the battle. Beatty's command presents a thin line, for it stretches beyond the roadway, but, the enemy advancing openly, it firmly receives toward ten o'clock the shock of Adams' troops with a part of Stovall's brigade. The left of the latter and the right of Helm's brigade unite against the regulars, who, being well posted, vigorously repulse the attack: the Confederates are too disheartened to resume the offensive.

On the main road, where J. Beatty has not had the time to

raise breastworks, the issue is, on the contrary, in favor of the assailants, who are superior in numbers: Adams, outflanking the Union left, makes it fall back and throws it upon its reserves. But Stovall, detained on the left, does not support this movement, while J. Beatty, re-forming his troops on the northern edge of the grove that separates McDonald's farm from Kelly's, greets the Confederates with a well-sustained fire in the open field, which they vainly try to cross. Adams, seriously wounded, is abandoned by his decimated troops. Breckinridge's division has been fighting for the last hour, its strength is exhausted: this reverse gives the finishing-blow to its defeat; the remnants of his three brigades are going to re-form far from the enemy's reach at the very time when tardy reinforcements arrive on the ground which Breckinridge's division has just uselessly sprinkled with its blood. If at this moment Thomas had in hand Negley's entire division, he might overthrow the enemy's right wing.

Cleburne, though he is still struggling, has not been more fortunate than Breckinridge. His division is likewise deployed on a single line, and its great extension causes breaks during the march in battle order which it executes through the woods to join the enemy. Lucius Polk's brigade, on the right, has received orders to advance some time after the departure of Breckinridge, who is to serve him as a guide. It obliques to the left, tries to rejoin him, and, failing of success, separates from Wood, who is placed in the centre of the division. Wood arrives upon the south-east angle of the Union line, which is occupied by Baldwin's brigade of Johnson's division. Polk, in another direction, deprived of all support, falls on the middle of the enemy's embattled front facing eastward. The three brigades—Helm's, Polk's, and Wood's—therefore attack, each separately, three points on this front, which is defended by Baird and Johnson with five brigades strongly posted behind log breastworks. We have seen what has become of Helm's brigade. At two hundred steps from the enemy's works Polk is checked by the fire from Starkweather and Dodge. His soldiers return the fire with spirit, but the Federals, being well protected and almost invisible, rapidly thin the ranks of the Confederates, who shoot quickly and badly: their ammunition gives out. Soon abandoning a contest in which they are unequal

to their adversary, they retire toward eleven o'clock to a corner of the field which offers them a good shelter. Wood's right has experienced a similar reverse, but, being somewhat less exposed, it holds its own at two or three hundred steps from the enemy's line, and exchanges with the Federals a continuous firing, during which the heaviest losses are sustained on its side. The left of this brigade has found no enemy confronting it, but has come to a halt, with the guide on the right. Still more to the left, Deshler, being deployed, continues the front of the division, and after having encountered in the woods, instead of the Federals, a part of Stewart's division, he waits, ere resuming his march, until his superiors give him a new direction.

At eleven o'clock the attack by the Confederate right has then completely failed. The execution of Bragg's entire plan of battle depended upon an initial success on that side. But Polk has renewed the blunder committed on the previous day. Only five brigades, deployed without reserves on a front nearly two miles in extent, have attacked intrenched positions occupied by seven hostile brigades. Walker and Cheatham, who, with their ten brigades, would have imparted to the attack an irresistible force, have not been called up in time. Two hours have been lost and many lives have been uselessly sacrificed. The Confederates must begin anew.

Bragg, now better acquainted with the enemy's position, strives to give more unanimity and concert of action in a fresh assault. The impediments which Cleburne has encountered appearing to be insurmountable, Lucius Polk is to remain idle before the centre of the Federal left wing while Wood and Deshler endeavor to execute a flank movement on the line of the breastworks which suddenly terminate in front of Wood. To support them, Stewart, whose line faces the north-west, advances upon the enemy by following this oblique direction. Cheatham, masked by Cleburne and Stewart, will remain as a reserve. At ten o'clock in the morning, Bragg, informed by Forrest that the approaches to the main road beyond McDonald's house are not provided with means of defence, has sent Walker's corps to that side, being well aware that the extreme left is the weak point in the enemy's line. But the roads are tortuous, the five brigades form a long column,

and when at last Walker rejoins General Hill, under whose orders he has been placed, Breckinridge has already been repulsed. The Federals appearing inclined to assume the offensive all along the line, Hill, instead of massing the reserve corps on the extreme right, as Bragg had directed, against the vulnerable point of the enemy's line, divides that corps so as to reinforce his front, which he believes to be seriously threatened. He halts on the way Colquitt's fresh troops, and leads them on to the open breach between Helm and Stovall. The two brigades are relieved by those of Liddell, which for this purpose are brought separately from the extreme right. On the right Walthall will support Polk's brigade, which can no longer maintain itself; Govan, who is on the main road, will aid on the other side Colquitt, who is already briskly engaged with the enemy; and Gist, with Ector's and Wilson's two small brigades, together reduced to about a thousand men, will form in the rear of Wilson to assist him in case of need. Unfortunately for the Confederates, the dispersion of these brigades having sundered between them the bond of rank and precedence, this new attack proves still more disjointed than the previous onset. Colquitt has arrived first upon the enemy. Believing that Helm is before him, he advances without deploying skirmishers, and unexpectedly stumbles upon the works defended by Baird. His right, which extends beyond the line of obstructions raised by the enemy, advances all the more easily because J. Beatty has not returned to his first position in the alignment of the regulars. But soon Colquitt's right, instead of assaulting the flank of the latter, is itself exposed to the enfilading fire from their reserves. It vainly wheels to the left: a stubborn resistance is encountered everywhere. For nearly half an hour the two sides keep up a fire at close quarters; but the Confederates, being the more exposed of the two, cannot protract the struggle. Colquitt is killed, with a great many of his officers, and his troops fall back in disorder upon the double line of Ector and Wilson at the very time when Liddell's two brigades advance to its right and left. Although separated from each other, they come upon the enemy with their accustomed spirit and enthusiasm, but they both lose their way on that field so cut up, and fruitlessly look for the troops which they are going to aid. Walthall, without having

met Polk's brigade, arrives upon the centre of Baird's line: his left, which is in advance, is exposed to fire from the angle formed by this line and that occupied by Scribner. The latter opens upon the assailants an oblique fire which causes trouble in their ranks. The right advances and endeavors to resume offensive movements. But it comes, in its turn, in collision with insurmountable obstacles, and Walthall, deprived of support, is soon obliged to abandon the field covered with the dead and the dying. He re-forms his men behind the ranks, also very much reduced, of Helm's brigade.

Govan, on the right, is more fortunate, although he has not been able to find Gist, who has already been repulsed. The former reaches the position which J. Beatty has taken, considerably to the rear of Baird's left, after having been so badly treated by Adams and Stovall. Beatty's soldiers are broken down by the exertions they have made to repel them, and the first charge by Govan is sufficient to break their line. If at this moment Walker had all his army corps collected on the main road, he would cause the Federal right wing to experience a disaster similar to that which Jackson inflicted on the Eleventh corps upon the field of Chancellorsville. But Polk is not like "Old Stonewall," and he has confronting him a warrior of the first class. Thomas, indifferent to danger and always found at the post whence he can best follow the phases of the battle, has skilfully replaced in time Negley's absent troops. Confident in the support that the breastworks afford to the rest of his line, he has not hesitated to hurl his reserves upon the hostile forces which outflank his extreme left. As soon as he saw J. Beatty recede before the onslaught by Breckinridge, he sent to his assistance Grose's and Van Derveer's brigades, taken from Palmer and Brannan. While the former is falling upon Govan's left flank, Van Derveer, who comes from the south-west, marching with his men deployed through the woods, suddenly debouches on the other side of the road, upon Govan's right flank, and puts him to flight. Finally, Negley, arriving on the ground with Stanley's brigade, seconds this movement. The small Southern command, isolated, menaced by three brigades, runs the risk of being surrounded. It abruptly rushes into the woods situate to the westward of the road, and, describing a large détour, escapes from the enemy, who does not yet occupy these woods.

The two other brigades engaged by Walker have not been less sorely tried, and all that army corps—which, by uniting its efforts to those of Breckinridge, might have obtained a complete success—now retires, vanquished and fruitlessly decimated in an unequal contest.

However, the battle is at last waging along the entire front line of the two armies. It is half-past eleven o'clock. The uninterrupted noise of musketry almost drowns the roar of the artillery, which booms without cessation. A thick smoke rises above the woods in which the two armies are charging and driving each the other without knowing on whose banners victory is perching. Having successively to describe the events taking place simultaneously in different parts of the battlefield, we shall follow the order prescribed by Bragg for the progress of the fight from his right to his left.

We have said that Cleburne has received orders to move forward Wood and Deshler, without being uneasy about the reverse to Polk's brigade. Stewart, who is to support Cleburne's movement, has drawn near to him in the forenoon. He forms, as the reader is aware, the right of the left wing, whose command Longstreet has just assumed. Longstreet brings to his preparations the precision and the methods which have so much contributed to the success of the army which he left a little while ago. His six divisions include more than twenty-two thousand soldiers. In forming them he adopts the same plan pursued by Thomas; that is to say, he places two brigades, deployed and adjoining, on the first line, with a third brigade, held as a reserve, massed into solid column. The division, yet incomplete, which Kershaw is leading in the absence of McLaws is placed behind that whose command Hood has transferred to Law, and which occupies the centre. The principal part of the attack shall be entrusted to the Virginia troops, thus united in elaborate order. Longstreet, wishing to allow Law the necessary room to deploy two brigades, and hoping to fill up the gap which separates Law from Polk, has directed Stewart to bear to the right from five to six hundred yards. The latter accomplishes this move about nine o'clock in the morning, and has posted himself upon the small woody crest which, running in a parallel line with the main road, inclines

toward the north-west from a point in the vicinity of Brotherton's house. But, not yet able to aid Polk's troops, whose exact position is not known to him, he causes Bate to advance to the right of Brown, placing the former *en potence*, facing northward to cover the flank of the division. Clayton is on the left, somewhat in the rear. He is found in that position when Cleburne attempts his first attack between ten and eleven o'clock. Marching directly in a westward direction, Cleburne has encountered Bate, near whom Deshler has halted, while Wood, advancing still a few steps, was coming to join Brown's right. The two first thus found themselves masked, and some time was required to define the position of the two divisions, which had become entangled in consequence of a converging march in the forest. In fine, Brown and Wood, who are alone on the first line, move on the positions occupied by the Federals under Palmer. The two brigades under Cruft and Hazen know that ground and have carefully fortified it. Their skirmishers have advanced a long distance to molest the enemy; after having compelled his skirmish-line to fall back, they themselves retire to their places of shelter. The portion of the line occupied by Palmer between the angle of the breastworks and the main road is not more than three hundred yards in length: the greater part of it follows the edge of the woods, which on the north fringe the field contiguous to Poe's house, and which woods the road traverses. Wood and Brown, having each altered his course, the one to the right and the other to the left, so as not to cross each other, arrive obliquely upon this line occupied by Palmer. Wood's right is then the first to be engaged. Advancing on a run through the forest, it is suddenly greeted by Cruft's fire, whose deadly precision checks it notwithstanding its impetuosity. In the mean while, Wood, with the left of his brigade and also Brown's command, debouches in the field belonging to Poe's house. Hazen on the left and Turchin on the right of the road await him resolutely. The Confederates spring bravely across the open space against an unseen enemy. Wood's soldiers reach the roadway to the northward of Poe's house; but after a few moments they give way under the terrible fire which strews the ground with the dead and the wounded, and seek shelter in the woods which they had left half an hour before. In this short

space of time Wood has lost more than five hundred men. A part of Brown's brigade is carried away with him ; the rest is posted to the southward of Poe's house, and awaits in this position the second line, which in its turn advances. Clayton, bearing a little to the right, has taken the place which Brown has left to move upon the enemy. Bate and Deshler have placed themselves on a line with him, and all three have advanced to the attack at the instant when Wood's right, being beaten, was returning in disorder upon them. Deshler's soldiers, the first exposed, halt in the woods under the heavy fire which thins their ranks. About noon their chief falls, struck by a shot in the breast. His force keeps the field in front of the Federals, who, ambushed behind their rude shelter, dare it almost with impunity ; then, being threatened on its flanks, it gradually gives up the fight. During that time Bate and Clayton have joined, in Poe's field, the remnants of Brown's brigade. By a great effort, which Stewart personally directs, they reach the road, and Clayton attempts to capture a Union battery near Poe's house, while Bate tries to clear the obstructions defended by Hazen. But, exposed without shelter to a converging fire, Clayton and Bate both fail of success, and their enthusiasm once lost they must as soon as possible abandon this field of carnage. Stewart promptly brings his division to the rear, and re-forms upon the ground which it occupied before this unfortunate attempt. In consequence of this retrograde movement Brown finds himself to the left of Clayton.

It is somewhat past midday. All the efforts of the Confederates have proved fruitless against the left of the Union army. Thomas has victoriously repelled the assaults with four divisions ; excepting on his extreme left his success has cost but little. The advantage which the least shelter affords in a defensive position has been demonstrated anew by the striking disproportion between the dead and the wounded on both sides. Hazen, for instance, who has inflicted upon Stewart enormous losses, counts only thirteen men disabled. Hence, the Federals having fought determinedly on that side, it has appeared to us more natural to follow the Southrons in their part of assailants.

Fortunately for them, their left, being better led and finding before it an adversary not so well prepared for the struggle, is

going to indemnify them for the reverse encountered by their right. Longstreet, seeing the inactivity, then the non-success, of the right, bore with impatience the suspense imposed upon him. At last, toward eleven o'clock, he had just sent a request to the general-in-chief for permission to commence the fight, when Stewart communicated to him the order to attack, which he had presently received without the intermediacy of Longstreet. Bragg, after having exemplified the higher degrees of military usage and etiquette, no longer observed them, and, ignoring alike Longstreet and Buckner, addressed his orders directly to their heads of divisions. This procedure must have astonished particularly the commander of the First army corps of Virginia, accustomed as he was to receive from Lee only general instructions, the execution of which on the field was confided to him without reservation. He availed himself of it at least so far as to follow only his own promptings. Stewart having thus become suddenly involved in the fight, it was necessary to cause the entire left wing to form line or else it would uselessly grow weaker through partial or separate attacks. But Polk's troops being halted, the divisions entrusted to Longstreet could not, as Bragg had directed, open the battle one after another, commencing with the division on the right, because by leaning to the left they would have become separated from the rest of the army. In order to take an effective part in the struggle the left wing should have wheeled to the right, choosing for a pivot Stewart's division, which, placed with its front to the north-west, was all prepared for this manœuvre. However, Bragg in his tactical dispositions does not seem to have felt any concern about this necessary change. Longstreet supplied his omission : he directed Hood, Johnson, and Hindman gradually to bear to their right against the pressure of the enemy until their line of battle should become perpendicular to the highroad. Preston's division, which in line with the marching wing could not have followed this conversion, received orders to proceed to the right by following the road as soon as the other troops should have cleared it, so as to form a reserve and reconstruct Buckner's corps by drawing near Stewart.

Before quarter-past eleven o'clock all the brigades belonging to the first line have thus, one after another, been set in motion.

However, Rosecrans, who through the density of the forest cannot perceive Longstreet's long lines, has for some time been astonished at the silence which reigns in front of his right. The noise occasioned by the struggle in progress on the left continually increases the preoccupation of his mind ; Thomas sends urgent requests to him for aid.

The Union general begins to think that Bragg, renewing the manœuvre attempted on the previous day, has turned all his army against Thomas to separate him from Rossville, while the Federal right wing vainly waits in idleness for its adversaries of the day before. It was natural to assume that the Southern general had such an intention, for a plan like that would have had, we believe, great chances of success. Unfortunately, Rosecrans at a time when he should have taken a decisive step adopted only half-measures. Care should have been taken to be in readiness to move the entire right, if the enemy did not attack it, to the new battlefield which appeared to extend in the direction of Chattanooga. But the right was already too much spread out ; it would not have any strength left if more troops were taken away from it. Since Rosecrans was weakening it by fresh detachments from its ranks, he should have brought it to the rear and assigned to it, between Villetoe and Snodgrass, a position stronger, with lines drawn closer and nearer to the left. Instead of that, he tears it apart without reducing its front. At a quarter-past ten o'clock, while Crittenden, with a view to support Wood, causes his own reserves to advance, Rosecrans directs Crittenden to send Van Cleve with two brigades to assist Thomas, and a quarter of an hour later he strips the extreme right by sending Sheridan with two of his brigades in the same direction. Laiboldt with the third brigade must hold himself ready to follow. It is true that Rosecrans recommended McCook to choose a good position to which he might retire, but the accomplishment of this movement will not be possible in the presence of the enemy. The troops Rosecrans left on the right, too numerous to form a simple fringe or screen, are too weak to offer any resistance to an earnest attack. An inexcusable misunderstanding aggravates his fault. At forty-five minutes past ten o'clock a message from Thomas causes Rosecrans to suppose that Brannan is far in the rear, thus leaving an open gap between Rey-

nolds' right and the left of the Twenty-first corps. Forthwith he despatches to Wood an order, expressed in brief and peremptory terms, to close promptly upon Reynolds. Wood receives this order at eleven o'clock. But as there exists no gap between him and Reynolds, and as Brannan's line, in spite of a slight depression, binds them together perfectly, he can give only one interpretation to the intentions of his chief; he believes that he is ordered to go and reinforce Reynolds. To do that it is necessary to pass behind Brannan. Unfortunately, Wood is in too much haste to execute the order as he understands it. His skirmishers, already sharply engaged with those of the enemy, are hastily recalled; his three brigades, moving by the left flank, abandon the rude breastworks erected by Negley, without Wood being concerned about the troops which must replace these brigades. Riding in advance of his column to reconnoitre the positions, he meets Thomas, who, much astonished at this movement, since Reynolds does not ask for any reinforcement, obtains from Wood the immediate despatch of Barnes' brigade to the assistance of Baird, who was very sharply pressed at that time. McCook, still more astonished when Wood communicates to him Rosecrans' order, makes an effort to fill up the space which will become vacant between Brannan and him. Davis' two small brigades, posted to the southward of Dyer's farm, move in turn by the left flank to take the vacant place on the east of that farm in the woods which separate it from the highroad. But no matter how thin Davis may make his line, he will not be able to occupy all that space. A little after eleven o'clock the entire Federal right is about to execute movements in different directions, such as withdrawals and marches by the flank—all equally dangerous in presence of the enemy.

It is at this critical moment that by a fortuitous coincidence, but fatal to the Unionists, the whole Confederate left wing moves forward in line of battle. The outposts that Brannan and Sheridan have left near Brotherton, and those in front of the Vineyard farm that Wood has caused to advance between them, are well posted: Longstreet is obliged to bring his entire first line to bear upon the enemy, so as to drive them back and reach the road. He has directed Stewart to resume at the same time, against Palmer and Reynolds, the attack which has just been repulsed with

much bloodshed. In order to execute this order Stewart moves to the edge of the wood which on the east bounds Poe's farm; his left advances as far as the road and proceeds beyond the house abandoned by the enemy. Palmer is lying in wait behind his breastworks on the northern boundary of the fields, and, although the battle is sharply contested by the artillery at four hundred yards, Buckner finds the position of the Unionists so strong that he directs Stewart not to attempt to carry it by assault.

However, Hood, bearing to the right with Law's division and driving before him the enemy's skirmishers, encounters the Federal line strongly posted in the woods to the westward of the same farm. Despite this movement, the brigade that bears the name of Law and forms the right of the division does not entirely connect with Stewart's command; Robertson is on the left and Benning in reserve. Law's front, although it is composed of only two brigades, is almost equal to that of Reynolds' and Brannan's four brigades massed behind felled trees. Notwithstanding their valor, his soldiers cannot break through the enemy's line. The fight is being hotly waged on that side. Kershaw, who with his two brigades was to form Hood's reserve corps, did not long keep himself behind him. While Hood was inclining toward the right, Kershaw continued to advance straightforward, and, outstripping his left, he enters, almost without firing a gun, the gap which Wood has just left open between Brannan and Davis. But when the Federal skirmishers quit the wood on the side of Dyer's farm the artillery of the Twenty-first corps, posted in an open field in the rear of the farm, at last begins to rain shells upon Kershaw. The attack of the division has quickly failed; while conducting it Hood falls seriously wounded in the thigh; the enemy's line has resisted all his efforts. Vainly has Benning come to co-operate with the two other brigades: he has also been repulsed with great losses, without the Federals having had to bring up their second line. Robertson's soldiers, thrown to the left, pass in front of Kershaw, who immediately wheels to the right to take his turn in the battle which was being waged at that point. He directs Humphreys, who being on his left would have been outstripped by this movement, to pass behind his brigade, so as to take a position on his right. While Humphreys

encounters Brannan's right formed by Connell's brigade, and, availing himself of the fact that Wood's departure has left Brannan's right in disorder, assails it at once in front and flank, Kershaw advances rapidly and reaches the little corduroy road which Wood has caused his troops to take so as to gain Kelly's fields. It is about half-past eleven o'clock. Buell, who brings up the rear of Wood's division, has not gone over more than a few hundred yards when Kershaw unexpectedly falls upon the flank of his long column. It has barely time to form in order of battle and open fire, but at such close quarters that it cannot arrest the impetuosity of the Southerners. In an instant the line is forced, driven in, and the greater part of the brigade is irretrievably scattered: one of the two accompanying batteries is captured, while the other escapes by retreat from the battlefield. Johnson, who was on the left of Law's division and placed under Hood's orders, advances at the same time with him as far as the main road under the fire of the enemy's skirmishers supported by a few pieces of artillery. Fulton's brigade passes near the Brotherton house; the artillery remains upon a cultivated slope in the neighborhood of that house, and the infantry enters the woods, taking Kershaw's left for a guide. Thus, Johnson arrives upon the points which Davis is about to occupy. The latter, warned by the resistance on the part of the sharpshooters, has had a half hour to establish himself behind the barricades thrown up by Negley, but he cannot extend his lines along the entire length of these barricades, for he has only twelve hundred combatants left, and finds himself absolutely isolated on the west of Dyer's farm. However, being well posted in a copse of young pine trees which embarrasses the movements of the assailants, he repulses for the first time McNair's brigade, and even carries confusion into Fulton's. Johnson must make Gregg advance, so as to allow his two other lieutenants to outflank Davis' line. The latter, thus menaced, cannot long resist forces three times as numerous as his own. Robertson's brigade, which has passed in front of Kershaw, comes to take position by the side of Gregg and supports his attack. The two small Union brigades, driven back in disorder, scatter in the woods, cross Dyer's farm, and are no longer anything else than a mass of fugitives deaf to the voice of command, making

for the hills which on the south overlook the entrance to the Villetoe Gap. Johnson follows them closely, and soon his soldiers, reaching the boundary of the wood, debouch with serried ranks in Dyer's extensive and undulating fields.

It is a thrilling spectacle for the two armies. For the Confederates it is the abrupt emergence from dark shadows, in which they were feeling their way as they marched into the battlefield flooded with light, animated with scattered groups of the enemy's infantry in full retreat, and the firing suddenly opened by the artillery, which crowns with smoke the heights in the background of the picture. For the Unionists it is the curtain rising upon the struggle, the vicissitudes of which they guessed without being able to follow them; it is the first sight of the adversary, who, emboldened by success, at last shows himself unmasked. For those among them who can, through the smoke, distinguish the details of this scene, the defeat of the Federals is not doubtful: their artillery alone cannot check the movement of the enemy. McCook, as soon he saw the enemy come out of the woods, placed himself at the head of Laiboldt's brigade, which was in the fields behind Carlin, and led it forward. But the stream of the fugitives around him soon impedes his progress and prevents him from responding to the well-kept fire that Johnson's soldiers pour upon the brigade. It vainly tries to disengage itself and make resistance. Its ranks are broken; it is carried away in the rout, and McCook is borne with it.

Still, we have seen that a rather wide space separated Davis' right from the Glenn house, which Sheridan has just quit with Lytle's and Bradley's brigades, leaving there only Wilder's brigade. By a singular chance, a like gap was made in the Confederate line. Hindman, placed on the left of Johnson, has followed his movement, passed the main road, and carried a portion of the enemy's line of skirmishers, whose resistance had checked him for a moment. But, instead of making on the right the required wheel, he allows still less deflection than Johnson in the direction pursued by his guides, separates from Johnson, and arrives in front of the Glenn house. Wilder alone occupies this position, yet Sheridan, who is near by, seeing the woods filled with smoke, halts and forms his force on the hillside covered with brush which

commands at once the Glenn house and Dyer's fields. Hindman has deployed Manigault on the left and Deas on the right; Anderson forms, behind them, the second line. Manigault's soldiers, being in the marching wing, arrive out of breath upon the barricades which Wilder occupies in the woods close by the Glenn house. With his fire they receive that from several batteries posted somewhat in the rear, and are quickly thrown to the right after having experienced heavy losses. In the mean time, Deas through the open space has penetrated the Federal line, and, separating more and more from Johnson, has moved against Sheridan. The latter's artillery and several batteries of the Twenty-first corps, posted on his left by Crittenden, open, in order to protect Sheridan, an enfilade fire upon the assailants. It was in vain: after a desperate resistance, Lytle's brigade is dislodged and its commander killed. Deas, following up his success, makes a flank attack on the Federal cannon, captures a dozen pieces, and compels the rest of the artillery to beat a precipitate retreat. Anderson, who has followed him, holds himself in readiness to support him. Manigault, who has joined Deas' left, supports him by attacking Bradley's brigade. The latter loses ground, but without becoming disorganized. Sheridan, with the same obstinacy which he had displayed at Murfreesborough, re-forms his troops some three hundred yards in the rear, ranges in battery the cannon left to him, and firmly awaits Hindman's soldiers. These soon come up with Sheridan, but their ranks are broken in consequence of the march, the fight, and the scaling of a steep slope. He repulses them with ease, and, promptly resuming the offensive, throws them back beyond the Dry Valley road at the foot of the slopes which they have just climbed. Manigault, whose flank is exposed to Wilder's fire, rallies with difficulty two of his regiments: all the rest of his troops are in flight. Disorder also prevails in Deas' troops, which receive an oblique fire on the right from some pieces of artillery collected on the knob which to the westward overlooks Dyer's fields. But Anderson, who has not yet taken any part in the fight, coming after Manigault, soon starts the battle again. Sheridan sees his weary troops fall back: he returns to take a position beyond the road. Hindman, who was wrongly counting upon Preston's support, finding

himself separated from Johnson, halts his division and grants it the rest of which it has great need.

At half-past twelve o'clock in the day the Federal right wing was thus almost annihilated. Sheridan alone, with two of his brigades and that of Wilder on the slopes situate beyond the Dry Valley road, is separated from the rest of the army by three divisions belonging to the enemy. The greater part of the artillery, planted upon the heights which on the north and the north-west bound Dyer's farm, is exposed almost without support. Van Cleve has experienced a disaster still more fatal than that which has befallen Davis.

A Federal battery which was on Brannan's right, attacked in flank by Kershaw while it was forming in column, suddenly threw itself into the midst of Brannan's soldiers, whose terrible struggle on the previous day had caused a reduction in their numbers and a diminution of their courage. The horses trample upon the infantry, several of the latter are crushed, and Kershaw, who arrives meanwhile, has only to show himself to disperse the last of the infantry. Most of them, utterly demoralized, will continue far into the night their senseless flight, yet three regiments which have escaped the panic retire in good order and remain until evening upon the battlefield. Van Cleve himself, wandering amidst the fugitives, who no longer listen to him, rejoins Crittenden at the moment when he sees his artillery attacked by Deas.

It seems that the disaster must extend to the Federal centre. We have said that the artillery posted on the right of Brannan's division has been forced to abandon its position. This division, attacked in flank by Humphreys, assailed in front by a part of Law's soldiers, is soon shaken, notwithstanding the support it receives from a regiment detached by Reynolds. Connell, on the right, falls back in disorder, and Croxton is constrained, while maintaining his ranks, to follow Connell's retreat. Thus another link in the chain is broken. Brannan by dint of energy succeeds in re-forming his troops near to several pieces of artillery on the first knob to the north-north-east of the secondary mountain-cone which separates the fields of Dyer's farm from the slopes of Horse-shoe Hill. However, this hasty retreat takes him about seven or eight hundred yards away from Reynolds, who, being thus uncov-

ered, is compelled promptly to bring back *en potence* his right, which is formed by Turchin. Fortunately for him, the Confederates dare not attack the left and the centre of his line posted on the edge of Poe's field.

One hour has sufficed to give the victory to Longstreet, for the attacks by Kershaw, by Johnson, and by Hindman have been almost simultaneous. However, Thomas like all the combatants placed under his orders, does not yet suspect the disaster inflicted upon the Union right. Wood, who, after having directed Barnes toward the left, has returned to the head of his column, learns the fate of Buell only on seeing Kershaw's skirmishers come out of the grove which he believed to be still occupied by his lieutenant. He takes them at first for friendly troops, and Thomas, who is waiting for Sheridan, shares his mistake. They are both quickly undeceived, and Wood causes Harker's brigade to take possession of a portion of the fence which cuts transversely the northern extremity of the principal field belonging to Dyer's farm. Kershaw, who comes to attack him behind this obstruction, advances in line, supported on the right by Humphreys, and, although under a very sharp fire, he outflanks the Federals' right and obliges it to retreat hastily. Wood, having succeeded in checking him, goes somewhat in the rear and on the right to take a stronger position which Thomas indicates to him, and in which he will keep himself all the rest of the day. This position is on a hillock which connects Horseshoe Ridge with the crest closing the far end of the vale, and commands the entire neighborhood. Buell, having rallied a part of his brigade, extends Harker's right toward Horseshoe Ridge, upon which, as we shall presently show, Brannan has just posted himself, and affords him on that side a solid support. The Federals, being well established on the cone of the mountain, the elevation of which enables them to fall to the rear to load their weapons, firmly await this time their adversaries. Kershaw, after having cannonaded them, hurls against them his two brigades; but the latter, exposed on difficult slopes to a deadly fire, are soon repulsed in disorder, and Harker, taking the offensive, drives them back vigorously to the foot of the hill. In order to attempt this attack, Kershaw has proceeded beyond Law's division, and left that of Johnson in the rear on the left hand. Having

experienced the serious reverse just stated, Kershaw halts his two brigades pending the general renewal of the battle.

Brannan before falling back on Horseshoe Ridge has succeeded, like Wood, in checking the progress of the enemy, and has thus gained a precious breathing-time. On the slopes overlooking to the north-west Dyer's farm, which he occupies with his two brigades, he has rallied a great number of stray soldiers and some battalions, nearly intact, belonging to Davis' and Van Cleve's divisions. To the left of him, on the southern side of the hillock which forms the end of the Villeteo ravine, is posted Sheridan's artillery. Crittenden, with all the guns that he has been able to save, remains to the right of Brannan on the hill from the top of which he has, for the second time, shelled Hindman. Longstreet, who does not wish to allow the Federals time to re-form, hurls Johnson's divisions against these positions. Fulton advances on the left, compels Crittenden's artillery to retreat, joins Gregg's brigade to attack Brannan, and, while the latter's troops approach him in front, he tries to turn their right. After a struggle which proves very destructive to both sides, Brannan, caught between two fires, falls back in good order on Horseshoe Ridge, which is, as we have already said, a few hundred yards in the rear. Colonel Sugg, who commands Gregg's brigade since the wounding of its commander, immediately attacks the south-west side of the hill on which Sheridan's artillery is posted, while McNair ascends the opposite slope. The latter falls dangerously wounded, but the Confederates capture about ten pieces of artillery. Among these trophies, and by a strange chance, the artillerymen of the First Missouri Confederate battery, attached to Gregg's brigade, find the material belonging to the First Federal battery, also of Missouri. The captured guns are quickly taken away to the foot of the hill—even dragged, it is said, by the Federal prisoners, whom their conquerors, according to report, had harnessed to the pieces in lieu of the horses that were killed. There is no time to lose, for Brannan's fire has obliged Gregg's brigade to go down the same slopes in order to re-form, in a position less exposed, in the rear of Kershaw, by the side of Robertson's brigade; and Johnson, finding that his line is too extended, gathers his brigades on the hillock

which he has captured from Brannan. A new spectacle, well calculated to excite the ardor of his soldiers, presents itself to their eyes as soon as they have occupied the summit of the knob. Horseshoe Ridge and the great chain of Missionary Ridge, forming the Villetoe gorge, leave only a narrow passage for the Dry Valley road. In this gorge, as at the bottom of a funnel, is pressing a compact mass of infantry, cavalry, and all sorts of teams and vehicles, which are seeking to gain the defile: cannon, caissons, ambulances, and baggage-wagons accumulate pell-mell without being able to advance. In this motley crowd are found most of the caissons and ammunition-wagons belonging to the Federal army, which were moved on the Dry Valley road with orders to reach Chattanooga as soon as possible. Fatal order! which may deprive the combatants of their means of defence, and which, in the midst of the general trouble prevailing, cannot be traced to its source.

The prey is tempting, but Johnson is isolated, for Kershaw and Hindman, by bearing the one to the right and the other to the left, have separated from him, and he does not dare to descend with his only division into the valley under the eyes of the Federals posted on Horseshoe Ridge. Leaving in reserve McNair's brigade, which has suffered the most, Johnson places Gregg on the slope facing the north, and Fulton on the hillsides which, facing the north-west, command the road and the Villetoe farm. Some detachments sent out by Fulton pick up in the valley several caissons and three pieces of artillery. The Southerners must content themselves with this small amount of booty, for the wagons have disappeared, and they now have before them the remnants of the enemy's right wing moving in disorder toward McFarland's Gap. This retreating column carries along with it all who, like McCook, Sheridan, Crittenden, Van Cleve, and Davis, vainly attempt to arrest its flight.

In the midst of this rout Negley arrives with one of his brigades. The rest of his division is engaged on the extreme left. After having led Stanley to Baird's assistance, he received from Thomas, toward half-past ten o'clock, the order to post his artillery, which had followed him at a distance, on the eastern slopes of Horseshoe Ridge, facing Kelly's fields, so as to check the enemy's

right wing if it attempts to outflank the Union line, and to attack this wing in flank on the south side of the main road. With a few pieces Negley had opened fire in that direction, and was annoying Walker, when, about one o'clock, the noise caused by the battle waging on the right attracted his attention and revealed to him, on drawing near, the danger which menaced the army. He immediately repairs to that point with Sirwell's brigade and a part of his artillery by following the crest of Horseshoe Ridge, back of Brannan, who has just occupied it, and, leaving with the latter one regiment to cover his left, he proceeds to seek a position on his right. But while he is advancing with the artillery the stream of fugitives separates him from Sirwell's brigade, a part of which is borne along by this tide of human beings, and the rest join Brannan. Wishing then to bring his artillery to the rear, Negley in his turn is caught in the tide, by which he allows himself to be carried as far as McFarland's Gap.

Rosecrans, who at the time of the onset by Longstreet was in the rear of Davis, was likewise carried away by the rout. After having tried to rally that scattered division, he has vainly attempted to gain the extreme right to organize resistance on the slopes occupied by Sheridan. Perceiving around him nothing but a bewildered mass, and on his left only troops in retreat, he proceeds before the fugitives to McFarland's Gap, where he no doubt expects to re-form them. But on reaching that point he enters, without waiting, the road which runs along Chattanooga Creek and is already crowded with wagons. Having arrived at Rossville, Rosecrans orders General Garfield, his chief of staff, to try by the main road to join Thomas, so as to convey to him full powers and authority to act. He gives to Thomas the absolute command of all the troops which may be on the battlefield, and himself takes with his staff the direction of Chattanooga. We can understand that he was borne away in spite of himself by the fugitives as far as McFarland's Gap—that once there, he gained Rossville with the view of meeting, by this détour, the part of his army which was yet to fight somewhere; but the necessity of organizing the defence of Chattanooga and to find a telegraph-office, the only excuse alleged by Rosecrans, does not explain the complete abandonment of the army by its chief—an abandonment

all the stranger because his personal courage has never been questioned, and he had given at Murfreesborough a signal proof of his tenacity of purpose. It may be said that on this occasion he acted without discernment: he was soon to pay for this weakness by the loss of his command. His unfortunate example finds numerous imitators. Crittenden, McCook, and Van Cleve, hearing of Rosecrans' passage through McFarland's Gap, hasten after him; Sheridan, Davis, and Negley, who reach this point with some troops, halt to put in order the train of wagons and to gather all the willing men around the small battalions which have preserved their organization. These three generals assemble to deliberate with some officers belonging to the staff of Rosecrans. They might try to bring back upon the battlefield the combatants rallied around them, either by returning to occupy the Villetoe gorges, so as to protect the right of the army, or by taking the Alexander's Bridge road, which would bring them to the rear of the positions that the Union left is defending with success. But Sheridan wishes to conduct his troops as far as Rossville, and hence he obliges his associates to follow him. He proposes, it is true, to go by the main road to meet Thomas; yet this *détour* will cause him to lose the remainder of the day; and a troubled mind, too natural under such circumstances, alone can explain why so gallant an officer as Sheridan has thus suddenly turned his back to the enemy. Negley will follow him to Rossville, where he will remain to put the defile in proper condition for defence. Davis, with all the men that he may be enabled to collect, will defend McFarland's Gap. These precautions are of no use to the brave soldiers who have not abandoned the battlefield. Other troops, happily, come up with more alacrity to support them. Granger, without having joined the Army of the Cumberland, finds himself, as we have stated, to the eastward of Missionary Ridge with three brigades belonging to the reserve corps. Two of them, under Mitchell and Whitaker respectively, have been placed by Steedman at the Red House Bridge; Daniel McCook's brigade, somewhat in the rear, occupies the place known as McAfee's Church. Granger, who is charged to watch the Ringgold road, has soon recognized that he has no enemy confronting him; the noise of the battle progress-

ing on the right attracts his attention, and its receding in the distance causes him to fear lest Rosecrans' left wing has been defeated. He then hearkens only to the inspiration of a soldier, and determines, toward eleven o'clock, to move on the enemy's artillery, so as to succor his imperilled comrades. Leaving McCook behind him, he reaches the highroad with Steedman one hour later. Pegram, charged by Forrest to cover with his division and four batteries the extreme right of the Confederate army, occupies the woods in the vicinity of that road; he opens fire with all his guns on Granger, and, causing a part of his troops to advance dismounted as skirmishers, he compels Granger to deploy. But the latter, being thus detained for some time in front of Colonel Cloud's plantation, understands by the hesitation of the enemy what they propose to do. He in turn trifles with them, slips away from them, leaves McCook, who was hastily called up, to stand before them, and continues his march with Steedman toward the battlefield, rising above which he perceives the bluish smoke of powder. A *détour* to the right across woods brings him, about half-past two o'clock, without firing a musket, to the vicinity of Kelly's farm. He could not have arrived more opportunely. Thomas sends him immediately to the assistance of Brannan and Wood, who form the right wing of the troops placed under his command.

We have reached the last phase of the great battle which was fought on the banks of the Chickamauga and will retain that name in history. The very nature of this struggle, so complicated as it was, has obliged us to extend the narration.

CHAPTER VI.

HORSESHOE RIDGE.

FORTUNATELY for Thomas, Polk has ceased his attacks at the very time when Longstreet's victory occurs. After one o'clock he no longer menaces the positions that Thomas has so gallantly defended. Polk's divisions, which have all been re-formed rather far from the enemy, wait for orders which are not issued to them—an inexcusable fault, because without coming again in collision with the breastworks which had previously checked him, Polk might by vigorous demonstrations have annoyed the left of Thomas. His inaction, on the contrary, allows the Federals to strip the left, so as to reinforce the remnants of their right. At about half-past two o'clock a large body of troops in John Beatty's and Stanley's brigades takes a position at the left of Wood in the grove between Snodgrass' farm and Dyer's. Reynolds, who has brought back his right *en potence*, extends it so as to be close to these detachments from John Beatty's and Stanley's commands and re-form a continuous line in front of the enemy. Van Derveer, sent by Brannan in the morning to the assistance of Baird, returns at the same hour near his chief, whom he finds, with some four thousand men belonging to several divisions, on Horseshoe Ridge. This ridge—in the shape of a horseshoe, as its name indicates—presents its convex side to the south-east; that is to say, to the enemy. The jutting portion is not very prominent. It is flanked on the left with the knob occupied by Harker's brigade, and on the right with the commanding elevation which the Confederates call Battery Hill, upon which Brannan has placed the bulk of his forces. The latter general, unfortunately, has not enough soldiers to occupy the approaches to the defile, and the enemy will be able to flank him on that weak side, where the absence of the troops that have retired as far as McFar-

land's Gap is very keenly felt. Harker has placed himself on the left of Brannan, almost perpendicularly to his line, and, facing to the south-west, commands all the upper portion of the vale.

These dispositions are made without the enemy trying to put embarrassments in the way. Although Longstreet knows the value of one hour at such a moment, he is constrained to halt to allow his soldiers a breathing-spell, but especially to close up his divisions, which during the general wheeling to the right have opened out and become separated from one another. Preston's division, which he keeps in reserve, is the only one that has not been engaged in the fight. After having crossed the road, it marched by the right flank in the rear of the entire line, and placed itself, in a column of brigades deployed, behind the left of Stewart, perpendicularly to the road. The right of Hood, posted near Poe's house, covers a portion of Gracie's brigade. Kelly finds himself behind him, forward of Brotherton's house. In fine, Trigg has passed from the right to the left by following, after the other brigades, the movement executed by Hindman. Longstreet is obliged to detach Trigg from his reserve at the very time when he would need all his forces to pursue his success. About two o'clock the announcement is brought to him that the Federal cavalry, the advance of which has already been observed from the direction of Gordon's Mills, is coming up the main road to fall on his rear. In order to check the hostile cavalry, Longstreet immediately orders Trigg to retrace his steps with a battery of artillery. The information was false: Confederate cavalry had been mistaken for the enemy. Nevertheless, this blunder caused Longstreet to lose during several hours the support of one-third of his reserve corps.

He does not yet wish to bring into action Preston's division, which is large and presents a fine appearance; but it is a novice in war, and must be kept back for a last resource in case of defeat. Longstreet is compelled to economize his strength, because he is aware that Polk has ceased his attacks, and Bragg, upon whom Longstreet has made a requisition for assistance, replies that the right, having been sorely tried, cannot furnish him even a single man. He concludes to make a fresh effort with troops which he has already placed under fire, not-

withstanding the price they have paid for their success. Horseshoe Ridge is the key to the battlefield. As it was impossible to dislodge the left wing of the Unionists, the position of their right wing must be wrested, so as to take away from the enemy's army the support which it finds on Missionary Ridge and drive it back toward Rossville.

Longstreet will not attempt a fresh attack before having all his forces ready at hand ; for when the struggle has begun success will depend upon the rapidity with which the blows shall succeed one another. Leaving, then, Johnson on the hill which he occupies, Longstreet recalls near him Hindman, who had allowed himself to be borne away in Sheridan's wake beyond the Dry Valley road. Kershaw will close up a little to the left, so as to join Johnson, and, together with him, to attack Horseshoe Ridge. After having issued his general orders, Longstreet leaves to his lieutenants full latitude to execute them according to the traditions of the army of the East.

Hindman supports the right and detaches Anderson's brigade, which proceeds to take a position between Johnson and Kershaw in front of Brannan's left. But Hindman deploys his two other brigades to the westward of the Dry Valley road, too far from Johnson to aid him. Still, the latter makes up his mind to assume the offensive. It is about half-past two o'clock. Fulton on the left, resting on the road, Gregg in the centre, and Anderson on the right, cross the vale which separates them from Horseshoe Ridge, and gallantly toil up the acclivity of that hill under a shower of bullets and canister. McNair remains in reserve. Happily for the Federals, Brannan has just been reinforced by Van Derveer, whose artillery occupies the summit of the foot-hills which on these slopes form veritable bastions. Fulton, who is the nearest to the enemy, is the first to come in collision with him ; but the Unionists do not give him time to reach the crest. Brannan's right descends rapidly upon a foot-hill overlooking Fulton's left, opens an oblique fire upon him, and routs him, notwithstanding the firing by the Southern artillery, which has moved forward to support him. Gregg, who has before him slopes not very rough, reaches the top of the hill, and a struggle takes place at close quarters ; but as he is not supported on the left, he soon loses his hold, and a vigor-

ous charge sends him also down into the bed of the ravine. The canister-shot belched out by Johnson's cannon covers the retreat of his two brigades, which re-form in their former positions. On the right the struggle has been longer and the palm of victory more disputed. Anderson and Kershaw have an understanding to approach, each by one flank, the jutting knob upon which Brannan's left and Wood's right are posted. Although Anderson rushes to the attack with much enthusiasm, he is repulsed at the same time with Gregg. But the crest on which the latter had previously captured Sheridan's guns offers to Kershaw, who has taken possession of it, a rallying-point whence his troops advance against the Federals, already in full chase after Anderson. This officer then resumes offensive movements, and the two Southern brigades take possession of the crest; but the inaction of Humphreys on the right and the discomfiture of Gregg on the left oblige these two brigades to beat a hasty retreat.

The combined attack on Horseshoe Ridge has not lasted longer than a quarter of an hour, and has completely failed. The Federal right, which a little while ago appeared to be annihilated, has proved to be strongly established in formidable positions, and has abruptly checked Longstreet's victorious march. He calls Preston to the left, so as to sustain, if need be, the fresh effort which the other divisions are going to attempt. To draw the attention of the enemy, Stewart will make a vigorous demonstration, and Bragg despatches to Polk an imperative order to recommence the fight. In another direction, with a view to bringing as many forces as possible to bear against the position on Horseshoe Ridge which it is proposed to capture, Hindman, making with his two brigades a half-wheel to the left, sweeps all the Missionary Ridge slopes, which are still occupied by detached portions of the enemy, and takes up a position on both sides of the Dry Valley road to the left of Johnson. The latter's third brigade comes to that point to support Fulton's brigade, which has been reduced to a handful of men. On the right Kershaw will aid in the attack, this time with his two brigades.

Hindman—who, in virtue of his rank, assumes the direction of Johnson's troops, joined to his own—orders Deas, who is placed on his extreme left, to cross the road within the gorge itself and

to ascend the western side of Horseshoe Ridge, so as to open an oblique fire on the rear of Brannan's right. All the brigades, even that of Anderson, will follow in succession this movement. It is about a quarter-past three o'clock. Deas rapidly gains ground; Manigault holds his own, and, driving back the Union detachments posted on the road, quickly enters into the gorge. In one moment more Brannan's right will be flanked, while Johnson will attack Horseshoe Ridge in front. Their success seems to be certain, and Longstreet, believing that the time has come to strike a decisive blow, orders Buckner to move Preston's division, nearly five thousand strong, on the slopes which separate Snodgrass' farm from Dyer's. If this onset succeed, the Federal right will be annihilated.

But at the instant when the Confederates believe the victory to be theirs they perceive numerous adversaries confronting them. Granger, who has arrived in the rear of Horseshoe Hill, seeing that the enemy is already master of the gorge, immediately orders Steedman to advance to dislodge him. Steedman, leading his two brigades, springs against Hindman. His troops, recently recruited, gallantly receive the baptism of fire, and, closing his ranks as fast as they thin out, he penetrates into the defile. Men wrestle in single combat. The soldiers, emulating the example set by their leaders, engage in a rivalry of ardor and courage. Steedman, holding aloft a flag in his hand, rallies such of his men as are ready to give way and brings them back into the thickest of the fight. Whitaker is wounded in front of his brigade. Finally, after the lapse of twenty minutes, the Unionists have the advantage, and Granger's artillery, which is promptly established in the gorge, riddles the Confederates. Twice does Hindman bring his soldiers to the assault on the position which had been so unexpectedly taken by his adversaries. Twice does he come up within pistol-shot of the artillery which makes wide breaches in his ranks. Toward a quarter-past four o'clock he is repulsed, and he reforms, not without difficulty, his troops in the rear of Villetoe.

The four brigades on his right have not been more fortunate. Granger has not brought merely an important reinforcement of fresh troops; he has secured to all the combatants already collected on Horseshoe Ridge the means of continuing the battle.

The flight of the wagons had left them without cartridges : Steedman brings them nearly one hundred thousand rounds, which are at once distributed. Brannan's and Wood's troops being thus reinforced, and knowing that they are covered on the right, receive without disorder the new shock of the enemy, check him, and drive him at the point of the bayonet beyond the ravine which bounds the foot of Horseshoe Ridge. The rout of Johnson's division is complete: the fugitives, carrying with them McNair's brigade, do not even halt near their artillery. If at that moment the battalions uselessly re-formed at McFarland's Gap were behind Wood and Brannan, they would not only capture the artillery, but inflict upon the enemy's left an irreparable defeat, because Kershaw's and Law's divisions would be hardly better able than those of Hindman and Johnson to make resistance to an earnest onslaught. The first has waited until the fortune of war is decided on the left, and does not appear to be disposed to climb anew the heights which it has already vainly assailed; the second has not recovered from the effects of the struggle in which it lost its leader. While Law's brigade remains alone in the presence of Reynolds, Robertson and Benning have, one after the other, borne to the left; they keep in the second line, believing for the time being that it is impossible for them to bring their troops back to the enemy.

However, Preston has received orders to bring his division into action. It is no longer the point with him to finish the victory, but he must attempt to renew the fight and prevent the Federals from assuming the offensive. He leaves Trigg in a position of observation on the highroad, and, crossing with two brigades Dyer's farm, he deploys them in the rear of the line which up to this time has fruitlessly assaulted Horseshoe Ridge. But the defenders of this crest also receive shortly after Granger's arrival fresh reinforcements. Buckner having checked the offensive movement which Longstreet had ordered Stewart to make, the battle has entirely ceased to the eastward of the main road. The generals belonging to the Federal left wing, astonished at the silence reigning on that side, listen with anxiety to the noise of the battle raging on the right. Thomas has left them and hastened to the scene of conflict. They hold a consultation, and,

coming to the conclusion that the enemy no longer thinks of molesting them, they decide to send reinforcements to the point which is menaced. Unfortunately, the ammunition is nearly exhausted: most of the divisions have only three rounds for each man. These troops, relatively fresh, although they have fired a good deal and done much damage to the assailants, find themselves thus disarmed at a moment when their efforts might be the most effectual. Hazen's brigade, which has reserved forty rounds for each man, is moved toward the right; Grose, returning from the extreme left, takes his place in the first line. Stewart observes this move, and in order to throw impediments in the way opens the fire of his artillery, which is posted in the vicinity of Poe's house; but he does not prevent Hazen from taking a position forward of Snodgrass, between Wood's left and Reynolds' right. The latter, extending his front line, which had been brought to the rear, joins with Hazen. A continuous line of defence is thus formed, about half-past four o'clock, from Villetoe as far as the road. Meanwhile, Preston has caused Gracie's brigade to advance against Wood. This brigade occupies the entire front of a division, for it numbers two thousand combatants; it has left in the rear, by passing one line beyond it, Kershaw's division, only a small portion of which moves to support it, and ascends the eastern side of the crest occupied by Wood. It extends much beyond his left, and would have surrounded it but for the timely arrival of Hazen. Kelly has formed to the left of Gracie, and, getting in motion a few minutes after him, resumes the attack upon the very ground that Gregg's and Anderson's soldiers have just dyed with their blood; in other words, upon the southern slope of the extremity of Horse-shoe Ridge. He clears the line formed by the brigades of those two generals; a portion of Anderson's command follows him, and McNair's brigade, taking a position on his left, rushes up to the assault with him. Hindman rallies Deas and Manigault, and hurls them once more against the positions held by Granger. Hence the engagement extends all along the front of the Confederate left. The two opposing hosts grapple, drive, and repulse each other; charges succeed one another without exhausting the courage of the assailants or the tenacity of their adversaries.

One side contends to achieve a victory for which it has already paid the price; the other, to avoid an irreparable disaster. "Never," says Hindman in his report, "had the Confederates been seen to fight better nor the Federals so well." Gracie and Kelly have soon captured the first knob and the prolongation of the hill which connects it with the culminating point on Horse-shoe Ridge: masters of all the foot-hills on the south and on the east, they have come to the determination to storm this last point. But as Hindman has caused the struggle to cease for a time, the Federals can concentrate their forces to repel this final attack. Wood is supported on the right by Van Derveer's brigade, and, being in a formidable position, awaits the onset of the enemy. Garfield, the future President—whom a crime shortly after his election, eighteen years later, was to snatch from the affection and the respect of an entire nation—has joined Thomas; he fights in the ranks of his old brigade (Harker's), thus proving that all the witnesses to the disaster of the extreme right might have come and resumed a place among the combatants. The presence of this gallant officer increases the confidence of these combatants, and they throw the enemy's line back in disorder upon the first knoll which Preston has occupied. The battle has been bloody; Gracie alone has lost seven hundred men in less than one hour. Fortunately, Trigg, who was summoned in haste, arrives in the mean time, extends his lines beyond Gregg's troops, and deploys on the left of Kelly. These two brigades, leaving behind them Gracie's command, which has been too sorely tried to follow, resume the fight toward half-past five o'clock, without, however, running the risk of a fresh assault. Although the firing continues along the whole front of the Confederate left, yet the struggle begins to flag: each side watches and feels the position of the other. To the eastward of the main road, on the contrary, the battle, which was for a long time interrupted, has violently recommenced.

About three o'clock Polk receives orders to renew the attack all along the line. Buckner has transmitted the same orders to Stewart. But the right must prepare for this aggressive movement, for since the last defeat which it has sustained its divisions,

crowded together, have ceased to maintain their relative positions, thus causing a break in the line of battle. Cheatham, as the reader is already aware, went at two o'clock to place himself with four brigades in the rear of the troops that were going to attack Baird on the extreme left of the Unionists. In order to support this attack, Cleburne deploys his entire division, moving it about five hundred yards to the right. Deshler's brigade, which was masked by Stewart, takes a position beside Cleburne. Lucius Polk's brigade finds itself in front of the centre of Baird's hostile troops: it joins on the right with Jackson's brigade, that had been detached since eleven o'clock in the forenoon from Cheatham's division, and was itself resting on Liddell's brigade. The latter has deployed, in the woods not far from McDaniel's, Walthall to a distance of a few hundred yards eastward of the road, and Govan on his left: facing to the west, they form a right angle with the alignment of Jackson and of Polk. Gist, who during the progress of the battle has received a reinforcement of six hundred men, is held in reserve behind Liddell's right, which farther on is covered by Armstrong's dismounted cavalry and also by Forrest's artillery. Cheatham arranges on the second line his three remaining brigades—Maney's in the rear of Jackson, with the two others more to the left. Finally, Breckinridge, causing Stovall to advance between Liddell and Armstrong, enters with his two other brigades into the angle formed by the double line of Walker on the right and Cleburne and Cheatham on the left. This time the attack has been well prepared, but the preparation has taken some time. It is after half-past four o'clock when Cleburne's guns, belching their projectiles into the grove which hides Baird's line and his breastworks, announce the beginning of a fresh battle. This is the time when Preston redoubles his assaults on Horseshoe Ridge, and the conflict is thus started simultaneously along almost the entire sinuous line which the two armies form in the midst of the battlefield. Cleburne leaves his two left brigades on the watch in front of Johnson, and hurls Polk against the angle, the defence of which Baird has entrusted to Scribner's brigade. To the fire of the Federal artillery there comes a response from the Confederate guns, which, pushed by hand and

strength of arms within two hundred paces of the enemy, riddle him with canister. And yet the assailants, being in the open field, suffer more than their adversaries.

On the right, Liddell and Armstrong have cautiously advanced toward the road. Their movement in a diverging line leaves between them and the troops facing southward an open space, of which Gist avails himself to pass up to the first line by bearing to the left. However, he does not come up as far as Jackson, who, marching briskly to the enemy, has engaged him on the right of Polk. King's regular troops, reduced to a handful of men, are dislodged from their works, and then Polk, spreading his brigade on the right, captures several hundred prisoners from their number. But Willich, who was despatched with Johnson's reserve brigade to the assistance of Baird, arrives in time to save his left. He checks Polk, penetrates the line between him and Jackson, who has leaned to the right, falls upon Polk's left flank, and repulses it, after having inflicted upon him severe losses. Willich and Barnes, with some fragments of Negley's division, alone cover the end of the Federal line near the road. The Confederates, without counting Cheatham and Armstrong, have seven brigades in front of this point; if they should rapidly advance upon the enemy, they would sweep that road; but Walker's two divisions move very slowly. They have not yet even finished driving back Barnes' skirmishers, who, with isolated detachments from various corps, remnants left upon the battlefield, hold the woods on both sides of the road to the southward of McDaniel's farm.

In front of Johnson's, Palmer's, and Reynolds' Federal divisions the struggle since one o'clock in the afternoon has dwindled into a fight between skirmishers. Some of these bold soldiers climb the trees, seeking to descry the enemy's line so as to pick off new victims, and there remain until well-aimed bullets remove them from their dangerous posts. About five o'clock the firing of cannon is suddenly resumed, and a fusillade announces that the Confederates are advancing afresh. The left of Cleburne and Stewart, which has spread out on the west of the road in front of Poe's, has recommenced the battle in pursuance of orders from General Bragg; but it does not earnestly attack the enemy, whose

formidable positions are known, and contents itself with menacing them by demonstrations in force.

Thomas, on receiving at four o'clock through Garfield the authority vested in him by his chief, together with the news of the disaster which had befallen the extreme right, understood that his part thereafter was to ensure the retreat of the army entrusted to his care. He no longer can, by his obstinacy, wrest the victory from the enemy, as at Murfreesborough, since the general-in-chief has left the battlefield with one-third of the army. The left has not been molested for several hours: he hopes to be able before night to extricate it from its position on the east of the road and to bring it back on the defiles of Missionary Ridge, while the right, holding its ground on Horseshoe Ridge, shall prevent Longstreet from interfering with this movement. Toward half-past four o'clock the order to fall back is despatched to the commanders of divisions on the left. The retreat shall begin on the right by Reynolds, who shall be followed by Palmer, and then Johnson. Baird shall remain in position to cover the march against attacks by Polk, and shall be the last to move. Unfortunately, the struggle is renewed at the moment when these orders reach their destination. Johnson, and especially Baird, who are the most exposed, send word to their chief and ask to have the retreat postponed until nightfall: they could hold their own behind the breastworks, but it would be dangerous to abandon them in the presence of the enemy. Thomas would no doubt have listened to their representations, but they do not reach him in time. Meanwhile, Reynolds, shortly after five o'clock, feeling that he was not seriously threatened, had commenced to move according to orders. King's and Turchin's brigades advance in two parallel columns, each made up of lines moving by the flank, so as to be able, in case of need, to face at once to the right and left. In this order they reach the main road; Palmer forms behind them. But Stewart perceives this retreating movement: scattering the skirmishers who remained inside the breastworks to mask it, he closely follows up the Unionists. Johnson, being thus uncovered while Cleburne attacks him in front, has only time to place *en potence* on his right Willich's brigade, which Baird has just sent back

to him, and to cause the two others to file in rear on the left under his protection.

However, on the extreme right of the Confederate army, Walker, about half-past five o'clock, makes a forward movement to retrieve the check sustained by Jackson. Barnes alone on that side falls back step by step before Colquitt, who forms the first line of Gist's division. But at that time, on the left, he spies Reynolds, who crosses Kelly's farm. Thomas, following with the latter the Chattanooga road, points out to him Liddell's skirmishers, who are advancing on a line parallel with that road, and have already passed beyond it near McDonald's house. While Barnes holds Colquitt back, Reynolds attacks Liddell with his two brigades. King's brigade takes Govan in flank; Turchin's brigade, filing to the left, so as to form in line of battle, captures, by a rapid right wheel, all of Walthall's skirmishers. The latter is shelled at the same time by Daniel McCook's artillery posted near Cloud's plantation, and whose fire Armstrong has provoked.

Liddell's division has a hard time, and is soon repulsed in the greatest disorder. Armstrong also is closely pressed by McCook and a portion of Turchin's brigade. He falls back with difficulty, covered by the light batteries belonging to his division. The high-road which must lead the Federal left to Rossville is open. Reynolds follows it with the small force which accompanies him. He joins McCook, and farther on meets Sheridan with the fragments of his division. About six o'clock, Polk, who does not suspect the movement which the Federals are executing, deploys his attacking force. Breckinridge recalls Stovall's brigade from the extreme right, passes on the left side of Gist, and falls upon King's brigade, which was getting ready to follow Reynolds. He checks its progress, and while he is engaged in a bloody encounter with King's brigade, Walker advances anew and occupies the road without firing a shot. During this time Stewart's Confederates have crossed the wood which separates Poe's farm from Kelly's, and find confronting them Grose's brigade, which forms Palmer's rearguard. By a vigorous charge Clayton and Bate throw the brigade in disorder and capture many prisoners. On the west Palmer rushes into the woods, and at last strikes, not without difficulty, the McFarland's Gap road, a way of retreat still open

to the Union left wing. Happily, this road leads him directly to the defile under the shelter of Horseshoe Hill. Johnson, resisting as best he can against Cleburne's soldiers, who are pressing him hard, crosses the main road in the rear of the troops on his left, and gains the same McFarland's Gap road, at the entrance to which he leaves Willich. His movement has left uncovered the right of Baird, who, being attacked in the centre by Maney and Lucius Polk, and also sharply pressed on the left by Jackson, runs much risk of being surrounded. He falls back toward the road with Barnes' brigade, but his men are exhausted, assailed from all parts, obliged to fight while retreating, and cannot keep their ranks. Most of them scatter and follow the direction taken by Palmer and Johnson. Willich forms the rearguard. Reynolds comes to share with him this post of honor. He was attacked by Breckinridge in the fields south of McDonald's house, and, being unable to hold his ground in the open way, has taken again through the woods the dangerous McFarland's Gap road. It is quite dark, for it is past seven o'clock. The Confederate right wing occupies the farms of Poe, Kelly, and McDonald: at last it is master of that highway which for two days it has sought to take. It picks up, besides the wounded, a great number of prisoners, but, despite the moonlight, the darkness in the timber renders pursuit impossible. The firing ceases along the line. The Unionists, marching somewhat at random, at last attain the foot of Missionary Ridge and discover the defile into which all the roads through the woods converge. A great number of soldiers lose their way and fall in with the Confederate outposts. However, the scattered regiments re-form, man by man, near those which have maintained their organization, and the retreat continues during the night in tolerably good order through the Chattanooga Creek Valley as far as Rossville.

The unexpected attack made by Polk could change into a rout the movement executed by the left: this danger was warded off at the price of great sacrifices. After having saved the army by its stubborn resistance in the morning, this left wing has in turn been saved by the way in which the right has held its positions in the afternoon. About half-past five o'clock the fight slackens on that side: Trigg alone keeps up a sharp fusillade with Wood.

However, shortly thereafter the Unionists lose a part of their positions almost without firing a gun. Steedman, having exhausted his ammunition, at six o'clock abandons the Villetoe pass and retires upon the second crest of Horseshoe Hill, which closes this pass to the northward. Hindman follows Steedman, takes possession of the ground thus left vacant, and again menaces the right flank of Brannan, who, in order to cover it, places Van Derveer's brigade *en potence*. If the assailants were not so fatigued nor the day so far spent, this movement might be fatal to the Unionists; but the night advances and the Confederates are coming up slowly. Besides, Thomas has just issued to Granger, Brannan, and Wood the order to retreat on McFarland's Gap. This movement, which was begun at sunset, is carried on without being seriously disturbed by the enemy. Hazen follows Wood, but the troops belonging to other corps which have joined one another to form a new line among themselves are not so fortunate. In fact, Trigg and Kelly have combined to form a new attack on these troops: the former will take them on the right flank, the latter attack them in front. The retreat of the entire Union line favors this attack. One of the regiments of Sirwell's brigade, armed with repeating rifles, which has held out against the assailants with a desperate energy, finds itself surrounded and almost every man is captured; another regiment meets the same fate. The rest scatter. The Confederates take many prisoners, but they do not think of pursuing, any more than they did on their right. Hindman, Johnson, and Preston confine themselves to the occupation of the ground which they had vainly assailed during the day. At their right Robertson's brigade takes on the first line the place of Kershaw's brigade. Night comes, the battle is over. The Federal columns, following the Dry Valley road and the neighboring roads which through the thick forest lead to McFarland's Gap, reach the defile that the right has already crossed and the approaches to which are protected by Palmer. The moonlight favors their march. Thomas goes before them to organize the defence of Rossville, where are found Crittenden and McCook, whom Rosecrans has sent back to their commands. The ranks of the latter are thinned out, while the fugitives who fill the Chattanooga Creek Valley are

many in number. Those belonging to Van Cleve's division are still fleeing in the direction of Bridgeport and searching for the bridge over which they passed a month ago. Their commander, who thought he should follow them, will not succeed in checking them before to-morrow. Meantime, before daylight the Union generals have placed in line of battle all the troops that they have been able to collect. The Fourteenth corps occupies the Rossville pass, and extends more than half a mile to the south on the crest of Missionary Ridge. The Twentieth corps, resting against the right of the Fourteenth, stretches out at right angles to the westward of the crest, across the vale and the Dry Valley road as far as the Chattanooga Creek. The Twenty-first is posted on the hills to the left of the Ringgold road. Steedman has resumed behind Rossville his position as a reserve.

We have not spoken of the two cavalry corps, each of which on the 20th was upon one of the banks of the Chickamauga above Gordon's Mills: their operations have had no influence on the battle. Mitchell, with E. M. McCook's division and a part of Crook's, remained alone, on the 20th, in the morning near the edge of that stream after the retreat of the Federal right. He is entrusted with the care of covering it, is under the orders of E. M. McCook, who commands this wing, and watches the fords as far as the vicinity of Owen's Ford. Wheeler, who is seeking an opportunity to attack Mitchell, is in front of him at Glass' Mills with his two divisions: a party of his cavalry on foot had forced the river in the forenoon. Wheeler is already advancing toward Crawfish Springs and driving before him the yet scattered troops of Mitchell, when he is held back by a message from Bragg which orders him to direct his efforts to Gordon's Mills. This is a point which he cannot gain without peril in descending the left bank. He reaches that point only about three o'clock, after having reached again the right bank, and recrossed the Chickamauga. At the same hour Mitchell, who has at last concentrated his forces at Crawfish Springs, receives from McCook the order to fall back in great haste to cover the Federal right wing. But as this order was conveyed to him verbally by a common orderly at the very moment when the entire cavalry of the enemy was advancing against him, he refused to execute it, for it would have given

Wheeler too good a chance. On the contrary, Mitchell keeps Wheeler back, preventing him from getting near the battlefield and turning the flank of the Union right. When the latter has entirely disappeared—that is to say, about five o'clock—he falls back, step by step, before Wheeler, allowing him to pick up only about a thousand stragglers and some abandoned *matériel*. In the night Thomas directs Mitchell to reconnoitre, on the right, the valley of Chattanooga Creek and to proceed as far as the slopes of Lookout Mountain. He shall be assisted by Wilder's mounted brigade, and also by Post's, which has come down from Stevens' Gap during the day. Minty, who for a long time past had been detailed, together with a part of Crook's cavalry, to the vicinity of the left wing, occupied during the fight the point of Mission Mills on the north-east of Chattanooga. Thomas recalls him and places him in observation on the Ringgold road.

The Confederates, being exhausted, have halted in the positions where night has overtaken them. Some officers, ignoring the fatigue of the men, proposed an immediate pursuit. No general would have had the imprudence to attempt it. While waiting for the return of day, which will enable them to finish the victory, they spend this night as painfully as they had spent the preceding, for lines must be re-formed, sentinels placed, the wounded must be found and attended to, while before yielding to sleep no one has found a drop of water to slake his thirst.

This struggle of two days was, relatively to the forces engaged, one of the most destructive of the entire war. The Federal army lost 1687 killed, 9394 wounded—of whom some 2500 remained in the hands of the enemy—and 5255 able-bodied prisoners. Hence, more than one-fifth of the combatants were involved in the loss, and the army was diminished by 16,336 men*—in other words, more than one-fourth of its real effective force, leaving out of the account 4000 fugitives who never returned to the ranks. Besides, the Unionists left on the battlefield fifty-one pieces of artillery, hundreds of thousands of cartridges, and more than fifteen thousand muskets, all of which enabled Bragg to supply the defective equipment of several of his brigades. The Confederate army numbered still more killed and wounded, but, naturally, many less

* For revised table of losses, see p. 619.—EDITOR.

prisoners. The left wing, out of 22,882 men and officers present, had 7647 disabled, or about one-third of its effective force. The losses sustained by the right wing, except five brigades of whose condition we have not been able to obtain accounts, were 781 killed, 3780 wounded, and 378 prisoners. The estimation of losses in the entire army, including Forrest's cavalry, may be more than fifteen thousand men*—of whom only seven or eight hundred were prisoners—together with fifteen pieces of artillery.

Generals Smith, Deshler, and Helm were killed, the latter the brother-in-law of President Lincoln. Five other generals were wounded; among them was the gallant Hood, who had not yet recovered from a serious wound received at Gettysburg.†

We have shown that which appeared to us to be worthy of praise or of blame in the conduct of the two armies during the undecided battle of the 19th. A few words will suffice us to criticise in like manner the operations of the second day. Bragg was the assailant, and yet he allowed his adversary all the time he wanted to make intrenchments. In consequence of orders which, not properly issued, were illy understood or illy executed, his right did not begin the fight before ten o'clock. Since he persisted in pushing his right forward, he should have caused his entire army to bear in that direction, so as to turn the positions which he could not carry on the preceding day. The attacks by Polk were conducted without method, without co-operation. The check he sustained was the consequence of this double fault, for which he was punished by the loss of his command. Longstreet, on the contrary, led his grand attack with consummate skill: he succeeded on the 20th as his lieutenant, Hood, had succeeded on the previous day. His success would have been complete if Polk had not used all his troops in useless assaults against the Federal left, and if Bragg, being more mindful of

* See official statement.—EDITOR.

† An account (manuscript) written under the direction of General Rosecrans attributes to the Confederate army an amount of losses still higher. The amount, of which we have not been able to verify the exactness, may thus be divided in figures: killed, 2573; wounded, 16,274; prisoners, 2003—total, 20,850.

Forrest's advice, had endeavored to check Granger while the latter was approaching the battlefield.

Polk's faults were the more fatal to the Confederates because the defence of the Federal left wing was directed by an eminent commander. Although assailed from three sides at once, Thomas made a firm resistance everywhere at the same time, and inflicted heavy loss upon his adversaries without himself experiencing like losses. The result of that day proved how much volleying discharges, by which Thomas' troops did much execution, are more effective than voluntary or isolated firing. In fact, the army was saved from irreparable disaster by the skill with which he conducted the retreat in the midst of the greatest difficulties.

On the other hand, the Federals confronting Longstreet committed all the faults which were to bring on their defeat. Rosecrans, after having caused his right to retire during the night, assigned to it a position where it was spread out too much. He gradually weakened it without concluding to bring it back to the heights which a little later were to offer so powerful a support to the remaining fragments. In a word, he should have transmitted earlier to Negley the order which directed him to the left, and he should have drawn up in more explicit terms the order which caused Wood's fatal error.

However, two fortuitous coincidences decide the event of the battle: Longstreet gives to five divisions the order to attack at the very moment when Wood quits his post in the Federal line, and Granger comes up to the aid of the Union right at the instant when Hindman has finished turning it and is preparing to attack it in flank. The first coincidence secures the victory to the Confederates; the second saves the Federals from complete disaster.

Their defeat is none the less marked. Since the beginning of the war the Confederates had not won such a victory west of the Alleghany Mountains.

The moral effect produced upon both sides was considerable. The illusions which the North had entertained since its successes in the month of July were rudely destroyed. It was not discouraged, but it understood that many efforts would yet be required to overcome its valiant adversary. The latter again took courage and hope, for the South could not foresee that the 19th and 20th

of September, 1863, would prove for it the last two brilliant days of that grand struggle. Naturally, if the consequences of its victory were great, the South was justified in counting upon results much more important still. In the evening of the 20th the Union army was greatly disordered and weakened; it was easy to see that. It could not hold its ground on Missionary Ridge. In order to recuperate its strength and make resistance it must take shelter behind the fortifications commenced by Bragg himself around Chattanooga. But might not this place become the grave of Rosecrans' army, as Vicksburg had been the grave of Pemberton's? The Tennessee River and the chain of the Cumberland Mountains—those great obstacles which had retarded the march of the Federal army—must isolate it. The parallel valleys which had enabled it to menace the rear of Bragg gave to the latter the means also to invest Chattanooga on the west side. It was necessary by a prompt and vigorous action to place Rosecrans in the alternative of abandoning the place with all its *matériel*, or else of allowing himself to be shut up in it. Hence on the 21st there was not a moment to lose to seek the Union army, follow it in its retreat, or attack it anew if it appeared to resist. Unfortunately, this supreme effort had to be asked of soldiers already much fatigued: Bragg must have regretted to have uselessly imposed upon some of his cavalry the part of soldiers serving on foot, and to have depleted Forrest's corps in the engagement on the 19th. Nevertheless, he could find in his four cavalry divisions six thousand men ready to spring upon the rear of the enemy—men accustomed to fight as well afoot as on horseback, and able, as at Thompson's Station, to capture an entire brigade of infantry if they should succeed in isolating it. Besides, there were in the right wing five brigades, two belonging to Gist's division and three to Cheatham's, which did not fire a shot during the day on the 20th: they could be started on the road as soon as day broke. The rest of the army would have followed: only seven miles and a half separated it from Chattanooga, three from Rossville, and hardly two and a half from Thomas' positions on Missionary Ridge.

Every one expects to receive early the necessary orders for this movement. The men, notwithstanding their fatigue, their hunger,

and their thirst, count upon it because they understand the importance of it. The officers remember that Bragg before obtaining the supreme command in his report on the battle of Shiloh criticised the remissness of his superiors by showing the necessity of following up a conquered enemy. However, daylight comes, and yet the Confederate army is not in motion. The leaders hesitate and deliberate. They do not yet know what has become of the Unionists. The commander-in-chief ere coming to a decision wants to make sure of the distribution of rations and cartridges, grant rest to his men, attend to the wounded, bury the dead, pick up the trophies of war, and in fact to inspect his entire line. He begins with the right, where Liddell informs him that his outposts, although extended pretty far, have not encountered any enemy.

About nine o'clock the general-in-chief reaches the left wing, and there naturally consults his brilliant lieutenant. But Longstreet has never directed an army; if he has gloriously arranged the attack that ended in disaster at Gettysburg, he has not on that account acquired the strategic science of a Lee or a Johnston, and allows himself to be beguiled by the chimeras of a plan conceived during the exaltation of victory. He proposes to his superior in command a grand flanking movement to cross the Tennessee above Chattanooga and oblige the enemy to evacuate that place. This operation being accomplished, he would have the Confederates ascend the river as far as Knoxville, and, after having crushed Burnside, they would march straight on Nashville. This plan does not contemplate the disturbance of the enemy's lines of communication on the left bank of the river, but leaves unprotected those of the Confederate army, and will carry this army far from Rosecrans at the time when he shall begin to retreat. Bragg, despite the assertions made in his report, appears to have adopted for a moment the ideas of his lieutenant. At all events, he examines and discusses them; which was a capital fault at a moment when, without stopping to devise campaign schemes, it was necessary to advance directly and rapidly upon the tracks of the enemy, because, according to Forrest's energetic expression, every hour uselessly employed is equivalent to the loss of a thousand men.

But the general-in-chief has determined to await the reports of his cavalry. Forrest, collecting in his two divisions all avail-

able men who can get on horseback, including even Bragg's personal escort, starts on the road as early as four o'clock in the morning. Before seven o'clock he reaches the crest of Missionary Ridge between McFarland's Gap and Rossville, and, uncovering the positions of the enemy, distributes his troops upon the two sides of the mountain. Colonel McLemore with one regiment descends westward into the Chattanooga Valley; the rest of Dibrell's brigade, under the direction of Forrest, follows the top of the ridge, supported on the right by Armstrong with his second brigade. Pegram's small division moves along the eastern slope and stretches out beyond the main road. While McLemore, availing himself of the confusion which prevails among the Federals, crosses the line that McCook has not yet completely formed and picks up many prisoners on the Dry Valley road, Dibrell advances along the crest until he faces the last knob which overlooks Rossville. Reynolds' division, placed so as to form a right angle to the west of this knob, checks the march of the Southern cavalry. It was too late, however, because from the top of an observatory established in a tree, where he has surprised a Federal officer who was looking in the distance for the enemy and did not see them at his feet, Forrest takes in at a glance the whole country stretching between the battlefield and the Tennessee River. He sees before him lines, yet illy defined, of Federal troops that their commanders are trying to re-form amidst the fugitives who encumber the Chattanooga road. Even that city, which is perfectly visible, is full of these fugitives, full of vehicles crowding in its straight and wide streets. Everything indicates the thorough disorganization of a large part of the Union army. Behind him the Confederate army is resting in a torpid condition upon the battlefield, without appearing to suspect the opportunity it allows to go by.

While Forrest's messengers are going to urge Polk and Bragg to move their troops, his cavalry engages in conflict with the Federals who are guarding the Rossville pass. Pegram follows the La Fayette road, encounters at ten o'clock Minty's outposts, and slowly drives them back upon the rise of ground which on the south overlooks the Rossville pass. At last, about two o'clock, he causes a portion of his men to dismount, and with the support

of his artillery he attacks Stanley's brigade, which is strongly posted above the road. Armstrong follows this move and menaces John Beatty's brigade, which belongs, like the preceding, to Negley's division, and is drawn up on the crest to the right of Armstrong. But Pegram cannot break Stanley's lines; Armstrong is quickly forced back by a charge from Beatty; and both together, after having lost many killed and wounded, fall to the rear to await the rest of the army.

On the left, Wheeler contents himself with sending, early in the morning, two regiments to pick up arms and stragglers beyond the line of outposts. It is only at nine o'clock that Longstreet orders him to go and look for the hostile army; but Bragg, still fearing a return with offensive demonstrations on the part of the enemy, allows Wheeler to detail only five hundred men to Colonel Anderson, who is entrusted with the reconnoissance of McFarland's Gap. Soon, however, Bragg learns that Mitchell, wishing to cover the right of the Federal army, has advanced his cavalry on the Stevens' Gap road. He immediately allows himself to be carried along to that side with the rest of his corps, makes a sharp attack upon the cavalry at the foot of the pass, and drives it back to Chattanooga Creek, after having picked up two thousand prisoners, eighteen flags, and many wagons. Notwithstanding this success, he had done better if he had moved with his three thousand cavalry on McFarland's Gap, whence, descending toward Chattanooga, he might have united with Forrest, and perhaps compelled the Federal army precipitately to abandon Rossville.

Anderson, like Forrest, has perceived the confused masses of the enemy drawn *en échelon* in the Chattanooga Valley, and, like Forrest, he has urgently asked his superior officers to hurl the infantry in pursuit of the enemy. Bragg makes light of Anderson's and Forrest's advice. When at last, toward midday, he gives the order to move, he does not direct the army to advance toward Rossville, but toward Red House Bridge, whither he himself repairs to concentrate his troops near the confluence of the two branches of the Chickamauga Creek and the station of the same name. At a decisive moment he thus takes the army away from the enemy. He doubtless wishes to encamp close to water for the benefit of his soldiers, who have not been able to quench their

thirst for the past forty-eight hours, and to get them nearer the railroad, so as to distribute to them subsistence for several days before continuing a campaign the plan of which does not yet appear to be settled in his mind. The trains and dépôts are exhausted: the railway has not been able to replenish them for nearly a week, having been used exclusively for the transportation of troops. Bragg also persuades himself that the enemy, with an army twice as large as his own, occupies on Missionary Ridge an impregnable position, whence he will descend to the battlefield in search of the trophies abandoned on the previous day. These preoccupations of mind should not have stopped him. There was no excuse for entertaining such illusions in regard to the strength of his adversary, and the commissariat following the different corps had that very morning distributed rations enough to enable the army to proceed a few miles so as to meet the enemy and accomplish his defeat.

The right wing of the Confederate army, with Cheatham in the advance, begins to move about two o'clock in the afternoon. In the evening it bivouacs upon the banks of the Chickamauga, from Red House Bridge as far as Mission Mills: a fresh distribution of rations is made during the night. As the rear of this column was not set in motion before sundown, Longstreet, who was to follow, was obliged to postpone his march until the next day. On the other hand, Forrest, after having remained some hours in presence of the enemy, returns to the main body of his command on the Ringgold road and brings it back near Polk.

The Federals were waiting only for nightfall to retire, for McCook, exposed on the left and without any supporting-point on the right, could not long protect Rossville. Besides, Thomas had accomplished his purpose. He had intimidated the victor of the preceding day, held back his cavalry, checked the disorder which threatened to reach every rank, and given to Rosecrans time to improvise the defence of Chattanooga. He asked his chief to recall the army to the neighborhood of that city.

The retreat, which commenced at nine o'clock in the evening behind a strong line of skirmishers, was accomplished about seven o'clock in the morning without having been interfered with:

each division established itself around Chattanooga in the position which had been assigned to it by Rosecrans. Baird's division, the command of which Rousseau had just resumed, brought up the rear under cover of Minty's cavalry, which proceeded to take up a position at a point where the road to Chickamauga Station crosses Missionary Ridge. At last the army found in Chattanooga the subsistence of which it stood in greater need than even its adversaries, for no distribution of rations had been made since the 18th. It also found the intrenchments begun by the Confederates, which were no doubt very imperfect, yet sufficient to bring confidence to the men, while they afforded an opportunity for reorganization.

Meantime, Bragg, who had received Forrest's report and believed that the enemy was still posted on Missionary Ridge, has decided to feel him, but only with his cavalry and two infantry divisions. Longstreet, after having set the entire left wing in motion on the road to Red House Bridge, directs that the La Fayette and Chattanooga road should be taken by McLaws' division, again led by that general, who has arrived during the night with Wofford's brigade. Since the break of day Rossville has been in possession of the Southern cavalry. Forrest, who left Red House Bridge about eight o'clock in the morning, clears the defile and occupies the outlets while waiting for the infantry. In another direction, Wheeler, following up Mitchell's tracks, comes down along the left bank of Chattanooga Creek until he is halted by the Federal cavalry a little more than a mile from the works. On the right, Cheatham starts out early on what is called the Shallow Ford road, leading from Chickamauga Station to Chattanooga, and arrives about ten o'clock in the morning in front of the positions occupied by Minty on Missionary Ridge. He immediately deploys Maney's and Vaughan's brigades on the right and left of the road, but he loses much time before deciding to begin the attack. Minty, who has managed to check him by a fortunate distribution of his cavalry, is not able to offer resistance to this attack, and therefore falls back in good order on Chattanooga.

McLaws has been less diligent than Cheatham, and Forrest, without waiting for him, starts on the Chattanooga road. The greater part of his command, on foot and deployed along a front

line nearly two miles long, advances across the valley, picks up the stragglers, and occupies all the roads leading into the city from the south and the east. At last he halts on the Rossville road in front of a large pentagonal fort, whose garrison is so zealous to relieve the sentinels on the parapet that a long time elapses before it becomes aware of the presence of the Confederates. Posting himself, with one of Armstrong's brigades, on Watkins' farm in front of this fort, Forrest charges Dibrell to spread out his left. Pegram, on the right, extends his troops as far as the vicinity of the Tennessee River. Everywhere the Federals have retired within their intrenchments, except a regiment belonging to Van Cleve's division, which is captured almost bodily by Davidson's brigade on the Harrison road.

Finally, McLaws comes up with Kershaw's and Wofford's brigades, and relieves the Confederate cavalry near Watkins' farm. Forrest, always eager for the fray, proposes to McLaws a sudden attack on the intrenchments, yet very weak, behind which the enemy is sheltered. But McLaws, feeling isolated, declines with good reason to attempt such a venture contrary to the instructions he has received. Besides, the result already obtained by Forrest is all the more important because Dibrell has completed the investment of the hostile army on the left bank of the Tennessee. After a sharp fight he has posted himself on the road running between the river and the lower slopes of Lookout Mountain in a defile of which the reader already knows the importance. Although McLaws refuses him the co-operation of his infantry, he maintains himself in that position, and his cavalry, in spite of fatigue, repulses several offensive efforts of the enemy.

But night has come. The Federals, who have labored since morning on the works at Chattanooga, now feel assured that they can successfully defend them against any attack by armed force. They have before them, besides the enemy's cavalry, only McLaws and Cheatham, and even the latter has halted upon the crest of Missionary Ridge. Bragg, learning that his adversary has shut himself up in Chattanooga, at last resolves to push forward all the rest of his army, which has just collected on the banks of the Chickamauga. This army cannot carry on a long offensive campaign, for the reinforcements which have come from the South and the East

have teams for neither their ammunition- nor subsistence-wagons, while one-third of the artillery-horses have been left dead on the field. But by planting itself in front of Rosecrans it closes to him the Bridgeport railroad and all the roads on the left bank of the Tennessee. Henceforth, the Federals not being able to take in supplies of provisions except by means of wagons over a chain of mountains covered with dense woods, will be reduced to hunger as soon as the season shall have rendered the roads impassable. If this partial investment does not suffice to compel the abandonment of Chattanooga, Bragg indulges the hope of making this movement a necessity by hurling his cavalry against the long line of railway between Nashville and Bridgeport, and which Rosecrans will not be able to protect.

In the morning of the 23d the Southern army reaches the different passes of Missionary Ridge to the northward of Rossville. Polk, on the right, halts on the crest. Longstreet, on the left, posts himself about eleven o'clock in the positions occupied on the day before by McLaws, and his lines take in the point of Lookout Mountain. The Bridgeport railroad, which passes around this point, is thus intersected. Forrest, supported everywhere by the infantry, brings back his exhausted troops to Tyner's Station, beyond the Chickamauga River, where they will rest. Wheeler, on the contrary, who has suffered less, is sent to the west in Lookout Valley; after having occupied Trenton, he must cross the Tennessee to destroy the enemy's railways beyond Bridgeport.

The Confederate infantry, whose looks are darting even into Chattanooga, immediately go to work to throw up a line of works around the rich prey which they certainly intend shall not escape from them. Notwithstanding all the time lost, there seems to be some ground for this hope. It will be a retaliation for the loss of Vicksburg.

Really, the situation in which Rosecrans is placed resembles that of Pemberton. Beaten as Pemberton was, Rosecrans, like Pemberton, allows himself to be pent up within a narrow place. He abandons Lookout Mountain, which covers Chattanooga, as the opponent of Grant had abandoned Haynes' Bluff. We have alluded to that chain of abrupt mountains extending like a long wall toward the south and stopping bluntly on the

north a few miles below Chattanooga on the left bank of the Tennessee, of which they overlook the tumultuous waters by more than seven hundred yards. When Bragg occupied Chattanooga he held a strong position near the alpine village of Summertown on the top of those heights, and watched the narrow pass through which the railway, commanded from the road, meanders between the rocks and the river. In order to cross Lookout Mountain, Rosecrans had been obliged to go and seek for a pass twenty-five miles more to the southward; but, finding beyond this impediment a tolerably open country, it had been easy for him, while menacing the enemy's line of retreat, to force him to evacuate Chattanooga.

Bragg's situation in front of this place was very different. He could easily invest the works which closed it on the side of Missionary Ridge and the Chattanooga Valley, but the ridge of Lookout Mountain offered to the Federals a gigantic protected way ending somewhat in the rear of their lines. Some troops posted behind good works at Summertown would have checked an entire army, and Bragg, in order to reach the railway which served as an avenue of supply for his opponents, would have been obliged to go up as far as Stevens' Gap, afterward to descend into Will's Valley as far as Wauhatchie. This manœuvre, undertaken by the entire army, would have uncovered its base of operations, more exposed than that of the enemy; if entrusted to an important corps, this manœuvre would have caused a dangerous division of the army. A simple detachment would have miserably failed to accomplish the purpose intended. Hence the possession of the crest and foot of the Summertown ridge was of paramount importance to both parties. The Federal engineers did not mind the matter during the ten days previous to the battle. Rosecrans did not think he could detach, to occupy this position, a portion of the troops that Thomas brought back from the Chickamauga in the night between the 21st and the 22d; nor did he extend his lines beyond the stream which runs along the foot of the mountain. We have seen that Forrest, moved by a happy thought, took possession of the defile, and on the 23d entrusted its keeping to McLaws' infantry. But McLaws placed there only an insignificant force, and for two days a detachment of Union soldiers remained quietly established in the village

of Summertown. Unless the Federal army was still absolutely disorganized, it was easy for one of its divisions to go and occupy this point by crossing the Tennessee River a short distance below. Rosecrans did not move to occupy the point, and he has vainly sought to excuse himself about it. Bragg did not then understand any better than he the strategic value of Summertown. It was almost by chance that he took possession of it. Having recalled Wheeler, who had not proceeded beyond Trenton, so as to collect all his cavalry above Chattanooga and menace East Tennessee, he ordered him on the 24th to sweep on his way back the entire crest of Lookout Mountain. While the bulk of his cavalry was taking the direction of Chickamauga Station, Wheeler executed this order with two hundred men only, and at night captured Summertown, from which he dislodged the Federals. The positions so easily conquered were at last strongly occupied by Longstreet. The latter at once extended all along the Tennessee a strong line of skirmishers, who by their ceaseless firing prevented the Federals from passing on the direct road between Jasper and Chattanooga that runs along the right bank. The service of the steamboats was likewise interrupted by the field-batteries posted near the river, above as well as below. One channel only remained open to supply Rosecrans' army: it was the road that crossed the Tennessee through the bridges at Chattanooga and led by rough passes over the arid top of Walden's Ridge, thence came down by Anderson into the Sequatchie Valley, which it followed as far as Jasper. From this point it led on to Bridgeport along the right bank of the Tennessee. This road was about sixty-two miles long. The military authorities never had contemplated the possibility of feeding, so far from any railroad, the seventy thousand men that Rosecrans had to provide for. The repair to the railway having been finished only on the eve of the battle, the commissary of subsistence had no time to fill up the stores in Chattanooga.

The news of the defeat at Chickamauga had caused a deep sensation at Washington; but the general uneasiness became much greater when the situation of the Army of the Cumberland became known. It was evident that this army, unassisted, could not break away from Bragg's grasp. In order to release it,

it was necessary promptly to bring to its aid the reinforcements which Halleck had so tardily ordered to get in motion. It was necessary to do still more, and respond to the presence of Longstreet in the West by the despatch of a portion of the Army of the Potomac; for, thanks to better means of communication, this detachment could reach the scene of the struggle sooner than any other reinforcement forwarded. It was the duty of the authorities at Washington to prove they were not afraid at so grave a time to weaken the army charged with the protection of the capital.

The Government understood this duty, and on the 23d of September the order was given to Meade to send the Eleventh and Twelfth corps to the city of Washington. As we said in the preceding volume, Howard and Slocum, who were in command of these corps, left on the following morning the banks of the Rappahannock, and conducted their troops to the capital, where they were joined by General Hooker, their new chief. Numerous trains were also in readiness to convey these twenty thousand men, with their artillery, ammunition, and baggage, by way of Cincinnati and Nashville, as far as Bridgeport; and within six days this army and its *matériel* were transported over the distance of nine hundred and ninety-four miles between Washington and Bridgeport. This remarkable achievement was due to the excellent management of Quartermaster-general Meigs, General McCallum, director of military railways, and the civil administrators of the different railroad companies. The confusion which had marked the earlier days was succeeded by a well-regulated system, of which the Federal armies at last reaped the fruit. The orders issued to Hooker forbade him to go beyond Bridgeport, but to defend to the last the railroad between this point and Nashville while waiting for the time when direct communications might be opened with Chattanooga. So long as there were no easy means of supplying this place, care must be taken not to increase the number of mouths to be fed within it. Like orders were issued to all the reinforcements drawn from the Army of the Missouri and the camps of instruction. Unfortunately for Rosecrans, the armies of the Ohio and of the Mississippi could not be transported to the vicinity of the Tennessee passes so promptly as the divisions which had been detached from the Army of the Potomac.

We left Burnside on the 24th of September returning in great haste to Knoxville with all the available portion of his army, to march at last to the assistance of Rosecrans. In the morning he met at Morristown the heads of columns of the Ninth corps and heard of the battle of Chickamauga. The result of this battle greatly changes his situation: he can no longer proceed on Buckner's tracks to join Rosecrans in the breach at Dalton. He halts at Knoxville with the bulk of his troops, leaving his cavalry on the banks of the Hiawassee to watch the southern roads, and asks of Halleck instructions for which the latter makes him wait a long time. The head of the general staff, wishing neither to abandon a single part of the vast territory reconquered by the Army of the Ohio, nor to refuse the co-operation of this army to the vanquished at Chickamauga, finds no other way of solving this problem than to order Burnside to have a clear understanding with Rosecrans. After several days of expectation Burnside proposes three plans for a campaign. According to the first, he should follow with the greater part of his army, say about twenty thousand men, the right bank of the Tennessee, so that, being protected by this river, he might join directly the Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga. According to the second, he should, on the contrary, come down on the left bank along the railway, with some fifteen thousand men, leaving the rest of his troops in East Tennessee, and then attack the right wing of Bragg's army. If the third plan be adopted, he should take with him the troops last mentioned; but, instead of going to seek Bragg, Burnside should pass behind him, moving by way of Benton along the foot of the Alleghany Mountains, cut, at Dalton, Bragg's communications, reach Atlanta, and, crossing the entire length of Georgia, should look for a suitable point for the embarkation of troops. Subsisting on the country, taking with him no train, and tearing up the railway behind him, he will not allow himself to be overtaken after he shall have forced Bragg to raise the siege of Chattanooga to pursue him. This third plan was perhaps chimerical at that time, as Burnside's forces were not proportioned to the magnitude of the enterprise; but we have mentioned it because in it are found clearly indicated the principal characteristics of the plan that somewhat

later was to lead Sherman from the banks of the Tennessee to the coast of the Atlantic. In other respects all three of the plans were impracticable; the second would expose Burnside, isolated, to certain destruction, while the first presented the double inconvenience of abandoning East Tennessee and bringing to Chattanooga a new army which would have hastened the dearth of provisions in that place. They were all discarded. East Tennessee could not be used for a base of operations against the Confederates, because, there being no railway connection at the northward, the supplying of a large army was impossible in that part of the State. Burnside with his four divisions hardly found there the necessaries of life, and he had been obliged to reduce the rations allotted to his troops. On the other hand, the retreat of the Army of the Cumberland rendered the occupation of East Tennessee much more important, for, as this army no longer menaced Dalton and Cleveland, it was only on the banks of the Holston River that the Federals could occupy the direct line, so useful to the Confederacy, from Lynchburg to Atlanta. It was therefore necessary that Burnside should remain in East Tennessee. Rosecrans was asking him to collect the bulk of his troops at Kingston on the south of Knoxville, so as to place his entire cavalry *en échelon* down the river on the western bank of the Tennessee. He would thus have covered the left of the Army of the Cumberland, while leaving sufficient garrisons at Knoxville and Cumberland Gap, the only points within his command which it was important to preserve. But the Government at Washington would not expose to incursions by the enemy the territory the liberation of which it had just celebrated, and Halleck ordered Burnside to occupy so many different points that the latter could not conform to the desire of Rosecrans.

Later on we shall see the service which he shall indirectly render to the defenders of Chattanooga by drawing to himself—without, however, having left Knoxville—a portion of Bragg's army. But he shall have no active part in the great struggle which is to take place around Lookout Mountain.

BOOK II.—THE SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA.

CHAPTER I.

WAUHATCHIE.

HOOKER'S troops reach Bridgeport in advance of all the other reinforcements expected with so much impatience by the Army of the Cumberland. But to ensure the deliverance of the place there is required the co-operation of a portion of Grant's army, to which, as we have said, Halleck sent pressing orders some days before the battle of Chickamauga.

We left this army, in Volume III., about the middle of July. The Mississippi is open, Johnston has been forced into the interior, while Pemberton's troops, prisoners on parole, have followed his track in sadness. The victory of the Federals is so complete that they no longer have an adversary confronting them. The troops collected from all parts to ensure this victory are available. As early as the 18th of July, Grant proposes to the general-in-chief of the army to transport these troops by sea to Mobile, to take possession of that city, and thence to enter upon a campaign which, in ascending the Alabama River, would lead him to the heart of the Confederacy. But this plan, the very probable success of which would have speedily put an end to the war, is not approved by Halleck, who is always ready to favor operations of a secondary importance at the sacrifice of measures which might prove of a decisive character. The forces collected before Vicksburg are scattered. As we have stated, the Ninth corps embarked at the beginning of August to rejoin Burnside. Halleck, while he sends the latter into East Tennessee, wishes also to finish the conquest of Louisiana. The Thirteenth corps is transported from Vicksburg to Natchez, to co-operate with Banks in the campaign of which we shall hereafter relate the disastrous issue. Hurl-

but, with the Sixteenth corps, is recalled to Memphis: one of his divisions is sent to General Schofield in Missouri. Only two corps remain with Grant near Vicksburg: these are the Fifteenth and the Seventeenth, commanded by his two favorite lieutenants, Sherman and McPherson. The former while returning from Jackson halted on the banks of the Big Black River. The latter encamps within the works which Pemberton had so long defended.

In this army, thus divided, every one thinks only of resting, for all have very quickly understood that great operations are suspended. The men would have gallantly made another effort if it had been demanded of them forthwith to strike the enemy yet stunned by defeat. But once that moment of enthusiasm is passed, fatigue overcomes the strongest constitutions. The warm and damp climate completes the enervation of troops which are no longer stimulated by the excitement incident to the struggle. More men are disabled by typhoid and marsh fevers than by the fire of the enemy. Requests for furloughs, at first readily granted, multiply at a fearful rate. It appears to be the belief that the army has accomplished its task. Besides, Halleck continues to parcel it out, for at the beginning of September he asks Grant for a division to reinforce Steele in Arkansas. Finally, the army beholds its chief himself reduced for a time to inactivity. The Federal Government wished to re-establish its authority in Texas and occupy the frontier formed by the Rio Grande River. The creation of the ephemeral empire of Mexico, together with the difficulties which it had raised between Paris and Washington, caused the latter to fear lest a foreign army, crossing the Rio Grande, might come and join with the Confederates. But Grant was still thinking of the expedition to Mobile. Whether the troops landed at the mouth of the Alabama or of the Rio Grande, they had to embark at New Orleans. Toward the latter part of August he went to that city in order to confer about his project with Banks. But shortly after his arrival he had so serious a fall from his horse that when brought back to Vicksburg he was for three weeks obliged to remain in bed, and for two months could not walk without crutches.

It is in the midst of this season of rest that Halleck's pressing appeal in favor of Rosecrans is received at Vicksburg. It has

already been noticed that the general-in-chief of the army addressed a first despatch to Grant on the 13th of September, directing him to send all his available forces to Memphis, and to move them thence eastward by way of Corinth and Tusculumbia. Forty-eight hours thereafter the same orders were repeated in a second despatch, containing more detail. However, the days succeed one another and the news of the battle of Chickamauga comes, without any response returning either from Memphis or Vicksburg: the telegraph-wire does not extend beyond Cairo, and official messages are forwarded by water. But important orders might easily be carried within fifteen hours by a special boat as far as Memphis, the distance being only about one hundred and fifty-five miles. A like service, organized by Grant, maintains communications between Memphis and Vicksburg, which are separated by a distance of nearly two hundred and twenty-four miles. Carelessness on the part of some employés is the only cause of this strange silence. The urgency of Halleck's despatches has doubtless not been made known at Cairo, nor understood by those who have received them. Whether they were mislaid or have been entrusted to boats which have stopped on the way, these despatches reach Memphis only after incredible delays. The despatch of the 15th arrives first, on the 21st; Hurlbut sends it immediately to Grant, who receives it on the 22d. That of the 13th is handed to him only on the 25th: it took ten days to carry this despatch from Cairo to Memphis. This neglect may compromise the safety of a large army, and it is incredible that Halleck should not have made a searching inquiry into this matter. Grant, although still confined to bed, loses not a moment to repair the neglect. All his orders are issued within a few hours. A boat despatched after J. E. Smith carries to him the order not to land at Helena, and to proceed by water as far as Memphis, whence Hurlbut shall direct him by land on Corinth, with two divisions of the latter's own corps. The expedition into Arkansas being accomplished, the troops which would return thence to Memphis would be sent in the same direction. Osterhaus' division of Sherman's corps is recalled in great haste from the banks of the Big Black River, and as early as the 24th it is ascending the river.

However, Grant has readily understood that in thus detaching four divisions from his army he has done either too much or too little. It is best to renounce the campaign of which New Orleans might be the base, by leaving on the river only indispensable garrisons, and to send the bulk of the army to the eastward in search of new battlefields near the blood-stained banks of the Chickamauga. Therefore, on the 25th, Sherman receives the order to bring back two more divisions to Vicksburg: all boats coming in from the south or the north are detained and loaded with troops, while on the 28th Sherman starts for Memphis, followed by a long convoy carrying the Second and the Fourth divisions under the command of Generals G. A. Smith and Corse. J. E. Smith's division, which Sherman will find at Memphis, will replace in the Fifteenth corps Tuttle's division, which was left near Big Black River and temporarily incorporated with the Seventeenth corps. Grant, with a view to explain to Banks the refusal of the help which the latter asks of him, sends a copy of Halleck's orders.

Thanks to Grant, six divisions will leave Memphis in a few days to proceed to the assistance of Rosecrans: it is the flower of the army before which Pemberton has surrendered. Sherman commands these troops, and he will thus double their value. His chief, who regretfully parts with him, is aware of the service which he renders to the Federal cause by opening a new and vast field of activity to the military genius of Sherman. Thus, Grant retains for himself on the Mississippi only one division at Memphis and three near Vicksburg. Ord by placing his troops *en échelon* shall be able easily to watch the course of the river from Natchez as far as Bayou Sara, near the town of Port Hudson, which is occupied by Banks. A portion of Johnston's army has remained between Meridian and Jackson; his cavalry is overrunning the northern part of the State of Mississippi: it is necessary to prevent these forces from making an offensive movement on the Big Black River or impeding the progress of the divisions sent to Rosecrans' assistance. McPherson receives orders to detain Johnston's forces by a vigorous demonstration against Canton and Jackson. On the other hand, Grant takes measures to prevent fresh delays in the transmission of orders received from his chief.

However, it was not possible any longer to leave inactive and useless behind the ruined walls of Vicksburg the general whom brilliant victories had raised above all the other promoters of the Federal cause. The Government understood at last that the defeat at Chickamauga was owing to the self-reliance or independence of the commanders of the armies of the Tennessee, the Cumberland, and the Ohio, and that it was expedient to place under one supreme command the direction of this sort of aulic council, the voice of which was heard only in the telegraphic-office at Washington. Nobody could dispute with Grant the claim to this rôle. President Lincoln determined to give him, under the designation of the Military Division of the Mississippi, the command of all the armies operating between the great river and the Alleghanies. On the 3d of October, Halleck called him to Cairo: despite the precautions he had taken, Grant received the despatch only on the 10th, when he immediately embarked for the north.

Sherman had arrived at Memphis on the 2d of October with G. A. Smith's division. Osterhaus had repaired by rail to Corinth, where Hurlbut's two divisions had already arrived. J. E. Smith was preparing to follow him by the same road; his troops were already collected at the station, but locomotives and cars were wanting. As G. A. Smith had not been able to start before the 9th of October, Sherman preferred that Corse's division, which had landed on the 4th, should move by land. On the 11th, all his troops being in motion, Sherman himself started for Corinth with his staff and a battalion of regulars. It was therefore a whole army which was going to throw its weight into the decisive struggle near Chattanooga. But Halleck, fearing to overtax the Louisville and Bridgeport line *via* Nashville, had directed Sherman to restore beyond Corinth the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, so as to use it to bring in supplies and provisions. The army was therefore obliged to regulate its march by the progress of this reconstruction.

From the first days in October, Hooker had ranged his two corps *en echelon* between Tullahoma and Bridgeport, to occupy the pass of the Cumberland Mountains and protect the railway employed for supplying the army collected at Chattanooga.

But while he saved it from immediate famine, he yet did not afford it the means of either extricating itself or accumulating provisions for the winter. Rosecrans, under whose orders Hooker was placed, also found it was impossible to bring him to Chattanooga, where the consumption by his troops would have increased the scarcity of food, and equally impossible to undertake offensive operations with forces thus divided. He was waiting for the completion of a new ponton-train to bring Hooker by the right bank in front of Lookout Valley and make him cross the Tennessee, so as to attack in flank the elevated positions from the top of which Longstreet was enabled to close to him the road to Bridgeport. This waiting was tedious and dangerous to his army.

On the 25th of September we left him finishing his fortifications in Chattanooga. His entire cavalry is massed on the left bank, which it is charged to watch above and below. It is a difficult task, for Burnside has not followed Rosecrans' suggestions: it is necessary to stretch the line of troops to within a short distance of Kingston. Above Chattanooga the task is entrusted to Crook's division, whose surveillance includes more than fifty miles, together with numerous fords, the water in the river being very low at that time. Colonel McCook's division is posted in the neighborhood of Bridgeport and watches the passes in Tennessee.

The Confederates are getting ready to pierce this feeble curtain. Bragg wishing to keep all his infantry on the left bank of the river in front of Rosecrans, it is the part of his cavalry to cross the river to operate against the supply-trains of the Federals. But he desires first to make sure that Burnside will not trouble his rear, and by a vigorous demonstration to stop any movement of the Army of the Ohio to the south of Hiawassee River. In fact, it is rumored that that army has already crossed this river. Forrest, after only one day of rest, receives on the 25th, in the morning, the order to send Pegram with Scott's brigade to the left bank of the Tennessee, so as to watch Crook's Federal posts, while he, with Davidson's brigade and Armstrong's division, will move toward Cleveland and Charleston. It is near to this last town, situate on the southern shore of

the Hiawassee, that the presence of the enemy has been reported. On the morrow, the 26th, at daybreak, Wheeler leaves the station at Chickamauga to form the reserve of the expeditionary corps, while Forrest, joining, at Cleveland, Hodge's brigade, moves rapidly upon Charleston, which Colonel Byrd occupies with one or two regiments of Union cavalry. Armstrong and Davidson, each with one brigade, pass the river above and below Charleston, so as to get ahead of the Federals on the road to Athens. After having allowed them time to accomplish this movement, Wheeler himself, with his artillery and two brigades, attacks the Federal post. Byrd makes haste to pass over to the right bank of the Hiawassee, which is defended by light works; but the Confederates, having found an easy ford, follow him up and compel him to retreat. Forrest, fortunately for Byrd, has been too quick, and he thus escapes from the detachments which were to surround him. Wolford brings a Federal brigade from Athens to his assistance, but he soon recognizes the necessity of falling back before the enemy, whose forces, again collected, press him closely, without, however, being able to attack him. Thus, the Confederates take possession of Sweetwater and Philadelphia, which the Union rearguard defends for a moment against Dibrell, and then they occupy Loudon, where they exchange some musket-shots with the Federals, who hastily recross the Tennessee. Their feeble resistance proves that the bulk of Burnside's army is yet far away. All bond between this army and that of Rosecrans is sundered: henceforth the Confederate cavalry may turn Rosecrans' left to undertake one of those destructive raids the tradition of which Van Dorn has bequeathed to that cavalry. But Forrest, who was recalled that very evening to Charleston, will take no part in the expedition which he appeared so fit to direct.

Pragg, dissatisfied with himself and others, has punished by arrests, pending the decision by a board of inquiry, the dilatoriness of Hill and Polk on the 11th and the 20th of September. Perhaps he has a grudge against Forrest for being too quick to pursue the enemy on the 21st. Be that as it may, he deprives him, in fact, of his command by enjoining upon him to remain on the left bank of the Tennessee with only one of his brigades.

The three others are taken away to double Wheeler's forces, which are going to spring upon the rear of Rosecrans. On the evening of the 30th the bulk of these forces is collected near the crossing called Cottonport Ferry, where the Decatur and Washington road crosses the Tennessee. Although he is obliged to send away a portion of Forrest's cavalry, whose horses are either foundered or wounded, still there are left him about four thousand sabres, which, with some batteries, are divided among the three divisions of Wharton, Martin, and Davidson.

While Bragg shall seek, from the northward, to gain the Nashville and Bridgeport Railroad, a force of nearly equal strength shall advance from the southward to reach that same road. On the 29th of September, Johnston orders the chief of his cavalry, General Lee, who occupies Northern Alabama, to cross the Tennessee with two thousand five hundred well-mounted men. Roddey's brigade, nearly fifteen hundred strong, shall leave Tusculum to join him.

Meantime, Wheeler as early as the evening of September 30th finds himself beyond the Tennessee. Crook has not been able to collect his forces in time to defend the passage. His posts have fallen back from Washington to Smith's Cross-roads before the enemy's powerful column. This column, without waiting any longer, has entered the road called Paine's Trace, leading across Walden's Ridge to Pikeville on the banks of the Sequatchie, and soon the darkness of night masks its movements. The Federal left wing is turned. Crook calls to him all the detachments *en échelon* down the river, and begins to march, October 1st, upon the tracks of the Confederates, with his two thousand cavalymen under the direction of Minty and Long. The brigade of mounted infantry, the command of which Wilder has given to Colonel Miller, will meet Crook in the mountain. The news of Wheeler's crossing, quickly transmitted to Chattanooga, causes a deep sensation among the Federals. For, once in the Sequatchie Valley, the hostile cavalry can easily reach at Anderson the only road which connects Chattanooga with Bridgeport, and by a fatal coincidence a long subsistence-train, including upward of three hundred wagons, happens to be just near the most exposed point on the road. Orders are issued to Colonel

McCook to leave on the Tennessee only such posts as are strictly necessary, and to move the rest of his division through Jasper to Anderson, where General Robert B. Mitchell, commander-in-chief of the Federal cavalry, is to meet him. McCook starts with Colonel La Grange's brigade, stationed at Bridgeport; Colonel Campbell's brigade, encamped farther down, will follow McCook; and the third, under Colonel Watkins, will do the duty formerly assigned to the entire division. But the weather is fearful. McCook, who got in late at Jasper, wishes to allow Campbell time to join him during the night; Campbell, likewise belated, does not appear, and, after having thus lost precious time, McCook, with a single brigade, at the break of day resumes his march in the direction of Anderson. Crook has experienced a like mischance: after bivouacking on the top of Walden's Ridge, he saw Miller appear only on the 2d, in the morning. Wheeler, on the contrary, marched throughout the night from September 30th to October 1st, so that in the forenoon of that date he reaches Pikeville, on the banks of the Sequatchie, near which he allows his men and horses a well-earned rest. He is about five miles ahead of Crook, and will know how to avail himself of this advantage. In the night of the 1st-2d, Wharton, with his division (Davidson's), the baggage-wagons, as well as the lame men and horses, toils up the eastern slopes of the Cumberland Mountains and takes the direct road to McMinnville, where the Federals have considerable dépôts which contribute to the supplying of Chattanooga by the way of Anderson.

During this time, Wheeler, firmly believing that Crook will start in pursuit of the principal corps, takes with him a body of fifteen hundred horse belonging to Martin's division, and rapidly descends the Sequatchie Valley in the direction of Anderson. After having captured, on the way, about thirty United States wagons, he gains at last that much-coveted point, and the joy of the Confederate cavalry may be imagined when they discover on the road to the south of the village the enemy's wagons, whose white covers in the distance form, as far as the eye can reach on the damp plains, something like a long chaplet of pearls. The escort is easily dispersed, and while a portion of the force remain under arms at the north of the village, the rest burn the wagons

and kill the mules, after having appropriated the finest. But soon the reports of Wheeler's skirmishers come in to interrupt his work of destruction. If McCook had not marched slowly, he would have arrived first at Anderson, for this point is only about sixteen miles distant from Jasper, and twenty-six from Pikeville, where Wheeler was the evening before. At last, toward one o'clock, McCook's march was accelerated by a dense smoke of which he easily divined the cause. Leaving one regiment on the Dunlap road, with the two other regiments he gains the left bank of the Sequatchie, falls upon the Confederates who were still engaged in pillaging the wagons, defeats them, and captures about sixty of their number. The pillagers, driven toward the main part of their division, rally near it beyond Anderson; but Wheeler, having no longer any motive to continue the fight, promptly falls back, notwithstanding the superiority of his forces. For the blow is struck, the wagon-train is destroyed, and subsistence for several days is captured from Rosecrans. It is necessary to hasten elsewhere and join Wharton's troops. In the morning of the 3d the two Southern columns meet in front of McMinnville.

A few hours later, Wheeler, at the head of Wharton's column, gallops into that town, whose garrison allows itself to be surprised, as the garrison at Holly Springs was surprised by Van Dorn in the preceding year. No one is found at his post; nearly six hundred men in uniform fall for a few hours into the hands of the Confederates, who systematically destroy the dépôts of subsistence, ammunition, and equipments, all the rolling stock belonging to the railroad, the railway-station, and the neighboring bridges. Martin remained behind at Thompson's Cove to keep back the Federals. For Crook has rapidly followed up Wharton's tracks by Pikeville, through which he passed in the afternoon of the 2d, and by the road known as Robinson's Trace, which in the evening brought him up to the top of the Cumberland Mountains. On the 3d, toward evening, Miller and Minty make a sharp attack upon Martin at Thompson's Cove. But the character of the ground is favorable for defence, and when, in the midst of night, Martin abandons the brook to the Federals, rendered very thirsty after a long march, his retreat is not molested.

On the following day, the 4th, Crook enters McMinnville

amidst the smouldering stores which the enemy left behind them when, a few hours before, they took the Murfreesborough road. Indeed, this great centre of supplies offers them a prey still more tempting because its destruction would prevent Rosecrans from sustaining his troops in Chattanooga. Hence both sides attach the highest importance to the fate of this town. There are formidable defensive works around it, but the garrison is so feeble that it cannot occupy the entire line. Crook has vainly tried to warn it of the impending danger. Fortunately, the garrison will not allow itself to be surprised. The patrol has reported from a great distance the approach of Wheeler, and they have immediately commenced to remove all the stores into the interior of the fort, where the garrison is to concentrate. Crook has not lost an instant in McMinnville. He presses the enemy's rearguard so sharply that Martin is soon obliged to halt with all his division and accept the challenge to fight. His cavalry dismounts and retires, step by step, before the Federals, taking advantage of all obstacles to retard their progress. At last, night enables the cavalymen to remount and rejoin their comrades. But Wheeler cannot attempt a *coup-de-main* against Murfreesborough before having rid himself of Crook, who presses him closely. He halts to post himself between Crook and the town, and thus oblige him to assume the offensive. Crook bivouacs at Readyville after the fight, and does not fall into this trap. Early in the morning on the 5th he gains on the right, by a cross-road, the Liberty and Murfreesborough road, and enters this last town without having met the enemy. A sentry on guard at the entrance announces to the garrison this unexpected aid. Thenceforth the place is secured from any attack, and Wheeler gives up the pursuit of his course any farther in the direction of Nashville. There is behind him an important section of the railway: while retiring he can destroy it and thus cause the greatest damage to the Federals. This stroke is accomplished on the 5th by Martin, who captures the small garrison at Wartrace, and on the evening of the same day takes possession of the dépôts at Shelbyville. In another direction, Wheeler, after having destroyed the bridge

and block-house on Stone's River, falls back on Duck River, close to which the bivouacs of his three divisions are stationed *en échelon* on the evening of the 6th. Davidson is at Warner's Bridge, Wharton nearly five miles farther down, and Martin between the two.

However, after the fight at Anderson, McCook remained, as he had been ordered, in this village, where Campbell joined him only in the afternoon of the 3d. Mitchell arrived on the ensuing day, and the division resumed its march for Murfreesborough. He reaches this town on the 6th in the morning, at the moment when Crook, having been obliged to halt twenty-four hours to obtain supplies from the stores that had been thrown into confusion, starts on the road to Shelbyville. This delay, if it allows Wheeler time for some advance, enables Mitchell to collect his two brigades on the same evening about eight miles from Shelbyville. Wheeler, not being able to attempt anything alone against the Federals, was in hopes of meeting Lee and Roddey on Duck River, and with their co-operation resuming the offensive against Mitchell. But nobody can give him any news of them; the enemy, who presses him, does not give him time to wait for Lee and Roddey, and he decides to return to the south bank of the Tennessee. His exhausted troops every day lose a great number of stragglers, and it would be dangerous for him to risk a general engagement.

On the 7th, in the morning, the Federals come up with Davidson a few miles from his camp. Wheeler, wishing hereafter to keep his command closely joined, has instructed Davidson to follow the banks of Duck River in order to rejoin the two other divisions. Instead of that, Davidson has taken on the left the road to Farmington. Happily for him, Mitchell has divided his forces. McCook is proceeding along the right bank of Duck River; Crook has moved in the direction of Farmington, and the absence of Minty's brigade, delayed in consequence of a misunderstanding, has reduced his command to about fifteen hundred men. However, he harasses Davidson, causes him to be charged first by the cavalry, then by Miller's mounted infantry on foot, with which Long's cavalry soon unites, and drives him from wood to wood throughout the day. Finally, near Farmington a last effort

breaks the line of the Confederates, who are then put to flight, leaving four pieces of artillery in Crook's hands. The arrival of Wheeler with Martin's division saves the train, which under the escort of Wharton takes the direction of Lewisburg. Each side loses from two hundred to three hundred men in this fight.

The Southerners all along the line take advantage of the night to resume their march, and this time, having no longer anything to destroy, they leave the Federals at a good distance behind. Wheeler, strewing the road with exhausted or dismounted cavalymen, deserters, and broken wagons, succeeds in reaching the bank of the Tennessee at Rogersville, and after having lost some seventy men in his last engagement, he fords the river on the morning of the 9th over the shallows called Muscle Shoals, already known to our readers. His men are fagged out and his horses unfit for service, having hardly been unsaddled at any time during the past ten days. He has left behind him some wounded men and stragglers, many deserters, and all the prisoners whom he had captured. But in compensation for these sacrifices he has inflicted upon the enemy heavy losses, the consequences of which may prove disastrous. The destruction of the long train at Anderson, the dépôts at McMinnville, and the railway between Murfreesborough and Wartrace is quickly felt at Chattanooga. The supplies of provisions upon which Rosecrans was counting have failed him for several days; he is obliged to exhaust his dépôts, reduce men and horses to half-rations, and, the rain coming at the same time making the roads muddy, he will be constrained to subsist from hand to mouth in a condition of dearth which the least accident might transform into a famine.

Such a state of things might be brought on, for instance, by the destruction of the tunnel at Cowan, which Roddey attempts at the moment when Wheeler recrosses the Tennessee. Roddey passes the river at Gunter'sville on the 10th, and, moving by Maysville and New Market, proceeds toward Salem, where he expects to reach Cowan. But he learns on the 12th that Wheeler is no longer in those parts, and that Mitchell, returning to Bridgeport, chances to be between himself and the river. He immediately retraces his steps, encounters in the night Crook's vanguard, that had followed his tracks from the vicinity of Gunter'sville, and,

passing between Crook and McCook, he returns on the 13th to the banks of the Tennessee on the south of Athens. General Lee, who had not yet been able to take the field, was near Muscle Shoals at the moment when Wheeler came so precipitately to seek this fording-place, and he naturally renounced the design of crossing the river alone. It was too late: the Confederate generals had illy calculated their movements and missed the opportunity of isolating Rosecrans. The Federal cavalry had need to recruit, and, there being no longer any fear of a fresh incursion by the enemy, the cavalry remained within reach of the railway guarded by Hooker's small army. On the 15th of October, Crook was established at Winchester and McCook at Bridgeport.

In another quarter Davidson has brought back to the positions occupied fifteen days before by Forrest the three brigades that have been entrusted to him. Their ranks are considerably thinned, and the effective force of this corps, which was so formidable a few weeks ago, has dwindled below that of a division. Besides, this corps has lost its commander. Forrest, smitten by Bragg, as we have said, with a virtual disgrace, was called to Mississippi by Johnston, who knew how to appreciate his rare military qualities. He was preceded by Ector's and McNair's brigades. These troops were replaced with Stevenson's division, which had been so imprudently taken away from Bragg before the battle of Murfreesborough. Bragg sends him to the banks of the Hiawassee to resume against Burnside the operations which Wheeler's expedition has suddenly interrupted. He occupies Charleston on the 19th of October, and we shall leave him there for the present.

Johnston has not the means seriously to impede Sherman's movements. A portion of his troops, scattered over a vast territory, observe the movements of McPherson, who has advanced his lines as far as Canton, Mississippi. General Lee, quartered at Tusculumbia, is too far away to meet the Fifteenth Federal corps. Chalmers, who with a few regiments has remained in the neighborhood of Grenada, endeavors to check its march. On the 11th of October he moves rapidly to the northward to cut the Memphis and Corinth Railroad: he hopes to surprise one of the trains carrying the Federal troops, and to stop the movement by destroying the road. For his objective point he selected the sta-

tion at Collierville, a small fortified post occupied by the Sixty-sixth Indiana, and about twenty-four miles from Memphis. If he succeed in capturing it together with its garrison, he shall be in a position to seize the trains and destroy the bridges. Our readers will remember that on the same day (October 11th) Sherman was going to Corinth on a train carrying his staff with only a few hundred regular soldiers. At the moment when he moves out of Collierville the outposts of the Sixty-sixth Indiana, which have advanced to reconnoitre the road, are driven back by the Southern cavalry. The train, stopped in time, quickly returns to the station, and all on board, generals and privates, jump out. They hurriedly form in line to occupy the earthworks, the buildings of the station, and the trenches along the railway. The employés of the company find weapons and join the combatants. While some minutes are gained in parleys with the enemy's flag of truce, the telegraph carries to Corse's division, which is moving on foot, the order to come in haste, and asks the authorities in Memphis for the train to bring up a portion of that division. Shortly thereafter Chalmers cuts the telegraph-wires and begins at once the attack. His dismounted cavalry completely surrounds the small Federal force; his artillery aids this movement. But Sherman, who brings to the command of a few hundred men the same care and instinct of war as to the direction of a large army, has made every preparation to receive them. The attack, several times renewed, is always repulsed. The Federals fight all the better as they feel how important it is to their cause to preserve the general who is with them. Finally, toward evening the enemy suddenly disappears. The train despatched from Memphis has taken up on the way a battery of artillery and a regiment of infantry, and, being covered by skirmishers, has advanced up to within a very short distance of Collierville. Corse closely followed the train at a double-quick, and the approach of these reinforcements has induced Chalmers to retreat. Sherman can continue his journey without difficulty. On the 16th of October his entire corps is at Corinth, and the troops which Hurlbut has stationed *en échelon* along the railway are preparing to follow him. On the 19th the heads of his columns, when they arrive at Eastport on the Tennessee, find two gun-

boats sent by Admiral Porter to protect the transports bringing in provisions for the army. This supplying by water, while it changes Sherman's base of operations, will allow him to abandon the railway on the west of Iuka and to call back the garrison which he had left to guard that town. But he cannot hasten his march, since he is obliged to rebuild the road for a distance of one hundred and sixty-one miles from Iuka to Stevenson, in order not to exhaust the dépôts, which hardly suffice for the subsistence of Rosecrans' army.

However, the Army of the Cumberland is already reduced to the extremities of a besieged garrison. Every day the only route followed by the wagon-trains becomes worse; the rains wash it into the gorges of Walden's Ridge, and it becomes a slough in the valley of the Sequatchie. To repair the interruption caused by the raid of the enemy it is necessary greatly to increase the work done by the wagons; in consequence of which the road is completely broken up and the teams are exhausted. The carcasses of horses and mules mark every turn on that road, as the dead bodies of camels indicate the track of the caravans in the desert. The reduction in the forage ration allowed to the draught animals causes them to lose the strength of which they stand in greater need than ever. The artillery horses must be harnessed to the baggage-wagons, and the artillery thus becomes a powerless arm. Ten thousand animals have perished. The rations to the men are diminished more and more; there is in reserve hardly enough subsistence for four days. In order to save the army it will be necessary to abandon the place, together with all the artillery, ere the snows come to block the roads.

The Confederates are kept well informed, and no longer have any doubt of success. Toward the 10th of October, President Davis came to visit the camps of Bragg's soldiers. He harangued a portion of them on the top of Lookout Mountain, and promised that the hostile army at their feet, and already half conquered, would not much longer prevent them from setting out to deliver the State of Tennessee from the enemy. He did more: after a council of war at which divers campaign plans were discussed, he instructed Bragg to leave before Chattanooga only such troops as were necessary to observe Rosecrans, and to assume the offensive

with all the rest of his forces. The Army of the Tennessee, removing southward its base of operations, is to pass the river below Bridgeport and march upon Nashville. Hooker, being isolated, will not be able to resist this army, and the first consequence of this movement will be to bring about the evacuation of Chattanooga. Unfortunately for the Confederates, a succession of abundant rains occurred immediately after the departure of Mr. Davis, and gave Bragg an excellent pretext for abandoning the bold plan which had been enjoined upon him.

But it appears as though his inaction should ensure to him, without effort, all the fruits of a laborious campaign. A feeling of sadness pervades every rank in the Federal army, which only asks to be led against the enemy rather than allow itself to be slowly starved out. It is true that Rosecrans devises several projects to open new channels for the receipt of supplies. General W. F. Smith—who after the battle of Gettysburg left the command of the Pennsylvania militia in order to become Rosecrans' chief engineer officer—prepares all the preliminaries for carrying out the plans of his superior: he increases the fortifications of Chattanooga, constructs a new floating bridge with boats, and repairs a steamer abandoned by the enemy. But the more the moment for action approaches, the more Rosecrans hesitates and appears to doubt the success of the undertaking. His despatches alluding to the possibility of an evacuation produce alarm at the White House, while a high official of the War Department, who happens to be in Chattanooga, represents Rosecrans, perhaps with some exaggeration, as being on the eve of ordering a disastrous retreat.

Meantime, Grant arrives at Cairo. On the following day the Secretary of War, who has come as far as Indianapolis to meet him, hands him the order of the President which invests him with the supreme command of the armies of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee. Sherman will replace Grant as commander of the Army of the Tennessee. He may, if he wishes, retain Rosecrans under his orders, or substitute Thomas, whom public sentiment designates as the hero of Chickamauga. Grant does not want to have Rosecrans for his lieutenant. On the 19th of October he orders him by telegraph to quit the command of the

army which he has so gallantly directed at Murfreesborough and brought so fortunately as far as Georgia, and the defeat of which must, above all, be attributed to Halleck's incompetence. The reproaches which Rosecrans deserved for his conduct on the eventful day of September 20th prevail over every other consideration. A sort of sinecure, a command in the State of Missouri, will be assigned to him by way of consolation. In the mean while, Grant has immediately set out for Chattanooga, and telegraphed to Thomas not to give up the place at any price. The new head of the Army of the Cumberland replies: "We will hold the town till we starve." He shall not have to wait for this extremity, for hereafter all the Federal forces collected in Grant's powerful hand are going to be brought to bear with the method and unanimity which have already ensured the conquest of Mississippi. Instead of the system of parcelling out which has hitherto paralyzed these armies, there will succeed the sole will of a man who inspires everybody with respect and confidence. At last General Halleck has been obliged to place a master over himself.

Rosecrans, wishing to avoid any demonstrations of regret on the occasion of his departure, quits his army on receipt of the first notification of his removal: his devotion to the common cause has found the means of rendering cordial his interview with Grant, whom he meets at Stevenson on the 21st. From Bridgeport to Chattanooga the general-in-chief, being still disabled, is obliged to be carried over rough places where it was not safe to cross on horseback. He can himself judge of the condition of the road, which every fresh rain renders worse, and thereby of the circumstances of the army, which daily become gloomier. Forage failing at Chattanooga, all the horses are sent back to Bridgeport, one-third perishing on the way. The wounded are not healed; for lack of sufficient nourishment the number on the sick-list rapidly increases, while death, striking right and left, makes vacant places in the hospitals.

The evening of October 23d is cold and rainy; the wind whistles in the miserable streets of Chattanooga; the swollen waters of the Tennessee roar around the frail pontons which connect the town with the right bank of the river. From the

slopes of Missionary Ridge, upon which long lines of works are ranged as in an amphitheatre, up to the sombre mass of Lookout Mountain, which, like a gigantic sentinel, seems to mount guard over the Federals, there are bivouac-fires, the incessant light of which must prove to the Union soldiers that the Southern army is keeping good watch around them. For a month past the Federals have asked nothing but to fight to break this circle of iron. However, their chief has left them in the same inaction, has done nothing to render the enemy uneasy, nor anything to divert his own men from the monotony of their enforced rest. Therefore, understanding that their sufferings are useless and seeing the fatal termination approaching, they allow themselves to be overcome by a mute sadness, the impress of which can be seen on every face.

The heroic Thomas has promised Grant to starve in Chattanooga, but he has not engaged to live there long nor to come out of the place victorious. He has provisions for four days only; subsistence for two days more has been promised him, to arrive on the following day.*

It is in this gloomy evening of the 23d that an officer, supporting himself painfully on crutches, enters, followed by a small number of aides-de-camp, into General Thomas' headquarters. Those who have recognized him do not doubt that a new era is opening for the Army of the Cumberland. In fact, Grant, coming to place himself in the midst of this army, proves that he will risk anything to deliver it, while he inspires it with the confidence which animates him. He finds in Chattanooga about forty-eight thousand combatants, these being the remains of the twelve infantry divisions which had crossed the Tennessee six weeks before. The regiments have been consolidated, the brigades re-formed, and the divisions reduced to six. The four army corps by the order of October 9 are reduced to two only, the Fourteenth and the Fourth, which latter takes the place of the three others suppressed in the general nomenclature. A great number of commanders have disappeared. Crittenden, McCook, and Negley, who preceded Rosecrans in the line of dis-

* There are 204,062 rations in store, and 96,000 are on the way, to feed about 50,000 mouths.

grace, have asked for an opportunity to justify themselves before a court of inquiry. Van Cleve has received the command of Murfreesborough. Johnson, Steedman, and Morgan have been called to other commands or are obliged to go in search of health in the Northern States. Reynolds and Brannan have left their divisions, one for the post of chief of staff to Thomas, and the other to assume the command of the artillery. One of the two corps is commanded by Granger, who has deserved this honor on account of his gallant conduct. Thomas leaves the Fourteenth corps to Rousseau, his oldest division commander. There are more than twelve thousand men in the cavalry, but it cannot concentrate near Chattanooga, where forage is scarce. Therefore it will take only a secondary part in coming events.

Bragg's army is still composed of three corps, but Polk and Hill have been replaced by Cheatham and Breckinridge. The reinforcements received for the last month have swollen the army to about fifty-seven thousand infantry and artillery, without counting its ten or twelve thousand cavalry. Hence it is considerably superior to Thomas' command. But it would be inferior in number to the Federals if Hooker with his eighteen or nineteen thousand men could join them.

It is this powerful reinforcement, detached over a month previous from the Army of the Potomac, which must be employed without delay to raise the blockade of the famishing troops, for they cannot wait for Sherman's arrival. Grant as soon as he comes sets about preparing an operation which the division of his forces in the presence of a concentrated enemy renders very difficult. Thomas has already had a hand in like preparations during the four days that he has been in command: he has instructed Hooker to collect all his forces at Bridgeport, and has matured with General Smith the plan the first thought of which occurred to his predecessor. At daybreak on the 24th, Grant repairs, with Thomas and Smith, to the banks of the Tennessee, and at a single glance he appreciates this plan, which is as simple as it is practical. Before the first day has elapsed everybody feels the hand of the new commander, who knows, without hesitation, how to come to a decision and promptly set in operation all the resources at his disposal.

His intention is a secret neither to his soldiers nor to the enemy : it is to reopen direct communications between Chattanooga and Bridgeport either by the course of the Tennessee or by the roads and the railway along the left bank of the river. The safety of the Army of the Cumberland depends on that, and as the lack of horses condemns it to inaction, or at least to operations of a secondary importance within a very limited circuit, it is to Hooker that the principal part must fall. He must cross the Tennessee at Bridgeport, and come, under the eyes of the enemy, to join Thomas, while occupying in force the territory which he shall have left behind him. The great parallel mountain-crests which rise like successive walls on his road seem to invite the enemy to bar the passage against him. Even if he should succeed in overcoming the first difficulties, and should manage to cross Raccoon Mountain, it is certain that Longstreet will oppose him at the foot of the abrupt slopes which on the west overlook Will's Valley. He must then avoid this last obstacle. It appears that Bragg believed the difficulty could not be solved, and while master of Lookout Mountain he had rested in a false sense of security. He had not properly studied the course of the river which he saw wildly tumbling at his feet. Indeed, to reach the base of the cliffs of Lookout Mountain this river, on issuing from Chattanooga, describes a vast circle and flows first to the south, then ascends to the north, after having received the waters of Chattanooga Creek and Lookout Creek ; it thus almost surrounds a long, low, and narrow hill. The peninsula formed in this way, reminding one by its outline of an Indian covering for the foot, is called Moccasin Point ; it is commanded on the south by Lookout Mountain, on the west by Raccoon Mountain. The isthmus which connects it with the right bank is, between Chattanooga and the point called Brown's Ferry, only eleven hundred yards in width. It is easily understood that, once landed at Brown's Ferry, the supplies of provisions destined for the Army of the Cumberland might have reached Chattanooga promptly and surely by a very short road quite distant from Lookout Mountain, and which could be kept open without difficulty. Hence this last chain of mountains could be avoided. It was not the same with the eastern crest of Raccoon Mountain, which extends much farther toward the north,

as if completely to shut out on the west the valley of the Tennessee, and commands on the opposite shore the road between Jasper and Chattanooga. A wagon-road running along the ridge of the mountain connects the boat at Brown's Ferry with Kelley's Ferry, which is situated at the foot of the western slope. Farther to the south, in two passes opened across this same chain, one meets first the railway, then the route called Murphy's Hollow road, both of which, branching off at Whitesides, lead down into Will's Valley. Therefore, it is Raccoon Mountain which is the key of all land and water lines of communication between Bridgeport and Chattanooga, and it is in this impregnable citadel that the Confederates should have established themselves to ensure the blockade of the Army of the Cumberland. These mountains, it is true, were far away from the slopes of Missionary Ridge, but Bragg could without any sacrifice divide his army, since the enemy—he knew the fact very well—was not in a condition seriously to assume an offensive attitude. In failing to occupy in force Raccoon Mountain he committed a fatal error. One brigade of Hood's division had been placed by Longstreet on the eastern slope, while only one regiment or two, ranged along the steep declivity as far as Kelley's Ferry, had been charged with the sole duty of preventing by their firing the Federal trains from following the right bank of the river.

Rosecrans was casting about for the means of bringing up boats loaded with provisions as far as the neck of Moccasin Point. The old steamboat which was being repaired at Chattanooga was to be employed in that service after having forced its way past the batteries of Lookout Mountain; there was another boat on the stocks at Bridgeport. On October 19th, Smith had been charged with the duty of reconnoitring the course of the Tennessee near Brown's Ferry, and particularly an island which it was intended to use as a landing for steamers. The ponton-bridge which was being finished at Chattanooga was no doubt meant to connect that island with the right bank. When Smith returned, Rosecrans was no longer in command: he brought to his successor valuable information. Between the mouth of Lookout Creek and Brown's Ferry the left bank of the river is bordered not by the slopes proper of Raccoon Mountain, but by a secondary ridge, that, sep-

arated from the principal chain in front of Williams' Island by a narrow passage, gradually recedes toward the south, and finally loses itself in Will's Valley, which it divides lengthwise to a good distance. This ridge is divided by deep cuts or notches crossed in succession by the road from Kelley's Ferry to Brown's Ferry, the Chattanooga road, the railway, and the brook which runs through the village of Wauhatchie. Smaller depressions cut up the entire length of the ridge into knobs standing in a line, steep, very narrow at the top, and rising to eighty and even a hundred yards above the level of the river. The part of this chain which was visible from Moccasin Point appeared to be not well guarded. Smith saw that, once master of this advanced position, which seemed to be placed there by nature to cover on the east the citadel of Raccoon Mountain, one might prevent the enemy from having access to the mountain, and consequently communications might be established by land and by water between Bridgeport and the neck of Moccasin Point.

Above all, it was necessary to take possession by surprise of the two knobs between which the Kelley's Ferry road comes down on the left bank of the Tennessee to a junction with the old crossing at Brown's Ferry. The ponton-bridge that was to be finished might, under the shelter of these heights, be fastened to the right bank, which would secure easy communications to the troops charged with the expedition. But Grant understood that there was a very different benefit to be derived, and that, thanks to this bridge, Hooker and Thomas might unite near Brown's Ferry. This operation, which was to ensure the removal of the blockade of Chattanooga, was determined upon a few hours after Grant's arrival.

Any other soldier than the conqueror of Port Gibson would doubtless have hesitated, for the difficulties in the way were very great. It was necessary, in the first place, to bring the pontons, with their equipments, from Chattanooga to Brown's Ferry under the eyes of a vigilant enemy, and establish the bridge before the enemy could interrupt the operation. In the second place, it was necessary that Hooker, having passed over the river at Bridgeport, should cross the formidable gorges of Raccoon Mountain and come on a stated day into Will's Valley to meet the troops which were

charged with the duty of opening the passage from an opposite direction. Grant by the precision of his instructions tried to diminish the risks attendant upon this double enterprise. Hooker received orders to take with him the Eleventh corps, commanded by Howard, and Geary's division of the Twelfth, to cross the Tennessee on the 26th, reach Shell Mound, Rankin's Ferry (at the mouth of Running Water Creek), Whitesides, and to come down through the gorge of Murphy's Hollow into Will's Valley. Once there, he should turn to the left and proceed to Brown's Ferry *via* Wauhatchie, having, like a curtain to cover his march on the east, the secondary ridge of which mention was made in the preceding pages. Slocum, with one division, was entrusted with guarding the railway from Nashville to Bridgeport. It was necessary to cover the rear of Hooker, secure the navigation of the Tennessee, and reopen to the trains the direct road from Jasper to Chattanooga. General Palmer, with two brigades, was assigned to the duty of following this last route as far up as Rankin's Ferry, and occupying Shell Mound and Whitesides on the 28th. The opening of the bridge, fixed for the 27th, was entrusted to Smith. For this perilous operation the two strong brigades of Hazen and Turchin were given him: adding thereto the soldiers of the engineer corps, he had about five thousand men under his orders. It appeared to be natural to bring the pontons across the isthmus far from the reach of the enemy's fire, and to launch them in front of the point which it was desired to reach on the left bank. But this would have revealed that spot so clearly that Longstreet would no doubt have come in time to interrupt the proceedings. Smith determined to have all his boats, loaded with troops, descend from Chattanooga to Brown's Ferry, to do which they had to run more than six miles under the fire of the Confederate pickets and batteries. But as the current must carry the flotilla with a speed much greater than the movement of the troops which would have tried to follow the boats, Smith was assured not to find any hostile concentration at the moment when he should land. The rest of his troops, hidden in the woods in front of Brown's Ferry, had orders to wait till the boats had deposited their first load before they took their turn to embark; the flooring of plank, which was also con-

cealed in the bush and intended for the bridge, was to be put on board immediately afterward. The bridge was composed of fifty boats; each had to carry twenty-four men and one officer: one hundred and twenty men, distributed upon two large lighters, were designated to be the first to disembark. The flotilla was formed in two divisions, intended to land at once above and below the road. On the 26th, Smith conducts Hazen and Turchin to Brown's Ferry, and, thanks to the indifference of the enemy's scouts and pickets, accustomed as they are to the sight of Federal officers, Smith can explain the projected operation on the spot to Hazen and Turchin.

The embarkation of troops takes place in the night at the wharves in Chattanooga, and the signal to start is given at three o'clock in the morning. The current is so strong that it is not necessary to use oars. A light mist conceals the Union boats, which, hugging the right bank, escape detection by their adversaries. Two hours later the boats are near Brown's Ferry. The enemy's guns have remained silent. Nothing has betrayed the passage of the Federals, not even the desperate cry of one of them who has fallen into the river, and to whom nobody has been able to extend a friendly hand. It is the decisive moment. With a few strokes of the oars they reach first the middle of the stream, then the left bank. The first boats of the second division are greeted with a harmless volley of firearms, and a moment after all the soldiers are landed. While they are engaged in toiling up the steep shore the boats start back to bring the rest of Smith's troops, that, grouped on the right bank, are impatiently waiting for their turn. The artillery has come forward with these troops, so as to cover their passage.

The Confederates are surprised, and endeavor to repair their want of foresight. The feeble brigade stationed by Longstreet in the vicinity comes on the run; it attacks the Federals on the crest of the river-bank below the ferry crossing, and is preparing to throw them back into the river, when Hazen, coming up with reinforcements, compels the Confederates to make a precipitate retreat. Turchin takes position on the right of Hazen. Some trees quickly felled added to the impregnable character of the positions which had been so easily conquered. The day has come: the mist, being

dissipated, allows the Unionists to see the gigantic slopes of Raccoon Mountain silent and deserted. Behind them the pontoniers establish the bridge under the fire—not very destructive, it is true—of the enemy's batteries on Lookout Mountain. At four o'clock in the afternoon the platform is solidly laid and passage on the bridge is secured. The operation entrusted to Smith has been perfectly conducted and crowned with complete success. The Army of the Cumberland holds the entrance to Will's Valley, where it is waiting for Hooker.

Notwithstanding the weight of his train, Hooker has followed exactly the programme which has been traced for him. On the 25th the ponton-bridge was finished at Bridgeport; on the 26th his three divisions have crossed the river and bivouacked on its banks between Shell Mound and Whitesides. On the 27th these divisions have passed the mountain and halted at the entrance to Will's Valley. On the 28th they descend upon Wauhatchie, while Palmer relieves the regiments left to guard Shell Mound and Whitesides. Hooker advances with circumspection in the deep valley commanded on the east by the solid mass of Lookout Mountain, for he is aware that from the top of that observatory Longstreet's sentinels are watching his movements. He expects an attack all the more because he has known for a long time the formidable adversary whom the fortunes of war have brought face to face with him.

Indeed, how could the Confederates quietly allow to be accomplished an operation which would cause them to lose the principal fruit of their victory at Chickamauga? The building of the bridge at Brown's Ferry should have been sufficient to reveal to them Grant's designs. However, after an insignificant effort to throw impediments in the way, they had done nothing, up to the 27th, to prevent the enemy from entering Will's Valley. The detachments which were occupying the western declivity of Raccoon Mountain have withdrawn before Hooker after obliging him to deploy two brigades of the Eleventh corps. Still, Longstreet, thus forewarned, attempts nothing to thwart him. Hooker, leaving Geary at Wauhatchie to guard the road and the railway, has continued his march with the Eleventh corps, and, in spite of a few shells fired from afar by the batteries on Lookout Mountain,

he reaches the vicinity of Brown's Ferry. One can imagine the joy felt by Smith's soldiers when they could take by the hand their gallant comrades of the Army of the Potomac, who had come from so great a distance to extricate them from a perilous situation.

A messenger from Hooker is quickly despatched to carry the good news to Grant. However, the latter takes care not to divulge it, and that night every one retires yet in doubt and anxiety. But suddenly, about one o'clock in the morning, the dull roar of cannon, swollen and repeated by the grand echoes of the mountain, is heard as far as the town. The Federals bend their ears, for all are aware of Smith's expedition, and it was known since the evening before that he had crossed the river. But it is also known that his artillery has remained on the right bank, and still the sound of this distant firing comes from the far end of Will's Valley. After a moment of hesitation a shout of joy goes up from every breast. There cannot be any doubt: it is Hooker's cannon. They hail it as the signal of deliverance, though they do not yet know the issue of the distant battle of which it brings the tidings.

At last the Confederates endeavor to retrieve the time they have lost. Strange to say, Bragg, blinded by his confidence, perhaps deceived by the reports brought in by his cavalry, has ignored Hooker's movement; he has even refused to credit the information that Longstreet transmitted to him about the march of the Federals since they left Bridgeport. On the 28th he was with his lieutenant on Lookout Mountain: to overcome his incredulity the latter had to take him to the top and thence point out to him the Union battalions marching at his feet. It is four o'clock in the afternoon: the three divisions of Longstreet's corps are stationed *en échelon* on the mountain-side. It is too late to stop Hooker, but if there is no fear to risk a night-attack the Confederates may try to cut his long line stretching from Wauhatchie as far as Brown's Ferry—a line which is all the weaker because he has neglected to occupy a portion of the hills commanding it on the east. When Geary shall have been thrown back upon the defiles of Raccoon Mountain, Howard will find himself isolated, and uselessly swell the already half-famished garrison in Chattanooga.

But at this decisive moment the Confederate chiefs seem to have lost all clearness of mind. After having simply ordered Long-

street to attack the enemy with two divisions, Bragg regains Missionary Ridge without waiting for the result, without thinking of reinforcing the troops, not numerous, charged with so important a task. Longstreet, so far as he was concerned, slowly executes the orders of a superior whose faults he sees without endeavoring to repair. Night comes, and his divisions have not appeared: he fancies that Bragg has issued a countermand, and returns also to his headquarters. In consequence of a misunderstanding one of the two divisions has not left its camps, but the other (Hood's) arrives, very late indeed, at the edge of Lookout Creek. Jenkins, who commands it, believing that he is supported, advances against Geary, whose bivouac-fires reveal his isolated position at Wauhatchie. A magnificent moonlight guides Jenkins' silent march. But Geary is carefully watching and guarding against a surprise: his outposts signal betimes the approach of the enemy, whom he receives with a firm front. The fight immediately begins vigorously, and there is heard the boom of the artillery, the echoes of which resound as far as Chattanooga. On hearing the cannon's roar Hooker instructs General Schurz, who was encamped with his division about four miles below Geary, promptly to lead two brigades to the aid of the latter. This assistance was very necessary, for Hood's division, recently reinforced by Jenkins' brigade, which Pickett had left in Virginia in the month of June preceding, numbers not less than eight thousand men under its colors. Geary's two little brigades are assaulted on three sides, but their commander sustains their courage by his example. While a portion of the Confederate forces are seeking thus to invest these brigades, the rest are stationed so as to isolate the Eleventh corps. Law's brigade, climbing up with little noise the crest of which we have spoken, has planted itself upon the knoll that commands on the north the gap crossed by the railway; some regiments occupy farther south another knoll at the moment when Schurz's column passes at the base, and open fire on it. The distance renders the firing but little destructive; still, the Confederates have carried their point, for Schurz is obliged to leave General Hector Tyndale in front of that enemy whose strength he does not know, and to pursue his route with one brigade only. Meantime, Hooker, who has, all told, only ten thousand men under arms, has started on the

road his third division under Steinwehr. It unexpectedly encounters Law's scouts near the very road followed a few moments before by Schurz. The division comes to a halt, and Orland Smith's brigade, guiding itself by the fire of the enemy, endeavors to ascend the steep slopes crowned with the Confederates. In another direction Tyndale most gallantly engages the enemy. The fight is waged all along the line. The rising moon allows the soldiers to direct their movements, without, however, revealing to them the horrors and perils of the battlefield: the shadows of night cover the dead and the wounded, conceal many an obstacle, and thus favor the obstinacy of the combatants.

This obstinacy is all the greater because on each side the combatants have promptly recognized their opponents. By a singular chance, the first adversaries whom the Unionists of the Army of the Potomac encounter in that distant section of country are Robert E. Lee's old soldiers, whose arrival one month before gave the victory to Bragg, and with whom the Federals have come across the continent to dispute the fruit of that victory. At first the advantage is with the Southerners. Geary, whom Schurz has not known how to rejoin with his second brigade, resists with difficulty. The Confederates disperse his train of wagons, but the frightened animals plunge into their ranks and delay their movements. The first regiments sent by Smith against Law are repulsed with bloody losses. However, he brings all his brigade to the onset, and finally takes possession of the crest. Once dislodged from this point, Law's soldiers are thrown back as far as the base of the opposite slope, and they leave behind them some forty prisoners. Their repulse causes the retreat of all the rest of the division. Jenkins, seeing that the enemy is master of the heights, apprehends being enveloped, and toward five o'clock in the morning he precipitately recrosses Lookout Creek. The fight at Wauhatchie has cost four hundred and sixteen men to the Federals, and probably more than twice that number to the Confederates, Jenkins' brigade alone having sustained a loss of three hundred and sixty-one men out of condition to fight.* At the break

* An interesting correspondence upon the battle of Wauhatchie and General Longstreet's relations to it will be found in the *Memoir of Hector Tynale*, privately printed, Philadelphia, 1882.—Ed.

of day Hooker was enabled quietly to place himself at a point between the battlefield and Brown's Ferry. The principal heights of the crest for which the enemy had contended were occupied and furnished with abatis that were soon replaced with regular breast-works. Mitchell's and Whitaker's brigades of Davis' new division came to reinforce the victors.

W. F. Smith's soldiers on landing at Brown's Ferry had found a few head of cattle and some sacks of grain, which they greedily divided among themselves. This windfall was only the prelude to the return of plenty which, thanks to their success, was going to follow after the days of famine. While Hooker was fighting at Wauhatchie the steamer which had been repaired at Chattanooga was braving the batteries of Lookout Mountain, arriving at Bridgeport, and immediately returning therefrom in company with another vessel. The provisions which they carried were promptly discharged at Kelley's Ferry, while long files of wagons—taking, some of them, the road to Whitesides and the ponton-bridge at Brown's Ferry, and others the road to Jasper parallel with the river—finally deposited their precious loads in the empty storehouses at Chattanooga. Liberal rations, so necessary to American soldiers, were immediately resumed. And then squads of military laborers were set to work to repair the railway between Bridgeport and Wauhatchie, a section that the enemy had not seriously damaged. Grant asked only one week from the evening of the 28th to put his army beyond the contingency of famine. But his soldiers had not waited for the storehouses to be full in order to regain their courage and confidence. The arrival of Hooker at Brown's Ferry, which was quickly made known in all the camps, was hailed as the advent of a better era. The parts, indeed, were changed: if Grant was not yet in a condition to assume offensive operations against the victors of Chickamauga, he could henceforth set them at defiance behind his intrenchments and prepare at leisure the new campaign.

CHAPTER II.

KNOXVILLE.

THE Confederates ought not to entertain any illusion in regard to the blow which has just been dealt to them—a blow all the more painful because the removal of the blockade of Chattanooga had cost Grant only insignificant sacrifices. They had to repair at any cost the fault which they committed when they failed to dispute with Hooker the passes of Raccoon Mountain. Longstreet, perched upon the inaccessible heights of Lookout Mountain, could no longer continue to witness, like an impotent spectator, the supplying of the enemy. In his place his old commander, Robert E. Lee, would certainly have essayed to interrupt the operations by one of those bold movements which he knew how to prepare with so much skill and to execute with so much decision. The Federal Army of the Cumberland, as we have said, was not in a condition to take the field. Hence a manœuvre bold and yet but little dangerous ought to have presented itself to Bragg's mind. By abandoning the lines established around the town of Chattanooga he would have yielded nothing to the Federals, since they could not go as far as Ringgold or Dalton to reach his stores. Instead of persisting in maintaining an investment which had become useless, Bragg could concentrate his entire army on Lookout Mountain and in Will's Valley. If he deemed it imprudent to retain his communications with the railroad by the way of Rossville, it was easy for him to open, *via* Trenton, Stevens' Gap, and Ringgold, another line less exposed, about thirty-one miles long, which for a few days might have been used to ration his army. These few days would have sufficed to wrest Will's Valley from Hooker, throw him back into Chattanooga, and re-establish the siege of that town. Indeed, once master of Trenton, Bragg might either attack Wauhatchie in flank or

pass Raccoon Mountain to head off his adversaries at Shell Mound or Bridgeport. In the latter case he would have obliged them to evacuate Chattanooga, as he himself had been constrained to do by Rosecrans' march on La Fayette.

We have no data in reference to the plans discussed in the Southern councils of war, but a subsequent report by Bragg seems to indicate that he could not make his personal opinion prevail. As famine was no longer an auxiliary in the matter, it became understood that something had to be attempted ere Sherman, whose advance was announced, should come up to ensure Grant a crushing superiority in numbers. But instead of marching the Tennessee Army against Hooker, there was adopted a singular plan, at once timid and venturesome, which at the South the personal opponents of President Davis did not hesitate to attribute to him. It was decided that Bragg should remain in front of Chattanooga with the greater part of his army, and that meanwhile Longstreet should attack Burnside in the upper Tennessee Valley. It was expected that the commander of the First corps, acting with his accustomed vigor, without being trammelled by any superior authority, might strike at Knoxville a telling blow, and then retrace his steps quick enough again to head off Sherman on the slopes of Missionary Ridge. The calculation was fallacious and this division of the army was imprudent, especially in the presence of an enemy engaged in concentrating his forces. In a word, the advantages to be derived from the campaign, even if it were successful, were smaller than the positive risks which it entailed. For the defeat, and even the capture, of the Army of the Ohio, isolated in the Alleghanies, was a misfortune which the Federals could repair, because it would not cause them to lose any of their most important conquests, whereas the absence of Longstreet would expose Bragg's army to an irredeemable disaster, since he would surrender to Grant the heart of the Confederacy.

The reader already knows that Bragg had nearly fifty-seven thousand men present under arms. But in this number were comprised neither Stevenson's division, about three thousand five hundred strong and stationed at Loudon on the upper Tennessee, nor Quarles' and Baldwin's two brigades, composed of Vicksburg

prisoners whom the Confederate Government had declared to be liberated from their parole, and who, on their arrival toward the end of October, had been sent to East Tennessee. Therefore, Bragg's forces under his banners must have amounted to sixty-three or sixty-four thousand men. His three army corps, brought under a uniform formation, comprised each three divisions, Buckner and Walker having been placed under the orders of Cheatham and Longstreet. In a council of war, held on the 3d of November, Longstreet had energetically protested, it seems, against the part which had been assigned to him with insufficient forces. He would have wished that the entire army should retire behind the Chickamauga, first to cover the operations in East Tennessee, and then turn against Grant after having thus made sure of the defeat of Burnside. The council did not listen to him, and on the following day he received, together with Bragg's definitive instructions, the order to march without delay against the Army of the Ohio.

We left this army at the beginning of October strongly quartered throughout the large valley watered by the rivers Clinch and Holston. At that period Bragg, being wholly occupied with the siege of Chattanooga, did not think of disturbing that army. Forrest's horsemen have followed westward Wheeler's great expedition. Burnside has availed himself of this fact to resume in the north-eastern extremity of the State the campaign which had been so rudely interrupted fifteen days before by the orders of General Halleck. About fifty miles north-east of Knoxville the railway, leaving the banks of the Holston, enters through two successive passes, respectively called Bull's Gap and Blue Springs Gap, the rich valley of Nollichucky, in the centre of which lies the town of Jonesborough. The Federals occupy the first-named of these passes, but Williams' Confederate cavalry brigade holds the second, thus covering the entire region of country as far as the banks of the Watauga River, upon which are encamped the rest of Ransom's division. Burnside resolves not only to dislodge this brigade, but to drive the Confederates into Virginia, for he was always apprehensive of a sudden attack from that direction. On the 9th of October he personally led three infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade under Shackelford to Bull's Gap, while

Colonel Foster, ascending Lick Creek with a cavalry brigade, was going to cross the mountain more to the eastward, so as to bar at Rheatown the retreat of the enemy. On the morning of the 10th the infantry by feints detained the latter in front of the Blue Springs pass. Finally, at five o'clock in the afternoon, Burnside, believing that Foster had accomplished his movement, caused Jones' position to be attacked by Ferrero's division. The Confederate line did not resist long. The shadows of night put a stop to the operations of the Unionists, but Williams was caught in the trap, because Foster, who had arrived in the evening on the southern side of the mountains, had only to occupy the Rheatown road to prevent the retreat of the Southerners, who, at last understanding the danger, had precipitately retired during the night. Instead of stationing himself with his entire brigade across the enemy's way, Foster sent a single regiment, the Fifth Indiana, on the road to Henderson's Mill, and halted his column under the pretext of allowing his men time to rest. At daybreak Williams, coming up with all his force on the Fifth Indiana, easily opened a way through, without Foster being able to attempt to hold him. He left about a hundred and fifty prisoners in the hands of the Federals, who themselves had lost something like a hundred men at Blue Springs and nearly twenty at Henderson's Mill. Foster's guilty neglect had saved Williams. Burnside urged his infantry no farther. But Shackelford closely pursued Williams, and, crossing the Watauga, attacked Ransom at Blountsville on the 14th. After a feeble resistance the Confederates fell back on the station named Union or Zollicoffer, which they had fortified since its destruction in the previous winter by the Federal cavalry. They promptly abandoned it, with a considerable amount of rolling stock, and the Unionists pushed on into Virginia. While Ransom was falling back on Abingdon, Shackelford was at last retracing his steps, systematically destroying all the railway-line beyond Jonesborough. The limits of the occupation were extended as far as that town, where Shackelford left a portion of his force. Willcox with a mixed division was placed in reserve at Greenville, and he despatched two regiments, under Colonel Garrard, to hold at Rogersville the Kingsport and Knoxville road. The two routes which led into

Southern Virginia were thus closed. On the 16th the pass of Paint Rock Gap was also occupied.

The Army of the Ohio by stationing itself on the south-east slope of the massive chain of the Cumberland Mountains has rendered a great service to Kentucky: it has closed access to it on the part of the partisans who found in these mountains an unapproachable refuge. Since the occupation of Knoxville the tranquillity of Kentucky, which is so novel a thing, has been disturbed only once by a bold dash against the small garrison at Glasgow. It was composed of two or three hundred men who were guarding a fort containing important stores, while sending out reconnoissances beyond the frontier of Tennessee. Since Morgan had been in prison and Burnside at Knoxville the vigilance of all the small posts in that region of country had been considerably relaxed. Therefore an audacious Confederate partisan, Colonel Hughes, collected in the neighborhood of Glasgow on the evening of the 4th of October about a hundred men without being observed by the Federal patrols, and in the morning at daybreak he quietly entered with his troop into the town without meeting a single sentinel. The Federal officers lodging in the houses of private citizens fancy they hear at this early morning hour one of their own detachments coming in, and do not even go to the windows to see it pass. They were warned too late, and could not reach the fort already occupied by the Confederates, nor rally the soldiers, who were as much surprised as their officers. Some men are killed, the rest surrender. One hour later, all the stores are destroyed, and Hughes, disappearing as he had come, escapes the pursuit of the cavalry despatched after him.

The massive character of the Cumberland Mountains, which protected Kentucky, also increased the difficulties of the army posted on the opposite slope. Burnside's wagons had to haul across these rugged mountains not only arms and ammunition, but the rations necessary for the Army of the Ohio and the quarters at Knoxville. This provisioning, which was all the more important and difficult because the unfavorable season was approaching, was one of the first things to which Grant turned his attention; and the advantages of the supreme power which had been vested in him became at once manifest. The *matériel* and provisions collected

by his orders at St. Louis on light-draught boats came down the Mississippi, ascended the Ohio River, and found at the mouth of the Cumberland some gunboats detailed to convoy them along the entire length of that river to the small village of Big South Fork, situated at the head of navigation and in the very heart of the mountains. It was there that Burnside was directed to send his wagons. They had to go over a distance of sixty-two miles to bring these precious loads to Clinton, which is connected by rail with Knoxville. Three hundred thousand rations of salt meat and one million rations of vegetables, rice, sugar, and coffee were thus forwarded, but they arrived only after the siege, of which we shall presently relate the vicissitudes.

However, it was not the intention of the Confederate cavalry to leave Burnside unmolested for a long time, either above or below Knoxville by the course of the river. It will be remembered that Stevenson with his infantry division had on the 19th of October occupied Charleston on the Hiawassee River. The presence of the Federals near to this river, only thirty-one miles from Chickamauga Station, is a standing menace to the army that is besieging Chattanooga. Stevenson is directed to drive them back beyond the town of Loudon on the right bank of the Tennessee. A portion of Wheeler's cavalry, back from the south a few days since, are watching the banks of the Hiawassee; the two brigades of Morrison and Dibrell are placed under his orders, and as early as the 19th in the evening they cross the Hiawassee, notwithstanding the rains which have swollen the stream and rendered the roads muddy.

A brigade of Union cavalry occupies Athens, a railway-station nearly thirteen miles to the northward of Charleston; but Wolford, who commands the brigade, feeling himself isolated, fell back some days before to Philadelphia, another station, three miles south of Loudon, to be nearer General White, who is quartered in the latter town with an infantry brigade. The Confederates, being well informed, take steps to surprise Wolford. A fortuitous circumstance favors them: in the morning of the 20th a flag of truce from Burnside having passed the line of outposts, Wolford, wishing not to expose it, countermands the reconnoissances which he usually ordered to be made on the southern routes.

The Confederates detain the flag of truce, and thus get near the Federals without their approach being reported. Dibrell's brigade moves straight on Philadelphia: it will deceive Wolford, while Morrison, making a long *détour* westward, will come up and place himself between the latter and Loudon in order to isolate White. A chance brings misfortune to the Federals. They had just despatched toward the Pond Creek Valley, east of Philadelphia, a train to collect provisions, when Morrison's column was reported in that direction. Wolford, keeping with him only two regiments and his mountain-howitzers, sends the First and the Second Kentucky to protect his wagons. The enemy has already captured them: the Federals retake them from him, and start in pursuit of Morrison, who, with about a thousand men, is marching on Philadelphia. But the Unionists are checked by a detachment that Morrison has left behind him. Another portion of his brigade presents itself before Loudon, and by a skilful deployment of forces prevents White, who has heard Wolford's cannon, from going to his assistance. The latter waited for him so long as he had before him Dibrell only, who was himself but little desirous of alone engaging the enemy. But on perceiving Morrison, Wolford wishes to break through the circle formed around him, and gallantly falls, with all his men, upon this new adversary. The Federal officers, sword in hand, are in the thickest part of the fight: twice Morrison's cavalry fall back before them, and twice they re-form. At last, Dibrell not having supported them, their line is broken. Wolford leaves in their hands his cannon, his wounded, and some hundreds of prisoners, whose number are yet increased by his precipitate retreat, but he saves the greater part of his command, and, rallying the two regiments that were coming to his assistance, he falls back upon Loudon. Although Dibrell has lost only a few men and Morrison about a hundred, the Confederates, instead of pursuing Wolford, halt to wait for Stevenson's infantry, and on the following day, in the presence of a demonstration by White, they retire to the station at Sweetwater. In spite of the arrival of the infantry on the evening of the 22d, the Southern cavalry no longer disturb the enemy, who have retaken Philadelphia.

However, every day is marked by some skirmishing, and on

both sides preparations are being made for a decisive campaign. Burnside concentrates his forces on the south of Knoxville: he stations his first line at Kingston and Loudon, and the second at Lenoire and Campbell's Station on the railroad. Every piece of news that reaches the Federal authorities brings intelligence of the designs of the enemy against the Army of the Ohio. It is too late to send reinforcements to Burnside: besides, they could not subsist at the beginning of winter in an impoverished country. Halleck and Grant cannot succor him, but give him the benefit of their counsels. Since the battle of Fredericksburg, Halleck has kept up against Burnside a particular mistrust, and unjustly makes him feel it. Grant, whose mind was preoccupied solely with the military question, urgently recommends Burnside not to sacrifice his lines of communication with the west, not even to save Knoxville. He also urges him to retain Kingston at any price, and if the enemy should take up the route followed the previous year by Bragg and penetrate Middle Tennessee through McMinnville, then Burnside should pursue him with all the troops he can gather.

There is a good foundation for these mental preoccupations. On the 27th of October, Cheatham's division, which had been detached by Bragg to reinforce Stevenson, arrived at Athens. The two brigades of Moore and Pettus, that had left Demopolis on the same day with General Hardee, were directed by him to move on Athens while he was proceeding to Chattanooga.

Thus the Confederates have to the northward of the Hiwassee more than twelve thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry. They are more than are required to hold Burnside in check, but not enough to defeat him, and this little army would have been better employed if turned against Hooker. It is all the more difficult to imagine what Bragg intended to do with it, because he withdrew it from East Tennessee at the very time when it should have been allowed to remain there.

Indeed, it seems that on no occasion do the Confederates know how to combine their efforts against Burnside. It is at the moment when Stevenson and Cheatham are idle at Athens that General Samuel Jones, who is in command in Western Virginia, receives orders to assume offensive movements with Ransom's

division. This division is scattered on the right bank of the Watauga River. But the isolation of Garrard, who is stationed with only two regiments at Rogersville, and is separated from Willcox by several mountain-ranges, has not escaped the attention of the Southerners, who are burning to wreak vengeance upon Garrard for the repulse experienced at Blue Springs. General W. E. Jones and Colonel Giltner, successor to Williams, are designated to wreak this vengeance. Their two brigades together make up about two thousand five hundred men. Jones, after having crossed the Watauga and menaced Jonesborough, will cross the Holston at Rogersville, so as to make a flank attack on Garrard's command, which is encamped somewhat to the eastward on the Big Creek. Giltner will cross the North Holston at Kingsport in order to attack the Federals in front. They will make a simultaneous assault on the enemy on the 6th of November. But this plan, which did not allow them to concert their movements, was promptly modified. Jones finds that the fording-place indicated to him is too near Garrard's camp, and decides, in the evening of the 5th, to cross the Holston higher up, so as to turn this camp on the north side. He has the good fortune to meet, during the night, Giltner's column, and thus is enabled to concert with him. Still, the two commanders after having taken their positions, the one in front of the Federals and the other between their camp and Rogersville, each waited until the other should give the signal for the attack. Meanwhile, Garrard, who was surprised by Giltner's presence, was preparing to fight when he perceived Jones behind him. He immediately falls back on the ford, which, according to his first project, Jones should have crossed and occupied. The dilatoriness of the Southerners allows a portion of the Federal column sufficient time to cross the river, but the detachment is soon dispersed, almost without fighting. The Confederates capture four pieces of artillery, together with Garrard's wagons and about seven hundred prisoners: five hundred fugitives carry the alarm to Morristown and Greenville. Willcox's troops, that occupy this last town, evacuate it in haste, fearing lest Jones, who is master of the situation at Rogersville, should get ahead of them at the pass in Bull's Gap. Their retreat, which was rather disorderly, ended only beyond the pass, while Jones,

without profiting by his easy advantage, brings the two brigades back to the banks of the Watauga. The issue of the Rogersville combat mitigates the bitterness of the defeat which the Southerners had experienced on the same day not far away at Droop Mountain in West Virginia, and deceived the Federal Government, who fancied they saw in this *coup-de-main* the prelude to important operations.

It is not on that side that Burnside is seriously threatened, but his situation is nevertheless critical. In fact, on the 4th of November, Longstreet, having received Bragg's final orders, moves his troops to Tyner's Station, whence they will proceed by rail to Sweetwater Station, near Philadelphia. We have shown how inopportune was this enterprise. Longstreet had to crush his adversary at once, so as to be able to reappear in front of Chattanooga before the arrival of Sherman. Out of the thirty thousand men in the Army of the Ohio, the occupation of Cumberland Gap and the necessity to watch Virginia left Burnside only twenty thousand available soldiers. It was easy to ensure to Longstreet a great numerical superiority. By joining to his corps, composed of twenty thousand men under arms, the troops that were already between the Hiawassee and the Tennessee, he would have had thirty-two thousand infantry, more than five thousand cavalry, and a numerous artillery—in all, between thirty-eight and forty thousand men. But Bragg, after having instructed him officially "to capture or destroy Burnside's army," did nothing to enable him to execute this order. He took away from him Walker's division, and left two only, those which Hood and McLaws had brought from Virginia. Besides, these divisions, which had come without transportation, had only such baggage-wagons as they had picked up on the field of battle, a number altogether insufficient. To their commander were given incomplete and inaccurate maps of a region which, however, the Confederate army had occupied more than two years. Briefly, Bragg at the very hour when he signed the instructions to Longstreet was calling back Stevenson with all his troops. On the 5th and 6th of November numerous trains were despatched to Sweetwater to bring these two bodies of troops. After having deposited them at Tyner's Station, the trains took up Hood's and McLaws'

divisions to carry them over the same road in an opposite direction. This going and coming, devised it seems, to delude the Federals, diminished by twelve thousand more combatants the forces which might have operated against Burnside. Longstreet, who arrived at Sweetwater in the evening of the 9th, had only sixteen thousand infantry and five thousand mounted men to take the field. Since Bragg judged these forces sufficient, he had done better had he not displaced Stevenson, and had acted wisely by causing Longstreet to go with one division only.

The latter is detained until the 13th by the necessity of collecting provisions and of organizing his train; besides, he does not find the number of teams which would be indispensable. But time is pressing, and the loss of these few days may be fatal to the Confederates, because, on the one hand, Burnside is on the alert, Longstreet's movements having been promptly reported to him, and on the other hand, which is a more serious matter, Sherman is rapidly advancing, and as early as the 14th the heads of his columns are at Bridgeport. Grant, on the 5th, hearing of the departure of Longstreet, would like to avail himself of this event to attack two days later his adversary, without waiting for the Army of the Tennessee. But although he had brought into requisition all the horses and mules, even the officers' horses, to put to Thomas' artillery, the latter had signified to him that his army was not in a condition to move, and, upon the advice of his brave lieutenant, Grant had renounced his design. He waited only with the more impatience for the occasion to make up for this disappointment, and wrote to Burnside to hold on for a week between Kingston and Knoxville, promising him to interfere at the expiration of that time in such a way as to compel Longstreet to give up his design. Burnside—whom Halleck very unjustly accused of indolence and indecision, for he had, on the contrary, up to that time proved himself obstinate—perfectly understood the part that the general interest of the cause imposed upon him. He could attempt to check Longstreet on the Tennessee, but he thought it preferable to retire, step by step, before him, even if it were necessary to sacrifice Kingston, so as to draw him as far as possible from Bragg, thus causing his campaign to be protracted, and giving Sherman time to rejoin their common chief. The latter,

returning to his first instructions, prescribed exactly this manœuvre to Burnside. He asked him to detain Longstreet, at any cost, long enough to enable himself to take the offensive before the return of Longstreet in front of Chattanooga. The construction of extensive fieldworks around Knoxville, which had been commenced in September, was actively pressed for several days under the direction of two distinguished officers of the engineer corps, Colonel Babcock and Captain Poe. These works and the situation of Knoxville on the railway rendered this town a strategic point much more important than Kingston. This is what Burnside had easily demonstrated to Colonel Wilson and Mr. Dana, whom Grant had despatched to him. But the time for discussion had passed.

On the morning of the 14th, even while holding conference with these two envoys, Burnside learns that Longstreet has crossed the Tennessee without fighting. He leaves them immediately, and a locomotive carries him rapidly from Knoxville to the Lenoire Station, occupied by General Potter with Ferrero's division and a portion of that of Colonel John F. Hartranft of the Ninth corps. General White of the Twenty-third corps, who is charged with watching the course of the Tennessee between Loudon and Kingsport, occupies each of these towns with a brigade. The cavalry that was watching Philadelphia has been recalled from the left bank: its new commander, the young and brilliant General William P. Sanders, will cover Knoxville on the east by occupying the region of country included between the Tennessee and the Holston. This last stream, the more important of the two, flows in a direction at right angles to the first as far as Lenoire, where they meet. Sanders crosses the Holston River on the ponton-bridge which had been brought back in time from Loudon, and advances as far as Marysville. Ferrero and White are posted on the road and the railway, which followed the west bank.

Longstreet desired to cross the Tennessee above Loudon, so as to turn the troops massed by Burnside between Lenoire and Knoxville, get ahead of him in front of Loudon, and capture, before he had time to fortify them, the heights which command the town and are situated on the left bank of the Holston. But his cavalry only will follow this route, for, it being impossible to

transport his pontons except by rail, he is obliged to attempt the passage of the Tennessee near Loudon. He commences moving on the 13th of November. Wheeler with three cavalry brigades rapidly gains the banks of the Tennessee, crosses it in the evening above Lenoire, and bivouacs on the Marysville road, without having encountered the enemy. The head of the infantry column occupies during the night the town of Loudon. The Federals have abandoned it and established themselves on the opposite bank, above the town, in a bend of the river, where are erected their huts constructed in anticipation of a long winter season. A similar bend down stream brings the river at four hundred rods from Loudon to the ford called Huff's Ferry. To attempt the crossing, Longstreet selects this point, which the double bend of the Tennessee conceals from observation by the enemy. In the night the troops are massed on the bank; the boats are dragged to the edge of the river and launched. In the morning of the 14th a strong detachment occupies the left bank, but the bridge was firmly established only in the afternoon.

White, who was promptly notified of this crossing, retires along the railway with Chapin's small command. Byrd's brigade, which occupies Kingston, being thus cut off, remains in the important position assigned to it, and will not be seriously molested. But Burnside on his arrival at Lenoire, believing that the enemy has passed above Loudon, orders White to retrace his steps to check him: White will be supported by Ferrero. From another direction Longstreet moves directly on Lenoire the head of his column, which the curve in the river has hitherto masked: fortunately for the Federals, this advanced force is not large and moves slowly. White, himself surprised by the enemy's skirmishers, and having escaped from them with difficulty, recalls in great haste Chapin, who was about to be cut off. The latter arrives in time. The Confederate advance-guard halts upon a bald hill. Chapin, while a portion of his force moves on to secure his line of communication with Lenoire, attacks the Confederates from two sides at once. His soldiers, although never having been under fire before, make a vigorous onslaught and dislodge the enemy after a short struggle.

The fight at Lenoire involves a loss of about a hundred men to

the Federals, delays the progress of their adversaries, whose entire force has not yet crossed the river, and allows Burnside time to prepare to receive them. Around him he has Ferrero's division, and a portion of White's and Hartranft's also, with the greater part of their artillery—in all, about six thousand men. He might try to check Longstreet and push him back beyond the Tennessee, but his own defeat so far from his base would entail the loss of all his *matériel* and a portion of his army: he will therefore follow the programme which he has just outlined to Colonel Wilson. All the troops that are south of Knoxville are ordered to rendezvous at that town. White and Ferrero will take the road on the 15th at early dawn, and on the way the garrison at Lenoire will unite with them. But the roads are muddy, the Federals are obliged to regulate their progress by that of their immense train, and Chapin, who brings up the rearguard, reaches Lenoire only at four o'clock in the afternoon: he has repulsed, with a loss of about twenty wounded, a pretty vigorous attack by the enemy. Happily for him, Longstreet, who was likewise delayed by the same cause, arrives in front of the strong positions in which Chapin is posted only at a time when approaching night no longer allows a serious attack to be attempted. Burnside avails himself of the darkness to hasten his retreat. The wagons of White's division are abandoned in order to add the teams to those of the artillery and remove the mired cannon. Only a few pieces are lost, and the army is able to get in motion on the morning of the 16th. It is time. Longstreet has at last massed all his forces in the evening of the 15th in front of Lenoire. A night-reconnoissance, during which Jenkins' brigade has been repulsed, having revealed the presence of the enemy's army, Longstreet conceives the design of cutting off its retreat. The deep and rapid waters of the Holston, which render impossible any movement eastward, flow at a short distance from the route which Burnside must follow. Campbell, a railway-station, is nearly ten miles from Lenoire and thirteen from Knoxville. Situated between the highroad and the river, very near both, the junction of the Kingston and Clinton roads gives it a particular importance. In the rear of this point of junction there is an isolated hill, easily defensible, which commands all the approaches. Longstreet proposes to take

possession of it by a rapid flank movement ahead of the Federals. This movement is entrusted to McLaws' division, which forms the left of the army, while Jenkins, in command of Hood's division, is charged to follow, step by step, Burnside's rearguard. When, at last, the latter's columns are in motion on the morning of the 16th, McLaws, taking a cross-road, has already reached the Kingston road. There is great danger to the Unionists. If McLaws takes possession of Campbell's Station, he will close to them all the roads that branch out between Knoxville and the Tennessee River, and back them against a stream that cannot be crossed. Burnside is warned in time, and understands the danger : he orders Hartranft, who leads the march, to move faster and take a cut to the left across the woods, so as to get ahead of the Confederates. The Federals, on the run, reach the Kingston road a short distance before coming to Campbell's Station, at the moment when McLaws' advance-guard is already in sight. Hartranft has only the time to throw the head of his column across the road, so as to check the enemy ; the rest of his column forms on the left in line of battle beyond the highroad to cover the passage of the trains and other brigades of the army, which Jenkins has not been able to detain. The danger is averted, but it is impossible to continue the retrograde movement under the very eyes of the enemy : it is necessary to give battle.

While Hartranft closes the Kingston road to McLaws' first battalions, Ferrero, who brings up the rear with Humphrey's brigade, suddenly halts and checks Jenkins' vanguard, which presses too closely on him. Thanks to the resisting power of this brigade, Burnside is enabled to pass through the public square at Campbell's Station and form his little army around the village, after having started his wagons on the road to Knoxville. His troops pass in the rear of Hartranft and deploy successively *en échelon* on his right, thus facing backward in line of battle, with White in the centre and Ferrero on the right. The artillery is on the top of the hill behind the infantry. Longstreet has not been able to interrupt these movements, and Burnside, now at ease in regard to the fate of his trains, brings back his troops on the slopes which overlook the public square, where his line, being well supported, is preparing to receive the enemy.

The latter is not slow in coming. While McLaws is engaging the Federals, Jenkins passes behind him and deploys on his left beyond the Kingston road. Longstreet hurls Jenkins forward without waiting for the arrival of the artillery, which was delayed in consequence of the bad condition of the roads: the Confederate leader thus resumes the flanking movement interrupted by Hartranft. Christ's brigade of Ferrero's division receives Jenkins with a terrific discharge of musketry, but without being able to check his advance. However, the Union brigade retires in good order, and draws the assailants under the fire of the artillery, which sows death and disorder in their ranks. Christ, feeling himself supported, re-forms his lines and in turn repulses the Southerners.

True to the tactics that he has practised in Virginia, Longstreet immediately exerts his efforts on another point of the enemy's line. McLaws attacks White with his wonted vigor, but the ground is still less favorable to him on this side, and the converging fire of the Union guns obliges him to promptly retreat.

The position cannot be carried without the aid of artillery. Finally, about two o'clock the artillery reaches the ground. Forthwith, Colonel Alexander directs the fire of three of his batteries to the centre of the Union line. White's pieces, which are of an inferior calibre, are silenced, while Longstreet prepares a fresh attack on the Union right. Burnside does not leave him time to execute it. The end which he had in view is attained: the trains are on the way toward Knoxville, and he falls back in good order to a second position. The Confederates follow him and exchange with him a cannonade at long range; but Jenkins' progress is delayed through the fault, it is said, of Law's brigade, and night comes before Jenkins is in line. The Federals immediately resume their march, and thus gain the advance that they need to reach Knoxville. The fight at Campbell's Station, which has cost them about three hundred men, has rendered their retreat secure. Longstreet will no longer be in a position to carry by a coup-de-main the principal city of East Tennessee: he will be obliged to undertake a regular siege.

While he goes with difficulty up the right bank of the Holston, Wheeler operates on the left bank. On the 14th, the latter

reaches the village of Marysville, occupied by his old adversaries, the soldiers of Wolford. The Eleventh Kentucky, which is at the outposts, allows itself to be completely surprised, and is captured almost to a man. The First regiment of the same State, coming up, attracted by the din of battle and ignorant of the disaster, falls into the enemy's lines, is put to flight, and leaves some thirty men on the ground. Wheeler is encouraged by this success, which gives him several hundred prisoners, and vigorously drives before him the remnants of Wolford's brigade. But Sanders, coming up with Pennebaker's brigade, checks his progress from the Little River crossing as far as the edge of Rock Creek, one of its affluents, which he cannot reach before night. The battle is renewed on the 15th in the morning. The Federals continue their retreat, without having their lines broken, and finally halt on the heights overlooking Knoxville, on the left bank of the Holston. These are the positions which Wheeler would like to take by a dash or rapid attack, so as to close the passage of the river to the Federals. However, Sanders and Parke, whom Burnside has left in command of the place, fully understand how important are these positions for defence. While a portion of the cavalry, having dismounted, check the enemy by their firing, the others, exchanging their carbines for axes and picks, hurriedly fell trees for an abatis and throw up breastworks. Even on the following day these works are sufficiently advanced toward completion to deter Wheeler from attempting an attack upon them. He immediately falls back to cross the Holston at the village of Louisville, and on the 18th he will rejoin Longstreet, whose march must be preceded by a reconnoitring-party. This general, after having moved Hart's cavalry brigade on Kingston, has already recalled it to head the march of his infantry and drive back the hostile detachments that occupy the northern routes.

Sanders, once assured of Wheeler's departure, also clears the Holston and enters Knoxville, leaving at the south only a feeble garrison.

It is indeed necessary to cover the retreat of the Army of the Ohio and give it time to settle in the place. On the 17th, in the forenoon, all the troops that had fought at Campbell's Station entered the city, while Sanders sent Wolford on the Clinton road

and Pennebaker on the Loudon in order to delay as long as possible the investment of the place.

On that day Sanders had to do only with cavalry-parties that he easily kept at a distance, Longstreet having waited till morning to resume his march. But on the 18th, early in the morning, Sanders is attacked by McLaws' division, which has bivouacked a short distance off. The Confederate soldiers are inspired with a new ardor by the hope of opening the gates of Knoxville after a few cannon-shots and entering as conquerors into this city faithless to the Southern cause. But Sanders, being supported by strong artillery, checks their progress with great skill. The struggle is very sharp on the Loudon road about a mile and a half from the city: the Federals make a desperate defence and the losses on both sides are considerable. At last, night comes to the aid of Sanders. Unfortunately, this general, only twenty-eight years old, who has exhibited the qualities of a true tactician, falls mortally wounded by a bullet which a hostile citizen has fired from the window of Mr. Armstrong's country house. He was bitterly regretted by his superiors in command and his comrades.

Wolford, on the right, is pretty roughly handled in the evening and driven back into the suburbs of the city. But Sanders' tenacity has borne its fruit. It is only on the following day, the 19th, that Longstreet is enabled to post himself in front of the defensive works, which are finally in a state of forwardness to resist a sudden attack. Notwithstanding the danger he runs and causes Bragg to run by prolonging his stay in East Tennessee, Longstreet is no longer in circumstances either to abandon or to temporize with the campaign so imprudently undertaken.

Burnside has brought back into Knoxville all the scattered detachments of his army with the exception of Willcox's division, which will yet remain some time near Bull's Gap, so as to hold back General Samuel Jones, and will then retire, with all its wagons, to Cumberland Gap. This division will thus hold, always ready to open, the gate which leads from Kentucky into East Tennessee.

The natural advantages of the ground for the defence of Knoxville was an offset to the yet unfinished state of the fortifications.

The city, situated on a table-land fifty yards above the level of Holston River, is bounded on the south by this stream, on the east and the west by two brooks with steep shores which were denominated respectively First Creek and Second Creek by settlers doubtless poor in imaginative faculties. Beyond these two streams rise hills completely overlooking the city, and whose possession is consequently necessary to the besieged. The ground dips toward the north. There is in that direction, before coming to the city, a depression parallel with the course of the Holston. The railway runs along this depression, in which were large establishments and the junction of the two lines of railroad called the Virginia and Tennessee and the Tennessee and Georgia. The two brooks flow into this depression of ground, which they cross at right angles to the plane of the horizon. Marshes on the north, the river on the south, and hills on the two other sides therefore constitute the four faces of the defence. The breastworks erected by the cavalry on the left bank of the Holston protected from sudden attack the heights which on that side commanded the city: the enemy could not seriously threaten them. In order to render impracticable the approaches from the north the flowing waters of the two brooks were dammed: there were thus formed in the depression two veritable lakes, separated only by a strip of land on which were the station and shops. Rifle-pits for the shelter of the sharpshooters were dug in front of the overflow; in the rear several batteries for field artillery were built and connected by strong breastworks. The eastern face seemed to be but little exposed, for the First Creek formed along a length of fifteen hundred yards an obstacle which would have cut in two all the lines the besiegers might have tried to establish. Still, the three heights to the eastward of Knoxville had been fortified; a large work of defence, closed at the gorge, rose from the principal elevation, called Temperance Hill. Colonel Babcock had applied himself particularly to the defence of the western face. In the centre of it were old Confederate works which after the death of Sanders received the name of that gallant soldier. Situated at a little over half a mile from the city, upon a commanding rise of ground between the railway and the Loudon road, Fort Sanders was open at the gorge, and composed of three bastioned fronts facing north-west, south-west,

and south-east. It formed the salient point of a continuous line extending from the Holston as far as the railroad-bridge on Second Creek.

Chevaux-de-frise covered the front occupied by the sharpshooters; the approaches to the principal works were protected by abatis and stakes or trunks of trees joined together with wires. In fine, all the houses along the lines of outposts had been utilized as places of defence. The report of cannon, which had not ceased drawing nearer since the morning of November 15th, had stimulated the zeal of the Federals to finish these works, in the completion of which a large part of the population was co-operating. At last, on the 20th of November, the place is in a condition to withstand an assault, and the long delays of a regular siege will allow time to perfect its defences. On that day also the fronts on the north and the west are invested: the two others remain free. The Southern cavalry appears alone on the east near the confluence of the French Broad River and the Holston, where Burnside's cavalry will not be slow to seek the enemy. Wheeler's four brigades cover the besieging army on the north and the east, from the neighborhood of Kingston, still occupied by the Federals, as far as the Cumberland Gap and Tazewell roads. No Confederate soldier shows himself on the south of the Holston.

The Army of the Ohio is therefore not completely invested. It maintains its communications with every part of Sevier county, while the sympathies of the farmers, compensating for the poverty of the country, ensure the supply of the troops. They embark their grain and live-stock on rafts, and avail themselves of the November fogs to descend the French Broad River and the Holston as far as Knoxville without being perceived by the enemy's vedettes.

Without this the defence of Knoxville would be of short duration, because the stores on hand could feed for only a few days the army, the inhabitants, and the numerous refugees, against whom Burnside could not close the doors. However, he has taken the necessary steps to husband his resources, for the fate of the campaign depends entirely upon the duration of the siege. The troops are allowanced: the sugar, coffee, and vegetables are reserved for the hospitals. Forage being scarce, a great number of horses

are shot and thrown into the rapid waters of the Holston : some are kept for food. Thus, Burnside will wait behind his parapets for his fate to be decided at Chattanooga. His deliverance is the affair of a few days if Longstreet's absence ensures Bragg's defeat. On the contrary, East Tennessee is irrevocably lost ; but opportune reinforcements, coming by Cumberland Gap, might perhaps join with the Army of the Ohio and enable it to reach Kentucky.

Longstreet's interest is to hasten the operations, but the means are not at his command. In order to invest the place it would be necessary to occupy the left bank of the Holston and connect the two banks by a bridge below Knoxville. Unhappily for him, the boats have remained near Loudon for lack of wagons to haul them. Not being able to bring them by the railway, every bridge of which is destroyed, Longstreet tries in vain to have them towed up the Holston as far as the village of Louisville : the rapidity of the current will not allow this. Finally, he is obliged to send the provision-wagons to get the boats at Loudon, but they will not return before eight days. Besides, the lack of implements delays the first preparations for the siege, which should have been pushed with rapidity. Fortunately, the Federals have abandoned their storehouses on leaving Lenoire precipitately, and a cavalry brigade having been despatched to search them, each man brings a pick or a shovel across his saddle.

Almost every day is marked by some collision between the two forces. In the night from the 20th to the 21st a conflict occurs around some houses which the Federals succeed in destroying, so as to take from the assailants a supporting-point. The latter, however, have set to work vigorously : the trenches are opened and a parallel is run against the western front, the only one accessible with pick in hand. McLaws' division undertakes the attack on that side ; Jenkins' division invests the northern front. The Confederate outposts drive in those of the Unionists more and more every day. At last, at fourteen or fifteen hundred yards from the Federal works a succession of redoubts, rifle-pits, and breast-works protected with an immense abatis constitutes a formidable contravallation. Already everything is prepared to storm the works in the night from the 22d to the 23d, when, that very evening, Longstreet gives a contrary order upon the advice of McLaws.

During this time Wheeler overruns with impunity the entire region of country abandoned by the Federals. On the 23d he is with three brigades before Kingston, but he allows himself to be intimidated by the small garrison, and retires almost without firing a gun. On the previous day one of the detachments that he sometimes sent out as a reconnoitring-party to the confluence of the Holston and the French Broad River availed itself of this excursion above Knoxville to launch a heavy raft intended to break the bridge which alone enabled the besieged place to receive provisions from the eastern counties. Shackelford, being warned of Wheeler's design, hastened on the 23d, in the morning, with some regiments to Boyd's Ferry, above the confluence; but he came too late: the Southrons disappeared and the raft was already drifting toward Knoxville. Luckily, Captain Poe had a long time since taken precautionary measures against such a thing: a chain stretched across the river above the bridge stops the raft and prevents disaster.

However, the besiegers are approaching the place nearer and nearer. On the evening of the same day Jenkins' soldiers carry the principal positions occupied by Hartranft's division above the overflow, on the short railroad to Clinton; the large establishments in the vicinity of the station are destroyed by the Federals in their retreat. A part of these positions is recaptured, it is true, on the following morning, but the Southrons remain masters of the strong locomotive round-house. At the same time, a more serious fight begins on the left of the Union line between the Second Michigan and the Confederates around new and advanced works thrown up by the latter. After losing about a hundred men, the Federals destroy these works, but cannot hold them.

On the morrow Longstreet obtains an important advantage. He has directed Law's and Robertson's brigades of Jenkins' division to cross in boats to the left bank of the Holston, and on the 25th at daybreak these troops endeavor to carry by a surprise the heights on that side in front of the city. Happily for Burnside, a portion of his cavalry had passed two days before to the same bank to reinforce Cameron's brigade, and, replacing the sabre with the pick, has extended the works begun eight days before. In advance of the lines that cover the bridges, and at a

little more than a mile south of the city, the Confederates are unexpectedly confronted with new works which bar the road against them. Finding the position too strong and the Federals on the alert, they dare not attack it, but post themselves near the river on the hill which fifteen hundred yards off commands an enfilading fire on the Union lines near Fort Sanders. They thus menace on the one side the lines of communication with the place, and on the other a part of its defences.

Longstreet soon receives reinforcements increasing his effective force. Two brigades of Buckner's division, led by B. R. Johnson, arrived on the 27th before Knoxville. In another direction, Ransom, having left the banks of the Watauga in the wake of Willcox, has retired with all his trains on Cumberland Gap; Martin, who had replaced Wheeler, being called by Bragg, has been able to put himself in communication with the latter, and has availed himself of this opportunity to detach from his division Giltner's and W. E. Jones' two cavalry brigades, which arrive in front of Knoxville on the 27th and the 28th. Finally, wishing to have all his forces collected at the decisive moment of the assault, Longstreet calls near him the greater part of his own cavalry, leaving before Kingston only Hart's command. On the 26th the Confederate general thus finds himself at the head of ten infantry brigades and six of cavalry.

However, notwithstanding this increase of force and the advantages obtained on the part of Longstreet, Burnside can detain him a long time before Knoxville. To the troops that entered the city with him he has added two other divisions of the Twenty-third corps, Shackelford's cavalry, and some three thousand refugees who have asked arms of him and whose organization is rapidly progressing.

For the moment we shall leave the two adversaries in the presence of each other, because while they are contending for some positions of little importance on the banks of the Holston, the fate of each has been decided on the hills which surround Chattanooga. There it is that we must return, after having told in a few words how ended the long march undertaken by Sherman in response to the call of his chief.

CHAPTER III.

LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN.

WE have accompanied Sherman as far as Iuka, where he arrived on the 19th and learned that Captain Phelps, with two gunboats despatched by Admiral Porter, was waiting for him at Eastport, an excellent shipping-point situated about ten miles from the mouth of Bear Creek, Tennessee. These gunboats have convoyed a fleet of transports carrying provisions, the arrival of which could not be more timely. While waiting for a large steam ferryboat following close in their wake, Phelps has caused a deck to be laid on a coal-lighter, which enables him to establish a regular ferry between Eastport and the right bank of the river. Sherman would willingly avail himself of this to transport his army corps to the opposite shore, for the rebuilding of the railway and the guard over it as far as Decatur will take much time and oblige him to leave numerous garrisons behind him. But Halleck has given express orders. Sherman therefore commands General Blair to march on Tusculum with Osterhaus' and John E. Smith's divisions, to the end that he may strongly occupy the first section of the line which it is necessary to restore. Meantime, on the 24th, Sherman hears of the creation of the Military Division of the Mississippi: Rosecrans retires, Halleck vanishes from sight; and Sherman finds himself again under the exclusive authority of his former chief. The command of the Army of the Tennessee, that fine force which has just opened the Mississippi, is a due reward for the glorious part that he has taken in its achievements. Foreseeing at once that Grant will modify Halleck's instructions, Sherman sends Ewing's division to Eastport, and prepares to transport it to the right bank of the river. It was a fortunate inspiration, for his foresight was soon realized. While Ewing is making for the banks of the Tennessee, a frail

skiff, carrying a solitary passenger whose homely clothes might cause him to be taken for either hunter or woodchopper, is descending the impetuous waters of that river. The skiff, leaping amidst the rapids of Muscle Shoals, is greeted every now and then with the bullet of a Confederate sentinel hidden in the woods covering the left bank. This bullet is fired at a venture, for the ambushed soldier has no time to challenge the impudent traveller passing within the range of his gun; but in these war-times whoever thus ventures on the river is justly considered suspicious, and becomes the game which duck-hunters are now watching near some sharp bend, some dangerous eddy. This time, however, if from the recesses of their lookouts these watchers could have guessed the mission of the traveller who was gliding so boldly before them, they would have aimed at him with a particular care. For he was bearing to Sherman a message which was to have a great influence on the whole campaign, and consequently on the very duration of the war. Grant had hardly arrived at Chattanooga when, understanding how important it was to hasten the arrival of the Fifteenth corps, he addressed to Sherman the following order, which, notwithstanding its conciseness, was sufficiently explicit for a general accustomed to take a hint from his superior in command: "Drop everything east of Bear Creek, and move with your entire force toward Stevenson, until you receive further orders." It was a copy of this order, sent by telegraph as far as Athens, which General Crook, stationed there, had entrusted to an intelligent soldier with a venturesome turn of mind. Corporal Pike, after having escaped the dangers of navigation, abandoned his skiff, and, striking on foot for the town of Tusculumbia, had the good-fortune to find it occupied by the Federals. Blair promptly sent him to Sherman, and on the 27th the latter, being suddenly accosted by the messenger, whose appearance, yet half wild, astonished him at first, received from his hands the precious despatch which was going to change all his plans and enable him to arrive at Chattanooga in time to play an important part in the decisive struggle of which the neighborhood of that city was to be the theatre.

Sherman's orders are promptly issued, and no less promptly

executed. Blair, suspending all work commenced on the railroad, brings back his two divisions from Tuscumbia as far as Iuka, while the two others cross the river. On the 31st the arrival of a steam ferryboat and of two transports renders this operation a quick and easy one. On the ensuing day it was nearly accomplished, and Sherman, leaving to Blair the care of the troops in the rear, overtakes at Florence the head of Ewing's column. Released from his orders to follow and repair a railroad, and protected on the south by the course of the Tennessee, Sherman can now hasten the step of his soldiers, and will have no other difficulties to overcome except the bad condition of the roads, the depth of the rivers, and a scarcity of provisions.

Johnston has not been able to make any opposition to the crossing, for if he commands over the most extensive territory, it is, of all the Confederacy, the poorest supplied with soldiers. In the State of Mississippi he has only the two divisions of Jackson at Canton and Loring at Grenada, with Ector's and McNair's brigades placed under the orders of the latter. These forces were drawn about the 15th of October to the left bank of Big Black River by McPherson's demonstration, but they are too far away to render Sherman uneasy. Therefore, Johnston might direct against the latter only Chalmers' and S. D. Lee's mounted divisions, which are stationed, the one in Mississippi and the other in Northern Alabama. But immediately after the affair at Collierville, Hurlbut sent all his cavalry to meet Chalmers. Two days thereafter (October 13th) Chalmers' force was met at Byhalia, a small town nearly thirteen miles south of the railway, and thrown back beyond the Tallahatchie: it was able to rally only at Oxford. There is left to Johnston only S. D. Lee's cavalry division. The latter, as we have said, being massed near Decatur toward the middle of October, declined to cross the Tennessee on learning the result of Wheeler's expedition. The arrival of Sherman on Bear Creek calls S. D. Lee to that locality a few days afterward. On the 22d he encounters Osterhaus on the banks of Caney Creek, about nine miles and a half west of Tuscumbia. After a pretty sharp engagement S. D. Lee retires before the numerous infantry of the Federals, but while falling back he harasses them and completes the destruction of the railway. If Sherman had continued his march

on Decatur, the Southern cavalry would have greatly impeded his progress in that direction. But a second dash by Chalmers on Collierville could not have the same result, for on the 3d of November, when he presented himself for the second time in front of this post, the break in the railway could no longer affect the Fifteenth corps, which was already beyond the Tennessee River. Besides, Chalmers failed utterly. The Seventh Illinois, which he expected to surprise and crush under the weight of Slemmons and McCulloch's brigades, was keeping good watch and defended itself gallantly. General Hatch came to its rescue, and Chalmers, being repulsed, fell back, leaving behind him about a hundred men killed, wounded, or prisoners: among the latter was Colonel J. Z. George, who led the charge.

Before leaving Iuka, Sherman attends to the moving of reinforcements on Chattanooga. Eight thousand men, drawn from the Sixteenth corps, form under Dodge a large division, which is immediately started on the way by Hurlbut; McPherson sends by water, to Memphis, Tuttle's division, which closely follows Dodge. On the other hand, Grant, in instructing Sherman to sunder his communications with Memphis, at the same time guarantees to him the provisions which he is no longer able to draw from that city. Halleck wished that Sherman should restore the Memphis and Charleston line as far as Stevenson, so as to be enabled to accumulate a considerable amount of supplies at that point; for it was calculated that the railway from Nashville to Bridgeport could not feed more than seventy thousand men. But instead of taking a distant base on the banks of the Mississippi, Grant preferred with good reason to supplement the service of this railway by putting in repair another line having the same point of departure. The Central Alabama Railroad was open from Nashville to Columbia. The only thing to do was to occupy and repair it from the latter city to its junction with the Memphis and Charleston line in front of Decatur, and to reconstruct this last line from the junction to Stevenson. The transit was thus shortened by sixty-two miles. The road, protected by the Tennessee River, was easy to guard, and therefore, like the other from Nashville, it simplified the service of the supply department without running the risk of exhausting its stores; for at that season of the year the stage of the

Cumberland River allowed the Federal steamers to replenish them rapidly. The war was then receding more and more from the Mississippi and concentrating near the Alleghanies. Sherman left upon the banks of the great river only such forces as were strictly necessary to ensure its free navigation, and Grant selected Nashville as the sole base of operations for his three armies. To supply them with provisions he needed much rolling-stock. He ordered McPherson to leave at Vicksburg only three locomotives and ten cars, and to send all the rest of the *matériel* by water to the railways running to Nashville. At the same time he ordered Hurlbut to abandon the Columbus and Memphis Railroad. The telegraph which connected the latter city with the Northern States, being no longer of any military use, was sacrificed together with that road; the cars and engines were brought back toward the east. Finally, there was forwarded to Nashville all the *matériel* which had been prepared at Louisville and was necessary to re-establish the bridges destroyed between Columbia and Stevenson. In order not to delay the Fifteenth corps, Grant assigned to Dodge's division the task of protecting that work.

The four divisions that crossed the Tennessee have continued their march toward the east, followed by their wagons carrying the provisions discovered at Eastport; the country they traverse, without fully supplying all their wants, furnishes a part of what they daily consume. But Sherman upon his arrival at Rogersville finds the Elk River to be an insurmountable obstacle. He has neither boats nor ponton-train; it would take too long to construct a trestle-bridge. He therefore moves up the right bank a distance of fifty-six miles, as far as Fayetteville, where a stone bridge offers him at last, on the 8th, an easy crossing. A detachment of the Twelfth corps occupies at this point the terminus of the branch which diverges at Decherd from the Nashville and Stevenson line. Sherman is thus in direct communication with Grant. Hence on his arrival he finds detailed orders and, what is better appreciated by his soldiers, about a hundred thousand rations. In order easily to subsist his troops Grant advises him to divide them into several columns. He therefore starts out with two divisions as far as Decherd, where the Fourth takes the Anderson and Stevenson road, while the Third moves on Bridgeport *via* the village of

University. Meantime, Blair with the two other divisions takes, by way of New Market, Larkinsville, and Bellefonte, a road which is longer, but traverses a country not so poor. Sherman reaches Bridgeport in the evening of the 13th, but he has with him only the head of the column of the Third division: it will be impossible to collect his *corps d'armée* before the 17th. He avails himself of this delay to reach in a steamer Kelley's Ferry, and thence Chattanooga, where he is impatient again to meet his old chief and receive his instructions personally.

The latter, since the day when he renounced the projected attack on Bragg, has been intent only on hastening the arrival of his lieutenant. Every hour that elapses gives Longstreet one chance more either to accomplish the defeat of Burnside or to return to Missionary Ridge. One will therefore understand with what joy Grant receives Sherman on the 15th in the evening. On the ensuing day Grant took him, with Thomas and Smith, above Chattanooga to explain to him on the ground the part which he had assigned to him in the next battle.

Grant had time to mature his plan during his long days of inactivity. In order to render it more intelligible we shall begin by indicating in a few words the condition of the Confederate army. This army, whose losses in men and materials were repaired after the battle of Chickamauga, and to which the fine days of autumn and the mountain-air of Georgia had restored nearly all who were on the sick-list, might have taken the offensive at any time during the month of October. It has not known how to do it, and, notwithstanding appearances, its condition is thoroughly changed. We can understand why Sherman, on viewing for the first time the magnificent positions occupied by the enemy, turned with uneasiness toward Grant and exclaimed, "You are then truly besieged!" But a more careful examination soon undeceived him. In fact, if the Confederate flag still floats at the top of Lookout Mountain, the Federal trains, protected by Hooker, pass with impunity at the foot of the mountain, braving the cannon that uselessly crown the crest. The works which completely command Chattanooga on the left bank of the river are still occupied by the Confederates, but the besieged are well fed and more numerous than the so-called besiegers; the former are constantly receiving reinforcements and

are preparing to break at one blow the weakened barriers which still encompass them. For the purpose of maintaining these vain appearances Bragg keeps his army in a position more and more perilous. From the moment when he allowed the Federals quietly to supply Chattanooga he should either have commenced a regular siege or renounced the partial and aimless investment of the town. The works of approach which he thought the blockade would save him would have been, it is true, very difficult to execute on account of the elevation of the hills crowned with Federal fortifications. Lacking heavy artillery besides, he could not think of bombarding these works, as the open space between them and Missionary Ridge was about fifteen hundred yards. Impressed with these difficulties, Bragg in two months did not once try to disturb the Federals and interrupt their work. Henceforth the possession of Lookout Mountain was useless to him. It should have been evacuated on the day of Longstreet's departure. It was necessary first, so as to enable Longstreet to take away his entire corps and give him the means of striking at Knoxville a prompt and decisive blow. It was also necessary, because this departure imposed a defensive attitude on the part of the army. Being obliged, in order to cover his dépôts, to occupy the whole length of Missionary Ridge as far as the edge of the Chickamauga Creek, Bragg, while retaining Lookout Mountain, compelled his reduced army to spread over an excessive length of nearly thirteen miles. This line was all the weaker because its concave form still lengthened the communications between the two wings, leaving to the enemy the chord of the arc which it described. In a word, Lookout Mountain itself, an impregnable citadel in the hands of a larger force, was a dangerous post for an inferior command, because its natural defences extended too far, and access to it from all sides was so difficult that the enemy, once master of the Summertown road, might isolate the garrison. As Bragg would not accept the consequences of his situation and diminish his front, we understand that he was unable to concentrate his efforts against the enemy's works. He did not even attempt to make up for the small number of his soldiers by seriously strengthening his line. The most important part of this line, the crest of Missionary Ridge, was too abrupt at the top to

offer good positions for the artillery. The breastworks and batteries which he had erected on the summit were sufficient to crown it; but instead of simple wooden barricades covered with a little earth he should have established strong works on the lower slopes. However, it would have been necessary to concentrate the entire army on Missionary Ridge in order to render this position impregnable. This army was not so numerous as to occupy at once the entire crest from Rossville on the south as far as the tunnel of the railway on the north, together with the western foot-hills of Missionary Ridge, which the enemy must have been tempted to take either to cover the defence of the place or prepare for offensive movements. These foot-hills formed a small crest running parallel with the main chain, cut up into a series of knobs, the principal of which was called Indian Hill by the inhabitants and Orchard Knob by the Federals. Although this crest commanded equally the valley on the side of Chattanooga and the foot of the gentle slopes which descend from Missionary Ridge, the Confederates had entrusted simple outposts with the care of guarding it.

On the 15th of November, Bragg's infantry comprised only forty-three thousand men. Supporting it, he had, it is true, a large field artillery of a hundred and twelve pieces, and to cover its wings he had more than twelve thousand cavalry. The eight infantry divisions were apportioned between Breckinridge—who, as we have said, had added to his division those of Hindman, Stewart, and Buckner—and Hardee, who, having returned about the 1st of November, had thus again reduced Cheatham to the part of a simple division commander, and united under his orders, besides the latter's division, those of Stevenson, Walker, and Cleburne. The first two had each left between the Hiawassee and the Chickamauga a brigade under Vaughan and Baldwin, with Quarles' brigade detached by Breckinridge from his old division. This army was not reduced in numbers only: doubt and discouragement had chilled every heart. Bragg's faults had not escaped the judgment of his soldiers. The general-in-chief was too cold and distant, living within himself, to be popular in the ranks: he might have acquired a great ascendancy over his army if he had taken advantage of the victory won at Chickamauga. But when he was seen fascinated, as it were, by the sight

of Chattanooga, attempting nothing, first to conquer this rich prey and then to release himself from a perilous position, he was no longer recognized as the leader who had so skilfully delayed for a year the progress of the Federals from Murfreesborough to the base of Lookout Mountain. It was soon known that grave dissensions had arisen between Bragg and several of his subalterns. The scenes which had marked the council of war held before the departure of Longstreet were related and no doubt exaggerated. The changes made by Bragg in the organization of his army also had, it is said, a deplorable effect: regiments that had always fought together were separated; the *esprit de corps* which animated them, which local patriotism stimulated in the brigades belonging to the same State, was destroyed. The arrival of two brigades and many detachments composed of Pemberton's old soldiers exerted an influence no less unfortunate. Those who had been vanquished at Vicksburg could not have the same confidence in success as the victors of Chickamauga.

This army, weakened in every way, was then so well chained within its works by the vain hope of keeping up the appearances of a siege that Grant could at his will choose the moment and the point to strike the enemy. He had thought at first of attacking the army simultaneously at both ends, Lookout Mountain on one side and the northern part of Missionary Ridge on the other. He hoped thus to compel Bragg either to divide his forces so as to defend his two wings, or bring one wing or the other to the rear—a very dangerous operation to execute in the midst of a fight. Even if the Southerners should succeed in concentrating on Missionary Ridge, the Federals were numerous enough to be able by manœuvring to constrain them to retire at the end of a few days. However, after mature reflection Grant dismissed the thought of attacking Lookout Mountain, as this position must necessarily fall if the other was seriously menaced: he concluded to reserve all his forces to support the assault of Missionary Ridge. This long crest, with steep, bare, and uniform slopes, was bristling with artillery and bordered at the base with a line of breastworks, the salience of which could not be ascertained from a distance; the crest appeared, indeed, as if it ought to oppose a formidable barrier to the Federals: the remembrance of Fredericksburg was yet pres-

ent in every mind. Fortunately for Grant, this crest extended to the north—as far as the confluence of the Tennessee and the South Chickamauga Creek. It was protected on the east and on the north by this last stream, and commanded on the west a small timbered plain which stretched over a width of three thousand yards, as far as the broad level of the river; and, in fine, being very remote from the limits of Chattanooga, the crest seemed on this side to be sheltered from any direct attack. Therefore, Bragg had not constructed any works on this part of the chain, which is nearly three miles long, and the centre of which is marked by the tunnel of the Cleveland Railway, while there is a considerable depression at the southern extremity. This part of the chain was not even occupied by his troops: a simple line of outposts established along the banks of the Tennessee extended beyond the mouth of the South Chickamauga. Grant had easily perceived it, and conceived the project of taking possession by surprise of this ill-guarded end, in order afterward to make a flank attack on the defences of Missionary Ridge, which he did not dare to attack in front. He could not move out of Chattanooga, under the eyes of the Confederate army, the troops intended for the accomplishment of this dash. It was necessary to bring them secretly on the bank of the Tennessee opposite to the mouth of the South Chickamauga, make sure of their crossing by secretly preparing a ponton-bridge, and then hurl them on the point which it was important to occupy ere the enemy could offer any serious opposition. In order to accomplish this brilliant and difficult task there were needed numerous and tried troops inured to rapid marches, because they might have upon them for a few hours the entire army of the enemy. Grant had reserved this task for the Fifteenth corps.

On the 31st of October, Sherman's four divisions, with their artillery, had on their rolls an effective force of twenty thousand five hundred and sixty-four officers and men present. Consequently, he could place in line at least eighteen thousand men. A division borrowed from Thomas was going to swell this number to twenty-four thousand. At the head of this little army he was to take at Brown's Ferry some out-of-the-way but very practicable routes, traverse through gorges the foot-hills of Wal-

den's Ridge at the north of Chattanooga, and thus reach the point designated for the crossing, without the liability of his columns being perceived by the Confederate lookouts. The Chattanooga sawmills were working day and night building new boats, repairing those that had been picked up on the river, and constructing long platforms, so that Grant was going to have in a few days a train of a hundred and sixteen boats with which he hoped to be able to throw two parallel bridges across the Tennessee. This leader, whose foresight was so remarkable, found a valuable auxiliary in General W. F. Smith, whom he had appointed chief of the engineer corps throughout the extensive territory over which he commanded.

The South Chickamauga, which empties into the Tennessee about four miles above Chattanooga, is made up of the two branches, the most western of which runs through the battlefield of the 19th of September. Two miles and a half farther up, on the opposite shore of the river, one encounters the mouth of a brook called the North Chickamauga, which flows from Walden's Ridge. This recess in the river was chosen to shelter the boats which, renewing the operation that was so fortunate at Brown's Ferry, were to descend the river down to the crossing-point, carrying with them an entire brigade, and hastily land it upon the left bank under the protective fire of a numerous artillery. In order secretly to conduct the bridge-train down to the edge of the North Chickamauga, it was necessary, notwithstanding its enormous weight, to haul it in the rear of Sherman's forces a distance of over nine miles across the rocky wastes and narrow vales of Walden's Ridge. It was calculated, however, that these preparations would be accomplished on the 20th of November.

The movements of the forces placed under the orders of Thomas were subordinate to Sherman's movements. Although united under one chief, these forces were composed of two very distinct elements. One part was the old Army of the Cumberland, distributed among the Fourth and the Fourteenth corps: it contained on the 31st of October an effective force of 47,595 combatants. But the despatch of a division of the Fourteenth corps to Sherman, the absence of the First division of the Fourth corps, a brigade of which occupied Bridgeport, while the two others were at Shell

Mound and Whitesides, and also the garrison required at Chattanooga, the protection of the bridges, the roads, and above all the fortifications, left only twenty-five thousand available men. The other part of the forces under Thomas' orders was made up of troops brought by Hooker: the three divisions which had crossed the Tennessee with him could hardly place more than eleven thousand men in line. Cruft's two brigades swelled Hooker's forces to about fourteen thousand soldiers. Grant had promised Thomas to deploy, as soon as Sherman should have cleared the river, the Fourth and the Fourteenth corps in front of the north part of the works at Chattanooga, leaving one division in reserve to wait until the Fifteenth corps had carried the extremity of the crest of Missionary Ridge, and to get in motion only when he should see Sherman, driving the enemy beyond the tunnel, open an enfilade fire on the batteries erected at the top of the crest. Thomas, then extending his left along the Tennessee, would endeavor to join hands with Sherman on that side, and, moving forward his divisions in succession, would take the defensive works on Missionary Ridge by attacking them in front while they were menaced in flank. The falling in line of the division posted on the right would mark the last phase of this movement and accomplish the defeat of Bragg. Grant intended to divide Hooker's forces. He ordered him to remain in the vicinity of Wauhatchie with Geary and Cruft's two brigades, which had been called to the eastern slope of Raccoon Mountain in order to detain by threatening demonstrations the enemy's forces that occupied Lookout Mountain, and to send Howard with the Eleventh corps to take on the right bank, somewhat above Chattanooga, a position whence he might through one bridge or the other reinforce Thomas' army or Sherman's.

In this great operation, which was going to collect on one battlefield sixty thousand men, some of whom had been fighting for the past three months in the mountains of Georgia, while others had just left the banks of the Mississippi or the hillsides of Virginia, Grant, as one can see, had reserved the first part for the troops that had fought under his orders and whose leaders had his entire confidence. He leaves the old Army of the Cumberland under the fortifications of Chattanooga, not merely because it has

lost ten thousand draught animals and must borrow some from the Fifteenth corps so as to equip, on an average, one piece of artillery in a battery. Wrongly believing that this army is down-hearted and discouraged, he wishes to give it, in order to stimulate its ardor, the spectacle of the attack by Sherman on Missionary Ridge, the configuration of which will enable every detail to be seen. It was a useless measure, for the animating spirit of the three armies, far from exciting petty jealousies, inspired each command with a noble rivalry which was a sure pledge of victory.

The Federal cavalry could not subsist near Chattanooga. The neighborhood afforded no forage, nor did the railroad bring enough for its consumption. Crook's division was concentrated around Huntsville in Alabama to cover the right bank of the Tennessee and the railways converging to Bridgeport. Long's brigade, detailed from Crook's command, was called to Chattanooga to escort Sherman, and on the first success obtained by the Fifteenth corps to rush upon the rear of the Confederate army. McCook's division had returned to its old camp in the middle of the rich valley which stretches between Walden's Ridge and the Tennessee from the village of Washington to the edge of the North Chickamauga. This division had only to cross the river to come on the day after a victory to offer valuable co-operation with Grant's forces. But he thought best to deprive himself of it, and employ it to disperse the guerillas collected in the vast rectangle between McMinnville, Murfreesborough, Lebanon, and the confluence of Caney Creek with the Cumberland River; for these bands sometimes menaced the communications and the dépôts of the army. On the 14th of November, General Elliott, who had succeeded Mitchell in the chief command of the cavalry, went with McCook's division to establish himself at Alexandria, a town situated in the middle of that region. Later, Grant had much occasion to regret his absence.

Such was the plan of attack which on the 16th of November he went to explain to his two principal lieutenants from the top of the hills that overlook the right bank of the Tennessee opposite the mouth of the South Chickamauga. Crawling from tree to tree, they reached down to the lower bank of the river without attracting the attention of the Confederate vedettes who were

guarding the other shore. In front of them towered the rounded and bare rump which forms the extremity of Missionary Ridge. Grant had no need to show it to Sherman to make him understand the importance of the position that he had to conquer; as to Thomas, he knew it long ago. The crossing of the river was fixed for the 21st before daylight. Smith immediately set about despatching the ponton-train to the bank of the North Chickamauga under the protection of Daniel McCook's brigade of Davis' division. In order to make certain that this operation would be kept secret, all the dwellers in the neighborhood were confined to their houses, and a sentinel posted at each door was a sure guarantee of their discretion. Sherman had not a moment to lose to be punctual at the rendezvous. That very evening he returned to Kelley's Ferry, and, finding no steamboat to reach Bridgeport, he jumped into a small barge, notwithstanding the obscurity of the night and the dangers of the rapids, himself bearing a hand to encourage the four soldiers bent over the oars which quickly urged him forward. At last, on the 17th, in the morning, he reached the camp of his soldiers posted near the river and the railway. The four divisions were quartered between Stevenson and Bridgeport. Ewing, who was occupying this last point, received orders at once to cross the ponton-bridge with the Fourth, followed by the others as rapidly as the bad condition of the bridge would permit; which rendered the process rather slow, however. It had been agreed with Grant that a division of the Fifteenth corps would move up Will's Valley as far as Trenton, to make the enemy believe that the corps was proceeding in the direction of the Stevens' Gap neck. Ewing was entrusted with this demonstration. While the latter was reaching Wauhatchie, multiplying his bivouac-fires in order to deceive the enemy as to his strength, Sherman at the head of the Fifteenth corps was taking, at Whitesides, a recently-opened road which led to Kelley's Ferry along the bank of the river. Thus protected by the mass of Raccoon Mountain, he was expected to reach Brown's Ferry without being perceived by the enemy: the crossing alone over the bridge could not escape the attention of the observers posted on the summit of Lookout Mountain.

The road was so bad that the first troops reached the bridge at

Brown's Ferry only on the 20th, and so narrow that the rear of the column was even then very near the bridge at Bridgeport. Hence, Sherman could not arrive the next morning at the rendezvous which had been appointed for him above Chattanooga. Grant, being notified of this untoward circumstance by the telegraph which connected him with Hooker's headquarters, postponed the attack to the 22d. John E. Smith's division, the only one that had come up to Brown's Ferry, commenced crossing. Fortunately, Howard's corps had already cleared the river, and had, in the evening of the 20th,* encamped on the right bank on the narrow slip of land called Moccasin Point. Ewing was recalled from Trenton, so as to get in time on the bridge as soon as it should be free. It was necessary that the Fifteenth corps should lose not an instant crossing the bridge, lest its delay be followed by aggravating consequences. This delay, owing to the way in which Grant and Sherman had calculated the halting-places from Bridgeport to Chattanooga, might compromise the entire success of the operation. In fact, the pontons were collected in the North Chickamauga; Long's cavalry was encamped on the banks of this stream; Davis' division, intended for Sherman, was hiding in the woods near the point designated for the crossing. The strict precautions taken to conceal these preparations proved the importance of them, and the escape of a single person would have sufficed to reveal them to the enemy, Grant might have apprehended something worse, because the silence of Burnside and the despatches, more and more alarming, from Halleck led him to believe that the Army of the Ohio, invested in Knoxville, was in one of the most perilous situations. The danger, as we already know, was not so great; but Grant must have thought that the delay of one day might cause him to lose the opportunity of relieving Burnside.

* Such is, at least, the version given by Grant, Thomas, and Hooker. Howard in his report says that he received on the 22d the order to cross the bridge at Brown's Ferry and proceed immediately to Chattanooga. But his text is incomprehensible, for he adds that his arrival at Chattanooga must have deceived the enemy and led them to think that his corps was a part of the troops coming down from Will's Valley: if he had crossed Brown's Ferry in full daylight on the 22d, the error had been impossible. It is probable that instead of the bridge at Brown's Ferry he meant the bridge at Chattanooga.

However, his patience was going to be put once more to the test. At the time when Sherman reached Brown's Ferry a torrential rain came to swell all the streams and render the roads almost impassable. The storm raged throughout the day of the 21st with the severity which characterizes the beginning of winter in that section of the country. The soldiers, blinded by the wind and rain, advanced with difficulty, while the horses floundered in the mire. Soon was seen the rising level of the Tennessee; the current, growing stronger and stronger, was unsettling the weak fastenings of the boats. Nature did what the Confederates should have tried long before. They did not have the wit to launch either fire-boats or rafts against the bridges constructed by the Union army: the trunks of trees carried away by the rise in the river several times threatened the destruction of the bridge at Brown's Ferry. The damages, though inconsiderable, occasioned each time an interruption of several hours. In the evening only two divisions had been enabled to land on the right bank; Ewing was still waiting for the way to be clear, and Osterhaus had just arrived at Brown's Ferry. Again the day for the battle had to be postponed. It was at last determined that Sherman in the evening of the 23d should without fail be opposite the mouth of the South Chickamauga. In consequence of a fatal neglect on the part of the Confederates, for which the bad state of the weather was no excuse, the preparations for crossing, which were completed as early as the 20th, remained unknown to Bragg during those three days of suspense.

The Eleventh corps was called to Chattanooga: on the evening of the 22d the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac at length bivouacked near their comrades of the Army of the Cumberland. Grant intended on the following day to have them move up the left bank of the river above the Citico Creek, which comes from Missionary Ridge, so as promptly to establish a solid connection between Thomas and Sherman. He had not hastened the crossing by the Eleventh corps simply to disencumber the bridges: he also wished to put the enemy on the wrong scent. The Confederate sentinels posted on Lookout Mountain saw the bridges at Brown's Ferry and Chattanooga, and could count during the day the number of companies and guns which crossed them; but hills

and woodlands concealed from the observers the narrow roads that zigzagged between those two places on the neck of Moccasin Point. The crossing of Sherman's troops at Brown's Ferry must have been reported to Bragg; they had disappeared in the woods: if the Confederates did not see them reappear to enter Chattanooga, they might conclude therefrom that the Fifteenth corps was moving up the Tennessee above that town. This was sufficient to attract their attention to the crossing prepared on that side. While Sherman's columns were moving unperceived through the passes of Walden's Ridge, Howard, coming out of the vale in which he had camped near Chattanooga, was entering that city in full daylight. The Confederate watchers by a very natural error must have taken these troops for the same that they had seen on the previous day pass across the river at Brown's Ferry. Bragg had no reports from his spies to correct this error: watching the Federal outposts was so continuous that for the last three days none of his spies had been enabled to transmit to him the least information. Fancying that Grant imitated his own faults, Bragg placed credence in a rumor spread through the Confederate camps according to which Sherman had marched directly to the assistance of Burnside along the right bank of the river.

At the very time when the Union general had decided to devote the day of the 23d to the last preparations for the great struggle, his anxiety and impatience were increased by several signs of a retreat on the part of the enemy. On the 20th, Bragg had sent him, under a flag of truce, a summons to cause all non-combatants to retire at once from Chattanooga, as if he wanted and was able to assault or bombard the place. Grant thought he saw in this message a transparent ruse to conceal a backward movement. He was confirmed in this opinion by the story of a Confederate officer who had deserted in the night of the 22d-23d, and gave him the assurance that the Southerners had begun to evacuate their positions. The news was false, but the fact which had deceived the deserter was so strange that it might have led many other persons into error. Would it be believed, in truth, that Bragg, after having refused to Longstreet, three weeks before, Walker's division, was detaching at that supreme hour a division from his army to send it before Knox-

ville? In the morning of the 22d, Buckner had put on the road in that direction two of his brigades under the command of Bushrod Johnson; he was preparing to follow them on the morrow with the third. In fine, some troops had been detached and sent toward Gordon's Mills and McLemore's Cove to watch the outlet of Stevens' Gap, which Sherman had appeared to menace from Trenton.

Grant, who could not believe that his adversary was imprudent enough to divide his forces, came to the conclusion that the Confederate general was going to escape, perhaps even reach East Tennessee with all his army and wreak his vengeance on Burnside for this compulsory retreat. It was necessary to act without delay. On the morning of the 23d, Thomas received orders to move out of Chattanooga without waiting for Sherman, deploy his army beyond the fortifications, and feel the enemy. If the latter were in force, Thomas should confine his movements to a simple reconnoissance; if, on the contrary, they were in retreat, then the Army of the Cumberland should advance rapidly, take Missionary Ridge, and across the left side there should be thrown the bridge intended for Sherman, which he would find already established on his arrival. Thus one day might be gained for the pursuit.

At last the Union army was going to get out of the ramparts behind which it had been so long pressed by the conquerors of Chickamauga. As these works have not been subjected to any attack, a detailed description of them seems to be useless here. We shall confine ourselves to the statement that they had been much enlarged since the ill-omened day when they sheltered for the first time the soldiers of Rosecrans. Under the active and intelligent direction of General W. F. Smith these soldiers had quickly understood that in fortifying Chattanooga they were rendering the defence of it easy by a garrison relatively small in numbers, and were thus securing to the army the means of resuming offensive operations on the first opportunity. Their discouragement had given place to a great ardor: they had endured without murmuring, in the first place, hunger, then the inclemency of a rainy autumn. The fortifications, though they did not form a continuous circle, opposed to the enemy an insurmountable barrier without the works of a regular siege. On the south the place was covered by three suc-

cessive lines, the most distant of which bordered on Chattanooga Creek: all three of the lines converged to a point near a large pentagonal fort that had replaced the redoubt before which Forrest had halted on the 22d of September. On the north-east an undulating hill, whose every peak was crowned with works more or less regularly constructed, presented a formidable array. The culminating point on that side was a knob with steep but regular slopes—a gigantic cavalier, which a plain more than a mile wide, perfectly level and dotted with groves, separated from the heights of Indian Hill. General Wood had given his name to the fort which crowned that knob. The plain thus trending eastward and westward between two ranges of hills was bounded on the south by a plateau somewhat higher, and on the north by the course of Citico Creek. Strong lunettes established on the heights overlooking the city on the west might serve at the same time as a tête-de-pont and a last resort in case of disaster. Since the direct lines of communication had been reopened to Bridgeport, twenty- and thirty-pounder Parrott guns, together with some Rodmans, had been mounted on the most important works. These stationary guns were eighteen in number, without counting five heavy siege-guns placed on the hills of Moccasin Point to batter the northern face of Lookout Mountain. A line of outposts was established a few hundred yards beyond these works, and surrounded an isolated knob called Brushy Hill by the Federals. The Army of the Cumberland was cantoned between the city and the outside enclosure amidst forts and redoubts the number of which it daily increased: the Fourth corps was on the north side, and the Fourteenth on the south.

Everything is ready in Chattanooga for the great game which is about to be played: Granger, Palmer, and Howard, each with two divisions, are waiting only for orders from Thomas. The weather, which up to this time has been against the Federals, at last appears to turn in their favor. A brilliant sun causes the traces of recent storms to vanish: its rays, sifted through transparent vapors, impart a new gloss to the tints with which autumn has decked the woods. Light mists arise from the valleys, carrying away some of their moisture; the brooks, swollen the day before, resume their soft murmur. But Sherman has not

reached the point designated for his crossing: his first three divisions are still trudging through the passes of Walden's Ridge, while the breaking of the bridge at Brown's Ferry detains the fourth division in Will's Valley. Thomas with as much impatience as his soldiers awaits the signal of battle. Several hours of daylight have already elapsed when at last he receives Grant's order. Immediately his troops form between the works around the place and the line of posts covering the approaches.

These movements cannot escape the attention of their adversaries, who, attracted by the beauty of the day and the novelty of the spectacle, soon crowd the crest of Missionary Ridge to gaze at the enemy's battalions assembled at their feet. But the silence of the spies, the late hour when the movements take place, and the very display with which they are executed restore confidence alike to the Confederate commander and soldiers. The Southern army, rendered indifferent by having remained too long idle, and deceived on recent occasions, does not imagine that the Federals may act on the offensive. Even those who are at the outposts on the cliffs of Indian Hill, fascinated by the sight of the Union troops, whose uniforms and bayonets are glistening in the sun, fancy that they are witnessing the preparations for a review by some one of the chiefs in a group which they easily distinguish upon the glacis of Fort Wood. After having formed in line, these troops remain idle for more than half an hour: this halting again confirms the illusion of the Confederates.

As we have remarked, Grant proposes simply to feel the enemy, so as to judge by the resistance which he shall make whether he is disposed to retreat or to fight. It is then a reconnoissance which need not bring on a general engagement, but of which advantage must be taken if it reveals the weakness of Bragg. One division only (Wood's of the Fourth corps) shall be charged with the execution of this reconnoissance: an imposing body of troops shall be in readiness to support this division. It has deployed at the foot of the eastern slopes of the fort which bears its name, the right resting against the slopes of Brushy Hill, with the left along Citico Creek near its mouth. On the previous day a bridge had been thrown across this stream under the direction of

Granger, in order to prepare the way for Howard. Wood has deployed Willich's brigade on the left and Hazen's on the right, each in two lines, the first presenting a front alignment, while the other is composed of battalions massed in double columns. This last formation is the same as that of the third brigade, which Beatty holds in reserve in the rear of Willich. The right of the division is covered by Sheridan's troops deployed on the same line. The summit of Brushy Hill is crowned with a regular battery of artillery borrowed from Howard. In fine, the Eleventh and the Fourteenth corps are also under arms; the first within the fortifications, and the second, which is reduced to two divisions by the departure of Davis, on the Chattanooga and Rossville road. Johnson's division occupies the works which command this road: farther on Baird has deployed his three brigades *en échelon*, with the left forward, resting against Sheridan's first line. The small crest occupied by the Confederate outposts is distant fifteen hundred yards from the base of Missionary Ridge and about a mile and a quarter from the Union works, being separated from the latter by marshes dotted with clumps of trees. The knob of Indian Hill proper, which is about thirty yards in height, presents a steep and rocky glacis on the west and on the east. On the north side the knob ends rather abruptly; on the south it is prolonged with a less elevated crest, having precipitous slopes, however, and covered with brushwood. The Confederates, trusting too much in the strength of their position, have contented themselves with throwing up some rude breastworks composed of trunks of trees and rocks upon the ridge which is a prolongation of the knob of Indian Hill southward. But a more important intrenchment has been dug in front of the western slopes; it extends to the northward beyond Indian Hill, passes Citico Creek, and comes down back of the right bank of that stream. A part of Hindman's old division, commanded by Patton Anderson, is detailed for service at the outposts. Reconnoitring-parties are on the plain and in the woods, occasionally exchanging shots with the enemy: the reserves are posted in the trench at the foot of the hills.

On the Federal side the main guards with their supports and reserves have been moved toward the chain of outposts, so as to

reinforce it. This aggressive movement should have put the Confederates on the lookout. They took no notice of it, however, and when Wood's division, getting in motion at the tap of the drum and the sound of the fife, advances in perfect order preceded by a swarm of skirmishers, the Confederates are as much surprised as if these forces had suddenly burst upon them. The time has past for Bragg to aid Anderson's soldiers and accept battle on this first line, without which, albeit, he could not maintain the investment of the place.

Willich, leading with much enthusiasm the brigade of which he has just received the command, has already dislodged the enemy's sharpshooters from the woods; Hazen holds the position assigned to him, and both together resolutely attack the intrenchment behind which these sharpshooters have rejoined their reserves. In an instant the Confederates are dislodged. Willich pursues them up the slopes, does not allow them to re-form on the crest of Indian Hill, and vigorously throws them on the opposite declivity of the knob, which they descend in great haste to reach the line of works constructed at the foot of Missionary Ridge. Hazen has encountered a more serious resistance. General Manigault, commander of a brigade belonging to Anderson's division, has posted his reserves behind the intrenchments which crown the ridge on the south-west of Indian Hill. The country being open, they have seen from a distance the approach of the Federals and greet them with a well-sustained fire. The ranks in Hazen's first line are thinned and come to a halt, but at the sound of his voice they close up and spring upon the enemy, whom they rout after a short fight. The Southerners defend themselves with desperation, but are crushed by numbers and surrounded; the Twenty-eighth Alabama, with its colors, falls into the hands of Hazen, whose losses amount to nearly one hundred and fifty men. Willich's losses are insignificant.

The unexpected attack made by the Federals under the eyes of both armies has succeeded beyond their expectations. They are masters of a position easy of defence, and which is indispensable to them for future operations. They have taken possession of it without great effort; however, the long lines of gray coats which garnish Missionary Ridge forbid the suspicion of a retreat on the

part of Bragg. The event not having been provided for in his instructions, Granger, who has accompanied Wood, far from giving him the signal to return, concludes to have him supported by Sheridan. The latter takes position to the right on the spur of the crest, which he finds entirely abandoned.

Shortly thereafter, toward half-past three o'clock, Grant, who has followed up all the engagement from the glacis of Fort Wood, sends to Granger an order to fortify in his new positions, which he does not intend to give up. Besides, the Confederates apprise him of the importance of his conquest by opening from all their batteries a heavy fire against the new possessors of Indian Hill. But the distance is too far for the field-pieces: they cannot reach Willich's and Hazen's soldiers, who throw up, as if by magic, a line of solid breastworks on the top of the eastern slope of the hill.

Meantime, Howard advances up the left bank of Citico Creek to cover the flank of Wood's forces on the north of Indian Hill. His first line, being exposed to the fire of the Confederates, who are still posted in the trenches on the opposite shore, halts before this obstacle after having lost some fifty men. But the Southerners are soon compelled to evacuate the trenches in consequence of a demonstration made by Beatty's brigade, which has crossed the stream farther up.

Night has come. The musketry-fire has ceased along the line. Bragg's artillery, aware of its ineffectiveness, is also silent. Everywhere the Federals are strengthening their positions; they construct even a small redoubt upon the culminating point. The guns belonging to Howard's regular battery are hauled up by hand, and before daylight are mounted upon the redoubt.

This first success inspires the Federals with new ardor. Sherman has not misspent the day which has just closed. His three divisions, with all their batteries, are at last in the evening massed in front of the mouth of the South Chickamauga in the rear of the guns belonging to the Army of the Cumberland. Davis' division has joined Sherman. G. A. Smith's brigade, pushing a little farther, has reached the banks of the North Chickamauga, where are collected the boats on which it will embark and which will afterward carry the flooring for the bridge. General W. F. Smith has

gone ahead of the brigade in order to prepare even the least details of this operation, still more difficult than that which he so happily accomplished at Brown's Ferry.

From this time forth Grant has no more delay to apprehend. Agreeably to his plans, the six divisions gathered in front of Chattanooga shall wait, before getting in motion, until Sherman has crossed the river, gained a footing on the extremity of Missionary Ridge, and thus shaken the centre of Bragg. Toward the end of November the days are so short that the twenty-four hours on the 24th shall probably have elapsed before the Fifteenth corps accomplishes its task. Grant avails himself of the accidents which have retarded his march to assign to Hooker a new part on the 24th. In the morning of the 23d the bridge at Brown's Ferry had once more been carried away, just as Ewing's division had crossed over: the damages were considerable and the violence of the rising waters rendered repairs very difficult. The Confederate pickets stationed on Lookout Mountain had taken cognizance of the disaster and promptly notified Bragg's headquarters. Sherman's last division, commanded by Osterhaus, was thus detained on the left shore: Grant, with a view to avoid fresh delays, had ordered Sherman to move with his three divisions, also Davis' division instead of leaving it in reserve, so as to replace Osterhaus, and had ordered Hooker to keep Osterhaus with him if the crossing was not completely restored at eight o'clock on the morning of the 24th.

The former commander of the Army of the Potomac, whom Grant seemed to have wished to reduce to an insignificant rôle, therefore again found himself, in consequence of a simple accident, at the head of a considerable force; for in the evening of the 23d, Cruft's division of the Fourth corps, called by the orders of the general-in-chief from Shell Mound and Whitesides, had joined Geary's division of the Twelfth corps in Will's Valley. Adding Osterhaus' division to these two, Hooker would be in command of seven brigades.

In the evening of the 23d, Thomas, who was attaching a great importance to the immediate capture of Lookout Mountain, obtained from Grant the permission, if Osterhaus was finally detained on the left shore, to change the demonstration prescribed

to Hooker into a serious attack. Hooker was to try and take the crest which rises five hundred yards above the Tennessee River, and for the past two months was bearing the Confederate flag up in the clouds. He was not the man to wait until such an order was repeated. Within a few hours all was ready for the fight on the following day. At two o'clock in the morning he learned that the bridge would not be repaired within the time fixed by Grant. He was at liberty to retain Osterhaus, and from that time awaited but the coming of day to begin the attack.

Therefore, Grant was counting on the battle being commenced simultaneously at the two ends of his line during the day of the 24th. Hooker was not only to open for himself the direct route to Chattanooga, but above all he was to facilitate Sherman's task by detaining the Confederate left wing. The capture of the crests of Indian Hill had changed the part which Grant was reserving for his centre according to the plan formed two days before. Instead of moving in succession nearly the entire Army of the Cumberland forward by the left as fast as Sherman should advance, he was obliged to maintain the greater part of that army in the newly-conquered positions until all the northern portion of Missionary Ridge was occupied by the Fifteenth corps. But, in return, these positions were sufficiently menacing to compel the enemy to keep a considerable force on the opposite heights.

On the other side, Bragg could no longer indulge in illusions. The Federal battalions as they crowned the crests of Indian Hill had rudely dispelled them. The movements of Howard along Citico Creek and the bridge thrown across that stream made Bragg feel uneasy for his right flank, although he did not yet suspect all the danger to which he was going to be exposed on that side. He must then have bitterly repented that he had consented to the departure of Longstreet, and still more that he had sent to his assistance on the day before two of Buckner's brigades, although he had, of course, retained the third with this general. Bragg's forces—which, as we have stated, amounted to about forty-four thousand infantry and artillery—formed two distinct groups badly joined by a very thin line. On the south of Chattanooga three divisions of Cheatham's corps, under the orders of Stevenson, Jackson, and Walker, occupied the extremity of Lookout Moun-

tain and the banks of Chattanooga Creek. The rest of the army was stationed upon the crests of Missionary Ridge from the vicinity of Rossville to the railway tunnel: this position was apparently very strong, but extended so far that the entire army would hardly have sufficed to defend it. The enemy was, as it were, invited to advance between the two groups so as completely to isolate the left wing. Therefore, Bragg, as early as the 23d in the evening, should have abandoned the crags of Lookout Mountain, which thenceforth no longer presented any obstacle to the advance of the Unionists. He would thus have had time to concentrate his army on Missionary Ridge and organize his forces for its defence. It may be that he would then have also recognized the weakness of that long straight line without any flanking support which was easy to be turned both on the north and south, and have understood that it was better to draw his adversary farther from his base of operations. By a timely retreat he would have obliged Grant either to give battle after a very arduous march in that season of the year, or content himself until spring with having relieved the investment of Chattanooga. He would have found before reaching Dalton defensive positions stronger than that of Missionary Ridge, whence he might either have sent reinforcements to Longstreet or, on the contrary, have called him up at the proper time. But he wished to acknowledge neither to others nor to himself that the siege of Chattanooga was raised. He was satisfied to weaken his left wing, which was composed of three divisions, as the reader is already aware. Stevenson's division occupied the top of the mountain; Cheatham's, commanded by Jackson, was posted on the western slope; the third, under Walker, was stationed on the eastern side bordered by Chattanooga Creek. Hardee, who after the departure of Longstreet had been entrusted with the defence of Lookout Mountain, received in the afternoon of the 23d the order to take away with him in the night this last division, and to lead it to the extreme right of the army, which was threatened by Howard, so as to reinforce Cleburne's troops, which also belonged to Hardee's army corps. He passed over to Stevenson the command of the two divisions which he was leaving behind him, and reached before daylight his new positions.

Stevenson, from the height of his observatory watching all the

movements of the Federals during the engagement on the 23d, has ascertained the breaking of their bridge at Brown's Ferry, and informed Bragg that they were preparing to attack Lookout Mountain on the ensuing day. His despatch, conveyed by means of signals to which the Unionists have the key, has been deciphered by them, and its contents are a new stimulant to Hooker.

Obliged as we are to relate in succession operations which are absolutely distinct one from another, we shall first follow Hooker, for it is he who during the engagement on the 24th has the most completely fulfilled his task.

This task is difficult, and appears still more perilous than it is in reality. The top of Lookout Mountain forms a narrow plateau which, with a succession of slightly rounded elevations, extends to the southward as far as Stevens' Gap. Its northern part is surrounded with abrupt rocks, veritable cliffs—called "palisades" in America—which on the western side render access to it absolutely impossible to the most skilful man, save by one path only, known under the name of Smith's Trail, that leads down into Will's Valley below Wauhatchie. It was through this way that Wood's soldiers had scaled the deserted mountain and reached the village of Summertown in the first days of September. Below the culminating point, called Pulpit Rock, the palisades suddenly end on the north in the promontory which has given to the entire mass of earth and rock the designation of Lookout Mountain. These palisades also bound the eastern side, but their range is broken with gaps which open the way to several roads leading to the country-seats near Summertown, where the inhabitants of Chattanooga were wont to resort for cooler air during the scorching days of summer. An enormous mass of rubbish forms an irregular glacis, which, from the foot of the palisades, comes down on the west as far as the stream of Lookout Creek and on the east as far as Chattanooga Creek. The western slope is the most abrupt. From the base the two slopes rise gradually toward the north until they form a new bed of rocks cropping out of the ground and constituting a second escarpment above the brawling waters of the Tennessee. Their intersection thus forms, on the northern prolongation of the summit-line, a crest called the Point, the declivity of which is very gentle, while in the upper part there is even a

small plateau in the midst of which rises Craven's house. The cultivated fields belonging to this plantation extend a few hundred yards east and west to the foot of the palisades. Everywhere else the soil yields only brushwood and stunted oaks. The route in which run the Trenton, Whitesides, and Kelley's Ferry roads crosses Lookout Creek below the railway-bridge, goes up a portion of the talus, and passes below the Craven house and above the second escarpment. The railway, on the contrary, is cut through the rocks laid bare by the constant action of the water, and its grade is maintained almost on a level with the surface of the river. Hence Lookout Mountain formed a gigantic bastion surrounded with inaccessible walls, and the salient angle of which, extending into the Tennessee, was protected by an impassable ditch.

The Federals knew perfectly that three of the enemy's divisions—namely, twelve or thirteen thousand men—occupied this position. Hooker, reinforced by Osterhaus, had not quite ten thousand men* to attack them. Among the troops thus temporarily placed under his orders, the three armies of the Cumberland, of the Potomac, and of the Tennessee were each represented by one division: the soldiers did not know one another, the chiefs had never served together. But this diversity, instead of being a source of weakness to them, inspired every one with a spirit of noble emulation. Notwithstanding the remembrance of Chancellorsville, Hooker had remained popular with the soldiers. He knew how to animate them in the hour of danger, and sometimes had strategic conceptions of a fortunate character. He had studied the natural fortress which was towering before him, and had found out its weak points: therefore he promptly came to a conclusion in regard to his plan of attack. The bastion of Lookout Mountain has no flanking defences. The part called the Point is protected by the river against an assault, but not against the artillery of the enemy; while the knobs ranged on the left bank of the brook, which had been contended for during the night-engagement at Wauhatchie, formed natural approaches to the bastion. The Federals had availed themselves of this fact. The artillery posted on Moccasin Point swept the crest so thoroughly that the Southerners could not work in the daytime on the

* Exactly 9680.

breastworks which they were throwing up on the two slopes and around Craven's house. Hooker's guns, placed on the knobs, ploughed the western slope and enfiladed the track of the railway, which, first as an embankment and then as a trench, might have offered the Confederates a good line of defence. The citadel formed by the top of the mountain was for them only a source of perplexity: the surrounding rocks isolated its garrison, the road leading to Craven's house was very long, while the one which, more on the eastward, came down to the highway, alone connected Stevenson's troops with the rest of the army. In fact, the very elevation of the position renders the fire of the rifles uncertain, that of the artillery difficult, and even both often impossible, owing to the mist which those heights attracted at that season of the year.

Hooker's plan is plain. While a feint shall turn the attention of the enemy toward the mouth of Lookout Creek, the bulk of his forces shall cross the stream higher up, follow the slope from south to north, and, supported by the artillery, attack the ridge of Craven's house. No notice shall be taken of the Southern troops posted on the top of the hill. The Confederates realize the difficulties which compass their position; their chiefs even exaggerate these difficulties and communicate their uneasiness to their soldiers. The sudden departure of Hardee with Walker's division has disturbed all the measures taken long ago. Stevenson, who has succeeded him as commander in the night of the 23d-24th, is not aware of the defences raised on the two sides of the mountain. These defences consist in a line of earthworks laid out somewhat at haphazard around and below Craven's house. They extend on the east near the road as far as a point opposite Chattanooga, because, the slopes being gentler on that side, the Confederates are apprehensive lest the enemy should attack them to prevent them from descending to Summertown. The Southern generals have not been able to agree so as to guard against attacks coming from the westward, all the positions commanding Lookout Creek being exposed to a flanking fire from the batteries on Moccasin Point. They have therefore chosen Craven's house as a centre, and laid out their line of breastworks in an oblique direction from the south-east to the north-west from the foot of

the palisades up to the crest of the second escarpment ; but, being unable to protect it from enfilade, they have placed there only two mountain-howitzers.

General Cumming with his brigade and that of Jackson has before daylight relieved Walker on the eastern slope. He rests his left against the railway-bridge on the Chattanooga Creek, and covers on the highroad the entrance to the Summertown and Ross-ville roads. General Jackson, separated from his own troops, becomes in the place of Cheatham, who is absent, the commander of Moore's and Walthall's brigades. The first occupies the intrenchments in the centre of which stands the Craven house ; the second guards the banks of Lookout Creek, in force on the side of Brown's Ferry, but with weak numbers opposite Wauhatchie, where the brigade counts only a few small posts. Stevenson has remained on the top of the mountain with Brown's and Pettus' brigades ; his guns, posted on the crest, are so trained as to secure a plunging fire. In order to occupy all the western slopes he has scattered along a line of about ten miles detachments of infantry, the absence of which he shall soon have occasion to regret.

However, it is getting daylight. Mists are rising from the valleys and remain hanging on the sides of the mountains ; which is almost a certain sign of approaching rain. It is a fortunate presage for the Federals, because these mists will hide their movements. Cruft arrived in the evening of the 23d from Shell Mound with his two brigades. Grose's will try to cross Lookout Creek near the bridge half destroyed by the enemy on the Chattanooga road. Osterhaus takes up a position fifteen hundred yards above the bridge, plants his artillery on the knobs which command the left bank of the stream, and, keeping Williamson's brigade in reserve, causes Wood's to move forward so as to attempt to cross the creek at this point. While Osterhaus will thus attract the attention of the enemy, Geary with his own division and Whitaker's—the latter alone numbering nearly three thousand men—will quit Wauhatchie to undertake the flanking movement which is to cause the fall of the enemy's defences.

Shortly after eight o'clock Grose begins the fight with Walthall's outposts, and two regiments occupy the shelving banks of the creek. But as the fording-places are flooded, it is necessary

to restore the bridge, while the Confederates are not slow to interrupt this work. A deadly fusillade commences between the two shores. Walthall brings all his reserves to the threatened point. During this time, Stevenson, discovering from afar the movements of Geary, believes that the latter wishes to attack him by Smith's Trail, and makes a disposition of his two brigades so as to defend the crest of the mountain.

Toward ten o'clock, while Grose is still struggling in vain to force the passage of the bridge, Geary, having found a passable ford, has cleared the creek and captured a post of forty men. Wood has also been fortunate near the railway-bridge: some soldiers have effected a landing on the right bank, and as the stream is very narrow he has improvised with the trunks of trees a foot-bridge for his infantry. Hooker, being promptly informed of this success, immediately orders Grose to leave in front of the road-bridge, so as to deceive the enemy, the two regiments already moving over, and with the rest of his brigade to cross Look-out Creek after Wood. These troops suddenly debouch upon Walthall's flank, for he had not perceived their crossing in time to guard against the attack: they throw his command into utter disorder. The detachment which had remained in front of the bridge at once clears it and finishes the rout of the Confederates, who flee toward the Craven house works. But Geary and Whitaker have headed them off. After having passed the stream, Whitaker gained the foot of the palisades under the harmless fire of Stevenson's soldiers; Geary formed in line of battle on Whitaker's left, and then the entire line advanced toward the north through a chaos of piled logs of wood. All the officers have dismounted and the ranks are broken. Nevertheless, the Federals, forming a serried line of sharpshooters and skirmishers, rapidly gain ground. In fact, they see a portion of the enemy's forces below them on the banks of the stream, another portion above their heads, and feel that they must be the first to reach the top of the fortified crest, the profile of which appears before them on a background of clouds. They thus fall upon the main body of Walthall's soldiers, who, ascending the slope, already fancied themselves in safety. The latter are finally dispersed. Out of fifteen hundred combatants, about one hundred are placed *hors de*

combat and more than eight hundred are captured ; only a few crowd around their chief.

It is too late to repair this unforeseen disaster. Jackson, who is still unaware of it, has just sent Walthall an order to fall back on the works between the rocky formations and the Craven house, while he sends to Moore the injunction to advance so as to occupy on his right the works which extend toward the road. But Whitaker has taken possession of the Craven house almost without any fighting ; the two howitzers fall into his hands before having fired a single shot. In another place Geary meets Moore, who completes his formation, not expecting to find himself so soon in the presence of the enemy. The Confederate brigade, thus isolated, soon gives way. However, a small reinforcement enables him to maintain the struggle. Stevenson, understanding at last where the danger lies, has sent to the aid of the brigade General Pettus with three regiments. Pettus, coming down by way of Summertown, arrives too late to save the Craven house, but he forms his lines in the rear, on the left of Moore, and, rallying the remnants of Walthall's command, the fight immediately begins with great earnestness. The Federals, encouraged by success, make their way among the rocks and through the brushwood and closely surround their adversaries. The two lines waver amidst the obstacles which favor the defence ; still, the assailants are gaining ground. Since noon clouds have gathered around the top of the mountain, concealing from the troops which occupy it the view of the battle that is being waged halfway down the slope. On the north-east slope Cumming's two brigades are detained on account of an alarming demonstration made by Johnson's division, which is massed beyond the Chatanooga Creek. It has only to pass over the road-bridge, yet nearly intact, to menace the cross-roads where the Summertown road comes in. Stevenson does not dare to withdraw troops from this point ; he leaves Moore to stand alone, with Pettus, all the efforts made by Geary and Whitaker. These two commanders, being reinforced by Wood's and Grose's brigades, quickly drive before them the enemy, over whom Hooker's fortunate measures have given them so great a numerical superiority. However, a drizzling rain comes to increase the density of the mist. Lookout

Mountain has disappeared from the eyes of the two armies ; only the crack of the musketry reveals to them the phases of the battle which is in progress amid the clouds. Fearing, with reason, lest his troops should scatter if they move forward too rapidly, Hooker has ordered his lieutenants to halt after having conquered the crest. Happily, this order reaches them somewhat late, when they have passed nearly a mile beyond that point. Cruft, on the right, occupies the road which leads directly up to the summit. Geary, leaving behind him on the left both the mouth of Chattanooga Creek and the railway-bridge across this stream, makes a flank attack on the works occupied by Cumming, and compels him to cause his left to fall back as far as the very cross-roads which the Confederates are so interested in defending.

At this juncture his operations are stopped by the prudent orders of Hooker, who does not yet know how complete is the success achieved by his subalterns. Johnson, on the right bank of Chattanooga Creek, was watching for an opportunity to aid Hooker. Warned of his approach by the rattling of the fusillade, he ordered Carlin's brigade to advance on the right in the peninsula lying between the river and Chattanooga Creek, and to clear the latter at the foot of the mountain when Hooker's soldiers shall have come up to him. As soon as he saw Geary pass beyond the ruins of the railway-bridge, he quickly threw his troops over on the left bank by means of a large flatboat provided by the engineer department, and dislodged the Confederate sharpshooters, who were posted on that side. He ascends on the run the first slopes occupied by Geary, with whom he effects a junction toward five o'clock ; then, continuing his upward march, he proceeds to relieve on the right Whitaker's brigade, which, though standing firm, is rather warmly engaged with Pettus' regiments. Carlin brings to the combatants the ammunition of which they were beginning to feel the lack. But if Hooker's valiant soldiers hail him with special joy, it is because his arrival is a proof that the direct road to Chattanooga is open and the entire series of defences of Lookout Mountain has been definitely turned.

The Confederates have understood this, as did Hooker's soldiers. Stevenson, unwilling to withdraw troops either from the cross-

roads or from the top of the mountain, and being at a loss how to succor Jackson, forms the project of moving down Smith's Trail and following Geary's steps, so as to take, by the rear, between the two escarpments, Hooker's entire army. In order to execute this chimerical manœuvre he asks of Bragg reinforcements which his general-in-chief cannot send him. He ought to know that well; therefore, for a reply the latter only orders him to prepare for a retreat, and promises a brigade to cover it.

Fortunately, the density of the fog has hastened the close of day: one of the darkest nights follows the half obscurity which has prevailed for the last two hours. The Federals think only of resting after their fatigue. The moment has come for Stevenson to abandon the mountain before the road to Missionary Ridge is cut off from him. Breckinridge comes personally to prepare this movement; he brings Clayton's brigade, which relieves Pettus' and will cover the march. During the night the top of the mountain is evacuated, the dépôt of provisions destroyed, and Stevenson's division—of which that general has just resumed the command—quietly crosses Chattanooga Creek over the bridge on the road to Rossville.

The battle of Lookout Mountain has cost the Federals only a few hundred men; the Confederates have left in their hands more than a thousand prisoners, two guns, and five flags. The three divisions collected under Hooker's orders will hereafter form the right wing of Grant's army. The retreat of their adversaries on the Rossville road will indicate to them, when daylight shall have come, what direction the division shall have to take.

CHAPTER IV.

MISSIONARY RIDGE.

SHERMAN on the 24th was not able to accomplish, as did Hooker, all the task which was assigned to him, but it was not for lack of zeal on the part of the leaders or the men. Besides, the results which they have already achieved are considerable. It was only in the evening of the 23d that his four divisions of the left wing found themselves collected near the crossing-point. At midnight Giles Smith's brigade embarks, on the bank of the North Chickamauga, on the one hundred and sixteen boats collected by Lieutenant Drener under the direction of General W. F. Smith. Noiselessly the lines are cast off, and the flotilla, reaching the waters of the Tennessee, silently descends the stream, keeping close to the right bank. Then, at a given signal, it comes to the shore on the opposite bank, somewhat below the mouth of the South Chickamauga—that river so painfully suggestive to the Army of the Cumberland, and the troubled waters of which still appear dyed with the blood of its best soldiers. Two regiments, quickly landed, surprise the enemy. Some of the boats, thus unloaded, will be used to throw over the Chickamauga a bridge which will enable Long's cavalry rapidly to gain the rear of the hostile army. Giles Smith lands, with equal good fortune, the rest of his brigade six hundred and fifty yards below the confluence. Without losing a moment his soldiers begin the work which before daybreak will command the heads of the bridges, and they prepare on the shore, besides means of access, some landings for the steamboats.

Sherman, on the other hand, has moved forward, on the right bank of the river, all the artillery, yet silent, but ready with its fire to protect the crossing, and also Lightburn's brigade, which, like Giles A. Smith's, is under the orders of Morgan L. Smith. The three other divisions are under arms. Meanwhile, the boats,

having discharged their loads, and retaining on board only a few men of the crew, have promptly returned to the right bank to take more passengers. Thus Morgan Smith's division was soon collected on the opposite shore. The pontonniers likewise have set to work ; twenty-five boats, which with the floor-sections were following Sherman, are placed in position and furnish the means of establishing immediately the first section of the bridge. It was a difficult work, for on the Tennessee River floated uprooted trees, which, driven on the opposite bank, threatened at every moment to sever the moorings. It was necessary to raise the anchors, and to maintain the boats in their positions they had to be made fast to the trunks of old trees growing on the shore. Thus, a free passage was left for the strongest part of the current. At five o'clock in the morning the work of constructing the bridge was begun simultaneously at both ends by taking off, one after another, the boats required, while the others continued to ply backward and forward to transport General John E. Smith's division after the division of his namesake. But a certain number of the boats remain idle. Swollen by the rains, the Tennessee is more than four hundred yards wide and the Chickamauga nearly sixty. The pontonniers could build but one bridge, that over the former river, the one hundred and forty-one boats not being sufficient to carry one thousand yards of flooring.

At the break of day eight thousand infantry are gathered on the left bank : they can defy the attacks of the enemy. But the latter has given no sign of life since the sentinels scattered on the bank have retired before Giles Smith. The construction of the bridge over the Chickamauga is progressing. The two sections of the bridge over the Tennessee are approaching each other, but as the number of available boats was diminishing, the passage would have been almost interrupted without the aid afforded by the steamer *Dunbar*. This vessel, repaired by the direction of General W. F. Smith, was engaged throughout the night in transporting from one shore to the other a number of horses detached from Sherman's artillery and intended for a portion of the guns belonging to Thomas. This work, rendered necessary by the condition of the Chattanooga bridge, damaged by the freshets, was finished early in the morning, when the *Dunbar* immediately

ascended the river with a lighter in tow. With the aid of this steamer all the officers' horses of the army corps, together with a battery of artillery and the greater part of Ewing's division, are landed on the left bank before midday, the time when the pontonniers from both sides of the river effect a junction of the floor of the bridge. An officer who does not conceal his impatience jumps first upon the boat designed to unite the two sections: it is Sherman. He has followed, step by step, the progress of the work which marks the last stage of the long march begun two months before on the borders of the Big Black River. Standing on the opposite section, another general, with but one arm, awaits Sherman to welcome him on this new battlefield. He is Howard, who henceforth and until the end of the war shall be his faithful lieutenant, and whose arrival shows that direct communications are established by the left bank between Chattanooga and the head of the new bridge. Howard, wishing to open himself these communications, caused Schurz's division to pass beyond Citico Creek, and, taking with him Buschbeck's brigade, ascended the left bank of the Tennessee, driving before him without difficulty some of the enemy's pickets. These two men, who in order thus to meet had started from the opposite extremities of the territory in dispute between the belligerents, separate after a short conference. Howard, followed by a simple escort, proceeds to join his corps, leaving Buschbeck to guard the passage. The commander of the Army of the Tennessee renews to all his lieutenants the detailed instructions which he has already issued, and sets in motion the three divisions of the Fifteenth corps. Meantime, the head of column of Davis' division was already defiling on the floating bridge, which from a distance appears to be a simple black line drawn across the yellowish waters of the river. The establishment of this bridge, exceptionally long, was a very difficult performance. It was executed with rare precision and as promptly as the most exacting officers could wish. However, Grant had hoped that the passage might be accomplished a little sooner, because his despatches on the evening of the 23d * clearly prove that he counted upon Sherman establishing himself that

* See Grant to Halleck, Chattanooga, 3 o'clock P. M., November 23d.—*Moore's Rebellion Record*, vol. viii. p. 190.

very day on the crest of Missionary Ridge and being enabled forthwith to engage Thomas coming up in the rear. If he had not flattered himself with the hope of delivering battle on the 24th, he would have deferred until the morrow the attack on Lookout Mountain, the principal object of which was to retain on the left a portion of the enemy's forces, and not to throw them back, as was the case, on Missionary Ridge at the moment when their arrival might save the Confederate right wing.

This right wing, like Stevenson, soon finds itself enveloped with fogs which conceal from its view the movements of the Unionists. However, this advantage is offset by the increasing obscurity, which will not be long in arresting the latter. They have no time to lose in seizing the heights upon which they must at least establish themselves before nightfall. Nearly two miles separate them from the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge. But the necessity of reconnoitring the woods, and the natural hesitation of troops finding themselves against a river and in the presence of a new adversary, retard their progress.

The three divisions of the Fifteenth corps, preceded by a heavy force of skirmishers and formed in brigade columns deployed on two lines at whole distances, advance *en echelon*. Morgan Smith, ahead on the left, moves along the Chickamauga; John Smith is in the centre; Ewing on the right and in the rear, ready to face the enemy if he presents himself on that side. Morgan Smith arrives, without firing a gun, on the last slopes of Missionary Ridge, which his skirmishers rapidly climb. As these slopes, with the Dalton railroad running along their base, face the north-west, the three *échelons* reached them at the same time. At half-past three o'clock the Union skirmishers occupy the entire crest, and Sherman, not wishing to lose a position so easily conquered, quickly pushes ahead a brigade from each division. Before four o'clock he establishes them on the top. But a cruel disappointment awaits him at the moment when his eyes seek the prolongation of this crest, which he expected to be able to follow without difficulty beyond the tunnel. All the maps furnished him represented the crest of Missionary Ridge as being uninterrupted from this point to the extremity, and the previous survey of the ground with his glass confirmed him in this error. Therefore great was his

astonishment when he found himself upon an isolated ridge composed of two large peaks and separated by a deep valley from the true chain, before which is thrown, like a mask, this small parallel chain of equal elevation. It was only from Fort Wood to Chattanooga that one might have perceived the valley which divides these two chains of mountains; but its windings concealed the bottom, and led the beholder at a distance to believe that the valley was shut in by the principal crest. The heights rising before Sherman are crowned with the enemy, who, firmly planted, await him at the top of slopes the elevation of which, owing to a prevailing fog, appears greater than it actually is. Bragg, uneasy, as we have stated, on account of Howard's demonstrations, has made up his mind to extend his right beyond the fortified positions which it has held for a long time. Hardee, uniting Walker's division to Cleburne's, has planted himself on Missionary Ridge beyond the gap which divides the chain south of the tunnel. He has hastily fortified three main knobs, one of them being between the gap and the tunnel; the two others more to the northward, in front of the knob upon which Sherman has just made his appearance. It is upon these last two knobs that he has gathered his forces, for he has been informed since the morning of the movements of the Fifteenth corps; and if he did not interrupt these movements it was because he did not wish to go away from the rest of the army, and preferred to fight upon chosen ground of which he knew the advantage.

One glance from Sherman and his lieutenants has sufficed to take the measure of the error they have committed. The heights which they have just seized give them no access to Missionary Ridge, and afford them no advantage to attack it. At the moment when they thought to pluck the fruits of a complete surprise they find the enemy on his guard. Instead of holding the key to these formidable positions, which it was their object to take by the rear, they shall be obliged to engage them in front.

Shall they avail themselves of the last flushes of sunset to try and carry these positions ere the enemy shall have received fresh reinforcements and completed his defences? Their judgment inclines them to do so, but the lateness of the hour allows time neither to reconnoitre the ground nor to prepare the attack. The

enemy's artillery has opened fire. In order to respond they convey, not without difficulty, to the crest on the right some of Ewing's guns. Meanwhile, Lightburn's brigade advances on the left and seizes a knob which terminates the ridge on the north-east; but the Confederates, loath to be flanked, send out strong lines of skirmishers against Lightburn. To drive them back it is necessary that Giles Smith should move forward his brigade, and during the engagement which ensues this general is seriously wounded. Pending these movements night comes. Sherman avails himself of it to fortify the heights he occupies—a very wise precaution, for his isolated position is not without danger. The three divisions of the Fifteenth corps are massing on the heights; Davis' division is placed *en échelon* in the rear as far as the bridge.

Grant, having frequently received news from Sherman, no doubt soon gave up all hope of delivering battle on the 24th; therefore he issues no order to Thomas. The latter confines himself, as we have said, to establishing an unbroken connection between the three portions of the army on the left bank of the Tennessee. It is then on the 25th that will take place the decisive struggle for which preparations have so long been made. This time, Grant issues his orders with the certainty that he will not have to countermand them any more. However, the first despatch addressed to him by Sherman after having scaled the hills occupied by the Fifteenth corps creates in Grant's mind some illusions which shall have a great influence on his dispositions for the battle of the morrow. Not having been able to undeceive himself, like Sherman, with his own eyes, he persists in confounding the positions conquered by the latter with the extremity of Missionary Ridge, and believes that his lieutenant will have only to follow the crest in order to bring to the ground all of Bragg's defences. Thomas will support him, as he gains ground, up to the moment when, the enemy's left being dislodged and his centre taken by the flank, the rest of the Army of the Cumberland will be enabled to engage them in front. On the evening of the 24th, Grant orders Sherman to make an attack at the break of day, and, believing that nothing will arrest his progress, he announces to Sherman that Thomas will soon support him. Hooker receives orders to make sure work of Stevenson, and quickly to seize the

Summertown road, so as to cut off his retreat if he is delayed at the top of the mountain. Hooker will hold himself in readiness to advance into the valley of Chattanooga Creek to support Grant's right when Thomas shall have set on the march the Fourth and the Fourteenth corps.

During the night the north wind dissipates as by enchantment the clouds and the fogs; the weather is piercingly cold, the stars shine out with particular brilliancy, and the bivouac-fires, extending from the hills crowned by Sherman to the positions held by Hooker, trace with a bright streak the immense line of battle occupied by Grant's forces. The lights displayed on the side of Lookout Mountain, the summit of which is shrouded in darkness, acquaint the two armies with the success which Hooker has just achieved.

Now Bragg must part with his illusions: he understands the danger which threatens him, and also the weakness of his line. Toward sunset he hastened to the banks of the Chattanooga Creek, and it was after having himself recognized the impossibility of defending any longer Lookout Mountain that he gave orders to evacuate. It is positively stated that in the night, yielding to General Hardee's counsel, he thought of abandoning Missionary Ridge to cross the Chickamauga without giving battle. But it is too late, and, whether he has confidence or not in the strength of his position, he must defend it as best he can. Early in the morning Hardee's corps shall be massed on the right. Cleburne's division is in front of Sherman. Walker's division, the command of which, owing to his illness, the general has left to Gist, is posted more to the rear, even above the tunnel, in a sort of natural military park formed by a depression on the ridge. Stevenson and Cheatham, who have reached before daybreak the neighborhood of Rossville, are on the march to join Hardee by following the crest of the mountain. The troops of the former are almost intact; those of the latter have been cruelly reduced in battle. Stevenson and Cheatham will come on the north and the south of the gap to fill the space which Hardee's move beyond the tunnel has left vacant on the right of Breckinridge's corps. The latter occupies the three narrow ledges on the slopes of Missionary Ridge. His outposts are in the trenches at the

foot of these slopes, some twelve hundred yards from the crest of Indian Hill; the reinforcements are posted upon the side of the mountain, with the line of battle upon the crest near to the large artillery force which has crowned it for the last two months. Breckinridge's division, commanded by General Bate, occupies the centre in front of Truman's house, General Bragg's headquarters, which commands the entire country, and is situated about twenty-six hundred yards to the south-east of Indian Hill. Two isolated brigades are on its right—Reynolds', which Stevenson had not taken to Lookout Mountain, and the brigade with which Buckner remained after the departure of the rest of his army for Knoxville. Anderson, with Hindman's division, is on their right, extending his lines to Cheatham's. Stewart is deployed on the left. Thirty-seven thousand infantry and three thousand artillery thus occupy a line nearly five miles in length; for the left wing, to avoid being turned, has been obliged to stretch out as far as the Rossville defile. Nevertheless, the uncovered slopes of Missionary Ridge, crowned with a hundred and twelve guns, appear so difficult of approach in front, and terminate on the north in a manner which renders them so favorable for a defence, that Bragg may yet flatter himself to hold out against his adversary until nightfall. He cannot expect anything more, because, if his position is strong enough to give battle on the defensive, it is too weak from a strategical point of view to face an army as powerful as that of Grant. The Confederates, who in the month of September could not retain Lookout Mountain when Rosecrans threatened to turn it by the south, would still less be able to maintain themselves on Missionary Ridge in the presence of a like manœuvre.

However, daylight has come; a bright sun shines upon the mountains which surround Chattanooga. To the northward of the Tennessee, whose meandering course is enveloped in mist, rises the great bulk of Walden's Ridge, a silent witness to the struggle which is about to take place. On the east the ridges and slopes of Missionary Ridge are bristling with bayonets, for the entire Southern army is under arms, watching, not without anxiety, the Federal battalions, which, becoming more and more numerous, cover the plain below. On the west the rocky formations of

Lookout Mountain rise above the mist floating over Chattanooga Creek. Upon the top of the mountain a spot appears in relief against the sky: the Union staff officers, whose field-glasses are soon trained to that spot, have readily recognized the starry banner. Grant, who has just taken a position on the knob of Indian Hill with Thomas, Granger, Wood, and some other important personages, such as General Hunter, General Meigs, quartermaster-general, and Mr. Dana, assistant Secretary of War, is thus made aware of retreat on the part of the enemy's left. The national emblem has been planted on Pulpit Rock by some soldiers of the Eighth Kentucky, whom Whitaker had sent out as a reconnoitring-party before daylight. Hooker, disengaged on that side, has only to ascend the left bank of Chattanooga Creek to fall in line on the right of Granger. But before setting his troops in motion he deems it necessary to reconnoitre the banks of this stream, now hidden from view by the fog. It will not be long ere new orders shall modify the rôle which has been assigned to him.

As soon as daylight enabled him to take in at a glance the vast battlefield of which he occupied the centre, Grant recognized the error which he was induced to commit in the evening of the preceding day by the report, no doubt too vague, emanating from Sherman. He saw on the north of the tunnel the enemy's forces strongly posted in front of his lieutenant. If the latter does not succeed in dislodging them, the direct attack on Missionary Ridge by the Army of the Cumberland cannot take place, for it must be prepared by the turning movement of the Fifteenth corps. When he announced to Sherman that Thomas would begin the fight at an early hour, it was with the conviction that this turning movement was already half accomplished, and that the Fifteenth corps would soon reach the head-waters of Citico Creek. He is so engrossed with his plan, in accordance with which the Army of the Cumberland is to be set in motion only after the first success by the left wing, that he does not even think of recalling this essential condition to Sherman, to whom he confides all his projects. But if the enemy's right, thanks to the inactivity of Thomas, holds its own until nightfall, if Sherman cannot throw it back sufficiently to the southward to bar Bragg out of the road to

Cleveland, is there no danger that the latter may avail himself of the night to evacuate without loss his positions and gain the eastern part of Tennessee?

This is what it is important to avoid at all hazards. Provision must therefore be made for a check which might befall Sherman. In that contingency it is for Hooker that Grant reserves the task of turning the enemy's positions. It is against Bragg's left wing, thinned out to defend his right, that the decisive attack will be directed. Although this move may not close the Cleveland road, by making sure the defeat of the Confederates it will prevent them from effecting a junction with Longstreet. If Hooker thus gets ahead of Sherman on the crest of Missionary Ridge, it is he who will give to the Army of the Cumberland the signal for attack. His great superiority in numbers and the strong positions of his centre enable Grant to prepare this double attack without compromising the solidity of his line.

As early as eight o'clock in the morning he therefore orders Hooker to take the Rossville road, leaving behind him only two regiments on Lookout Mountain. Carlin will join Johnson's division. Fresh instructions, directing Hooker to extend his lines to the Fourteenth corps in order to effect a conversion to the left, where he would form the marching wing, will soon be modified, and he will operate alone at the south as Sherman at the north.

The latter has not waited for daybreak to make his dispositions for the battle. Hardee, on the other hand, has taken the entire night to prepare the defence of the positions which he knows will be warmly disputed. Breastworks of trunks of trees, stones, and earth cover his right, midway down the deep ravine debouching near Boyce's Station, and crown the knob rising to the northward of the tunnel. Cleburne's division, which its chief has been enabled to inspire with his own heroic courage, occupies these positions, that flank each other perfectly and cannot be turned on the east, because they terminate with abrupt slopes above the deep waters of the Chickamauga. The crest rising on the south of the tunnel commands all its approaches, as also the western side and the top of the knob. It commands even the extremity of the ravine which separates the combatants, and, at

the great range, it is true, of twenty-five hundred yards, likewise the slopes occupied by Sherman. Hardee has covered this crest with artillery; Gist's division is massed in the neck above the tunnel. His position forms a kind of bastion whose two flanks rest, the one against an unnavigable river, the other against the principal front of the Confederate army, and which by their height protect the jutting angle exposed to attacks by the Unionists. Thick woods extend from the crest as far as the edge of the Chickamauga, but except a little grove on the declivity of the main knob the slopes facing the Federals are, on the contrary, entirely bare.

It is against this knob that the principal effort of the Unionists will be brought to bear. A narrow crest extending from it by following the general direction of Missionary Ridge would connect this knob with the foot-hills of the heights opposite if the crest did not gradually dwindle down to a deeply-depressed neck which divides simply into two acclivities the ravine before which Sherman has halted. The latter has promptly made every disposition for battle. Each of the three divisions of the Fifteenth corps will leave a brigade in the breastworks raised during the night. Davis with his division remains in reserve, guarding the bridge and its approaches. A part of Buschbeck's brigade, relieved by him, will follow Ewing's division. To the latter is assigned the task of assaulting the central knob, but the slopes are so steep that Sherman does not believe Ewing can scale them in front. He therefore instructs him to direct Corse's brigade, now stretched across the ridge, as soon as it shall have descended into the ravine and reached the neck: this ridge is so narrow that only three regiments will be able to deploy on its two slopes. The others will follow them closely. On the right Colonel John Mason Loomis' and Buschbeck's brigades scale the slopes obliquely in order to reach the little grove, whence they attempt to carry the knob by attacking it on the western side. John Smith, with Matthies' and Raum's brigades, will be posted at the entrance to the ravine, ready to support Ewing. On the left, Morgan Smith, leaving Lightburn behind him, has remaining, to approach the northern extremity of the enemy's positions, one brigade only, the one of which Giles Smith, being wounded, has transferred the command to Colonel Nathan W. Tupper. Sherman, who has twelve brigades under

his orders, will therefore bring into action, at three different points, only a small portion of his force—namely, in the centre, three battalions; on the left, one brigade only; on the right, one brigade and the half of another. Twelve guns, raised with much trouble on the hills, will support these attacks.

Although the character of the ground renders difficult a concerted movement, Sherman, while engaging the enemy in the centre, might avail himself of his great numerical superiority to try and turn on the north-east the flank of the extremity of Cleburne's line. He cannot be laboring under an illusion as to the efficacy of this first attack, undertaken with an insufficient force on formidable positions defended by upward of six thousand men. But it is not without reason that he leaves eight brigades in reserve. Deceived by Grant's despatch, which no subsequent order has modified, he waits until Thomas is engaged before making a determined attack on these positions which he has so unexpectedly encountered.

As early as eight o'clock in the morning the Federal columns come down the slopes opposite Cleburne: he has ample time to prepare to receive them. The column in the centre has the least space of ground to go over; it will be the first to make the attack. Corse, leaving his reserves at the neck, gallantly ascends the ridge with his three regiments. Despite a deadly fire, he reaches the last projection which offers some protection to his men, but he cannot clear the eighty-five yards of ground which separate him from the top. It is nine o'clock: the fight has not yet commenced either on the right or on the left. Corse summons to him the rest of his brigade and springs to the attack; but he is seriously wounded and his forces repulsed. Hardee and Cleburne in turn endeavor, but in vain, to push back into the ravine the Federals, who obstinately cling to their position. On both sides the number of the combatants is limited by the configuration of the ground: they cannot be placed in thick masses upon these narrow ridges, which the bullets furrow in every direction. For an hour the two contending parties drive and repulse each other without any marked advantage. Finally, toward ten o'clock, the troops that Sherman has posted on his two wings take their turn and fall in line. It is time, for

Corse's men are sharply pressed. Hardee, on the other hand, calls up Stevenson's division, and draws it nearer the tunnel to serve as a reserve for Cleburne against the general attack that is preparing. This move, performed under the eyes of the whole Federal army, cannot have escaped Grant's attention. He is aware of the difficulties encountered by Sherman, and, failing to see his troops appear on the ridge, he decides to reinforce him ere he shall have reached the tunnel, on the south of which Thomas' left wing is to adjoin him. Howard, who forms this left wing, receives at a quarter before ten o'clock the order to go and meet Sherman; and, being unwilling to expose his column on the flank, he resumes the side road which he followed the day before to reach the floating bridge. He will thus arrive about eleven o'clock in the rear of the Fifteenth corps.

However, Morgan Smith, who forms Sherman's left, after having cleared the ravine and ascended very steep slopes finds himself in front of positions so strong that his first assault is promptly repulsed. Isolated with one brigade only, without any reinforcements to be expected, he confines himself to maintaining with the enemy a somewhat deadly fusillade, without coming to close quarters. Loomis, on the western declivity of the knob occupied by Cleburne's left, comes to more favorable ground. Being protected against the plunging fire by the inequalities of the slope, he reaches the little grove, and there firmly plants himself, supported on the right by Buschbeck, who is ranged along the base of the hill. But when he tries to assault the ridge he is repulsed, as was Corse, by Cleburne's soldiers, who are always ready to face the danger. The struggle, being thus waged at three different points, is protracted without the Federals gaining any ground; and, although the enemy does not risk an offensive return to dislodge them, it becomes evident that without powerful reinforcements they will not be able to take the ridge.

Still, Sherman does not wish to bring forward his reserves, because he is still waiting for the move by Thomas upon which Grant's despatch has given him reason to count. Hence, Howard, having joined him toward eleven o'clock, has taken good care not to engage him: Sherman directs him to take a position on his left, between the summit of the hill occupied by Morgan Smith and

the Chickamauga, near Boyce's Station. He also leaves the whole of Davis' division between these hills and the river. Out of fifteen brigades, he has, then, sent only four to the front. Grant, on the contrary, counts on him to achieve the first success which will shake the hostile line. Hence the reason why he persists in removing a portion of his centre to increase the forces of his lieutenant. The evacuation of Lookout Mountain has restored freedom of action to Baird, hitherto charged with the care of guarding the northern side of Chattanooga Creek. Shortly after having sent the Eleventh corps to the left, Grant orders this general to pass in the rear of the entire Army of the Cumberland, to follow Howard, and to place himself, like Howard, under the orders of Sherman. But the latter, seeing him arrive a little before midday, declines his co-operation, and directs him to retrace his steps to assume, on the left of the Fourth corps, the position at first assigned to Howard. Thus Grant, expecting from him the decisive blow, gives him seven of his thirteen divisions, while Sherman, convinced that his part is only to attract to the left the greatest number of the enemy possible, finds that they send him more men than he can use. This misunderstanding might make them lose, while waiting the one for the other, the few hours of daylight yet remaining to them, but they both have too much experience of war not to comprehend the perils involved in this prolonged delay.

Toward two o'clock General John Smith receives from Sherman the order to bring forward in line Matthies' and Raum's brigades, until now in reserve. These troops, not being able to follow the ridge already occupied by Corse, advance farther down on the side of the hill. Passing behind Loomis and Buschbeck, they form on their right, and thus face the north-east to ascend the slope, partly timbered, which overlooks the railroad to Cleveland. The battle is renewed, not only on the right, but in the centre and on the left: Cleburne is hard pressed. This is the moment Hardee chooses to engage Gist's division, massed above the tunnel. General John Smith by deploying has almost reached the rather deep gorge followed by the railway before coming to the tunnel. Gist, descending into this gorge while the Federals are advancing in an opposite direction, passes beyond their right without being perceived by

them, and suddenly throws himself upon their flank. With their lines broken by this unforeseen attack, the two Federal brigades rush down the slope, vigorously pursued across extensive fields stretching between the last foot-hills of the heights occupied by the two contending parties. General Matthies is among the wounded. Buschbeck also receives the shock: his losses are great, his right suffers badly, and he leaves, like General Smith, a number of prisoners in the hands of the enemy. But the latter is soon checked, for in turn he presents his flank to a portion of Corse's brigade; his rear is menaced by the fire of Loomis, who has remained in the woods, and General Smith is not long in rallying his men to stand against the enemy. Gist, loath to expose himself in the open country, brings back his division above the tunnel.

His opportune and energetic movement has completely released Cleburne. The Fifteenth corps has been much tried in these partial attacks. The reserves are rather distant, it is three o'clock in the afternoon, and Sherman appears determined this time to await the falling into line of the Army of the Cumberland, the inaction of which he cannot explain.

The Union generals from the height of Indian Hill have witnessed Smith's rout, and the positions of Corse's and Giles Smith's brigades, being hidden from the Federals by the configuration of the ground, have appeared to them even of greater importance than they really were. Sherman being unable to take the heights commanding the tunnel, it is henceforth upon his right wing that Grant depends to turn the flank of Bragg's line of defence. But he has not yet had any news of it. Hooker got in motion for Rossville about ten o'clock, as soon as he received the first order giving him this direction: it appears that the second order never reached him. The road followed first by the Confederates, and then by their adversaries, crosses the Chattanooga only four miles from its mouth, but eighteen hundred yards from Rossville. Osterhaus' division, advancing in front, reaches at noon the crossing-point. No enemy is in sight, but the bridge is entirely destroyed, and the river, swollen by the rains, is nowhere fordable. To cross the headlong torrent trees must be felled. This operation retards Hooker's movements. It is past two

o'clock when, no longer expecting the repair of the bridge and availing himself of a plain foot-bridge, Osterhaus throws his two brigades on the right bank. The first regiment landed on that bank was sent toward Rossville to take the defile through which, two months before, Thomas crossed Missionary Ridge.

A detachment of the Confederate division of Stewart, composed of infantry and a few pieces of ordnance, is posted on both sides of the passage in the rear of the town of Rossville, which was hastily evacuated. These troops, well posted, arrest at first the progress of the Federals. But as soon as Osterhaus, coming up with his two brigades, deploys Woods on the left and Williamson on the right of the road, the Confederates, fearing to be surrounded, fall back on the main part of their army by following the crest of Missionary Ridge.

It is three o'clock. The bridge across Chattanooga Creek is finished. Hooker hastens the march of his troops to reach the defile and afterward effect the conversion to the left which has been enjoined upon him. These manœuvres have not escaped the attention of Breckinridge, who sends ahead of him the remainder of Stewart's division. The left flank of the army being seriously threatened, he is obliged to detach a portion of his forces to cover it. But he thus completes the weakening of the centre of the line of battle, which Hardee's manœuvre to the right has already deprived of a support on that side, and thus finds itself reduced to ten brigades.

The unevenness of the ground does not allow Grant to follow with his field-glass the movements of his right as he follows those of his left, and, this wing operating without connection with the rest of the army, the consequence is that the general-in-chief is ignorant even of the passage of Chattanooga Creek. Hooker intends to give news of himself to Grant by appearing on the top of Missionary Ridge. However, Grant's anxieties increase in proportion as the day advances; one hour later and it will be too late to attempt the decisive effort which must ensure a victory so fortunately prepared. It is in vain that with an assumed calm he darts his eyes over every part of the battlefield. Turning toward one of his old classmates, General Wood, he said to him: "Still, something must be done to help Sherman." In fact, Grant is not one of those narrow minds which persist too long in the presence

of unforeseen obstacles. Like all great men of war, he knows how to modify his designs in accordance with the hazards of the battle. After a few moments' conversation with Thomas—this tried chief in whom, from the time of his arrival, he has shown the most complete confidence—his mind is made up, his orders are issued. Baird having returned near to the Fourth corps, he has four divisions in hand. One brigade only (Starkweather's) occupies the fortifications at Chattanooga. The eleven others shall advance in line of battle, preceded at a short distance by a double line of skirmishers, and shall carry by storm the works covering the base of Missionary Ridge. The enemy once dislodged, the brigades shall await new orders to assault the positions on the hill itself.

Grant no doubt hopes that Bragg, troubled by this menace, will recall the troops which are opposing Sherman or that Hooker will appear at the proper time on his flank, and that one of his two wings will thus come to support this assault. Six cannon-shots, rapidly fired from the battery posted on Indian Hill, will give to the four divisions the signal to get in motion.

A little after half-past three o'clock the signal resounds in the midst of the irregular cannonade which has been going on since the morning between the centres of the hostile armies. The men of the Fourth corps, under Sheridan and Wood, deployed right and left in front of Indian Hill, alone have heard the guns, and they immediately obey the signal. But Johnson, who extends the front of the former, and Baird, who has just taken a position beyond the latter, warned beforehand, do not hesitate to follow them. A striking spectacle is offered to the eyes of the witnesses, friends or foes, who from the summit of the hills opposite gaze over the battlefield. Twenty-five thousand combatants move in perfect order: it is the main line, somewhat convex on account of the slight projection made by the Fourth corps. A cloud of skirmishers goes before it: it is followed at a short distance by a second line of battalions massed in double columns, with long intervals between them. The sun sheds its oblique rays upon the shining bayonets of this army advancing, as in a parade, with a quick and steady step, and upon the groups of mounted officers at its head. Bragg concentrates upon this army the fire of

sixty cannon. The Federal batteries, planted upon the crest of Indian Hill, and which up to the present have counted their shots, respond, and seek in vain to divert the attention of the Confederate artillery. The pieces of heavy ordnance mounted on Fort Wood also belch out their long conical projectiles in the direction of Missionary Ridge, although the distance, about five thousand four hundred and seventy-two yards, renders them more dangerous to the assailers than to the enemy. The Federal line extends nearly two miles. Before it is a stretch of woods occupied by the hostile skirmishers; then follows a small plain ahead of the first breastworks. The sides of Missionary Ridge, from the crest to the base, present a uniform length of some four hundred and thirty-three to five hundred and forty-two yards. Although bare, they are bristling with obstacles—here trunks of trees scattered, there projecting rocks or rolling stones, elsewhere turfy, slippery, precipitate slopes. They are crossed by numerous zigzag roads. The sides of the mountain consist of a series of small ridges, like the ins and outs of a rack, while the summit on the crest, withal very narrow, offers, however, positions of which Bragg has availed himself to establish his batteries. But the pitch of the ground diminishing toward the top, these positions, which well flank the internal angles, have no range on the external.

Now the Confederate skirmishers precipitately abandon the woods, closely pressed by those of the Army of the Cumberland. The latter, coming upon the run, are greeted with a formidable musketry-fire, for all the Confederate regiments assigned to outpost duty have massed in the breastworks. Soon the Union line of battle debouches from the woods in spite of a shower of shells: it hastens its step while maintaining its good order. At the sight of these serried battalions, of which nothing can check the advance, the Confederates feel their courage weaken. Most of them desert the works behind which, but a few moments before, they believed themselves invincible. Others throw themselves into the trench to avoid the projectiles, and are taken prisoners by the Federal skirmishers, who on all sides have scaled the parapet. The bravest meet death while facing the enemy.

Thomas' battalions now come up, also on the run. Willich's brigade, forming the centre of Wood's division, is the first to

reach the hostile intrenchments. Hazen on the right and Beatty on the left closely follow it. Sheridan penetrates at the same time into the intrenchments with two brigades—Wagner's on the left, and its neighbor under Harker. The third, under Colonel Sherman, is somewhat in the rear at right angles, the right ranged as a column to cover his flank, because Johnson, who was not up with Sheridan, has not been able to meet him.

Twenty minutes have elapsed since the Federal line got in motion. It is enough time to allow Bragg to prepare the defence of the slopes of which it has reached the base. The ten brigades and the batteries which form its centre number some thirteen thousand infantry and two thousand artillerymen. It is true that from this number must be deducted the losses that the first line has just sustained. But the position appears to be so strong that, according to Bragg's own words, a single cordon of skirmishers ought to have sufficed to defend it against the entire Federal army. Hence it is with the utmost confidence that the Confederate general makes his last arrangements for the fight. While the fugitives gain the crest through the internal angles of the ridges, the entire artillery resumes fire against the Union battalions, whose compact masses present a large mark for its shells. As fast as the latter reach the parapet after having dislodged the defenders who could yet dispute it to them, they try to gain shelter behind this obstacle. But it is in vain, because the exterior projection of the work is not sufficient to protect them against the plunging fire of the enemy. Sheridan has so well foreseen this contingency that, when on the point of setting his division in motion, he caused Granger, his immediate chief, to be asked whether there has not been a misunderstanding, and whether it is necessary to come to a halt at the foot of the hills. In fact, the position of the Federals is one of those in which no force would be able to maintain itself long. Riddled by a formidable artillery only a few hundred yards off, exposed to the bullets of the skirmishers ambushed on the slope, they must needs move forward or fall back. In an instant everybody has understood it, from the general down to the last soldier. They have not come there to fall back, nor can they move forward without orders which will

ensure by their uniformity the success of the movement, and there is no time to wait for orders. For some minutes the anxiety of the chief is painful. But it does not last long. One of those inspirations, sudden and so contagious that they appear unanimous, that sometimes carry away a number of experienced men whose very peril enlightens their judgment, has abruptly put an end to all hesitation in contempt of rules regarding military practice. Those of Willich's men who first reached the intrenchment have followed up their adversaries without halting at the foot of the slope. Their comrades follow them instinctively. On their right, Hazen, not being able to wait for another signal, carries away his entire brigade. The example thus set is so rapidly followed by Wagner's and Harker's troops near him, and by those of Beatty and Turchin on the left of Willich, that the battle-front of the entire Federal centre is not broken by this spontaneous manœuvre. The second line crosses the works without halting, and it is not long in uniting with the first. Two of Baird's brigades and Johnson's division are somewhat in the rear.

To use an expression bold as the resolution which has just carried away an entire army, it may be said that the soldiers fled forward. Their superiors hasten to follow and encourage them. It is, in fact, necessary to take advantage of their ardor in order to deal the blow which will decide the fate of the battle: any hesitation would be irreparable. Meanwhile, the unity of the manœuvre appears for an instant to be compromised by some orders given conformably to instructions by General Grant. The officer whom Sheridan has sent to Granger, and who brings him back the advice not to proceed beyond the foot of the hill, causes Wagner's brigade to return the way it came; a portion of Harker's brigade follows this movement. The losses sustained by these troops prove how much a retreat would cost them. Fortunately, Sheridan hastens in the midst of them, and, receiving fresh instructions from Grant, he brings them again. On the left a similar incident has broken Baird's line. Van Derveer's and Phelps' brigades, which form his centre and left, reached somewhat later than Turchin the intrenchments abandoned by the enemy. While Turchin was resuming his forward march they came to a halt, and an order sent from Indian Hill held them an instant. But at the end of a

few minutes a fresh order enabled Baird to hasten with them to the assistance of the brigade on the right.

Great was the astonishment of Grant and Thomas when they beheld the entire line of battle advancing regularly upon the slopes which they had not dared order them to ascend. The adventure was perilous, for there was no reserve to sustain the assailants and offer them a support in case of a reverse. If the crest is not carried it will be necessary to fall back on Chattanooga and break the line of communication with Sherman and Hooker. The first will have only to recross the Tennessee, but the second, with smaller forces, is in an isolated position, of which fact the conquering enemy may avail himself to inflict upon him a painful lesson. It is, then, either a decisive victory or a complete defeat that the Federals are going to get upon that crest bristling with cannon. But the die is cast, and the officers of Thomas' staff have gone to carry, as we have said, to the four division commanders the order to continue marching if they think it is possible to reach the summit. The entire Union artillery, redoubling its fire, causes Bragg's artillery to sustain serious losses.

Meantime, the ranks have intermingled, the regiments have united in the Federal line. It forms a mass more or less deep, swaying, delaying on some points, without ceasing to advance. The slopes are hard to climb; strength and ardor are not the same among all the assailants. But if their ways differ somewhat, there are seen no laggards among them. The boldest of them gather around the flags, each of which they pass from hand to hand as fast as one pays with his life for the honor of holding it a moment: they move rapidly forward, then halt to give others time to join them. Thus they go up, almost without firing a gun, on the sides of Missionary Ridge: the intermediate line of breastworks, incomplete and illy defended, has already been passed at several points.

The Confederates had not believed in so much boldness. As soon as they saw the Federal line arrive halfway up they mingled the fire of their musketry with that of the artillery and changed the shell for canister. Although this fire is too plunging, it opens large gaps in the Federal lines. The external angles which rib the slope presenting a smaller area to the shots of the enemy,

the Unionists close up on these ridges, thus breaking their line into separate groups which advance slowly, leaving behind them the bloody marks of their passage.

The Confederate artillerists, always full of ardor, redouble their fire against the groups not concealed from their view. Bragg, who is by the side of his only two mounted pieces of artillery, placed in front of his headquarters, encourages the men and shares their confidence. Opposite him, Wagner's brigade not having been able to regain the advance made by the others, he believes it to be already repulsed. But during that time five or six groups among the most numerous and the least exposed have almost finished the redoubtable ascent. In the centre, Willich's and Hazen's brigades, each following a ridge, have escaped more and more the direct fire of the artillery, whose well-directed shots from Indian Hill have otherwise unlimbered several pieces, and, notwithstanding the losses inflicted upon them by a fusillade received almost at close quarters, they attain to a few yards from the summit. Most of the higher officers have been hit ; one of the flags has changed hands six times. However, nothing arrests the Federals, and, grouping themselves in masses, they spring upon the crest. They had hardly planted their feet there when the hostile infantry disbands and precipitates itself in disorder down the declivity on the opposite side of the hill. It is Reynolds' brigade that Hazen has routed, and the left of Anderson's division that Willich has penetrated. Bragg comes up in haste and endeavors to rally the fugitives, while Bate on one side and Anderson on the other strive to take the assailants obliquely on both flanks. Willich's and Hazen's position would be critical indeed if they were isolated, but they have preceded only by a few minutes on the crest Harker's and Sherman's brigades on the right and Turchin's on the left. They have seized the enemy's guns, killing the artillerists, who bravely defend them to the last. While they turn them against their former owners, almost exhausting the caissons and firing canister on the troops in confusion that crowd upon the crest right and left, Sheridan has established himself on the summit and broken the ranks of Bate's division, weakened by the detachments sent to the north-east. Turchin has likewise carried the centre of the positions occupied by Anderson's division. Five or six gaps are

thus made in less than ten minutes in the Confederate line. All the assailants rush in at once, widening them with a rapidity against which the isolated remnants of that broken line struggle in vain. The artillery becomes silent on both sides. The *mêlée* lasts an instant only. Wagner and Beatty, who have had the hardest ground to climb, are supported on all sides, and soon join their comrades. Bragg, rendered desperate by the powerlessness of his efforts, is borne away by the bewildered crowd of his soldiers at the moment when he is on the point of being surrounded. A number of officers—among others, Breckinridge's chief of staff—many privates, almost all the guns that had fired canister on the Federals, fall into the hands of the latter. A general panic seizes the troops that had firmly awaited the enemy with so much assurance. The crazed soldiers, deaf to the voice of their officers, precipitate themselves in the direction of Chickamauga: some pieces of artillery and many limbers encumber the narrow roads which furrow the eastern slope of the hills. Out of ten brigades, only one or two, those which form Anderson's right, have maintained their ranks; separated from the rest of the army by Turchin's attack, they have formed perpendicularly to the ridge upon this same eastern slope elsewhere covered with fugitives, and menace the left flank of the victorious Federals. But Baird's arrival with the brigades of Van Derveer and Phelps obliges Anderson to fall back in turn toward the north with the remnants of his division, to seek support near Hardee, whose position has not yet been broken through.

Indeed, this general, concentrating the fire of his powerful artillery on the slopes that Sherman has vainly tried to scale, has kept completely in check the commander of the Army of the Tennessee. It is at the moment when, the night approaching, he congratulates himself upon this success, that he hears of the disaster which has befallen Breckinridge's corps. Taking with him Cheatham's division, composed of soldiers better inured to war than those of Stevenson, and which, unlike the latter, have not been engaged against Sherman, he moves rapidly, following the ridge, to the assistance of Anderson. He arrives at the time when the remnants of this division, driven by Baird, hastily fall back on the road to Chickamauga Station. This opportune reinforce-

ment interrupts the progress of the Federals, who advance toward the north by following the crest of Missionary Ridge. Cheatham's division, deployed upon this crest, for a moment resumes the offensive, and causes to the assailants heavy losses in rank and file, among others Colonel Phelps. Then, retiring step by step, it reaches a culminating point, upon which it stands until nightfall.

The right wing is saved, but the disaster to Breckinridge is complete and irreparable. Stewart's division itself has shared the fate of the rest of his army corps. We left it at the time when he led it in front of Hooker, who about three o'clock rendered himself master of the Rossville defile. The latter has deployed his three little divisions across Missionary Ridge to the northward of the defile; Osterhaus forms on the eastern declivity and Geary on the slopes facing the west, with the entire artillery, which Hooker has not wished to carry on mountain-paths. Cruft, in the centre, will follow the crest, of which he has taken possession after a pretty sharp engagement. This crest being very narrow, he ranges Grose's brigade *en échelon* on three lines: a portion of Whitaker's brigade supports it on the left; the rest is placed in reserve. These seven brigades encounter Stewart's division, which has rapidly occupied the breastworks constructed by the Federals, five hundred and forty-three yards from the defile, during the sad night from the 20th to the 21st of September. Yet these works, turned toward the east, offer no support against an enemy master of the two slopes. While Cruft attacks them in front, Osterhaus and Geary, advancing right and left, compel Stewart's soldiers to evacuate them. The same manœuvre dislodges them from a second line of intrenchments. Closely pressed by Hooker's soldiers, they can no longer stand anywhere, and soon their retreat turns into a rout which no effort of their officers can check. Some, going down to the eastward to gain the crossings on the Chickamauga, fall into Osterhaus' hands; others rush to the westward as far as Geary's lines. Most of them, following the line of the ridge, escape from one danger only to fall into another.

The two brigades of Johnson's division crowned, shortly after Sheridan, the crest occupied by the left of Bate's division. Uncovered by the departure of Stewart, the Confederates have shown but little resistance on that side. At the sound of the firing,

Hooker's troops, that are now only sixteen hundred and fifty yards from there, have hastened their steps, and Carlin has only to face to the right in order to pick up most of the fugitives that the troops are driving before them. Breckinridge, with those that he has been able to save, rapidly gains the banks of the Chickamauga, upon which are crowded the remnants of his army corps. The rout is therefore complete, and notwithstanding the successes of Hardee the disaster to the Confederate army is irreparable. Bragg sends to his two lieutenants the order to fall back during the night beyond the Chickamauga: truly an ironical order for Breckinridge, useless for Hardee, who well understands the peril of his situation. However, Bate has maintained some regiments in good order. Upon him devolves the task of covering the road to Chickamauga Station and the bridge thrown across the river of the same name somewhat below the confluence of its two branches—a useless task, because, while Baird is engaged with Cheatham, Wood is fortifying upon the crest and picking up most of the abandoned guns, and Johnson is finishing the dispersion of Stewart's division, Sheridan in hot pursuit descends the slopes of Missionary Ridge with Wagner's and Harker's brigades deployed on the left and right of the road to Chickamauga Station.

Night has come. Most of the victors think only of establishing themselves in the positions which they have just secured. Grant and his lieutenants are in the midst of them. Hardee is already in retreat. While Cheatham, on the south, was masking this movement he fell back upon the heights which narrowly enclose on the north-east the Chickamauga, so as to cross this stream on the bridges of the two railways. Sherman, tired of a fruitless struggle in which he has lost nearly two thousand men and three generals, has contented himself with occupying the approaches to the tunnel, which he has found abandoned. On the right Hooker came to a halt as soon as his lines met Johnson's. But the indefatigable Sheridan is on the track of the fugitives. Bate awaits him, with all the soldiers he has been able to collect and some guns, upon a crest not much elevated, but precipitous, which some sixteen hundred yards from the main chain separates it from the Chickamauga Valley. Although without artillery, the Federals do not hesitate to attack him. The first

line is checked, but Sheridan, who comes up with the reserves, brings them into action despite the obscurity and the difficulties of the ground. While Harker engages the enemy in front, General Wagner with two regiments scales a steep acclivity and endeavors to turn the flank of Bate's right. The full moon, an accomplice with the victors, slowly rises behind the dark crest of the hill. Sheridan and his companions see, depicted like Chinese silhouettes against the sky, which the moon tinges with its pale light, the profiles of Wagner's soldiers, who have just reached the top. It is the signal for a fresh attack, before which Bate promptly falls back. But in gaining an hour this valiant soldier has allowed the remnants of the left wing to cross the river; he himself reaches the bridge and destroys it, after having been the last to cross it. As early as half-past seven o'clock Granger has taken measures to cut off the retreat of the fugitives, the wagons, and the guns that must have delayed between the river and the ridges carried by Baird. Sheridan will rapidly gain the approaches to the bridge; then, facing northward, he will descend the left bank of the Chickamauga, supported on the west by Wood. But the guides having been long in coming, he reaches at two o'clock in the morning only the ruins of the bridge. He found only broken wagons, abandoned muskets, and stragglers eager to deliver themselves captive. It is useless to continue; besides, it is necessary to give some rest to the Fourth corps before requiring it to undertake a fresh expedition, which a paramount reason forbids delaying. Granger retains Wood and halts Sheridan.

The bivouac-fires joyously kindled on the summit of Missionary Ridge proclaim afar the reunion of the three Federal armies in the formidable positions secured by their common efforts. The happy Grant and his soldiers have a right to rejoice, for the battle of Missionary Ridge is the most complete, the most decisive, victory won by the Northern army since the outbreak of the war. Forty guns and six thousand one hundred and forty-two prisoners remained in their hands. Yet these losses, to which must be added the dead and the wounded, too few in number for the honor of the Confederate army, says Bragg in his official report, do not furnish the measure of the blow received by that

army. Its prestige has vanished ; it has lost its daring, its confidence in its leaders.

We have shown Bragg's principal faults : his prolonged inaction before Rosecrans, his indifference after the battle of Wauhatchie, his imprudence in sending Longstreet before Knoxville ; in short, his obstinacy to preserve Lookout Mountain. It is astonishing, however, to see tried troops in sufficient numbers, supported by powerful artillery, allow themselves to be dislodged from a position equally judged unapproachable by Grant and Bragg. This latter, not having yet fairly recovered from the surprise he felt about it, accused his soldiers of cowardice and attributed their failure to the impression caused by the deployment of Grant's legions, of which they could for the last two days compare the effective force with their own reduced numbers. Without absolutely discarding this explanation, we believe that the positions on Missionary Ridge were more difficult to defend than the two chiefs imagined. It was halfway up, and not on the summit, that Bragg should have had his principal works and posted all his infantry, as Lee had done at Fredericksburg for the defence of Marye's Hill. It would have been less dangerous to place it thus halfway, even without any protection against the bullets of the enemy, than to range it at the summit on one line only against a steep slope, without reserves or a rallying-point. That position, too high for firing, deprived of views of certain salient elevations, was so narrow that the line once broken at any point it was impossible to re-form it. However, the loss sustained by the assailants proves that the Confederates defended themselves energetically until the time when the stream of bluecoats which no firing could check came and mingled with their ranks. The Unionists succeeded because, instead of feeling the enemy by partial attacks, they at once rushed up to storm his works, without leaving one man in reserve behind. But the Fourth corps, which delivered the principal blow, in less than an hour saw fall the fifth part of its effective force upon the bloody slopes of Missionary Ridge. Sheridan had thirteen hundred and Wood one thousand men disabled, among whom was a very large number of field officers. Grant's total losses in the engagements on the 23d, the 24th, and the 25th of November amounted to about

seven hundred men killed, four thousand wounded, and three hundred prisoners—considerable losses, without any doubt, but which are largely offset by the result obtained. After having broken the impediments which closed the passage of the Mississippi, it is again Grant who has just opened the doors of Georgia. The Federal armies have at last found the warrior worthy to lead them. The bold and skilful manœuvres which began in the valley of Lookout Mountain and terminated a month later near the house whence Bragg and Davis had contemplated a Union army besieged at their feet, enhance the glory of the conquerer of Vicksburg. He has proved that his mind, powerful to conceive, firm to execute, is fertile in resources at the critical time.

If Bragg thought for an instant to halt in the Chickamauga Valley, the state of his army did not permit him long to keep up this hope. His army must seek, not defensive positions, for it cannot fight, but places impenetrable to the enemy, sheltered by which it might recover from the effects of its disaster. The rigor of the season, the lack of provisions, the necessity for the Federals to aid Burnside, will soon deliver it from the pursuit of its adversary. It will be able to halt at Dalton, where important dépôts are to be found.

Meanwhile, Grant loses not an instant to despatch his soldiers upon the tracks of the defeated enemy. Unfortunately, the want of forage has obliged him, as we have seen, to send away from Chattanooga all his cavalry save Long's brigade, placed under the orders of General Sherman. This brigade, in the field for two days, carries destruction on the railway which connected Bragg directly with Longstreet. Long, having passed in the afternoon of the 24th, after Sherman, the Tennessee, then the Chickamauga near its mouth, reached on the same evening the Cleveland Railroad at Tyner's Station. The destruction of this important dépôt would have sufficed to cause serious alarm to Bragg and great embarrassments to his quartermaster if, when the former received the news of that destruction, the battle waging on Missionary Ridge had not absorbed all his attention. While the din of this battle was rumbling behind him Long continued the destruction of the railway *via* Ooltawah as far as Cleveland, where he found vaster stores abandoned without defence. On the

morning of the 26th he had already rendered unfit for use about ten miles of this road in the direction of Dalton, and then he proceeded northward, expecting to arrive in time to carry away a large supply of provisions destined for Longstreet which the break in the Hiawasse bridge detained at Charleston to the southward of that river. On the other hand, Sherman, informed during the night of Hardee's retreat, gave orders to Davis' division to cross the Chickamauga at four o'clock in the morning on Long's tracks. During that time Howard is to throw a bridge across the river near Boyce's Station, and is to be followed in his march by the Fifteenth corps. Sherman himself, with his six divisions, is to ascend the right bank. If Bragg has delayed on that side, he will thus compel him promptly to retreat; if Bragg has not waited for him, he will move on his flank to throw him back toward the south and close to him the road to East Tennessee. Thomas has likewise received Grant's orders. He is to remain at Chattanooga, where the Fourth corps will return during the day to take up the stores and equipments requisite for a long campaign.

In fact, as soon as Bragg's movements shall be made known, Granger shall take up the line of march, with his two divisions and some reinforcements, for Knoxville. The last news received from Burnside causes fear lest he may be very closely pressed, and unable for want of provisions to resist longer than the 3d of December. Therefore, there is no time to lose in going to his aid. The rest of the army—that is to say, the three divisions of Osterhaus, Cruft, and Geary, and the Fourteenth corps—shall move down the eastern slopes of Missionary Ridge and start at daybreak, under Hooker's direction, in pursuit of the enemy.

Stimulated by success, the Federal soldiers execute with alacrity the orders of their chief. On the left, Davis crosses the Chickamauga in the night. Materials lacking to establish a crossing at Boyce's Station, the Eleventh and the Fifteenth corps will cross over, after Davis, on the ponton-bridge. They are not long in joining him, because a dense fog much delays the march of his vanguard. At last the fog vanishes, and Davis reaches Chickamauga Station, which for the last two months was the main subsistence centre for Bragg's army. The latter, believing this station sheltered from the enemy, had collected there his stores

of ammunition and provisions for the winter, his commissary and other wagons, his bridge-equipage, and some guns of large bore recently arrived. Several weeks would have been required to evacuate dépôts so well filled, and Hardee, after having allowed his army corps the time to take therefrom the provisions necessary for a long march, had assigned to his rearguard the duty of destroying these dépôts. On the approach of the Federals it took up a position on two hills beyond the station and crowned with some unfinished works. But Hardee, whose entire corps, marching in good order, does not need that his rearguard should sacrifice itself to cover him, has ordered it not to expose itself, while retarding the movements of the enemy, to a struggle of too unequal a character. Therefore it disappears in the direction of Graysville ere Davis has had time to make preparations for an attack. Among the smoking ruins which it abandons to them Sherman's soldiers still find enough to fill their exhausted haversacks. They do not delay long, however; and, guided by the abandoned wagons, arms, and equipments which mark the track of the enemy, they follow and finally overtake him. But night approaches. The head of the Federal column, after having crossed a marsh covered with rank vegetation, again finds itself in presence of the Confederate rearguard, and when Davis, perceiving his first battalions warmly engaged, wishes to deploy his division the darkness brings him to a halt three miles from Graysville. Meantime, Hardee, traversing this town, rapidly continues his march toward Ringgold, where he finds the remnants of Breckinridge's corps, with his crowd of fugitives, artillery, and the long trains that the day before the battle were started on the road from Rossville to Dalton. This road, which, as the reader will remember, crosses the West Chickamauga at the Red House Bridge, also crosses near Ringgold the gap made by the eastern branch, called East Chickamauga, in a chain of hills named on the north White Oak Ridge and on the south Taylor's Ridge. The road and the railway, running over a narrow strip on the right bank, are commanded on both sides by bluffs from a hundred and forty to a hundred and seventy-three yards high. The nearest necks, Parker's Gap and Nickajack Gap, are both nearly eight miles off, one to the northward and the other to the

southward. This narrow passage, which Bragg's entire army is obliged to cross, will retard his progress, but it affords excellent positions to check for some time the pursuit by the enemy. It is therefore important that Hardee's troops, alone in a condition to fight, should occupy it as promptly as possible.

Fortunately for the Confederates, Hooker was delayed during the course of the day on the 26th. However, he early set his troops in motion, and no fog interfered with their progress until they reached the edge of the Chickamauga. The river not being fordable at that season, he caused the five divisions to be converged on the Red House Bridge, near which he hopes to be enabled promptly to establish a crossing. To that end his chief of staff, General Butterfield, early in the morning sent to Chattanooga for a section of equipage composed of three pontons, with planking in proportion to the width of the stream. The Red House Bridge was chosen because a good road nearly ten miles long connects this point with Chattanooga *via* Rossville. It is thus expected that the equipage will arrive early on the 26th, and will enable the entire right wing promptly to cross the river. All the collected troops wait in vain for the pontons. Butterfield's requisition not having been foreseen at headquarters, there was nothing ready to comply with it. Hence, notwithstanding the zeal shown, as always, by W. F. Smith and his subordinates, Colonel Buell cannot start with the equipage and the brigade of pontonniers till very late on the 26th. Hooker, as Buell does not appear, at last concludes to improvise a passage over the ruins of the bridge. But it is already three o'clock when his infantry is finally enabled to venture upon the frail structure. The officers' horses swim across. The artillery and wagons remain on the left shore. The crossing of so numerous a force cannot be finished before night. Baird's and Johnson's divisions, which pass first, receive orders to turn to the left after crossing Pea-Vine Creek at a distance of two miles from the bridge; Osterhaus, Cruft, and Geary will follow, with Hooker, the Ringgold road. A flying bridge is soon established by Baird over the creek, and the Federals, full of confidence in the trouble of their adversaries, do not allow themselves to be checked by the darkness of night. Toward nine o'clock in the evening Johnson reaches the forks of the Ringgold

and Graysville roads. Carlin's brigade had already entered the latter when there was heard on the right the confused sound of troops on the march. Stoughton advances in the direction of the sound, and soon falls upon a portion of Stewart's division, which brought up the rear of Breckinridge's marching corps. This detachment—which cannot be called a rearguard, for it was not on its guard, and chance alone had placed it behind a confused mass of fugitives—scatters after the first volley, leaving on the road three guns, several flags, caissons, and wagons. Johnson, after having picked up these trophies, resumes the Graysville road. The enemy, who was not expecting him on that side, had neither destroyed nor occupied the neighboring bridge over the East Chickamauga. Carlin rapidly crosses it, and suddenly strikes, in the village, Hardee's rearguard, which, finding that it was no longer pursued by Sherman, believed itself in complete security. This rearguard is quickly dislodged, and leaves numerous prisoners in the hands of the Federals, who at last come to a halt and take a well-earned rest.

Grant, who has followed his columns and spent the night with Sherman, issues all necessary orders to resume the pursuit at daybreak. Sherman will remain on the right bank of the East Chickamauga; Hooker, following the left bank, is to proceed in the direction of Ringgold.

Although, for want of a strong bridge at the Red House, the latter finds himself without his artillery, he sets his troops in motion at the appointed hour. Johnson, who has recrossed the East Chickamauga, proceeds along the southern bank. Baird and Cruft, who have occupied the heights called the Chickamauga Hills, still smoking with the fires kindled on the preceding evening by the enemy, remain in reserve. Osterhaus, and Geary, after him, take the Ringgold road by the way of Pea-Vine Church.

The *débris* of every kind with which this road is strewn proves that the bulk of the Confederate army has followed it, and attests the precipitation, the disorder, of its retreat. In fact, during the whole night groups of straggling soldiers, long files of wagons, cannon, and caissons, followed by remnants of regiments no longer numbering more than a handful of men faithful to the flag, have crossed the defile. Happily, Hardee, after hav-

ing marched all night on the right bank of the East Chickamauga, has at last rejoined, near Ringgold, Breckinridge's column. His rearguard alone occupies this village. In the morning of the 27th, when Osterhaus' van appeared on the edge of the Chickamauga, he had entrusted to Cleburne the care of checking, with his division and Gist's, the pursuit of the enemy. They are the same troops which two days before had resisted the forces of Sherman.

Beyond Taylor's Ridge the Dalton road crosses several times the Chickamauga, each bridge constituting a strait the narrow passage of which must retard the march of a large column. Time must therefore be given the army to reach five or six miles farther a parallel chain called the Chattooga Mountain, easy of defence, though slightly elevated, and through which the railway penetrates on the west by a tunnel which has given its name to a group of neighboring hills. Half a day must suffice for the bulk of Bragg's forces to attain this chain. Cleburne, with his two strong divisions, will be able easily to detain for a few hours the Federals on the western slope of Taylor's Ridge. The town of Ringgold is situated upon this slope, commanding the confluence of the East Chickamauga and the stream called Faight's Creek: it occupies the northern extremity of a small triangular plain bounded on the south and the west by the river above and below the confluence on the third side by steep slopes. This plain, commanded all around, terminates in a point on the east at the entrance to the gorge, the approaches to which are covered by a small grove stretching on the sides of the mountain. Cleburne, far from defending the plain, endeavors thither to attract his adversaries. The small grove is strongly occupied by the greater part of Gist's division: two or three batteries remaining with him are posted on the edge of the grove by the side of the plain. The rest of Gist's troops are placed upon the extremity of Taylor's Ridge, so as prevent the enemy from turning the defile by the south. Cleburne's division is on the right. Liddell and Smith are established on the last summit of White Oak Ridge, which commands on the north the entrance to the gorge and affords a view of Ringgold; Polk and Lowry are at right angles on the eastern slope of the chain, in order to cover

the right against the Federal troops which might come from Parker's Gap. A single line of skirmishers is along the edge of the river, and to encourage the enemy they even avoid destroying the bridge on the road from Ringgold to La Fayette. After a feint of defence in the last houses of the town they precipitately retire toward the gorge, accompanied by a battery of artillery. Hooker, who forded the stream a little farther down with Osterhaus, allows himself to be easily influenced by the ardor of his soldiers. He believes he has before him only Breckinridge's fugitives; if the enemy has not put the defile in a state of defence, an irreparable disaster awaits him ere he shall have time to reach Tunnel Hill; and, to make sure of it, Hooker, although without artillery, does not hesitate to move Woods forward with one of Osterhaus' brigades. It is nine o'clock in the morning. The fight which immediately begins proves that the enemy is determined to resist. Woods' right has followed the Confederate skirmishers, and within a short distance from the grove it finds itself exposed to the cross-fire of the infantry and the artillery. It succeeds in establishing itself in some houses which offer it a strong point of support, but its attack is repulsed, and it is forced, in order not to fall back, to take shelter behind the embankment of the railway, which obliquely crosses the plain.

Not being able to carry the defile in front, Hooker tries to turn it by the north. Osterhaus despatches Williamson with four regiments on the slopes which commanded Ringgold: if these troops reach the summit, they will soon clear the passage of the gorge. But Cleburne has foreseen this manoeuvre. While one of Smith's regiments checks the right of the assailants, Polk's brigade, summoned in haste, ascends the eastern slope and arrives before them on the top. After a fusillade of a few minutes, all to the advantage of the Confederates, these spring upon their adversaries, break their ranks, take from them several flags and nearly two hundred prisoners, and throw them back in disorder as far as the railway running along the base of the slope. It is only behind this slope that Williamson at last succeeds in re-forming his soldiers. Cleburne takes good care not to follow, for a fresh danger menaces the top of the mountain. Hooker, seeing the resistance encountered by Williamson, ordered Geary to send

four regiments more to the left, so as to reach the crest of White Oak Ridge beyond the line occupied by the enemy. But he has made a mistake in regard to the strength of his adversaries. Colonel Creighton of the Seventh Ohio, entrusted with this new attack, in vain makes a great *détour*. When, toward noon, he approaches the summit, Cleburne is ready to receive him. Polk has rapidly moved to meet his new assailants; Lowry has come back to strengthen his line; and both together easily repulse the assault by a single brigade from the heights of the formidable position which they occupy. However, Creighton succeeds in maintaining himself halfway up on a ridge which breaks the uniformity of the slope.

Finally, Hooker recognizes the futility of his efforts against Cleburne. He attributes the cause of his reverse to the absence of his artillery, and hopes that it will open the defile to him. While waiting for it he moves forward Cobham's and Ireland's brigades, one on the left, the other behind Woods, to support him against an offensive return. At the same time he asks Sherman to find a passage through White Oak Ridge, so as to take by the rear the enemy's defences.

Meanwhile, the pioneers who arrived at the Red House Bridge in the night of the 26th to the 27th have been able to finish the construction of the bridge only at eight o'clock in the morning. Immediately after having crossed over it Hooker's batteries were set in motion. They reached Ringgold a little before one o'clock, and forthwith six pieces opened fire upon Cleburne. But this accomplished soldier is not ignorant of the fact that the troops charged with the care of covering a retreat must know, after having halted betimes, when to quit the best positions. His is easy to turn by Parker's Gap: besides, Bragg at this time has no doubt reached the gorges of Chattooga Mountain. At the first cannon-shot fired by Hooker he falls back in good order, while the Federals prepare to attempt a fresh attack. When these advance into the defile they find a single fringe of skirmishers, who disappear on their approach. The battle of Ringgold, which cost the Federals from three to four hundred men, brings up to 5815 men the losses sustained by the Union army during the series of operations of which the capture of Indian Hill marked

the beginning. This total is composed of 752 killed, 4713 wounded, and 350 prisoners. Cleburne's losses are inconsiderable; he left 230 men and two flags in Hooker's hands.

While the latter was thus checked, Sherman encountered no obstacle before him. In the morning of the 27th he arrived with Davis' division at Graysville, and, learning that the Ringgold roads on the left bank of the Chickamauga were encumbered with Hooker's columns, he directed Davis' division along the right bank on that town, near which he knew there was fighting going on, because he distinctly heard Cleburne's cannon. Howard receives orders to push on as far as the Dalton road at Cleveland, and to tear it up in the vicinity of the Red Clay Station, so as to cut the communications which might still exist between Bragg and Longstreet. The Fifteenth corps at Graysville awaits news from the enemy or orders from Grant to move either on Ringgold or on Parker's Gap. It is toward this defile, situated only four miles from Graysville, that Howard has proceeded. He reached it promptly, and, finding it unoccupied, continued his march beyond White Oak Ridge. Thus before midday he has turned the position which Cleburne defends at Ringgold, and if the latter had not retired in time Howard would have made him prisoner.

Hooker, having under his hand nearly the half of the Federal army, for Davis has just rejoined him, would like to resume his march on Cleburne's tracks. But Grant, hastening up at the prolonged roar of the cannon, halts him, and only allows him a little later to despatch one brigade—namely, Grose's—on the Dalton road. The pursuit of Bragg has ended.

BOOK III.—THE THIRD WINTER.

CHAPTER I.

FORT SANDERS.

IN crossing the Chattooga Mountain, Bragg abandons for ever the basin of the Mississippi, in which his valiant army has been fighting for the past two years and a half. Grant contents himself with holding the entrance to the great gap in the Alleghanies, and thinks only of delivering Burnside, who is besieged. While Granger proceeds to his assistance, the other corps hold themselves in readiness to support him and prevent Bragg from taking, in his turn, the Knoxville road. It is, then, necessary to watch the latter closely, without allowing one's self to be carried away in pursuit of him. Hooker will remain at Ringgold until the evening of November 30th, avoiding an engagement with the enemy if the latter remains quiet, but ready to attack him vigorously if he proceeds to Cleveland, or to push as far as Dalton if he evacuate that point.

The different divisions temporarily collected under his orders will go into winter quarters in the positions which they occupied on November 23d. Cruft's will deflect from its road to accomplish a holy and sad duty: it is to visit the battlefield of Chickamauga and bury the victims of that cruel struggle, of whom, notwithstanding the care of some compassionate Confederates, the decomposed corpses are still lying, for the most part, in the woods, covered as with a thick shroud by the sere, dead leaves.

Sherman, having hastened to Ringgold, receives orders to return also, by easy marches, to Chattanooga, systematically destroying behind him the railway between Ringgold and Chickamauga Station. But Grant's stores are again almost exhausted; the commissary, who feeds a hundred and twenty-five thousand

men, has only three hundred and ten thousand rations of salt meat, and procures with difficulty the one hundred and seventy beeves that represent the fresh meat for one day. Hence, on the morrow, the 28th, Sherman will be authorized to lead his six divisions as far as Cleveland and Charleston, in order to feed them for a few days on the resources of a country rich in cattle and grain. Finally, the order is sent to Thomas to set Granger's corps on the road on the morning of the 28th.* So as to reach more promptly Knoxville, Wood's and Sheridan's divisions, each man taking forty cartridges and rations for three days, will not be followed by any wagon, but a steamer ascending the Tennessee, loaded with provisions for ten days, will resupply them at Cottonport, between Washington and Decatur. With a view to supporting this movement and employing his cavalry, Grant instructs General Elliott to quit Alexandria with two brigades, to march on Kingston, where he shall collect Byrd's brigade, and to lead these forces to Athens, where he shall meet Granger and unite with him. On his side, General Foster, the designated successor to Burnside, who has just arrived at Cumberland Gap, shall take all the available troops there found—say about three thousand men—and march toward Knoxville. His movement, coinciding with Granger's, will possibly contribute to the prompt raising of the siege.

From Ringgold the retreat of the Confederates has not been annoyed. Grose, after having picked up booty on the road, finding Cleburne posted on the slopes of Tunnel Hill, has rejoined his division in the evening. Howard has reached Red Clay Station without meeting the enemy; he has destroyed the road, and, entrusting a cavalry regiment with the care of watching this line, returns to Graysville at one o'clock in the morning. At last, Long, whom we left on the 25th marching on Charleston, retraced his steps on learning that the city was strongly occupied by B. R. Johnson, and, passing by Harrison, re-entered Chattanooga on the evening of the 27th.

Bragg has, then, been able finally to halt his army at Dalton, where he finds the provisions, the rest, and the security which it needs to reorganize and instill fresh confidence. We shall leave it there for the moment.

Although he received his orders on the 27th at seven o'clock in

the evening, Granger had not yet left Chattanooga twenty-four hours afterward, when Grant entered that place. The general-in-chief, rendered impatient by this delay, for which he holds the commander of the Fourth corps responsible, and judging that Thomas has not sufficiently reinforced this corps, gives the direction of the short campaign which is to ensure the safety of Burnside to Sherman, who finds himself, by a fortunate chance, on the road to East Tennessee. He authorizes his most illustrious lieutenant to take with him, besides the troops already intended for the expedition, the whole or a part of the Fifteenth corps. He knows that Sherman will conduct the campaign with the energy necessary to reach Knoxville before December 3d, which will mark the exhaustion of the resources of the garrison. Although the soldiers that have followed him without halting since they left Memphis are well entitled to some rest, Sherman is not willing to deprive himself of their services to accomplish the difficult task which is entrusted to him.

Grant hastily makes preparation at the very moment when the destiny of the Army of the Ohio is being decided on the glacies of Fort Sanders. Longstreet and Bragg have remained in telegraphic communication until the evening of the 24th. The first has thus been cognizant of Grant's demonstration on Indian Hill. The abrupt silence which succeeded this exchange of despatches proved to Longstreet that the hostile cavalry is in the field on the left bank of the Tennessee River. On the next day he learns that it has appeared between Cleveland and Charleston. At last, on the 26th and the 27th, first the report of a great battle, then of a disastrous defeat, spreads in the country drained by the Hiawassee: this vague report is soon confirmed by the despatches of several telegraph-operators. A weak general, feeling himself thus isolated and menaced, would have concluded promptly to retreat: the peril of his situation inspires Longstreet, on the contrary, with an energetic resolution. Instead of raising the siege of Knoxville, he decides to attack without further delay. His army, reinforced, is full of ardor and confidence: since he has the time neither to complete the approaches nor to starve out the place, he will make a determined effort to carry it by assault. His lieutenants protest against his decision and raise objections to all projects of attack on

the works to the north, the east, or the south. But nothing can shake him. "The more complete Bragg's defeat is, the more necessary it is," said he, "to repair it by a brilliant victory. By retiring without fighting into Virginia we abandon the Army of the Tennessee to its conquerors. This army once destroyed, what shall we be able to do to save the Confederacy? Dragged into the general ruin, we shall be dishonored if we have not risked all while it is yet time. There is safety and honor only in the plan that I have adopted, and of which I order the execution." The hour for the assault is fixed for the end of the following night—i. e. for the 29th before daylight: Fort Sanders is the objective point. That is, it is true, the best fortified point, but if the Confederates seize it they are masters of Knoxville. The Union artillery, in truth, enfilades equally the double line which extends as far as the Holston and the breastworks trending in the direction of the north-east.

This fort, constructed, of course, without either masonry or shelter with blinds, is not yet completed; the curtains and the flanks of the south-west bastion are only outlined, but batteries posted at the junction of the lines with the two half-bastions afford a very good flanking. The ditch is wide and deep; in the rear of the parapets bales of cotton piled up form thick traverses which ensure to the defenders an effectual protection. The embrasures, very wide, give to the artillery a large field for firing; branches of trees mask them to the enemy. Long and gentle slopes rise from all sides up to the fort; a line of rifle-pits constantly occupied by sharpshooters extends about two hundred and seventeen yards in front of the parapet. The glacis is bristling with abatis, before which spreads an invisible network of wires. The works are mounted with ten pieces of artillery, of which two are Parrott guns of twenty inches bore. An eleventh piece, posted in a battery at the extremity of the north-west front, fronts the right face of the western bastion. The garrison is composed only of two hundred and twenty men belonging to the Seventy-ninth New York, the Seventeenth Michigan, and of two batteries of artillery, one regular, the other from Rhode Island. But the commander of the division, General Ferrero, who has posted himself in the works, and Lieutenant Benjamin, who has the artillery under his

orders, know how to inspire this handful of men with their confidence and courage.

Longstreet, on his part, neglects nothing to ensure the success of the assault. His last parallel being yet three hundred and twenty-two yards from the works, all the guards of the intrenchments, from the approaches to Fort Sanders as far as the Holston, will endeavor to surprise the hostile sharpshooters, so as to establish themselves in their rifle-pits and there improvise a shelter whence the storming-columns may spring. The most important of these columns, furnished by McLaws, is made up of Wofford's, Humphreys', and Bryan's brigades; it will get in motion a little before daylight, and move against the salient angle of the west bastion; the two brigades which B. R. Johnson has just brought up will serve them as a reserve. On the left, Jenkins will take up a position with Anderson's brigade, and as soon as McLaws shall have cleared the ditch he will attack the point of junction between the works and the line of breastworks trending to the north-east. In fine, to divert Burnside's attention Robertson and Law on the left bank of the Holston will make, at the same moment, a vigorous demonstration against the works on the south, the defence of which the Union general has entrusted to Shackelford.

Toward midnight the preliminary movement is executed with unanimity, and succeeds completely. Under cover of the darkness the Confederates, following the Kingston road, approach the positions occupied by the hostile sharpshooters, push them out, make seventy of them prisoners, and take possession of these positions. But the surprise, however successful it was, had the grave inconvenience of putting all the defenders of the works on their guard. During the rest of the night the irregular rattle of musket-shots keeps the Federals on the alert.

At last, at six o'clock, all the batteries of the besiegers open fire at the same time: Fort Sanders is particularly their objective point. This bombardment, rendered almost inoffensive by the traverses with which the works are provided, is for the Federals a final warning. It is the hour when the garrison relieves the sharpshooters. In sending the fresh guard General Ferrero, by a fortunate inspiration, orders the officer on duty to retake, no

matter at what cost, the positions lost during the night. The Confederates, in their turn, are surprised and dislodged at the moment when Longstreet and McLaws are making the final preparations for assault. When the three brigades advance with precaution to form in the rear of the sharpshooters, they find them a few yards in front of the parallel. In spite of the distance which separates them from the works, the Confederate battalions start on the run and drive in the outposts of the enemy without responding to their fusillade. These promptly throw themselves on their left to re-enter the works. Benjamin's guns immediately belch out canister on the assailants and open wide gaps in their ranks, without, however, being able to slacken their course. Longstreet closely follows his men. The unforeseen obstacle of the wire network causes among them a greater disorder than the enemy's fire: their march is delayed, their lines are confounded, the heads of the columns trip, and thus give the artillerists of the fort ample time to reload their pieces; but soon the wires are trampled under foot and disappear under the dead and the dying.

The Confederates are on the glacis. This time they must halt to cut the abatis with axes. They avail themselves of this halt to re-form, notwithstanding the well-sustained fire of the defenders who crown the parapet. In one minute a gap is made; the assailants precipitate themselves into the ditch, at the bottom of which they find themselves sheltered from the artillery of the fort. But mounting the parapet is difficult; they receive shots which they cannot return: as fast as some of them climb into the embrasures, they fall back, mortally wounded, on their comrades. Colonel McElroy waves an instant on the works the flag of the Thirteenth Mississippi, to disappear soon afterward. Two other Confederate flags—that of the Seventeenth Mississippi, belonging, as the Thirteenth, to Humphreys' brigade, and that of the Fifty-first Georgia, which is part of Bryan's brigade—are planted in turn on the parapet. The sight of them imparts a fresh ardor to the assailants. Longstreet himself can perceive them by the uncertain twilight, and already believes that he holds the victory. But after a few seconds of hand-to-hand struggle the flags remain in the hands of the Federals. A dozen intrepid men who have penetrated into the bastion are surrounded and disarmed.

While the Union foot-soldiers thus fight at close quarters, the artillerists train their pieces on the rear of the column, which has not yet reached the ditch; following Benjamin's example, they light with their hands the fuses of their shells to roll them from the top of the parapet down into the midst of the human mass swaying at their feet. At last, the guns placed so as to flank the two faces of the salient angle attacked by McLaws fire a few canister shots, enfilading the ditch, and send the last missiles of death to the troops which fill it. The assailants are vanquished. The struggle has been short, but perhaps never in the whole course of the war have so many corpses, in so short a time, covered as narrow a space of ground. The battalions that have remained on the glacis dare not enter the fatal ditch wherein an awful, certain, useless death awaits them; they hesitate, disband, and return on the run to the point whence they started. At that moment, in consequence either of an order misunderstood or a thoughtless suggestion, Anderson's brigade advances in turn. Forthwith all the fire of the defence converges on that column, which the early light of day enables the enemy plainly to discern. It encounters the same obstacles as did the first, and clears them with the same ardor; but once at the foot of the parapet it cannot stand the fire and falls back in disorder.

Finally, day breaks—a sad, raw day—upon an awful scene. Upward of one hundred and twenty killed and four hundred and fifty wounded men fill the ditch or lie near the glacis and among the stumps of trees, thus marking the bloody track made by the assaulting columns. The total losses of the assailants amount to seven hundred and thirteen men, among whom are two hundred and sixteen prisoners who were found hidden at the foot of the scarp. The defenders have had, on their side, only thirteen men disabled, thanks to their coolness and the manner in which they were directed.

Robertson and Law, warned by the sound of the cannonade, made before seven o'clock the attack enjoined upon them. This demonstration was crowned with a complete success. The Twenty-fourth and the Twenty-seventh Kentucky, which occupied the breastworks constructed by Shackelford, were surprised, and abandoned these works, leaving about seventy men in the hands

of the enemy. But they soon returned to the charge with the rest of the brigade, and the Confederates, no doubt unwilling seriously to engage in battle, promptly fell back before them.

Meanwhile, the unfortunate wounded piled up in the ditch of Fort Sanders see the light of day advancing without any one coming to assuage their sufferings. The Federals, sheltered behind the parapet, hear their moans without being able to extend to them a friendly hand, and the Confederate generals do not wish to acknowledge their reverse by asking permission to remove them. As soon as Burnside sees that the enemy renounces any fresh attack, moved by so much suffering, he proposes a suspension of hostilities. All day long the Federal ambulances aid the Confederates in their work of charity. The men captured in the ditch of Fort Sanders gave to their adversaries the first reliable news of the battles fought around Chattanooga. The news is confirmed by the Confederate officers during the armistice, for the disaster of Missionary Ridge has been officially known for several hours in the camps of the besiegers.

By a singular coincidence, at the very moment when Longstreet has just seen his supreme effort fail, while he rallies and encourages the valiant soldiers of McLaws, one of General Ransom's aides-de-camp, who comes up at full speed from Rogersville, the last telegraph-station on the Virginia side, brings him a despatch from Mr. Jefferson Davis ordering him immediately to join Bragg and his vanquished army. A few hours thereafter he receives from Wheeler a message transmitting to him, on the part of the latter, the advice to meet him at Ringgold. But it is too late: the reservations with which Wheeler in his letter has surrounded this message prove to him that instead of finding his chief he would throw himself into the arms of an enemy strong enough to crush him. Soon he learns that Cleveland is in the power of the Federals, and he immediately recalls his trains, already on the way to the south. It was well for him to do so, because before the evening a fresh despatch from Bragg announces the retreat of the Army of the Tennessee as far as Dalton and restores to him full liberty of action. However, he does not forget his companions-in-arms of the Chickamauga. Not having been able to obtain the success

which would have compensated for their defeat, he wishes at least to extenuate the consequences of it to them by drawing to him a portion of the Federal army. If he raise the siege of Knoxville, Grant, being reassured concerning the fate of Burnside, will set out in pursuit of Bragg. To make him change his mind it is necessary to oblige him to come and deliver the Army of the Ohio. He will therefore remain in his positions until the approach of a force superior to his own. Ransom is recalled from Rogersville with all the troops of which he can dispose. Vaughn, who occupies Loudon, is to watch the crossings of the Tennessee, ready to fall back toward the north unless he can join Bragg by throwing himself eastward in the Alleghanies. We have seen how correct was Longstreet's calculation.

On the morning of the 29th, Sherman sets his army in three columns on the road toward the Hiawassee. Howard again clears Parker's Gap; Davis and Blair cross White Oak Ridge at the two necks in the neighborhood of McDaniel's Gap and Julian's Gap, near Ooltawah. They meet in the evening at Cleveland. The next day the six divisions get in motion toward Charleston. There they will halt to recuperate before taking the road which will lead them by short marches as far as their winter quarters.

Already, Howard, surprising the enemy, has not given him time completely to destroy the railway-bridge over the Hiawassee, and every one on arriving at Charleston thinks of the promised rest at the end of this last stage. But hardly has Sherman entered that town, when he is met by General Wilson and Mr. Dana, who have hastily come from Chattanooga to bring him the fresh orders of Grant. There is no time to lose to carry them into execution.

The three divisions of the Fifteenth corps, which to deliver the Army of the Cumberland have marched over half the distance from the Mississippi to the Atlantic, have not even been able to enter Chattanooga to rest there one day; they left on the bank of the Tennessee the small amount of baggage they had brought from Vicksburg, and, from the private to the commander-in-chief, each man has only a single blanket, without a change of any article. Intensely cold weather has succeeded the heavy rains. The regular distributions of provisions have ceased since the 23d. The

march on Knoxville is the more painful because it must be rapid. But the matter at stake is to carry assistance to comrades in peril—to spare the Army of the Ohio a disastrous capitulation, to the Federal cause a cruel humiliation: nobody complains; each one awaits with impatience the signal to depart. In the night Howard repairs the railway-bridge. The army clears it on the morning of December 1st, and after a march of fifteen miles reaches, on the evening of the same day, the little town of Athens. Long, who, having come the day before, was already on the road toward Columbus, was recalled in haste. During this time Granger has made an effort to repair the delay with which Grant has so sharply reproached him. Having started on the 29th from Chattanooga, he reached on the evening of the 30th the banks of the Hiawassee at Kincannon's Ferry, nearly ten miles below Charleston. A towboat having brought him several lighters, he crossed that river the ensuing day before noon, and on the evening of the 2d joined Sherman at Philadelphia. The latter finds himself at the head of eight divisions, for he has left no force at Charleston: since it was necessary to march to the assistance of Burnside, he wished to do so with forces sufficient to crush Longstreet if he could find the opportunity.

While the bulk of the army halts at Philadelphia, Howard, who leads the march, pushes in the direction of Loudon, hoping to surprise General Vaughn and seize the ponton-bridge that Longstreet established a month before at Hurst Ferry in the place of the viaduct, which was completely ruined. Long, who assumed at Sweetwater the duty of outposts, rapidly arrives at Loudon, having carried away on his march a part of the hostile outposts. But Vaughn is on his guard. Loudon, as we know, is on the southern bank of the Little Tennessee, and was, up to the 25th, in direct communication by the railway with the dépôts at Dalton: it was then Longstreet's base of operations against Knoxville. Hence, as early as the 30th, Vaughn has commenced to destroy the supplies of provisions which he has not been able to send to the besiegers. Thirty-eight wagons and three locomotives which are backed against the broken viaduct are loaded with provisions and run into the river. The balance of the provisions is distributed among the inhabitants. Vaughn, ready to recross the bridge,

receives the enemy with firmness and compels Long to halt for Howard. The latter, overtaken by night, has given some rest to his exhausted soldiers, and, although he started the next morning at four o'clock, he arrives too late. Vaughn, not being able to join Bragg, has received orders to fall back on Knoxville. During the night he abandons the town of Loudon, leaving behind him only about thirty wagons, of which he has broken the axles. After having destroyed the ponton-bridge he set out toward the north, and when Howard's troops reach the banks of the river they perceive on the right shore only a curtain of cavalry. The Union artillery opens fire nevertheless, in hopes that the sound of its pieces may be heard in Knoxville, for the fatal day has arrived when the provisions must fail in the place, and the relieving army has not yet crossed the Tennessee. It is necessary, at any cost, to warn Burnside of its approach, so that he may hold on, though famine be the cost. To this end, in the night of the 2d-3d, Sherman orders Colonel Long, accompanied by one of his aides-de-camp, to push forward in advance with the flower of his brigade, and not to allow himself to be halted by the enemy, by any obstacle, nor by fatigue until he has given news to the besieged. He is to ford the Tennessee above its confluence with the Holston, and to follow the left bank of that stream, which the enemy occupies in force at one point only.

The entire army will thus pass above that confluence. Sherman, apprised of Howard's delay, thought, of course, that the army would destroy the bridge during the night, and on the 3d at daybreak he caused Blair to take the road to Morgantown, a village situated to the north-east of Philadelphia, on the Little Tennessee, which he hopes to be able to ford. Granger is to follow the Fifteenth corps. Howard remains on the 3d at Loudon, whence he will likewise repair to Morgantown. But having ascertained the existence of a ford called Davis' Ford nearly eight miles below that town, on the road to Unitia, he obtains permission to try the crossing. He will thus spare his troops a great détour and gain one day's march. He immediately goes to work: the enemy's wagons being promptly repaired, are laden by the inhabitants, most of them Unionists, with boards intended for the construction of a foot-bridge. While one regiment crosses the Ten-

nessee by means of some boats at Hurst Ferry and picks up four abandoned guns, the One Hundred and Forty-third New York occupies Davis' Ford: the river at this place is two hundred and seventeen yards wide, the bottom hard, of uniform depth. The wagons, pushed one after another into the water, are ranged like pontoons and support a light flooring thrown across their length. The oblique direction which it was necessary to give to the bridge, extending its length to three hundred and twenty-two yards, renders the number of the wagons insufficient; they are supplemented by wooden trestles, the parts of which are cut and made on the spot, and the work, begun on the 4th in the evening, is finished during the night. A foot-bridge for the infantry connects the two shores; the water is low enough to allow the horses and the artillery to ford the river. On the 5th, in the forenoon, all the Eleventh corps is on the north of the Little Tennessee, and ascends the left bank of the Holston.

Sherman has experienced greater difficulties at Morgantown. The river has the same width as at Davis' Ford, but the bed of the ford, much cut up, presents various depths, which render impossible the crossing of the infantry and the artillery. It was thus necessary to establish a bridge, and the entire day on the 4th was occupied in this work under the direction of Wilson, the cavalry general, who on this occasion performed the duties of an engineer officer. Most of the houses in Morgantown are demolished, trees are felled, and on the evening of that very day a strong trestle-bridge affords a crossing to the Fifteenth corps, followed by its artillery and equipages. On the 5th, in the morning, Blair sets out on the Knoxville road with his three divisions. Granger and Davis are detained for a while by an accident which happened to the bridge, some of the trusses of which were ill secured for lack of bolts; but before the close of day Granger and Davis will form a third column that will halt between the Fifteenth corps, posted at Marysville, and the Eleventh, camped at Louisville. Therefore, the whole army has cleared the icy waters of the Little Tennessee. No obstacle separates it any longer from Knoxville, the bridges over the Holston being in friendly hands. But the delay fixed by Burnside expired forty-eight hours ago, and Sherman asks himself with anxiety whether, despite his diligence, he

shall not arrive too late. Happily, his uneasiness is soon dissipated: an officer who started from Knoxville on the preceding day joins him ere he leaves Morgantown, and brings him the reply to the messages which had been entrusted to Colonel Long. The latter arrived on the morning of the 4th at Knoxville, having reached the Holston bridge without encountering the hostile pickets. He found Burnside sufficiently supplied with provisions, through this way, to be enabled yet a long time to defy famine, and his army full of confidence, since the assault on Fort Sanders was so easily repulsed.

At the time when Long was announcing to Burnside his approaching deliverance the Confederates were making preparations for departure. As soon as Longstreet knew, by Vaughn, the approach of the Federal columns he understood that the time had come to raise the siege. Besides, Grant, believing that the capitulation of Knoxville was imminent, caused purposely to fall into his hands, to hasten his retreat, a despatch enumerating to Burnside all the forces sent to his aid: this ruse succeeded beyond the wishes of the Union general, for Longstreet, thus pressed, is going to take several days in advance of the troops intended to pursue him. Only one road remains open to him. While ascending the Holston he will find a country capable of supporting him, will cover a very vulnerable portion of Virginia, and will be able at the decisive time to bring back to Lee the soldiers who were taken away after the events at Gettysburg. The preparations for departure were made on the 2d, but Longstreet does not hurry, because in order to save Bragg it is necessary to draw Sherman beyond the Little Tennessee. The trains are put in motion on the 3d; the care of them is entrusted to Law's and Robertson's brigades, which, being recalled from their positions on the southwest of Knoxville, leave open the road taken by Long. This column follows the railway, and will ascend the right bank of the Holston to pass on the left at Strawberry Plains. The rest of the army begins to march in the night of the 4th-5th. McLaws and Johnson abandon the intrenchments opposed to Fort Sanders, join Jenkins to the northward of the place, and, passing beyond the range of the Federal works, take the Rutledge road. Martin with the cavalry, including his division and Giltner's and Jones'

brigades, is charged with the care of covering the retreat. At daybreak he evacuates the approaches, of which the Federal outposts immediately take possession. The Army of the Ohio is delivered, but Burnside cannot, with his forces alone, pursue Longstreet. Hence the latter is not molested in his first stage, and after a march of nineteen miles he reaches Blain's Cross-roads, where General Ransom awaits him. All his forces are collected at this point on the evening of the 5th.

The preparations for this retreat were known to Burnside as early as the 3d, and the despatches forwarded on the 4th informed Sherman of them. The latter, on learning that the Army of the Ohio is no longer in danger, grants for the morrow, the 6th, to most of his soldiers a necessary rest, and repairs to Knoxville with his corps commanders. He himself relates his astonishment when, entering a place which he believed to be reduced to the last extremities, he beheld a park filled with the finest cattle, and when afterward Burnside bade him sit down to a table abundantly served. He understands that the peril has been exaggerated, but, while regretting perhaps to have forced the march of his troops in spite of the bad season, he is not the man to lose his time in retrospective discussions. Haste must be made to despatch after Longstreet forces sufficient to drive him back as far as Virginia, and to send back to Chattanooga the troops which will not be necessary for this operation. For this purpose Sherman comes to take orders from Burnside, his superior officer by seniority. The latter thus finds himself at the head of a large army. He has from twelve to fifteen thousand men around him; Willcox has more than six thousand, the half of whom are on their way toward Knoxville; and Sherman brings nearly forty thousand. It is true that these sixty thousand men could not all undertake an active campaign against Longstreet; the artillery and the wagons of the Army of the Ohio are not supplied with animals, the Fifteenth corps has need of rest, and all the soldiers lack the things necessary to withstand the rigors of winter. However, there might be formed an active army of thirty thousand men, before which Longstreet would be obliged to beat a hasty retreat. Thus would be opened one of the doors to Virginia, through which Grant thinks, next spring, to penetrate the rear of General Lee's army. But Burnside, who

from day to day expects his successor, appears to be less concerned about the advantages of such a campaign than about the perils to which Sherman's prolonged absence may expose Grant. He imagines, very wrongly, that Bragg will avail himself of it to attempt an offensive return, and issues to Sherman a positive order to take back to Chattanooga all his forces save the Fourth corps. He calculates that this reinforcement will enable the Army of the Ohio to finish the pursuit of Longstreet.

Granger, after having cleared with Davis the Morgantown bridge in the evening of the 5th, pushed out the following day as far as the edge of the Little River, so as to be able promptly to join Burnside while the remainder of the army was resting. The Eleventh corps passed the day on the 6th at Louisville; the Fifteenth corps and Davis' division at Marysville. On the 7th, Sherman returns to take command of these forces: their task is accomplished, they will not go so far as Knoxville, but return by short marches on the road to Chattanooga.

We shall leave them for a moment to finish the recital of the incidents of which East Tennessee was the theatre during the last days of the year 1863.

General Parke, Burnside's chief of staff, set out on the 7th to follow up Longstreet with detachments of the Ninth and the Twenty-third corps, under the orders of Generals Potter and Manson. He is preceded by Shackelford's cavalry division, which recrossed on the 5th to the right bank of the Holston. On his side, Elliott, in pursuance of Grant's orders, proceeds from Alexandria to Kingston, where he will meet Spears' brigade, that is ascending the right bank of the Tennessee. But his march is delayed, and he joins the Army of the Ohio only in the middle of the month of December. In fine, Willcox, who occupies Cumberland Gap and its approaches with the Fourth division of the Twenty-third corps and three thousand horse under Garrard and Graham, has not lost an instant in trying to break, on the north side, the investment of Knoxville. His cavalry encamps at the foot of the mountain on the banks of Powell River. On the 27th, Graham is in motion; he crosses on the following day Clinch River, at Walker's Ford on the Rutledge road, and bivouacs a little farther on. Proceeding to the right on the

morning of the 29th, he halts again for the night in the village of Maynardsville, situate some twenty-five miles from Knoxville. It was then, on the 30th, four days after his departure, that he approached Knoxville and tried to penetrate into the place. His slowness has given the enemy time to be on their guard. Martin has sent a detachment of cavalry to Blain's Cross-roads to menace his left flank, while another detains his vanguard nearly eight miles from Knoxville. The *coup-de-main* failed, and Graham understood that he had to retire quicker than he had come. Immediately the Confederates sprang in pursuit of him. Happily, he succeeded in halting them all day in front of the neck through which the road from Maynardsville to Gravestown crosses Copper Ridge, and, the night having come, he rapidly fell back on Walker's Ford. But the two Confederate detachments, having united, are not long in attacking him. A sharp engagement takes place on the morning of the 2d a few miles from the ford. The Federals, though sharply pressed, succeed in crossing the river after having lost some fifty men, and reach their encampment on Powell River. Meanwhile, General Foster, who, after having succeeded Burnside in North Carolina, must again succeed him at Knoxville, arrived on the 30th of November at Cumberland Gap; but, enlightened by the non-success of Graham, he will resume the Knoxville road only with considerable force. Therefore he gets in motion only on the 6th to molest Longstreet, after hearing that the siege of Knoxville had been raised. His position enables him to fall on the left flank of the Confederate columns that are coming up the long and narrow valley of the Holston.

It is seen that Longstreet is surrounded by enemies. As firm in retreating as energetic in attacking, as skilful in taking the offensive to cover his retreat as he was well inspired in the choice of the direction given to his army, he will soon prove to the Federals how imprudent was Burnside in keeping with him only two of the divisions sent by Grant to his assistance. After having joined Ransom on the 5th at Blain's Cross-roads, he falls back on the next day as far as Rutledge. He soon perceives that he is not seriously pressed by Burnside, whose cavalry alone is after him, and that Foster has not yet left Cumberland Gap. He profits

by these facts to give a day of rest to his army. The most difficult part of the retreat having been accomplished, he separates from Martin's cavalry, that is instantly required by Bragg: it will proceed to join the latter by crossing the mountains of North Carolina. Jones' cavalry brigade crosses at Bean's Station¹ to the left bank of the Holston to cover his trains in motion and reconnoitre on that side for the flank of the principal column. The latter moves, *via* Mooresburg, on Rogersville, which it reaches in the daytime on the 9th. This point is the last stage in the retreat. In fact, Longstreet was not willing to take up his winter quarters at Rutledge, where the closeness of the hostile cavalry would have prevented him from dispersing his trains in quest of provisions. He has not here to fear the same danger. In occupying Rogersville and the defile of Bull's Gap he covers the two valleys of the Holston and the Nollichucky, a fertile country in which he will be able to subsist his army until spring. It will be all the easier for him to maintain himself there because, on the next day after his arrival, a despatch from President Davis came to authorize him to keep near him Martin's cavalry. The latter, who, fortunately, had not yet started out, immediately receives orders to remain in the neighborhood of Russellville between the Holston and the Nollichucky. The enemy must not be allowed to advance farther. The Federal cavalry only has been able closely to follow Longstreet in his retreat. Shackelford, who started in time, has marched on his tracks without trying to attack him, but picking up the stragglers, the deserters, the broken wagons, that in such a case an army leaves behind it. He thus arrived on the 8th at Bean's Station, where Martin detained him a few hours ere taking the road to the south. On the other hand, Foster started on the 6th, *via* Tazewell and Walker's Ford, toward the neck of Clinch Mountain, which opens out on Rutledge; but he found on the 7th this passage so strongly occupied that he did not dare to attack it, and proceeded to the south-west to reach Blain's Cross-roads by turning the extremity of the chain. While his infantry is making painful progress toward that point, where it will encounter the troops which have come from Knoxville, Garrard and Graham start ahead and join Shackelford before he has

¹ Notwithstanding its name, Bean's Station is not on a railway-line.

reached Bean's Station; but Parke, who has only just then set out, fearing lest the latter should involve himself in difficulty, sends him orders to halt. Shackelford therefore confines himself to sending out on the 9th reconnoitring-parties that follow Longstreet's rearguard to Mooresburg, and Martin's beyond the Holston. Martin's rearguard, formed by Jones' brigade, awaits the Federals in the village of Morristown, and abandons it to them only after a rather sharp engagement, in which the losses amount to some fifty men on each side. The main part of the cavalry is posted at Bean's Station, while the infantry reaches Blain's Cross-roads, where it comes to a halt also. Parke, having only some ten thousand foot-soldiers, does not dare to risk them further in the presence of so redoubtable an enemy as Longstreet.

He was right to be prudent, for Longstreet, as soon as he was authorized to keep Martin's cavalry, sought the opportunity to turn against his adversaries. On the 12th he learns that Sherman has left, that Burnside has sent insufficient forces after him, and that the Federal cavalry is isolated nearly twenty-five miles ahead of the infantry. He immediately decides to fall on Shackelford, who, with his four thousand horse, remains at Bean's Station in absolute security. All the infantry, with Johnson's division in front, will bear on that point by a direct march: Law, with the two brigades which have hitherto escorted the trains, finds himself nearly eight miles beyond Rogersville; he receives orders to join Jenkins' division. The cavalry, advancing on the two flanks and protected on the left by the river, on the right by the mountains, must endeavor to prevent the retreat of the enemy. Jones' two brigades, passing to the northward of Clinch Mountain, will occupy, at the neck of Bean's Station Gap, the Tazewell road, while Martin, who is to the southward of the Holston, will cross the river at Kelley's Ferry on the road from Morristown to Rutledge, to attack Shackelford in the rear if he should stand out against him, and quickly to pursue him if he retires. The troops are to take the road on the 13th, so that the attack be made in the morning of the 14th.

After a night-march of about twenty-one miles in a cold and heavy rain, the Confederate infantry arrive at the appointed time in sight of Bean's Station. The Federal troopers have taken no

precaution to send out reconnoitring-parties and to guard the approaches to their camps. However, measures for defence are promptly taken. Wolford's division, on the first line, rests against the houses of the village and checks the impetus of the assailants. These, exposed to its fire in a plain without shelter, experience severe losses. Longstreet waits in vain for his cavalry to turn the Federal positions. Martin, delayed in his progress, has not yet crossed the Holston; Jones, on the contrary, arrived too soon at Bean's Station Gap, captured some of the enemy's wagons, and retired, instead of waiting for the principal column. Shackelford, who has had time to recover from his surprise; forms his troops across the little valley of which Bean's Station occupies the centre: his left covers the defile. Meanwhile, the rest of the Southern infantry arrive in line. A fresh attack, sustained by a vigorous cannonade, causes the Federal right to give way, while Kershaw, at the head of McLaws' division, throws the left back into the mountain. Night comes to help the Unionists. The defenders of the village, who have held out until the last, avail themselves of the occasion to fall back in turn: they recover their horses and join the rest of the troops. The left wing escapes from Kershaw by following the crest of the mountain, and Shackelford, gathering his forces, establishes himself in a strong position somewhat in advance of Rutledge. The Union losses amount to about two hundred men; those of Longstreet, to two hundred and ninety. He cannot follow up the enemy closely, for he is without news from his cavalry and his infantry needs rest. However, on the morning of the 15th, while McLaws sends Humphreys' brigade into the mountain, Jenkins sets out and arrives promptly enough in front of the Federals' new positions. But these are on their guard and have covered their front with earthworks. Parke, who on the day before was between Blain's Cross-roads and Rutledge, has sent some reinforcements to Shackelford, and detached on the right Ferrero to watch Kelley's Ford. The latter arrives in time to prevent Martin from crossing the Holston and flanking the Union troops. Jenkins, having two brigades only, in vain asks McLaws to support him. Law does not come. Johnson, who remained at Bean's Station, is too distant. The day passes thus without the Confederates deciding to

attack, and, the night coming, Shackelford retires on Blain's Cross-roads, where Parke concentrates his forces to give battle. But Longstreet does not follow him beyond Rutledge. The season is so rigorous, provisions are so scarce, that McLaws and Law, whose energy is well known, remonstrate against the protraction of a campaign so hard on their men.

It would be useless, besides. In fact, on receiving intelligence of the action at Bean's Station, Foster, who replaced Burnside on the 12th, directed on Blain's Cross-roads all the forces he could withdraw from Knoxville. In a few days Parke thus finds himself at the head of twenty-six thousand men and in a condition to withstand all attacks. But the cold, that has already paralyzed the Confederates, does not permit him to molest Longstreet, who, after exhausting the neighborhood of Rutledge, quietly falls back on Russellville. The rich plateau of which Jonesborough is the centre will easily subsist his army during all the bad season.

Meantime, the Federals are not resigned to leave him master of a country which they had believed to be finally freed from the Confederate yoke. As soon as the fall of the waters of the Holston has rendered passable the fords in the neighborhood of Blain's Cross-roads, Parke sends his cavalry to the left shore at Nance's Ferry, and pushes it, *viâ* New Market, on the Russellville road, while at Strawberry Plains the railway-bridge over which will cross the infantry and the artillery is being repaired. General Sturgis, who has replaced Shackelford in the command of the cavalry, promptly reaches New Market, and on the 28th he advances with an infantry brigade of the Twenty-third corps to the railway-bridge on Mossy Creek. Martin, who had hastened to meet him with his two divisions, attacks him vigorously on the 29th. The Federals, posted beyond the stream, are soon reduced to the defensive: their artillery, seriously threatened, is saved only by the tenacity of the infantry and by a fortunate charge on the part of the First Tennessee cavalry. At last they succeed in repulsing the assailants, but they must await the arrival of Parke to resume the offensive.

In the mean time, Grant, leaving Nashville, to which his headquarters have been transferred, arrives at Knoxville on the 30th of December; he promptly recognizes that the Army of the Ohio

is not in a condition to undertake a winter campaign. The communications with Kentucky by the Cumberland Gap are so difficult that it has not been able to receive either the clothing, the provisions, or even the ammunition, which it would need. Supplies of provisions sent from Chattanooga by water to Kingston, and thence on wagons to Knoxville, arrived, it is true, on the 28th, but they are very insufficient, and Grant issues to Foster the order to suspend the campaign.

Besides, throughout the valley of the Tennessee the soldiers on both sides are more concerned about guarding against the cold than seeking fresh battles. Sherman's return has not been molested by the enemy. His columns took up the line of march in the morning of the 7th. Howard crossed the Little Tennessee at Davis' Ford, where he found the foot-bridge which he had constructed, and arrived at Athens on the 9th. He sent a brigade to Charleston to repair the bridge on the Hiawassee that a detachment of Confederate cavalry had partly destroyed. The rest of the army, after having cleared the Little Tennessee at Morgantown, proceeds more to the eastward : Davis and Ewing, *via* Madisonville, toward Columbus ; Blair, with the two other divisions of the Fifteenth corps, moves on Tellico at the base of the high bluff called Unaka Mountain. Finally, Long with his troopers, crossing this chain, pursues beyond Murphy, on the banks of the Hiawassee, a large train intended for Longstreet, who has thrown himself into the mountains of North Carolina. The army, slowly advancing into a country the resources of which are yet intact, gathers the cattle and grain necessary for its subsistence. Most of the soldiers are exemplary in their bearing and strict discipline : only the Eleventh corps, largely composed of German soldiers, who have brought with them across the sea the spirit of the old lansquenets, distinguishes itself by acts of pillage which the efforts of the honest and religious Howard fail to suppress.

On the 14th the entire army is massed on the banks of the Hiawassee. Long has come back without having reached the train he was seeking, but his manœuvre has rendered uneasy the Confederates. He establishes himself at Calhoun, in front of Charleston, on the Hiawassee, so as to protect, in concert with Elliott, the overland road and the railway from Knoxville to

Chattanooga. Sherman will bring back the rest of his troops to this last town. His columns, which are following only one road along the railway, by Cleveland and Tyner's Station, reach on the 16th and 17th the battlefield of November 24th. Davis' division is immediately returned to the Fourteenth corps: Howard joins Hooker in Will's Valley; and Blair, meeting with his fourth division under Osterhaus, conducts the Fifteenth corps to Bridgeport, where Sherman has established his headquarters. Grant has resolved to scatter his armies during the bad season in order the easier to subsist them, and to form at the same time a cordon able to resist a raid by the enemy's cavalry, the only operation which he may attempt just now. Leaving to Thomas all the region between Bridgeport and Chattanooga, he instructs Sherman to post the Fifteenth corps, whose command General Logan has just assumed, on the railway which borders the Tennessee from Stevenson as far as Decatur. Dodge, recently arrived at Pulaski with a detachment of the Sixteenth corps which is almost equivalent to two divisions, will occupy the railway connecting Decatur with Nashville. Thus shall be preserved two lines of supply, without counting that by the river.

The position of the Confederate Army of the Tennessee will not take long to describe. We left it on the day following the battle at Ringgold covered by Cleburne, who occupied Tunnel Hill, and massed at Dalton, unable for a time to give the least trouble to its adversaries. This command, so valiant, is greatly discouraged. Desertion increases so that Grant is obliged to take special steps to return to their country the deserters belonging to the States of Kentucky and Tennessee: official Southern documents acknowledge more than ten thousand of them since the 1st of November. All pretexts are good for quitting the ranks. The number of soldiers on furlough increases to more than three thousand; that of men on detailed service, to nearly two thousand. Still, there are yet under arms on the 10th of December thirty-eight thousand seven hundred and forty-four infantry, three thousand three hundred and sixty-nine artillerists, and nearly eight thousand cavalry—say, about fifty thousand men—with one hundred and fourteen pieces of

artillery. But rolling-stock and camp-equipage are lacking, the ammunition is not sufficient; the provisions come in with difficulty, because the farmers in Georgia refuse to exchange them for Confederate scrip. Above all, the army will no longer brook the leader whom it makes, not without reason, responsible for its misfortunes. Mr. Davis understands that he can no longer leave Bragg at the head of the army, but, with a sort of defiance of public opinion, he summons him to Richmond to occupy a position analogous to that of general chief of staff, which Lee left vacant nearly two years before. In fine, he gives him for a successor General Hardee, better known by his writings on tactics than by his services on the battlefield. But at the end of eight days, on the 18th of December, this time better inspired, he replaces him by the illustrious general who was vegetating in Mississippi, useless and almost in disgrace, at the head of a skeleton army. Johnston, relinquishing his command to Polk, immediately takes the road to Dalton. He reaches this last point on the 26th of December, and finds the Army of the Tennessee still more weakened since Bragg left it. In fact, the two brigades of Quarles and Baldwin have returned to Meridian, while the bad weather is painfully trying upon the troops encamped around Dalton.

We have arrived at the close of the year 1863. However, before terminating this chapter, we must say a few words about the operations of the Confederate cavalry. We left Johnston's cavalry divided between Chalmers and S. D. Lee, who, one to the west, the other to the east, of Eastport, have vainly endeavored to interrupt Sherman's march. It received shortly thereafter an important reinforcement. Forrest, sent off by Bragg, had arrived on the 15th of November at Okalona with some two hundred and fifty men. This small force was to serve as a nucleus to the corps of partisans whom he proposed to raise in the very midst of the hostile lines.

West Tennessee, comprised between the Tennessee River and the Mississippi, forms a vast rectangle, of which the railway from Memphis to Corinth is the southern side. It is a fertile country, which was then cultivated by numerous slaves, and the white population of which was therefore passionately devoted to

the Southern cause. It had furnished since the outbreak of the war a very large contingent to the Confederate cavalry. Forrest enjoys in that country a great popularity among the young men, who have remained grouped into small partisan bands waging war on their own account, and he counts upon collecting them around him to form a division and take it to Johnston. The plan of his expedition is promptly arranged with the latter and S. D. Lee. Three brigades of Confederate cavalry guard the northern part of the State of Mississippi; they are posted *en échelon* on the left bank of the Tallahatchie, from New Albany as far as Panola. On the other hand, the Federals strongly occupy the line of railway from Memphis to Corinth, which it is proposed to force. Grierson, the Union general, whose headquarters are at La Grange, has distributed his three cavalry brigades along that line and watches the crossings on the Wolf River, an important stream which flows from Grand Junction to Memphis, and of which the railway follows the left bank. The principal stations are fortified, and in the last-named city Hurlbut holds himself in readiness promptly to bring forward his infantry on any point menaced by the enemy.

Forrest counts for his expedition on the mounted brigade of Tennesseans recently raised by General Richardson; this command, estimated at two thousand men, is reduced, however, by desertions to two hundred and fifty combatants. It is therefore with five hundred mounted men that he takes the road; he is followed only by two guns and four wagons. But General Lee accompanies him to help pierce the hostile line, and crosses with him on the 3d of December the Tallahatchie River. Ferguson's and Ross' brigades, accompanied by Forrest, meet at Ripley a portion of Chalmers' brigades, while this general, with the rest of his men, leaves Panola to make a demonstration against the railway on the west of La Grange. The main column reaches the line at Salisbury on the morning of the 4th. The Federal outposts, sharply pressed by Ferguson, are quickly thrown back upon the detachment that guards the road at this point. This force vainly tries to resist Lee's artillery: it is obliged to fall back in great haste, leaving the way clear to Forrest.

To cover this manœuvre, Lee bears to the west with Ross' bri-

gade, and, avoiding the well-fortified post of La Grange, vigorously attacks in the evening of the same day the post of Moscow. He is repulsed with loss, and retires without having been able to destroy the railway-bridge over one of the branches of Wolf River. But this demonstration, and that made by Chalmers at the same time against Collierville, divert the attention of the Federals, and Forrest arrives at Jackson without having been molested. Colonel Bell was waiting for him there with a small body of troops raised in the country. Received with open arms by the people, Forrest restores the fortified enclosure around that town, which, since the breaking out of the war, has been used alternately by both parties. He assigns to Richardson the western districts, with Brownsville for the centre, and both set about recruiting men and horses, picking up wagons and provisions, as though they were not on all sides surrounded by the Federals.

Although they could not be ignorant of his presence at Jackson, the latter leave him alone for more than a fortnight. They are no doubt biding their time to close against him the return road, and do not wish to remove any force from the Memphis and Corinth Railway, which Lee's troopers are always threatening. Finally, toward the 15th of December they make ready to attack him. A column of infantry and cavalry, under the orders of General A. J. Smith, leaves Columbus on the Mississippi and proceeds toward the south against Jackson. A few days thereafter two brigades—one of cavalry under Mizner, the other of infantry under Mower—which were at Corinth start toward the north-west to bar the passage to Forrest as soon as Smith's manœuvre shall have determined his retreat. Colonel Prince, with several régiments of cavalry, has posted himself to the northward of the Memphis and Corinth Railway to cover the approaches thereto. He has established his headquarters at Sommerville, and pushes his outposts as far as the left bank of the Hatchie. Thomas gave on the 20th the order to General Cook, who commanded the second cavalry division of the Army of the Cumberland, to quit Huntsville with his two brigades, leaving the care of guarding the railways to Sherman's troops, and to move rapidly toward the north-west, *vid* Prospect on the

Elk River, to head off Forrest if he should cross the Tennessee River.

The time has come for the latter quickly to return to the State of Mississippi. He has collected nearly four thousand men, well mounted, but badly armed and little inured to war: his forty wagons of provisions, his droves of beeves and swine, are going to impede his progress. It is with inexperienced recruits and with cattle instead of artillery that he will have to escape from the flying columns of the Federals.

On the 22d he hears that Smith's column has appeared on the north, at Trenton and at McLemoresville—that of Mizner on the south-east, at Jack's Creek. He immediately adopts a course of action. Richardson's brigade shall open the march toward the south: it shall leave Jackson on the 23d in the morning, and shall pass over the Hatchie at Estenaula. It shall be followed, one day's march apart, by the trains, the drove of live-stock, and all men without arms, escorted by Colonel Bell and his troopers. About five hundred combatants under the orders of Colonel Wisdom shall go by Mifflin to meet Mizner, who, fearing the overflowing of the Hatchie, has followed the right bank of this stream, and has thus moved away from Prince. Their task is to detain him as long as possible. Forrest with the rest of his troops shall follow the train, ready to go wherever danger may call him.

On the 24th, Richardson, after having crossed the Hatchie, was continuing his route with one regiment, when he encountered Colonel Prince, who was hurrying from Bolivar to meet him at the head of the Seventh Illinois. After watching each other for a moment, the two forces spring to the charge, but the Federals, being more numerous and better drilled, in an instant disperse their adversaries. These rally at Estenaula, near the rest of the brigade, that Prince, arriving in the night, does not dare to attack.

However, Wisdom has well fulfilled his part. He encountered the Federals on the 24th in the morning near Mifflin, attacked them briskly, and, after having engaged them all day in a skirmish, when he saw himself almost surrounded by superior forces he suddenly took the road to the south-west. Leaving the

Union cavalry uncertain as to whether it will follow this route or that to Jackson, he marches all night, clears the Hatchie below Bolivar, and will again meet his chief on the 25th.

The latter, as soon as he saw the trains on the road, started ahead with his cavalry after being the last to leave Jackson, and arrived at Estenaula during the night of the 24th-25th. The reverse which befell Richardson proves that he has before him a serious adversary. Instead of avoiding him, he makes up his mind to attack him with all his force while the enemy coming from Columbus and Corinth is yet to the northward of the Hatchie. If he can pass Prince's command, he will be enabled to cross Wolf River and the railway near Memphis; that is to say, far to the westward of the point where the Federals await him. In the morning of the 25th, while Bell causes the wagons, the drove of live-stock, and the recruits to pass over on a ferryboat, the only one found at Estenaula, Forrest divides his forces into two columns to attack the village of Sommerville, to which Prince had retired during the night. Richardson, whose force increases at every step, sleeps at Whiteville, so as to come up with the Federals the next morning by the Bolivar road. Forrest will follow the direct Estenaula road to fall on their left flank when the battle has commenced. This plan is faithfully carried out. Prince, although not expecting the attack on that side, quickly places himself on the defensive: his men, being sheltered, easily hold Richardson. But the sight of the latter's recruits without arms, who have deployed at a distance, begins to trouble them, and a charge by Forrest, who arrives at that moment, scatters them in every direction. Prince himself narrowly escapes, and, though he has lost but forty men out of five hundred, the Seventh Illinois will not be collected together for three or four days. Forrest does not ask anything more, because it only remains for him to deceive Colonel Hatch, who guards the crossings of Wolf River.

The latter, being badly informed, has just concentrated his brigade around La Grange. Forrest, marching in a contrary direction, proceeds toward Memphis. His wagons have come up with him: it is now proposed to find the weak point in the enemy's line. A Confederate officer, Colonel Logwood, who was

scouting the country in search of recruits, came to designate it to him very opportunely at the moment when he had reached the village of Oakland. All the bridges across Wolf River had been destroyed save one. That of La Fayette had been preserved for communication with Prince; only a few boards from the flooring had been taken off. They were deposited upon the left bank in front of a little fort which commanded the entrance to the bridge, and were replaced when a force presented itself to cross over. Logwood, who had himself gathered this information, had ascertained the small number of the defenders of this work. Forrest resolved to surprise them and thus secure a crossing for his train. He had just sent Major Strange with seven hundred men to make a demonstration toward Memphis: after having passed across Wolf River at Raleigh, Strange was to follow the Grenada Railway as far as Como, the general rendezvous. Two hundred men went to the westward to attract the attention of the enemy to La Grange. During this time Bell started out with an equal force to take possession of the La Fayette bridge. Forrest, who had reserved for himself the most difficult task, was marching as rapidly as possible on his tracks while escorting the wagons.

On the 27th, at eleven o'clock in the morning, Bell reached, without being perceived, the approaches to the bridge. His men, springing upon the stationary beams, clear the bridge without minding the volley of musketry fired by the small garrison. They come upon the fort before the Federals have time to reload their pieces. The moment they jump upon the parapet the latter escape on the other side and scatter in all directions. At four o'clock the bed of the bridge is restored, and Forrest's entire column crosses over.

Smith and Mizner are distanced. However, the wagons have so much trouble in making headway that Grierson may yet catch up with them and strip Forrest of his booty. In order to deceive him, the latter leads on the westward Richardson's brigade against Collierville, and despatches on the east a small detachment that, after having come up with the enemy, shall retire along the railway. In the mean time, the train with its escort is to proceed rapidly toward the south. Forrest's ruse succeeded

all the better because he left at La Fayette soldiers who, disguised as countrymen, gave Grierson false information. The latter brought Hatch's brigade by rail from La Grange to Moscow. Mizner follows him the next day. He soon finds Forrest's tracks, and allows himself to be guided by them without suspecting the road taken by the train. The Union vanguard closely presses the Confederate troopers, and follows them, while exchanging musket-shots, to a point in front of Collierville. In spite of the reinforcement he finds in the garrison of this post, Grierson does not wish to risk a battle in the night. Before daybreak Forrest escapes from him in the direction of Mount Pleasant, where he finds his wagons on the morning of the 28th. Hatch, who has been close on his heels, catches up with him near Hudsonville, but, not daring to attack him with one brigade, waits for Mizner; but when both together resumed the chase they could not gain on the enemy. At last they came to a halt, on the 1st of January, near Holly Springs. The two commands, then turning round, proceeded by short marches, the Federals toward Wolf River, and the Confederates toward the Tallahatchie, on the other side of which Forrest, henceforth at the head of a complete division, took up a position with the rest of General Lee's cavalry.

At the eastern extremity of Tennessee the year closes also with a cavalry fight. Bragg's army includes not less than fourteen thousand men, formed in four divisions. Two of them, under Martin, have followed Longstreet. The other two, commanded by Wharton and Kelly, remained to the northward of Dalton after the battle of Missionary Ridge. Wheeler came to resume the command of them about the 1st of December. During Sherman's entire campaign in East Tennessee he had no other anxiety than to cover on that side the vanquished army: the detachment that he pushed as far as Charleston was, as we have seen, promptly driven back by Howard. But after Sherman's return to Chattanooga he sought to molest the communications between that place and Knoxville. A long train of wagons, carrying provisions and the baggage of the Fourth corps, and escorted by the convalescents who were going to rejoin this corps, was leaving Chattanooga under the orders of Colonel Laiboldt, the same who commanded one of Sheridan's brigades in the battle of the Chickamauga.

Wheeler, informed of its departure, starts to seek it with Kelly's division. But Laiboldt, who had marched quickly, notwithstanding the bad condition of the roads, arrived on the 27th of December at Charleston ere the Southern troopers, who started too late, could come up with him. The bridge over the Hiawassee is guarded by Long's brigade, that Sherman left at Calhoun. On the morning of the 28th, at the moment when the train was commencing to pass over the river, Wheeler appeared before Charleston and sharply attacked the infantry that was covering the crossing. The latter, being surprised, began to fall back, but Laiboldt resumes the fight, and Long, hurrying up with a handful of troopers, completes the rout of the Confederates, who leave more than a hundred prisoners in his hands. The Federal losses are insignificant; the wagons reach Knoxville without molestation, and Wheeler returns to his encampment. All along the line, from Cumberland Gap to Memphis, the new year, which opens in the midst of a very rigorous season, then finds the belligerents on both sides inactive. Their bold troopers forget for some weeks, near their great fires of cedar and pine, the trials and fatigues of the service in outposts. We shall leave them for the present enjoying this manner of truce, which secures to them a well-merited rest.

CHAPTER II.

CHARLESTON.

AFTER having related the campaigns of which Virginia and the Valley of the Tennessee were the theatres during the latter half of the year 1863, we must devote a chapter to the operations of the Federals on the long seaboard of the Southern States during the same period. As the title of the chapter indicates, the siege of Charleston, which forms an incident quite independent of these campaigns, alone presents an important interest, and it will take up the greater part of this chapter. Nevertheless, not to omit any fact, we will resume the division adopted in the third chapter of the first book in the third volume, of which this is a sequel, and we shall speak in succession of the four naval divisions which blockaded the Southern States under the name of squadrons—viz. the North Atlantic, the South Atlantic, the East Gulf, and the West Gulf.

The first, which is always under the orders of Admiral Lee, confines itself, since the Confederates raised the siege of Suffolk, to blockading the coasts of Virginia and North Carolina. Unimportant expeditions up the rivers that cut these coasts, and the destruction of some blockade-runners at the entrance to Wilmington, the only important port that the Federal ships have to watch, break the monotony of the blockade along these inhospitable shores.

The official reports mention three large steamers surprised by the blockading fleet at the moment when, with rich cargoes, they were going to enter Wilmington. All three of them ran aground—the *Kate* on the 12th of July, the *Hebe* on the 18th of August, and the *Venus* on the 21st of October. The first, after having been cannonaded by the Federals, was taken off by their adversaries on July 30th, but at the instant when the latter were going to take it

into friendly waters the fleet intervened and seized the steamer. The *Hebe* brought ill-luck to the Federals. These, seeing the vessel abandoned by the crew, who had reached the shore in spite of the heavy weather, wished to seize it, so as to make sure of its destruction, but their boats capsized, leaving some fifteen men on the wreck. Soon a Confederate battery of artillery was posted on the shore, and, supported by skilful sharpshooters, its fire obliged the Union sailors, deprived of all assistance, to jump overboard and swim for the beach to surrender. Taught by this experience, the blockading fleet contented itself, when the *Venus* went aground, with destroying it with cannon-shot.

The enumeration of the expeditions undertaken inland will be brief. From the 24th–30th of June several vessels, ascending the Pamunkey River, supported Keyes' demonstration against Richmond, of which we have spoken in the preceding volume. On the 22d of August a dash skilfully executed by Lieutenant Cushing—whose gallantry we have again occasion to mention—ensured the destruction of a hostile schooner, the *Alexander Cooper*, at New Topsail Inlet, near Wilmington. Cushing, causing a yawl to be carried by hand over the sandhills, embarked with seven men, proceeded on the inland waters, surprised the Confederates, made ten of them prisoners, and destroyed the schooner. The ship's papers revealed to him a fact really curious and of a nature to make the Americans less exacting in their claims against the violation of the blockade by neutral nations. The *Alexander Cooper* was a blockade-runner fitted out in New York, and, having been consigned ostensibly to Port Royal, had availed itself of the solitude of the ocean to run in one of the coves of North Carolina occupied by the Confederates, expecting thus to realize larger profits on its cargo.

Reconnoissances of the Roanoke River made on the 6th of July, of the James River on the 5th and 6th of August, of the Piankatank River in Virginia on the 11th of August and the 7th of October, were not marked by any incident, and had no other result than costing the lives of several men. The Federals did not succeed in reaching a vessel that their adversaries were building on the Roanoke River, the light draught of which placed it beyond the range of the former's guns: public rumor had repre-

sented it as being an ironclad formidably armed. There was truth in the rumor, and we shall see the vessel in the ensuing year at work under the name of the *Albemarle*.

We shall leave the North Atlantic squadron, which has lost one vessel only, the *Sumter*—foundered accidentally on the 24th of June—to pass on to the squadron blockading Charleston, and of which Admiral Dahlgren, arrived on the 4th, has just taken the command on the 6th of July. Henceforth it shall not have to fight alone against the formidable works which defend the approaches to Charleston. The Washington Government, taught by experience, has decided to undertake a regular siege of that place, in which the land and sea forces shall render mutual assistance. It has understood that, despite their precious qualities, the monitors cannot, like the fabled salamander, move with impunity in the midst of fire and defy all the offensive and defensive engines of the besieged in order to reach the docks of the rebel city. It is necessary to reduce the forts, and not merely to brave them; to do which the Unionists cannot dispense with the steady fire of siege batteries, nor with the bayonets of soldiers, who at the decisive hour will take possession of the hostile works.

The circumstances were particularly favorable to the operations that Gillmore and Dahlgren were going to undertake. When DuPont attacked Charleston in the month of April, Beauregard, who commanded the forces on the coasts of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, had more than thirty thousand men under his orders: the garrison at Charleston was upward of eleven thousand. But to create Johnston's army in Mississippi and reinforce Lee's to attempt to save Vicksburg and invade Pennsylvania, it had been necessary to weaken a portion of the coast garrisons, and, on July 10, Beauregard's total forces were reduced to 15,318 men, of whom there were 5206 infantry, 5794 artillery, and 4316 cavalry; the latter could not be of help to him. The garrison at Charleston had dwindled to 2462 infantry, 2839 artillery, and 560 cavalry—say, adding the officers, about six thousand men. It is true that it could be promptly reinforced by two or three thousand from the garrison at Savannah. It was, withal, full of ardor

and commanded by eminent leaders. Beauregard, on account of his science and inventive genius, was better able than anybody else to direct the great operations about to commence with an enemy provided with iron-clad vessels and arms so new as rifled ordnance. Therefore, since the battle of April 7th he had sought to offset the weakness of the garrison by completing batteries which formed the second and third lines of defence—a necessary precaution, because provision had to be made for the loss of the first line. According to his own testimony, these two inner lines were not, at the date of April 7th, in a condition to resist the attacks of the monitors if they had succeeded in passing beyond Fort Sumter after having silenced its fire. It was no longer the same at the end of June. The works we described in the third volume had been enlarged, completed, and armed: new batteries were rising around the harbor and commanded every access to it.

The Federal Government, which had perhaps lost the opportunity of taking Charleston by a naval dash, having allowed DuPont to pass in the most absolute inaction the months of April, May, and June, so well employed by the defenders of Charleston, did not seem to have suspected the numerical weakness of the latter, who were presenting it a fair chance to approach the place by land. On the coasts of the three States which Beauregard had to defend, and which were also included within the command of Gillmore, the latter found an effective force of 17,463 combatants. Out of this number he could collect ten thousand infantry and one thousand artillery before Charleston. It was a small force, and the Government took care to inform him that this figure could not be increased; but they led him into error by adding that it was superior to that of the garrison.

The difference, however, was not great enough to have enabled Gillmore, better informed, to attempt a campaign inland so as to reach Charleston by turning the defences of the harbor. It would have been imprudent thus to move away from the sea, his base of operations. But while remaining within range of the fleet he had the choice of three points of attack: He could land, to the northward of the bar, upon the sandy beach of Sullivan's Island and besiege Fort Moultrie. This operation presented great

difficulties, because there was no easy landing-place, and it would have been necessary to transport to Sullivan's Island all the forces collected at the south on Folly Island ; but in case of success the manœuvre would have had decisive results. The Federals, if they had taken Moultrie, would have become masters of the passes and could have promptly demolished Fort Sumter. They might yet resume on the lowlands of James Island the campaign of General Benham, interrupted in the preceding autumn by the reverse at Secessionville. If they had succeeded in seizing this island, they would have effected a landing in the very harbor of Charleston, and, turning all the exterior defences of the place, would have compelled Beauregard to evacuate it. The opinion of the latter is that this operation would have had the best chances of success, and that he had not the force necessary to make it fail. Gillmore would not attempt it : the ground of James Island, cut up with bayous and sloughs, was easy to defend ; the Confederates would quickly have thrown up numerous works, and there accumulated the greater part of their force and artillery. In order to conduct regular approaches against the place he preferred, with reason, to select a point where he would have the powerful co-operation of the guns from the fleet. Hence the objective point of his attack could only be Fort Wagner. To land on Morris Island it was only necessary to cross the narrow channel, called Lighthouse Inlet, which separates this island from Folly Island, occupied in force by the Federals. To the southward of Folly Island the estuary of Stono Inlet offered the fleet a pretty safe anchorage and good landing-places, since the Confederates had abandoned the works raised on the point of Cole's Island. The base of operations was, then, assured. The long and narrow sandy spit which forms Morris Island was separated on the west from the mainland by impassable sloughs. The waters which bounded it on the east were deep enough to enable the monitors to come near it within good cannon-range, since the main channel lay along the island at a distance varying from 2167 yards at the bar up to 1301 at Fort Wagner. Once established on the southern extremity of the island, the Federals might then advance toward this fort in full security, protected on one side by the sloughs against an offensive return on the part of

the enemy, and assured that on the other side the fleet would attack in the rear all his exterior works of defence. Under these circumstances Gillmore thought he could count on the fall of Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg, situated farther at the extremity of Cumming's Point. Master of these positions, he was calculating to establish there his heavy artillery to batter in breach and reduce Fort Sumter in spite of the distance, as he had reduced Fort Pulaski. If he could not force the enemy to evacuate, he hoped at least to silence his fire. Then war was commenced, according to the plan elaborated at Washington, the rôle assigned to the navy. While Gillmore with his small force was contenting himself with occupying Morris Island, the monitors, having no longer to fear the plunging fire of Sumter's barbette guns, were to push into the very harbor of Charleston, clearing the inside passes of all the obstacles that Beauregard had accumulated there. This last part of the programme was somewhat chimerical, because the powerful artillery that the Confederates could place on these interior lines of defence, the cables stretched in all directions to embarrass the screws of the propellers, and the torpedoes everywhere scattered in profusion would have rendered the execution of it singularly difficult. On the other hand, batteries placed on Morris Island, owing to the distance, could not have bombarded Charleston. The capture of these positions could therefore be considered only as a first step, and to continue the regular siege a considerable army would have been required. But by occupying Morris Island the Federals would have obtained more important results than by the capitulation even of the city. The guns on Cumming's Point enabled a few vessels stationed in the pass to completely close the entrance to the port; they thus replaced the blockading fleet and the armored ships of the squadron, which could give battle elsewhere, and took away from Charleston all its importance. It was even better not to capture the city, for to defend it there were thus detained several thousand soldiers who might serve the Confederacy more usefully elsewhere.

From the 12th of June, the day he took command of the military department of the South, Gillmore busied himself in concentrating at Hilton Head and on Folly Island all the forces intended for operations against Charleston. To accomplish this, a

number of small posts were evacuated. The landing on Morris Island, the first step in that singular siege, was difficult and perilous. The landing-point was limited to the southern extremity of the island: if the enemy should finish the fortifications which he had commenced, and should place in them a good garrison, the disembarkation would become impossible. Hence it was necessary to conceal with great care all the preparations. Folly Island, bounded on the north-east by the pass of Lighthouse Inlet and on the south-west by that of Stono Inlet, is separated from the mainland by a winding arm of the sea called Folly River: the island is timbered, except in its north-east portion, which, being bare and very narrow, terminates in sandhills covered with brushwood and palmettoes. Vogdes' brigade, which occupied the island, had furrowed it with roads. This force was charged with the task of constructing ten batteries on the sandhills in the neighborhood of Lighthouse Inlet, intended to cover the projected debarkation on the opposite extremity of Morris Island. During three weeks, beginning on the 17th of June, this work was prosecuted in the night, in the greatest silence, and with all requisite precautions not to arouse the attention of the enemy. During these short summer nights the sandhills were excavated so as to shelter the cannon; the wooden platforms, the gun-carriages, and the ammunition, landed in Stono Inlet, were brought to the batteries across the island. The sandhills and the brushwood masked by day the work thus accomplished; but, in order not to betray it, it was necessary to throw dry sand upon that which had been freshly turned up, and the color of which was altered by the dampness. When it was necessary to cut through a tree, instead of felling it they set it up as near as possible to the spot where it formerly stood. The better to lull the enemy, the Federals allowed him to break up under their eyes, a few hundred yards from their batteries, the hulk of a blockade-runner, the *Ruby*, which had grounded a short time before at the entrance of Lighthouse Inlet. In fine, they affected to labor actively at the works constructed on the south end of Folly Island. Beauregard suspected, it is true, that his adversary meditated a dash on Morris Island. As early as the 25th of June he had given warning of it to his government that was asking him for

more troops, believing the Federals to be on the defensive. But he lacked the means to prepare an effectual resistance. Being obliged to furnish garrisons for the forts and to occupy the long lines of works thrown up on James Island, he had been able to collect on Morris Island only eight or nine hundred men. The slaves whom he called for not having been furnished to him in sufficient numbers by the local authorities, the white troops, little accustomed to hard labor, had not been able entirely to do the work of the blacks. Two batteries—one on Vincent's Creek, an arm of the sea bounding the northern part of the island, and the other on Block Island, a hummock rising in the midst of sloughs—were to sweep the two extremities of Morris Island, and there was constructed a bridge connecting Morris Island with James Island, to enable the troops that occupied these two islands to support one another. These works were not completed. Besides, the Federals so well lulled the vigilance of their adversaries that Beauregard, writing his report fifteen months later, still believed that all the preparations for the attack had been made within the last two days. All, on the contrary, had been prepared long beforehand: the batteries, carefully masked, were armed and provided with two hundred rounds of ammunition. Almost all of Gillmore's forces were collected on the island—namely, Terry's division, four thousand strong, and that of Seymour, including the brigades of Vogdes and Strong, the first being established a long time on the island, the second counting two thousand five hundred combatants, and among them a negro regiment, the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts. In the night from the 8th–9th the Federals had opened a passage through a boom established by the enemy across Folly River. By means of a saw placed at the end of a crossbeam with two branches and moved by two boats they had cut, about three yards under water, the posts which obstructed the channel. A number of boats sufficient to carry fifteen hundred men had been collected in this bayou. Notwithstanding the observatories built on Morris Island, the enemy had not perceived any of these preparations. On the 9th only, having noticed unusual movements of troops, Colonel Graham, who commanded on the island, asked for reinforcements from Charleston. They were to come too late.

In the evening of the same day the greater part of Strong's brigade embarked in the boats of which we have spoken, and about fifteen launches belonging to the fleet, themselves loaded with troops, took them in tow. The flotilla, clearing the breach opened in the piles, and following, with the rising tide, the sinuous course of Folly River, debouched at daybreak into the deeper waters of Lighthouse Inlet, where it hid under the shelter of the tall reeds bordering the eastern shore. A few minutes afterward the forty-seven pieces posted on Folly Island, which were unmasked during the night, opened fire, at the same time, on the southern extremity of Morris Island. Colonel Graham hurried to take defensive measures. He had eleven pieces of large calibre, with three hundred and fifty artillerymen and as many infantry. Having perceived the hostile flotilla rather far up the stream on Lighthouse Inlet, he supposed, not without reason, that the Federals would follow a bayou running between Block Island and Morris Island, to land near an old lighthouse on a spit called Oyster Point, so as to attack in the rear the batteries placed upon the southern extremity of the island. He sent his infantry in that direction, while his artillerymen responded as best they could to the artillery of the Federals.

But the latter soon received a powerful reinforcement. As early as four o'clock in the morning Admiral Dahlgren, hoisting his flag on the *Catskill*, passed over the Charleston bar with four monitors; he approached Lighthouse Inlet, and when abreast of the hostile batteries, getting his ships to bear broadside on, he soon covered them with shells. Two hours have thus elapsed; it is nearly eight o'clock in the morning, and the decisive moment has come. While some boats, supported by launches from the fleet armed with howitzers, make a demonstration on Oyster Point, and detain on that side the bulk of the hostile forces, all the rest of Strong's brigade moves down toward the sea; the launches, leaving the boats they were towing, quickly throw upon the beach of Morris Island the troops they were carrying, and return to bring the boats containing the rest of the brigade. The landing is promptly executed in front of the Federal batteries. These remain silent, and an instant afterward the Confederate cannoneers are surrounded by a swarm of enemies: most of them are taken or

killed at their pieces, which remain in the hands of the assailants. The boats return to Folly Island to get the remainder of Strong's brigade, while the Federal infantry, hurrying up, threaten to attack Graham at Oyster Point at once in flank and in front. The latter has only time to fall back, rallying the fragments of his troops. Fortunately for him, a tardy reinforcement of some hundred men comes to cover this retreat, which ceases only on the glacis of Fort Wagner. For him the struggle has been bloody and disastrous, for he has lost two hundred and ninety-four men, nearly the half of his effective force. After having followed him far enough, the Federals, broken down by the heat of the day, come to a halt for rest. The monitors, on the contrary, harass him with their large projectiles up to a short distance from Fort Wagner.

The undertaking by the Federals was hazardous, but it was well calculated, and it proved a complete success. This success was due, in fact, to a happy diversion by General Terry. He embarked on the 8th on transports, which, ascending Stono River, deposited on the ensuing day almost all his strong division on the low beach of James Island. Posted with nearly four thousand men between Grimbald's Cross-roads and Secessionville, supported on his two flanks by gunboats in the waters of Stono River and Big Folly Creek, he was seriously menacing Beauregard, who could not consider his presence as being simply a demonstration. The latter was obliged to reinforce the garrison on James Island, and could not send to Morris Island the troops that might have foiled the debarkation of Strong's brigade.

Another demonstration ordered by Gillmore to prevent Beauregard from drawing troops from Savannah did not succeed so well. Colonel Higginson embarked on the same date with a negro regiment, the First South Carolina, on transports to ascend by the South Edisto River and the Pawpaw River as far as Jacksonboro', where he was to cut the Savannah and Charleston Railroad. The attempt failed, like those which, to reach the same end, had previously been directed against the bridges at Coosawhatchie and Salkehatchie: the narrowness of the rivers and the distance rendered all these expeditions very perilous. Higginson was

checked, repulsed, and obliged to retire, after abandoning two guns and burning one of his steamers.

The greater part of Seymour's division, collected on the 10th, posted itself strongly on Morris Island, of which it occupied three-fourths. It held all the sandhills extending into the sloughs, and pushed its outposts to within six hundred and fifty yards of Fort Wagner, which is connected with the rest of the island only by a narrow spit of sand. The monitors, ranged broadside on at thirteen hundred yards from Fort Wagner, the depth of the water not allowing them to draw any nearer, exchanged all day long with that fort a lively cannonade. More than five hundred projectiles were fired by the fleet without producing any serious harm. The *Catskill*, on the other hand, attracting by the admiral's flag the fire of the enemy, received upward of sixty shots, without, however, sustaining any heavy damage.

Encouraged by his success, Gillmore wished to avail himself of the opportunity to carry by a dash Fort Wagner, of which he did not know exactly the strength, and whose garrison he expected to find discouraged by the late reverse. But it had been reinforced during the evening by a Georgia regiment, and when, on the 11th at daybreak, General Seymour directed two storming-columns against the fort, they were received with a terrible fire. The heads of the columns reached the top of the parapet, but the remainder, crowded into the narrow space which it was necessary to go over in order to reach the fort, was soon in disorder, and in its retreat it dragged away the first assailants. The Confederates buried ninety-seven of the enemy's dead and took one hundred and nineteen prisoners, some forty of whom were wounded. They had only twelve men disabled.

In spite of this reverse, the results obtained by the Federals were considerable: the true siege of Charleston could at last be commenced. The first operation with the fleet and the army combined had succeeded well; the auxiliary part of the monitors in the operations to follow was indicated. Admiral DuPont, who had not wished to leave his ships within the bar after the month of April, had scattered them among the different stations in his command; Dahlgren's first care had been, on the contrary, to recall them in front of Charleston, and when he passed the bar with four

of them on the morning of the 10th, he was quite determined thenceforth to leave his armored fleet in the passes that his predecessor had considered as too dangerous. It was the only way to employ it successfully against the place, and the event proved that he was right.

The position of Fort Wagner rendered regular approaches to it by land very difficult. The sandspit on which it was necessary to proceed, narrowed by the encroachments of the sea since the drawing of the hydrographic charts by the Coast Survey, measured at several points only fifty-four yards in width; near to the fort it was reduced to twenty-seven yards. The front attacked had thus an extension greater than that which could be given to the approaches; furthermore, by digging three feet into the sand, water was found, which prevented giving the intrenchment a sufficient depth. To spare his troops these long, painful, and dangerous labors, Gillmore resolved to attempt a fresh assault as soon as he could establish batteries capable of covering the fort with projectiles. He believed that his artillery, supported by that of the fleet, would dismantle the enemy's pieces, and, paralyzing the defence, would ensure the success of this *coup-de-main*. Notwithstanding the bad weather, which often interrupted the work, four batteries were completed on the 17th of July: situated at distances from the fort that varied from thirteen hundred to nineteen hundred yards, they mounted twenty mortars and twenty-seven rifled pieces of artillery, fifteen of which were in position and twelve movable.

However, Beauregard had well employed these few days of respite. The Government at Richmond, understanding at last the designs of the Federals, sent him important reinforcements. Colquitt's and Clingman's brigades arrived on the 11th and the 15th. The former had occupied James Island, where was already on the ground Hagood's brigade; the second supplied, in successive detachments, a part of the Morris Island garrison commanded by General Taliaferro. The armament of Fort Wagner, composed of twelve pieces of large calibre, was completed by the addition of six smooth-bore guns. This fort, that had the shape of an enclosed work, was protected on one side by the sea and on the other by the waters of Vincent's Creek,

and presented a front three hundred and twenty-five yards in extent, protected by a morass impassable throughout, save for about forty-three yards, the breadth of the tongue of firm land that connected it with the rest of Morris Island. The ditch, a very important thing, was provided with a sluice-gate, by means of which high-tide water could be retained. Constructed, of course, without masonry, its batteries were open at the top; but an immense shelter with blinds formed with trunks of trees and plates of sheet iron covered over with a thick layer of sand, could receive all the garrison. This sea-sand, of a very fine grain, that constituted all the soil of Morris Island, was at once very embarrassing to the assailants, because it could not be worked in the trenches, which would fill up with it at the least wind, and very advantageous to the defence, because, on account of its very mobility, it neutralized the effects of the projectiles: these, penetrating the slope, thanks to the elasticity of the sand, caused it to scatter in the air, but it would come down and cover the furrows, thus constantly effacing the tracks of the shells and bullets. Not to revert to this subject, we shall say that, according to the calculations made by General Gillmore on the weight of the projectiles thrown against the fort and the damage resulting therefrom, it required nearly sixty-six pounds of iron to displace two hundred and nineteen pounds of sand.* Under these circumstances a bombardment could produce no decisive effect unless it were the destruction of the uncovered cannon behind the parapet.

While the artillery of Fort Wagner, supported by Sumter's heavy ordnance, sought to delay the construction of the Federal batteries, Beauregard, very uneasy on account of the presence of Terry's division on James Island, made a demonstration on the 16th of July against the positions that the latter had taken near Grimball's plantation. The Confederates, although superior in number, did not seriously attack, but their artillery compelled a prompt retreat on the part of the Federal gunboats, which could

* This sand weighs 86 pounds to the cubic foot (about 1100 kilogrammes to the cubic metre): it absorbs 24 pounds of water in a cubic foot (about 300 kilogrammes to the cubic metre), and loses then, with 5 per cent. of its volume, a part of its resistance to shots.

not operate on Stono River : the *Pawnee* was riddled with shots. On the morrow Gillmore recalled Terry's division : he needed all his forces on Morris Island, and could not, as we have said, attempt to occupy James Island, however advantageous might have been this conquest to menace Charleston.

On the 18th, at noon, the Federal batteries, opening fire on Fort Wagner, announced to its defenders that a fresh assault was in preparation. The latter responded with ardor, supported by the cannon of Sumter and Battery Gregg. But they were going to struggle with new and more formidable adversaries. At noon Admiral Dahlgren had arrived with five monitors, the armored frigate *New Ironsides*, and five gunboats, each carrying a piece of very heavy calibre, every vessel being ranged with its broadside bearing on the fort. However, the tide was not favorable, and he was obliged to keep at a distance. Finally, at four o'clock he placed himself with the ironclads at less than three hundred and twenty-five yards from the fort, which he covered with shells. Despite their courage, the Southern artillerists were soon obliged to abandon their pieces and take refuge in their casemates. The fort remained quiet and received in silence all the projectiles which the land and sea ordnance showered upon it until the evening : more than nine thousand, it is said, fell within its enclosure. Only Fort Sumter could respond to this bombardment, but the distance prevented it from causing damage either to the fleet or to the siege-batteries.

In order to render the firing from this fort less dangerous to the assaulting columns, Gillmore decided that they should begin to move at twilight. His orders are punctually executed. General Strong claims for his brigade the honor of forming the first column ; it advances in good order, having at its head the negro regiment, that the white officers lead for the first time under fire. Vogdes' brigade is ready to support it. The Federal batteries remain quiet ; Sumter's cannons redouble, on the contrary, their fire directed against the batteries, and, above all, against the assailants. But they are soon obliged to intermit it. In fact, the garrison, seeing that the Federals are approaching the glacis, spring on the parapet and a terrible fire of musketry mows down the front ranks of the negro regiment. The others advance even into the ditch,

which fills with the dead and the dying. But after this effort they withdraw in disorder; their officers are killed while trying to rally them. The troops following them return uselessly to the charge; the fight, bloody for the assailants only, is continued in front of the work in the light of the discharges, without the assailants being able to pass beyond the crest of the glacis. Still, on the right they have obtained a success which might prove decisive. The Thirty-first North Carolina, charged with the task of defending the part of the work resting on the seashore, has cowardly refused to come out of its casemates: the Federals have seized this portion, and if all their forces are brought to bear on that side they will become masters of the position. But the darkness and the tumult of the battle prevent the leaders from perceiving this fact in time. In fact, most of them have fallen: General Strong, Colonel Shaw—a young man of great promise who commanded the black regiment—Colonels Chatfield and Putnam, are killed; Seymour is wounded at the head of the second column. The latter cannot approach the work, for the first column has already been repulsed and riddled in its retreat by the canister from Wagner's cannon, which for the most part have escaped the bombardment as if by a miracle. A new attempt is impossible, and over a hundred Federals who have penetrated into the work are abandoned without any hope of assistance. However, they defend themselves valiantly, repulsing all the attacks made by the garrison, and surrender only in the middle of the night, when the latter is reinforced by a regiment sent in great haste from James Island.

The reverse to the Federals was complete and their losses were considerable. They have never acknowledged the total. The Confederates, who had only twenty-eight men disabled during the bombardment and a hundred and forty-six during the assault, buried six hundred dead Federals. They threw pell-mell into the same grave all the negro soldiers and their white officers, including the body of Shaw, trying thus to inflict a last insult on these champions of abolition. They were mistaken, and were giving, on the contrary, a supreme consecration to the equality of the races for which the latter were contending.

After this there only remained for the Federals to undertake a regular siege of Fort Wagner. They immediately set themselves to work. The fire of their batteries, which commanded the waters between Cumming's Point and Sumter, rendered the navigation of these waters in the daytime impossible to the Confederates. Hence the supplying of Fort Wagner and the changes in the garrisons could be done only in the night, which was a serious embarrassment. This difficulty obliged Beauregard to renounce the design which he had conceived for a moment after the fruitless assault of July 18th, of throwing all his forces on Morris Island, so as to drive the Federals away from it. He was constrained to resign himself to a defensive rôle. There was nothing left for him but to prepare for it as best he could. The garrison of Fort Wagner, on which the anxiety incident to the bombardment and the confined air of the casemates in that tropical climate were trying morally and physically, was frequently renewed, and its effective force was maintained at the figure of eleven hundred men. The damages sustained by the fort were repaired, and some defensive works which remained unfinished were promptly completed. In fine, Beauregard told the chiefs of the garrison that their duty was to defend themselves: even if all their artillery were unlimbered, their bomb-proof shelters enabled them to await without any serious danger the assault of the enemy, whom they should always be capable of repulsing, when they came to fight at close quarters, with musketry. Meanwhile, he was taking all his precautions in anticipation of the inevitable day when the Federals should take possession of the entire island. He only asked the defenders of Wagner to delay that day sufficiently to give him time to complete his preparations. Having again become the master of all James Island, he established along the swamps that separate this island from Morris Island some batteries intended to operate on the flank of those of the Federals. New works were constructed on the bay in the rear of Sumter, and armed at its expense. In fact, Beauregard, taught by the experience of Fort Pulaski, knew well that the high walls of that fort would not stand against a prolonged bombardment, and that its artillery would be reduced to silence. Therefore, he took off a portion of it, and exerted himself only to ensure to the defenders some shelter which would

afford them a slight protection at least against the increased calibre of the Federal artillery.

The bombardment that he was foreseeing took place earlier than he expected. Gillmore had determined to undertake it ere the fall of Fort Wagner. The end which he had in view in trying to take possession of the northern extremity of Morris Island was, above all, to be able to establish breaching-batteries against Fort Sumter. It was the destruction of this fort, and not that of Wagner and of Battery Gregg, which would, as people thought, open the port of Charleston to the fleet, because it was in front of Sumter that it was stopped on the 7th of April, 1861. Gillmore thought that while pushing his approaches to Wagner he might at the same time establish on such parts of Morris Island as he already occupied some pieces of large calibre able, in spite of the distance, to batter the walls of Sumter. The enterprise was all the more uncertain because these pieces were going to be exposed to the fire of Wagner. But Gillmore was counting on the fleet to silence that fire. In fact, Dahlgren, true to the design that he had formed on relieving DuPont, had maintained his entire fleet within the bar, and every day he sent shells into the enemy's works. By reducing Fort Sumter to silence Gillmore expected to open the entrance into Charleston, and, if that were not possible, then to enable him at the least to push with a few ships into the roads, so as to isolate Fort Wagner and force it promptly to capitulate.

The construction of the breaching-batteries against Sumter and the approaches against Wagner were carried on at the same time. The positions occupied by the Federals on the 18th of July were carefully intrenched; under the designation of first parallel they formed a strong defensive line, which was, little by little, transformed into works provided with bomb-proof shelters as formidable as Fort Wagner itself; some palisades, networks of wire on the ground, floating obstacles on the bayou bordering the sandhills on the west, protected these positions against any surprise. This first parallel was at once the first breaching-battery and the initial point for trenches, which, rapidly pushed forward, permitted the establishment on the 23d of July of the second parallel, six hundred yards nearer to the enemy. This new position was immedi-

ately intrenched, as was the first, and prepared to receive also guns of large calibre.

During this time the Federals undertook a work the results of which were not to be proportionate to the effort it cost, but which, from the standpoint of a difficulty overcome, presents an interesting aspect and deserves a special mention. The immense bogs that separate Morris Island from James Island were occupied neither by the Unionists nor by their adversaries, and were much nearer to the city of Charleston than were the batteries intended for action against Fort Sumter. Gillmore thought that if by dint of perseverance he could succeed in planting a battery on that moving ground, he might from it bombard the rebel city, and if he could not bring about its evacuation, he might at the least satisfy public opinion, which at the North so imperatively demanded its chastisement. Colonel Serrell found at seventeen hundred and thirty-four yards in a straight line from Morris Island and seven miles from the city of Charleston a spot where the soil offered more firmness than the rest of the bog. Situated at the confluence of two bayous, this spot was protected by them on the west and on the north—that is to say, on the side of the enemy. A third bayou, leading to the southward, was nearer Morris Island; it was navigable at high tide for small boats, and would thus facilitate transportation. A reconnoissance of the ground made between the 16th and the 20th of July revealed all the difficulties of the enterprise. The mud in the swamp, like gelatine, resists a certain pressure, vibrates to a great distance, but quickly yields under the foot of a man. Soundings indicated that it had a depth of from six and a half to seven and a half yards, and that it rested upon a bed of hard sand. Composed of alluvial soil mixed up with innumerable shells that have gradually covered the bottom of the sea, the surface is overgrown with high grasses similar to the alfalfa, amidst which the Federal workmen could easily conceal themselves. But high tides submerge nearly all the expanse of the bog. At ebb tide a man walking would sink into the mud, according to the localities, often two inches, sometimes ten. But if one stood still the sinking increased rapidly, and in many spots there was even danger of disappearing under the surface. Therefore the first officer to whom the colonel gave orders

to go to the quartermaster to request all that was necessary for the first works was so frightened at such an undertaking that he asked, as we are assured, to be furnished with a hundred men eighteen feet high, to the end, said he, that they might work without danger.

These difficulties did not stop Colonel Serrell: experiments made with care proved that this mud would stand a pressure, equally distributed, of about five thousand two hundred and fifty pounds to the square yard. It was on this foundation that it was intended to establish a battery capable of receiving and sheltering a two-hundred-pounder Parrott gun (nearly eight inches calibre), weighing more than fifteen thousand pounds. We have seen that the foundation could support a considerable weight, provided it was perfectly poised. But it was to be feared that once the firing had commenced the shaking produced by the recoil of the piece would disturb the equilibrium, and gradually cause the entire construction resting on that moving ground to sink. To avoid this danger, the parapet and the platform were established upon absolutely independent bases. Trunks of pine trees sixteen to twenty yards long were cut down in the woods on Folly Island and carried by the bayou to the location of the battery; four rafts were formed by fastening these logs one to another; then two of the rafts were placed one way, the other two another perpendicular to the first, and all four were joined at their extremities so as to form an immense rectangular floor, leaving an empty square in the middle. The surface of this square had been calculated in accordance with the coefficient of resistance of the superficial yard of mud and with the weight of the cubic yard of sand, so as to be able to bear a parapet of a height and thickness sufficient to shelter the piece and the gunners. The rafts were separated from the mud by alternate beds of grass and tarred cloth, which prevented it from getting in between the logs, and distributed the weight of the load equally. Even the parapet was made up of sandbags piled on one another on three sides of the floor, the fourth being used solely to connect the other three together. The platform of the piece was placed on piles in the space remaining vacant in the middle of the flooring. A square coffer was formed with sheet piles driven into the mud

without a pile-driver by the simple weight of a squad of workmen, who suspended themselves to a beam placed across the top of the pile-planks: the sandy bed was reached. Inside the cofferdam grass, cloths, and sand were spread in succession over the mud to keep it down. The whole was covered over with three thicknesses of crossed pine boards fixed on the coffer itself and bearing the platform. In this way the concussion caused by the firing could not be communicated to the raft bearing the parapet, and which was, as it were, floating on the mud. However, if at last the raft should sink, the only thing necessary to do would be to raise it with a few bags, and the mud forced away by its weight would form outside a kind of glacis; whereas inside, the pressure, working upward in the coffer, would result only in sustaining the platform of the cannon.

This work could be commenced only on the 2d of August. A workshop was established amid the sandbanks extending a certain distance into the swamp: the sandbags, the timber, the gun-carriage, and the ammunition were transported in barges on the bayou, and hauled at high tide to the location of the battery by means of a strong corduroy road. A plank-road laid across the swamp allowed the men to go in on foot: the planks rested upon a thick bed of grass. Platforms were constructed in like manner to answer the purpose of a camp for the supporting troops. Finally, after three weeks of this rough work, prosecuted in the mud, under a burning sun, everything was ready on the 23d of August to place the cannon in position. As its weight would have caused to sink the only boats that could be navigated on the bayou, it was carried by hand across the swamp. Wooden cylinders, thick enough to leave free play to the trunnions, were placed around the breech and the muzzle, and enabled the men to roll the piece like a barrel on two board tracks prepared for that purpose. This piece, the mounting of which had been so arduous, was called by the soldiers "The Swamp Angel." A false battery was made of reeds, a short distance from there, to deceive the enemy and draw its fire.

The second parallel, established on the 26th of July four hundred and sixty-six yards in front of the first, was distant eight hundred and forty-five yards from Fort Wagner and less than

two hundred and sixteen from the rifle-pits occupied by the hostile sharpshooters. While this work was being completed the first had been armed with four pieces of large calibre: five other pieces had been placed more to the left in batteries specially directed against Fort Sumter, amid sandhills about forty-two hundred yards from the fort. Among these pieces there was one of extraordinary dimensions: it was a Parrott gun of a diameter of nearly eight inches, the projectile of which weighed three hundred pounds. Never before had such a mass of iron been projected against walls.

The placing of the breaching-batteries in the second parallel was much more difficult, because they were within short range of Fort Wagner and exposed to an attack in the rear by the artillery recently placed by Beauregard on James Island.

Gillmore did not allow himself to be checked by this double danger. Fortunately for him, Fort Wagner had suffered much from the bombardment of the 24th, the object of which was to protect the completion of the second parallel. The fleet, which no longer left the passes and came every two or three days to send its projectiles into the fort, had dismantled all the pieces facing the sea, had considerably damaged a magazine protected by blindage, and had even shaken for a moment the courage of the garrison. To reduce Fort Wagner to silence it is sufficient, therefore, to resume this fire and to support it with that of the pieces in the first parallel. The work, that time, suffered but little, but the Federals, thanks to this silence, could set up their new batteries without trouble. The Confederate guns on James Island, which had opened fire on the 26th, also remained quiet, no doubt so as not to draw the fire of the besiegers on works yet unfinished.

Putting the second parallel into a state of defence was more difficult. Space and soil alike were lacking to give sufficient extension and elevation to the approaches. As the presence of water did not permit the deepening of the trenches, it was necessary to gather at a distance the sand to raise the parapets; and this sand, carried away by the wind—which nothing could abate, for there were only two trees on the entire island—quickly filled up the trenches. In digging the ground the Federal workmen constantly found either coffins, the island having long served as a quarantine for Charleston, or the remains of the victims of the assault on July 18th. To

avoid having to exhume them several times, it was decided to bury them in the parapets. Thus the dead answered the purpose of a shelter for the living.

The fluctuations of the tides exposed the flanks of the Federal approaches. To the right, on the side of the sea, the space left open was limited. To prevent the enemy from availing himself of it, there was built an open-work jetty lengthening out the parallel, upon which were placed three mitrailleuses, then called Requa batteries, after the name of the inventor, which could sweep all the beach. To the left the difficulty was greater, for the swamp, in which it was impossible to dig any intrenchment, was passable at low tide for the hostile infantry. It was tried in vain to establish palisades and chevaux-de-frise on this moving foundation; the work undertaken in the night was interrupted by the fire from Fort Wagner. Then Gillmore caused to be constructed in rear of the line, on the edge of this swamp, a series of wooden block-houses to serve as a refuge for the guards of the trenches in case the enemy should attack them in the rear on that side. All these works were accomplished only at the cost of serious losses, owing to the precision of the firing on the part of the Confederate outposts, and particularly of a choice corps called the Charleston Battalion armed with Whitworth rifles that made numerous victims among the assailants. Nevertheless, in the first days of August the Federals found themselves strongly established in their new positions, protected on land by a network of wires, and in the bayou bounding the island on the west by a powerful obstacle composed of chained logs.

The garrison did not try any sortie: it contented itself with repairing the damages sustained by the work, with firing on the assailants during the night, when it had not to fear the fire of the monitors, and with supporting the sharpshooters posted in advance of the lines.

The Confederate navy, which included in its ranks some bold men impatient of the passive part to which they were condemned, distinguished itself by a small feat of arms. In the night from the 4th to the 5th of August it captured a Federal launch manned by twelve men, who, while patrolling to watch the victualling of Morris Island, had ventured too far into the harbor.

From the 1st to the 9th of August the besiegers had almost entirely stopped the fire of their artillery; the fleet alone had sent some shells into Fort Wagner; therefore the garrison had availed itself of the respite to complete the defensive works, to strengthen the blinds and traverses, and to mount four pieces of large calibre sent by Beauregard. But on the 9th all the Federal batteries opened fire to protect the third parallel opened on the preceding night, with the flying sap, three hundred and thirty yards in advance of the right of the second parallel. This operation being successfully accomplished and the two parallels promptly connected together, the works of approach were resumed on the ensuing day in advance of this new line. But the proximity of the enemy daily increased the difficulty. Besides, the greater part of the extra duty performed by the men consisted in the construction and armament of the breaching-batteries—a work which the sand and the heat rendered particularly laborious.

On the 10th the approaches had been pushed to within four hundred and thirty-three yards of Fort Wagner: they were then exposed to the fire not only of Fort Sumter and Battery Gregg, but of the works on Sullivan's Island, that fired above this battery. This fire rendered any day-work impossible. In the night the fire from Fort Wagner, supported by the sharpshooters of the Charleston Battalion, entirely checked the assailants, after having inflicted serious losses upon them. They wished to resume the work on the 11th in the evening. The Confederates allowed the men detailed from the negro regiment to issue from the parallel, and they had hardly commenced working when a fierce fire was opened on them. The blacks scattered. A second attempt was not more successful. The progress of the besiegers was absolutely interrupted. On the 13th, Gillmore decided not to attempt another advance before the bombardment which, by destroying Fort Sumter, would enable the fleet, according to him, to blockade and quickly reduce Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg.

The armament of the breaching-batteries had been delayed by the construction in the midst of the swamps of the battery which we have described above: this work, the results of which could not compensate for such a loss of time, was nearly finished on the 16th of August. The defensive works of the second and the

third parallels had also been completed, despite the very active fire from all the hostile forts. That very day a Confederate shell perforated the shelter with plate-armor established for the telegraph-station, and wounded Colonel Howell, the commander in the trenches. The defective powder sent by the ordnance department was replaced by that from the fleet, which was much superior to the former. Some shots had been fired against Fort Sumter to try the ranges alike by the land-batteries and the heavy pieces of the Federal gunboats. Calcium lights, the cones of which were directed during the night to the waters of Cumming's Point, had made uneasy the small Confederate steamers and embarrassed the supplying of Fort Wagner by forcing Beaugregard to use for that purpose rowboats. The latter, on the other hand, had completed all the works undertaken to protect the casemates of Fort Sumter: the blind-protected barrack which closed the gorge, the interior wall of which was exposed to a plunging fire, had been covered on that side with a thick layer of sandbags. The disarmament of the fort continued. Out of the sixty pieces which were there on the preceding month, there remained on the 16th of August but thirty-eight guns and two mortars. The others, for the most part of large calibre, had been distributed among the old forts and the new batteries. Those on James Island had been armed with particular care, and only awaited a signal to open fire.

The Federals were going to give this signal. On the 16th, in the evening, Gillmore had an understanding with Admiral Dahlgren to commence the next morning the bombardment by land and sea. The Federal batteries comprised eighteen large pieces and two mortars intended for action against Fort Sumter; ten thirty-pounder Parrott guns and ten mortars, which were to be used for cross-firing on Fort Wagner; and, lastly three coehorn mortars for the service of the third parallel. Some pieces were not yet in position in the breaching-batteries, but this work was to be finished within less than two days without delaying or interrupting the fire of the others. One can imagine what this work was by reflecting upon the fact that it was necessary to drag over the entire length of Morris Island—say, nearly two miles—on moving sands and under a burning sun, cannon weigh-

ing fourteen, and one even twenty-four, thousand pounds, besides all the requisite ammunition.

Fire was opened on the 17th at daybreak. The breaching-batteries directed their shots on Fort Sumter, and their enormous projectiles were not long in starting its high walls: two monitors came to support them, and the fifteen-inch pieces with which they were armed threw their large round shells into the interior of the fort. During that time the other land-batteries and all the rest of the fleet were uniting their efforts to reduce Fort Wagner to silence. Dahlgren with four monitors had ranged himself, broad-side on, at a distance of four hundred and thirty-three yards from that work. The *New Ironsides* had got as near it as her deep draught permitted; lastly, seven wooden gunboats, keeping at a good distance, fired at it shells under a very elevated angle.

The Confederates were ready to respond. The batteries on James Island, the guns of Sumter, of Sullivan's Island, of Gregg, and of Fort Wagner replied with ardor alike to the fleet and to Gillmore's artillery. The fire from the last fort was the most dangerous, on account of its proximity to the assailants. Projectiles rained on the monitors. These vessels were not seriously damaged, but the experience of that day proved that the armor with which they were covered did not shelter their crews from all danger. A well-directed shot sprang the blind-plated shelter placed at the top of the *Catskill's* tower and detached some bolts that killed the commander, Captain George Rodgers, and another officer. Toward nine o'clock the artillerists in Fort Wagner were obliged to cease firing. But as soon as the fleet's fire slackened they resumed their firing with so much precision against the batteries of the second parallel that Gillmore was every moment in apprehension of seeing dismantled and placed out of use the large guns that he had mounted. Fort Wagner had, however, on its ramparts only three pieces of large calibre.

On the following day, the 18th, a violent storm from the north-east rendered the firing very uncertain on both sides. The contest with cannon continued, nevertheless, and was kept up without intermission during six days, until the 22d. Suspended during the night, the bombardment was resumed at sunrise and protracted till dark. Several times the breaching-batteries of the

second parallel were obliged to train their guns on Fort Wagner, so as to interrupt its fire when it became too sharp and uncomfortable. They had equally to suffer from that of the pieces posted on James Island, to which they could not respond. The "Swamp Angel" added for a while its voice to this formidable concert. This piece being in battery on the 20th, Gillmore sent a summons to Beauregard, and threatened to bombard the city of Charleston itself if he did not evacuate Fort Sumter. After a delay of a few hours only, which Beauregard with reason found to be derisive, the bombardment so impatiently waited for at the North, especially by those who prated about the war without incurring its dangers, commenced on the morning of the 21st. The inhabitants of Charleston were soon reassured. The one piece trained on their city hardly succeeded in throwing into it a few shells, which did no damage, notwithstanding the pretended Greek fire with which they were loaded. On the ensuing day it burst at the thirty-sixth round, and Gillmore, satisfied with the demonstration which he had been obliged to make, did not replace the piece. Its fragments perhaps still lie to-day on the little hill created with so much trouble in the midst of moving ground, silent witnesses to the art employed by men to destroy one another, and over which the whippoorwill, the bird of the swamps, never tires of repeating its solitary plaint.

By way of retaliation, the success of the firing on Fort Sumter was complete. The official reports concur on this point in a remarkable manner. It was marked with rare precision, despite the distance of 3250 to 4333 yards. According to Gillmore, leaving out of the account two pieces placed no doubt at too great a distance, twelve Parrott guns fired 4225 shots: their projectiles weighed together 552,683 pounds. Out of this number, 4147 are said to have hit the work. Beauregard, counting all the shots fired against Sumter by the land-batteries and the fleet, reaches the the total figure of 5643, of which 4342 hit the fort and 1301 struck wide of the mark. All of Sumter's cannon were dismantled in succession; the garrison, which had taken refuge in the portions still intact of the casemates, gave up serving the guns from the second day. The work itself was completely ruined: the barbette batteries were destroyed; the masonry facing the

sea had lost its blindage and was partly crumbled, uncovering the vaults which shut in the protected batteries. One piece alone, turned toward the harbor, had not been rendered unfit for use. Fort Sumter was no longer anything else than an islet without any offensive power, but the garrison had lost only fifty-two men. It felt itself all the surer of defending the fort against any assault that if the Federals had captured it they would have been exposed to a concentric fire from all the other works, which would not have allowed them to maintain themselves in it. The respite accorded to the besieged in the night by the Union artillery had been employed in carrying away pieces of ordnance and provisions belonging to the fort, which Beauregard no longer considered as being anything more than an advance post for the defence.

Gillmore's artillery, having nothing left to destroy, ceased firing on the 23d. The men were exhausted by incessant work ; a large number of pieces had burst, making many a victim ; the others could be fired only with great precaution. But the results obtained were still more remarkable than the demolition of Fort Pulaski the previous year. Gillmore was counting that the fleet would avail itself of this success to reach up into the inland waters of Charleston. He was expecting from it the investment of the forts on Morris Island, and hoped that it might clear the second line of defence and come and take a broadside position parallel with the very docks of the town and in front of them. He foresaw that the blockade of Battery Gregg and Fort Wagner would bring on, in a few days, the reduction of those works : the naval authorities had always said that Sumter's fire alone prevented the monitors from carrying away the obstacles which had stopped them on the 7th of April. Gillmore believed that the Confederates had not yet transported the armament of Fort Sumter into the forts and the batteries of the second line. On this last point he was in error. These works were already furnished with powerful artillery, and as the land forces were not strong enough to occupy them in a permanent way after they should have been reduced for a moment to silence by the fire from the fleet, Dahlgren could not risk his monitors within the inland waters of Charleston without exposing them to the inability of getting out and to being caught as in a trap. He did not try it : however, if he renounced this

dangerous enterprise, it was not, it would appear, because he considered it impracticable, but in the wake of unforeseen incidents, of successive delays which were renewed during nearly three months.

In fact, on the 23d he announces to the Navy Department that he is going to force the passage; then he waits until the 26th, and on that day he declares to Gillmore that the musketry-fire of Sumter's garrison will prevent his sailors going in launches to remove the cables stretched across their way. During that time he does not appear to have thought about the investment of Morris Island—an operation which he might have attempted without imprudence, and which would have greatly facilitated the task of the army.

The latter was seeing difficulties accumulate in its way. Gillmore had availed himself of the bombardment to resume his works for approaching Fort Wagner—an operation which had been stopped since the 11th by the fire from the fort. But, as we have said, notwithstanding the number of pieces collected to crush the fort with projectiles, the Federals had not completely succeeded in silencing its fire. The field artillery which composed the greater part of the armament of Fort Wagner was placed under shelter in the rear of the merlons as soon as the bombardment began; then when night came it was brought back to the embrasures, whence it launched a deadly fire on the approach-works. In spite of the storm that raised the sea into the trenches, the works were resumed with activity on the 18th, in full sap, beyond the third parallel. Soon the Confederate sharpshooters' fire was added to that of the mounted guns to annoy the besiegers. A sandhill situated some two hundred and fourteen yards in front of the fort offered these sharpshooters a supporting-point and good shelter. On the 21st the trench-guards tried to dislodge them, but they were repulsed with loss. To shield from them the ground recently gained, a fourth parallel was at once run out, partly in full sap and partly in gabions, one hundred and eight yards before reaching the sandhill.

The regular bombardment of Fort Sumter ended, as we have said, in the morning of the 23d; during the eight following days the breaching-batteries kept up an irregular fire as much against

the ruins of the fort as against the works on James Island, which were doing much mischief in the third and second parallels. The other pieces every time they received a shot, no matter from what point, would respond by firing on Fort Wagner. Finally, the monitors, while sparing their ammunition, took care not to allow themselves to be forgotten. Meanwhile, Gillmore was repairing the damage that the fire of the enemy, and, above all, the accidents the consequence of excessive firing, had caused to his batteries. To replace the pieces that had burst he was obliged to apply to Admiral Dahlgren, who hastened to loan the needed guns. The latter had already furnished him with cannon and marines to arm and serve one of the breaching-batteries.

It was, however, necessary to continue the approaches. An effort was made to dislodge the Southern sharpshooters from the sandhills they occupied by establishing on the 26th, in the fourth parallel, naval howitzers and coehorn mortars. The fire from these pieces not having produced the desired effect, that same day, toward seven o'clock in the evening, two regiments of Terry's division captured the position and wellnigh all the men that occupied it. Out of eighty-four Confederates, only about a dozen escaped; the others did not dare to run, lest they should encounter the torpedoes scattered around the fort. The fifth parallel was established before daybreak in that position, two hundred and thirty-eight yards from the fort. The Confederate sharpshooters had no shelter left, for between the sandhills and Fort Wagner there was the isthmus, only twenty-seven yards in width, of which we have spoken above. They therefore shut themselves up within the place. But with their retreat the most difficult part of the siege was going to commence. The cannon on Fort Wagner, which no bombardment had yet been able to dismantle, having no longer that curtain of sharpshooters before them, could thenceforth concentrate their fire on the narrow space in which the besiegers were obliged to proceed: torpedoes had been scattered there in plenty. These torpedoes were either shells, as at Yorktown, or boxes filled with powder, intended primarily to float in the passes: they were buried and provided with a very sensitive percussion apparatus. Placed after the assault of July 18th, they presented a formidable obstacle to any fresh attempts of this

character, and increased the dangers of the sap. But the discovery of these engines, which cost the lives of several men, reassured at the same time the besiegers against the much more serious perils of the sallies. By surrounding themselves with torpedoes the Confederates condemned themselves to a passive rôle. It was a great mistake: the fifteen hundred men who had the means of sheltering themselves in the blindages of Fort Wagner should have retained the means of taking the offensive against the approaches of the Federals that could be guarded only by a small number of combatants: the history of all sieges, that of Sebastopol in particular, taught that to them. In fine, as fast as the besiegers approached the place the danger created by the outline of Morris Island augmented for them: their batteries had to fire above the trenches, and the shells which burst too soon hit their own soldiers. Colonel Purviance, who was in command of the trenches on the 30th of August, was thus killed by a Federal projectile, and it became necessary to displace several pieces to reassure the soldiers exposed to this new danger. The Confederates were not any more exempt from like accidents. Thus, in the night from the 31st of August to the 1st of September the steamer *Sumter*, that was engaged in supplying the garrison on Morris Island, was sunk by the batteries on Sullivan's Island, which took it for an enemy.

Notwithstanding so many obstacles, the trench was opened with gabions in front of the sandhills while the fifth parallel was being established, and on the 27th, in the morning, this approach was only one hundred and eight yards from the place; but after a few hours of daylight the enemy's fire interrupted the work. An attempt was made to resume it, but the gabions were knocked down every moment. No matter how the sappers were relieved, they were nearly all hit, without making any progress. It soon became evident that they could not proceed any farther under the fire to which they were exposed. These growing and fruitless losses, added to the diseases developed by the heat, to the malaria from the swamp, to the work in the water, and to the fatigue incident to extra duty at night, had finally produced great discouragement among the men. Vain attempts were made to employ in the trenches the soldiers under punishment; they

availed themselves of the darkness to disappear, and returned in large bodies to their camps.

Gillmore resolved to give his works of approach the support of the formidable artillery of which Dahlgren and he had the control to reduce Fort Wagner to utter powerlessness. After having dismantled the pieces of large calibre arming the fort, it was necessary to tear up the parapets, so as to make it impossible to replace in battery the field guns sheltered behind the merlons; and, if not that, then it was necessary to keep up a fire sufficiently strong, and, above all, sufficiently continuous, to prevent the garrison from serving the pieces and employing musketry against the head of the sap. In a word, this garrison once retired behind the shelters protected with blinds, it was necessary to batter in breach these shelters and demolish them. The first part of this task was to be accomplished by the mortars of the land forces and the large howitzers of the navy; the second, by the rifled ordnance, which had hitherto been used to fire against Fort Sumter.

Several days were required to change the direction of these pieces, supply necessities to the batteries and arm them with mortars, enlarge and fortify the fifth parallel, and, briefly, to prepare everything for the new bombardment, which was to continue night and day. Gillmore wished first to complete the destruction of Fort Sumter, hoping thus to decide Dahlgren to clear the pass. The admiral, in fact, crossed at first by bad weather, now alleged that the enemy had mounted new pieces on the top of the ruins of the fort at a height which the cannons of the monitors could not reach, and which gave these pieces a very formidable plunging fire. This assertion, to which Gillmore attached but little faith, was confirmed by the Confederate reports. After a bombardment lasting three days from the morning of the 30th of August till the evening of the 1st of September, in which several monitors had come to take a part, all these pieces were rendered unfit for use, all the casemated batteries were stove in, and the ruin was complete. Therefore Dahlgren announced for the morrow his entrance into the pass. But he again changed his mind a few hours later. Fearing, this time, the musketry-fire from the garrison, he determined to await the reduction of Fort Wagner, and then to attempt, before proceeding any farther, to capture Fort Sumter by storm.

A part of his fleet had not ceased firing upon the first of these two forts (Wagner), and had succeeded in dismounting several pieces on the sea-front. The Confederates, to save the others, had been obliged to disarm this façade about the 1st of September. All the fleet was to take part at once in the bombardment of Fort Wagner.

All was ready at last on the 5th of September, and at dawn a terrible fire was concentrated upon the work, which, being promptly reduced to silence, could not have been distinguished from a shapeless pile of sand if the Confederate flag, often knocked down by the rain of iron, and each time raised by some courageous hand, had not floated over the crest. Seventeen siege or coehorn mortars filled the fort with bombs, while thirteen large Parrott guns were firing upon the south-west angle of the shelter in which the entire garrison had taken refuge. While the monitors were dividing their shots between Fort Moultrie and the works on Morris Island, the armored frigate *New Ironsides*, which had a broadside of eight pieces, kept up a ricochet fire on the fort with great precision : its projectiles, rising above the water with a diminished swiftness, went to fall behind the parapets at the entrance to the shelter, and on exploding their fragments reached everywhere. When night came the fleet retired. But the garrison vainly counted upon the darkness to repair the damages of that day and to rest after an experience that had cost it nearly one hundred men out of a total effective force of nine hundred. Soon calcium lights were displayed in the fifth parallel, and their luminous foci lighted up the least details of the work, while the positions of the besiegers remained enveloped in the deepest darkness. Hence the Federal batteries did not slacken their firing for a moment. The work on the approaches, begun as soon as the fire from Fort Wagner was silenced in the forenoon of the 5th, was this time pushed forward with rapidity.

On the morning of the 6th, when the *New Ironsides* again brought her broadside to bear on the fort, the Federal flag, which marked the head of the sap to keep off the fire from the fleet, was only a few yards from the glacis of the fort ; the trench, with an oblique direction to the right, trended toward the eastern branch of the work, which was known to have been disarmed, and which

the fall of the tide rendered more accessible for an assaulting column. As fast as the day advanced the Federal workmen, encouraged by the absolute silence of the enemy and the precision of their own pieces, became more and more bold. After having timidly shown their heads, they soon worked without any shelter, and even went to reconnoitre the fort on the glacis, avoiding with rare adroitness the torpedoes with which it was strewn. This situation, so new and so strange, coming after long days of slow and perilous labors, stimulated their ardor, and the flag advanced all the time. The distant fire from James Island was even no longer to be apprehended by them, for they were so near the place that the pieces on that island could no longer fire upon them without danger to the garrison, and were obliged to direct their shots more to the rear on the siege-batteries.

The situation of the garrison in Fort Wagner was becoming every hour more perilous. The calcium lights rendered very difficult the communications with Charleston in the night, which for a long time had been impossible during the day. The Federals had attempted to land, from some launches, in front of Battery Gregg, to capture it by surprise: they had retired at the first alarm, it is true, but they were evidently preparing for an assault the issue of which was not doubtful. In fine, although the fire of the Parrott guns had been rather irregular, they had at last seriously broken through the blindage, and it was easy to foresee that if this fire continued the shelter would be opened before the 8th. The head of the enemy's sap was going to reach beyond the south front of the work, and thus mask the artillery of the fort. The garrison, exhausted by long vigils, the confined air of the shelters protected by blinds, could not therefore count any more on the support of this artillery. The enemy could reach the crest of the parapet sooner than the garrison, and make them prisoners ere they had emerged from underneath the ground. There was not a moment to lose to avoid this disaster. Beauregard decided in the afternoon of the 6th of September to evacuate Battery Gregg and Fort Wagner: his instructions were full and precise. The operation, a very delicate one, was to commence at sunset. He had estimated, with rare accuracy, the extreme limit of resistance of these works. In fact, the besiegers, hav-

ing crowned in the evening the crest of the counterscarp in front of the eastern branch, had descended into the ditch and carried away the chevaux-de-frise that covered the foot of the scarp. Everything being ready, Gillmore had issued his orders, so that the assault should take place the next morning at the time when low tide would leave on the beach a space sufficiently large for the formation of the troops. While he was making his final preparations the Confederates issued silently from the fort and took boats at the same moment with the defenders of Battery Gregg. In spite of the calcium lights, this movement escaped the attention of the besiegers, being entirely occupied as they were in the service of their pieces and in the work of the sap. The last guardians of Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg came out of the works after having kindled the matches which were to cause the blowing up of these strongholds, and got aboard without being perceived, leaving behind them about seventy stragglers. They attempted to take along with them a certain number of field guns, but were obliged to leave them on the shore. At one o'clock in the morning the two forts were deserted. But, to the great astonishment of the Confederates, and from a cause which has remained unexplained, the powder-magazines did not explode. Before daybreak some deserters called out to the Federals, who were still digging. Immediately the firing ceased, and the troops, ready for the assault, entered the forts.

The bombardment had lasted forty-eight hours without intermission. The thirteen large Parrott guns trained against the blindages had belched out 1173 telling projectiles, weighing about 109,000 pounds: the examination made by the Federal officers proved that the effect produced was insignificant. Since the 19th of July the garrison had lost two hundred and ninety-six men, almost all of them during the latter days. It had abandoned twenty-five cannons to the besiegers. Out of the seventeen pieces which Fort Wagner mounted, only three had been dismounted.

The besiegers, on the other hand, had not lost a single piece by the fire from the place, but a large number of guns had been rendered unfit for service, owing either to accidents or to firing too long continued. The Parrott guns of large calibre had, in

this ordeal, shown a great firing power, but a great inequality of resistance. The three-hundred-pounder, six two-hundred-pounders, and seventeen one-hundred-pounders had burst during the progress of the siege. It must be said that some of these accidents were caused by the premature explosion of the shells, and could not, therefore, be blamed on the gun itself.

The task assigned to the land forces had been accomplished; their feeble effective numbers, as we have said, did not allow them to undertake operations on the main land nor on the islands nearest to Charleston. The army had broken the first defensive line of the place, and established a footing at the entrance to the pass. Henceforth, the port of Charleston was closed to the blockade-runners. The siege operations had been conducted with intelligence and vigor. The Confederates had fought with courage, their sharpshooters had shown much skill, but they had committed several grave errors. In the first place, they were wrong, before the arrival of Beauregard, voluntarily to abandon the positions on Cole's Island which forbade access to Stono Inlet on the part of the Federals, and thus allowed them to establish themselves on Folly Island: then, by concentrating their principal elements of defence on the northern part of Morris Island, they had allowed the enemy to gain a footing on the southern part. Instead of collecting within two enclosed works all the artillery intended for action against the fleet, they would have done better to divide it into small separate batteries, which are far more difficult to silence. In fine, the defence itself of Fort Wagner was too passive, as we have already observed. Still, this defence, gallantly prolonged, gave Beauregard time to arm the second line of works, and thus to close access to the port on the day when Sumter was demolished, when Morris Island fell into the hands of the enemy. Finally, it may be affirmed that the success of Gillmore was due only to the co-operation of the navy. Without the fire from the armored ships, which could approach Fort Wagner and attack in the rear all the counter-approaches that the Confederates would have undertaken, the besiegers never would have brought the siege to a successful issue. The two contending sides, finding themselves face to face with equal arms on the narrow sandbank of Morris Island, would have come into conflict without either being able

to gain any ground on the other. It was, then, the navy that decided the victory.

Could it profit by it? We doubt it. Dahlgren resumed, it is true, on the 7th, the project agreed upon before the beginning of the operations, and announced his intention to force the passes. But he wished to attempt this operation only after having dislodged Sumter's garrison, of which he greatly feared the musketry. On the 8th he sent the *Weehawken* into the narrow channel that meanders amidst soundings between Cumming's Point and Fort Sumter, so that this vessel might support within easy range, with its artillery, the attack that he was meditating against the fort. But the *Weehawken*, driven by contrary currents, was not long in running aground, and became a target for all the batteries on Sullivan's Island. Other vessels came to its assistance, and the *New Ironsides* took up a position to cover, as against the fire of the enemy, the hull of the *Weehawken*, the broadside of which was very much exposed. Although there was no success in raising it before the next day, this fire did not cause it to experience any serious damage.

However, Gillmore and Dahlgren had both resolved to try, in the night from the 8th to the 9th, a dash to capture Fort Sumter. When they communicated their design to each other, neither of them would yield in regard to the command. It was agreed that the two expeditions should act independently of each other. They would have run the risk of taking the one or the other for the enemy if Gillmore had not prevented the departure of the one that he had organized. Dahlgren, on the other hand, had collected in Stono Inlet some twenty launches, manned with four hundred marines, under the direction of Captain Stevens and three lieutenants of the navy. The evening of the 8th being fine, the flotilla was towed up the passes to Charleston, eight hundred and sixty-six yards from Sumter; but the darkness which prevented the enemy from seeing these preparations caused a great confusion in the formation of the flotilla: several launches were even ignorant of their destination and became lost in the roadstead. Stevens had divided his forces into two columns: that on the left was to land first, on the south-west frontage of the fort, and to draw the enemy's attention to that side. Immediately thereafter Stevens was count-

ing upon availing himself of this diversion to climb the ruins of the south-east façade, which had suffered most from the bombardment. But they were hardly within musket-shot of the fort when the sailors were saluted in every direction by musketry, while the batteries on Sullivan's Island, guided by this discharge, were directing the fire of their artillery on their launches. The most daring among the sailors landed at once on the two fronts, but they were soon checked by escarpments higher than they had expected. Those that followed these, instead of landing to support them, began to fire on friends and foes alike. Projectiles from Fort Moultrie, falling in the midst of the launches, put the finishing-touch to the confusion among the assailants, and Captain Stevens very promptly gave the signal, and even, people say, the example, of retreat. He left behind him, on the fort, his three lieutenants and all who had disembarked with them. These, one hundred and thirty-six in number, of whom some twenty were wounded, were compelled to surrender. Only three men had been killed. This unfortunate enterprise seems to have deeply discouraged Admiral Dahlgren. In spite of many projects formed and then abandoned, he will not again attempt anything serious this year to force the passes to Charleston. It was thus that, recognizing the impossibility of occupying Sumter, and not wishing to risk his launches to take up the obstacles that closed the pass, he asked Gillmore to lend him a steam-transport to launch it against these obstacles and break them—a request which, naturally, was not entertained. Then, six weeks later, he demanded a new bombardment of Sumter, so as, said he, to compel the garrison to confine themselves within their shelter, and thus to allow the fleet to pass without having to fear their fire.

Gillmore, who had availed himself of this time to repair Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg, and who had armed them with the most powerful among his Parrott guns, opened fire on the 26th of October. The monitors joined themselves to the land-batteries to cannonade the silent ruins against which the Federals had been working for a long time. Other sections of wall tumbled down, other vaults were laid bare; the large fifteen-inch howitzers of the fleet did much execution inside the fort; but the garrison, letting this storm of iron shot pass over their heads, kept themselves in

readiness to lie in ambush at the first signal behind each stone and pile of bricks. At last the firing ceased, and the fleet did not move. The bad season had come: the monitors had fired so much that they had strained their guns and their towers; their keels were covered with barnacles, which impeded their progress, and they needed repairs. Other ships, on the same model, had just been constructed in the North. At last, Dahlgren acknowledged that he was waiting for the arrival of these ships to resume the attack on Charleston. Gillmore confined himself to throwing from time to time some shells on Fort Sumter, so as to prevent the enemy from repairing and arming it. The certainty that all his works might be destroyed in a few hours by the batteries on Cumming's Point was sufficient, any way, for that.

The Confederates, reduced to the defensive on their inner line, were henceforth blockaded on the sea side. But, seeing their forts powerless to keep the hostile vessels away from the passes to Charleston, they wished to resort to new and bold ways to destroy them and break the chain that isolated their city from the rest of the world. In all times man, resolved to sacrifice his life, has been enabled to overcome the most redoubtable and best-protected adversaries. In antiquity one Maccabæus drew down on himself the elephant of Antiochus; in our day torpedo-boats have sunk armored vessels. The harbor of Charleston was witness to an exploit of this kind. Its date obliges us to reserve the narration of it, but it was preceded by attempts about which we must say a few words in finishing the historical account of the siege of Charleston during the year 1863. We have already often spoken of the defensive torpedoes—that is to say, of apparatus placed at given points, and the explosion of which, produced either by a shock or by the will of a distant agent by means of an electric current, would destroy vessels at a time when they should pass over some of these points. The Russians having already used this system of defence for their coasts during the Crimean War, the Confederates, blockaded as the Russians were, had adopted it, introducing an infinite variety in the construction and mode of ignition of these apparatuses. A special bureau, conducted by the celebrated hydrographer Maury, was established in the Navy Department at Richmond to regulate and direct the use

of the torpedoes, which thenceforth played a considerable part in the war as carried on at sea and on the rivers. At the period of which we are speaking a number of Federal vessels had already been made victims of these formidable engines: the fear which they caused contributed more than all the artillery of the forts to protect the harbor of Charleston. They have, however, at times caused bitter deceptions to those who in laying them believed that everything was calculated to ensure the destruction of the hostile ships. Thus during the attack on April 9th the Union flagship, the *New Ironsides*, cast anchor over the most powerful torpedo of the Confederates, and remained an hour in that position, the danger of which DuPont was naturally ignorant of, without the Confederates being able to succeed in exploding the apparatus, as the current of electricity was interrupted. Bold and ingenious minds had entered the path opened by Bushnell, which seemed closed since the unsuccessful attempts made by Fulton. Bushnell, the true inventor of torpedoes, who was the first to prove that powder could be ignited under water and there produce destructive effects, had connected this invention with that of submarine boats, and tried several times during the war of American independence to cause a torpedo to be fastened to the side of a hostile vessel by means of one of these boats. Thus presented, the problem to be resolved was too complicated. Fulton, some thirty years later, had not succeeded any better than Bushnell. There is nothing astonishing about this, for submarine navigation is hardly better improved to-day than it was at that period. Therefore, the bureau conducted by Maury at Richmond gave no encouragement to the inventors who sought the means of carrying torpedoes even under the hulls of hostile vessels. It was no doubt right in regard to those who thought that it was possible, amidst the troubles of the struggle in a besieged city, to resolve this problem of submarine navigation, which all the advances of science have not yet been able to conquer. A cruel experience proved once more that in time of war we must apply and put in practice systems already known rather than invent new ones.

A private citizen, Mr. Hunley, built at his own expense a submarine boat provided with a screw propelled by hand, and designed to affix torpedoes which it towed to the sides of the

Federal ironclads while passing underneath their keels. Having on board a willing crew, the boat was about to proceed on its adventurous expedition when it was prematurely submerged by the eddy of a steamer passing by, and went down with two sailors. A fresh crew, commanded by Lieutenant Dixon, raised it and succeeded, it seems, in navigating it into the harbor of Charleston. But one day the inventor himself having wished to take the place of the absent commander, the boat, after plunging under his direction, never rose to the surface. When it was fished out shortly thereafter, it is stated that the crew had perished by being slowly asphyxiated as in a coffin. Mr. Hunley, like the sorcerer of the story who had forgotten the magical words capable of exorcising the demon after having invoked him, did not know how to move the apparatus intended to bring the vessel back to the surface. We may picture to ourselves the anguish of those wretched men seeking in vain the mechanism which could return them to life, and struggling in terrible agony as the respirable air was being exhausted around them.

Several months before this disaster a young officer on Beaugard's staff, Captain Lee, had understood that to obtain an efficacious result it was necessary to simplify the attempts of Bushnell and Fulton, and disconnect the use of the offensive torpedo from the difficulties and the hazards of submarine navigation. A narrow boat, not much raised above the water, painted gray, had a good chance in a dark night of escaping from the bullets and shells of the Federals. It was then, in reality, less dangerous than the plunging boat. It was much easier to direct, and therefore offered greater chances of success. In order to increase these chances, it was not to attach surreptitiously the torpedo to the side of its adversary, but, forsooth, itself to cause the torpedo to explode on striking the hostile vessel. To that end the powder-box, furnished with an apparatus detonating on percussion, was fastened at the extremity of a long rod and glided a few feet under water in front of the boat, ready to destroy the first hull against which the pilot of the little boat should bring it in contact. This arrangement, called a spar-torpedo or torpedo with a rod, had already been tried on board the *Atlanta*: this vessel, which was so promptly dismantled by the *Weehawken*, carried such a torpedo on its prow, but

its lack of swiftness rendered such an engine almost useless and less dangerous than an ordinary rostrum. The merit attaching to Captain Lee was that he had armed fleet and almost invisible boats with this torpedo. Those who knew how to use it had still more merit, for the greater the chances of success, the greater also were the risks incurred. Therefore, in accordance with a biblical comparison dear to the Americans, these little vessels that were to brave their gigantic adversaries, veritable Goliaths, were dubbed "Davids."

Unfortunately for the Confederates, the Secretary of War at Richmond treated with the same disfavor all projects in regard to offensive torpedoes, and it was only after great vexation that Captain Lee could bring about the adoption of his engine on board an old steamboat with which a mariner, Captain Carlin, went outside the passes to seek the Union flagship *New Ironsides*. He came up to the very ladder of the ship, but, his boat steering badly, he could not run into the ship, and the torpedo did not explode. Without receiving a single shot, Carlin had the luck to get out of the perilous situation in which he had placed himself by replying to the hostile sentinels that his was a Union despatch-boat.

A former officer of the Federal navy, Lieutenant Glassell, a man of great audacity, had previously made a similar attempt with a rowboat armed by Captain Lee with a spar-torpedo. His expedition had met the same fate with that of Carlin. Having arrived near the Union corvette *Powhatan*, he had ordered his men to bend all their oars to come up with it, but either from fear or treason one of them had backed his oars; consequently, the boat had come up to the corvette broadside on, and the torpedo did not explode. Glassell, whom the enemy, being confused, had allowed to get away without sending him a single volley, thought only of beginning anew. Experience proved that it was necessary to have a steamboat, but one smaller and more manageable than that of Carlin. The Government persisting in refusing its co-operation for such attempts, he found a devoted friend, Mr. Stoney, who built at his own expense at Wilmington, where Glassell then was, a small steamboat shaped like a cigar, which, sinking deep into the water and painted gray and blue, must be almost

invisible at night. This boat, brought by rail to Charleston and armed with a spar-torpedo, was the first to be dubbed a "David." Glassell took the command of it, with three resolute men who composed the crew. Their number was a guarantee of success. In the evening of the 5th of October he got under way with the ebb tide, and soon arrived unperceived in the midst of the hostile fleet. He moved toward the great indistinct mass of the *New Ironsides*, lighted up here and there by the regulation lights: his intention, in fact, was to destroy at the first blow the most powerful of the enemy's ships. This time no accident happened to thwart the Confederate sailors in their audacious attempt. The David, true to Glassell's rudder, who manages it with his feet, having a gun in his hands, advances under a full head of steam against the *New Ironsides*. The challenges of the Union sentinel, who perceives it three hundred and twenty-five yards off, remain unanswered; but at the moment when the guard is gathering, Glassell, being only some forty-three yards away, shoots dead with his gun the officer on duty, Ensign Howard, expecting thus to cause confusion on board the hostile vessel, and a few seconds thereafter the David strikes the latter abaft the ladder. The torpedo explodes, shakes violently the *New Ironsides*, and causes an immense body of water to fall back upon its invisible adversary. The fires on the David are extinguished and the machinery refuses to operate: Glassell and two men, believing the boat to be lost, jump overboard under a shower of bullets; one man only remains on board. Despite the fire of the Federals, this man escapes without injury, and soon vanishes in the darkness: having fished up one of his comrades, he revives the fires and brings back the David intact to Charleston. Glassell and the other man, who had life-preservers, were taken by the Federals: the former was picked up in the offing, half dead with cold; the latter was found hanging to the tiller of the *New Ironsides*. This ship had not been seriously injured; Glassell's torpedo was not sufficiently powerful to shatter its enormous iron hull; fortunately for the Federals, the explosion bore heaviest against one of the main timbers, which had deadened its force. Still, this attempt was not altogether useless: it rendered the Federals yet more circumspect than before, and obliged them, in order to protect their craft

against the Davids, to surround them with nets which much interfered with their movements.

The monitors, that had so often braved the artillery of the Confederates and escaped from their torpedoes, encountered more formidable enemies in the storms that winter was bringing back more and more frequently on the coast of South Carolina. The monitors were, as we have said, very bad sailers. The vessel called the *Monitor* had foundered off that coast on the 31st of December, 1862. One year afterward another vessel of the same class, the *Weehawken*, which we have already followed up in many an engagement, was lost in like manner. On the 6th of December, in the daytime, being made fast to a buoy in the Charleston roads, it went down so suddenly that some twenty men had not time to climb on the bridge and perished with the vessel. The sea, though heavy, was not rough enough to prevent the boats belonging to the rest of the fleet being lowered, and the greater part of the crew was thus saved. It is supposed that the flat bottom of the monitor, strained by a rough cruise and several strandings, had become disjointed, and soon after partly opened in consequence of the shocks which the ship, being very low in the water, had sustained from a choppy and broken sea. Eleven hours thereafter the loss of two launches capsized on the bar swelled the number of disasters caused by bad weather on this dangerous coast. Finally, the year closed in front of Charleston with an attempt, of little importance, by the Confederate troops posted on James Island against the Federal craft occupying the waters of Stono River—namely, the *Marblehead*, the *Pawnee*, and the sailing vessel *Williams*. A pretty sharp artillery engagement took place on Christmas Day near Legaréville, and ended with the retreat of the Confederates, who left behind them some men killed and two guns.

Almost the entire squadron of Dahlgren being concentrated before Charleston, a few words will suffice us to recall the incidents which occurred on the rest of the coast blockaded by this squadron. On the 17th of August the Federal steamer *Norwich*, reconnoitring on the St. John's River in Florida, captured two hostile signal-stations with all the personnel. On the 22d of September the crew of the gunboat *Seneca* destroyed considerable salt-

works in the vicinity of Darien, in Georgia. On the 17th of October the sailing schooner *Ward*, that was watching the entrance to the little bay of Murrell's Inlet to the northward of Georgetown in South Carolina, seized without fighting a hostile craft of the same strength; but three days later a part of the crew, having landed to take in water, were captured by a party of Southern horsemen. The same accident having been renewed under like circumstances in the case of the sailors belonging to the brig *Perry* that had relieved the *Ward*, Dahlgren despatched several vessels to Murrell's Inlet, and one of them, the *Nipsic*, effected a landing on the 1st day of January to destroy a hostile schooner.

The operations of the Eastern Gulf squadron may be expressed in a few lines. Still more than elsewhere the Federals sought to destroy the salt-works so numerous on the coast of Florida: in June they destroyed those on Alligator Bay; in July, those on Marsh Island, near to the Ocklockonnee River; finally, in December they destroyed the most important ones on the Bay of St. Andrew. The capture, without fighting, of two blockade-runners on the Suwanee River on the 20th and the 24th of December closes this enumeration, as short as it is insignificant.

The purely naval operations of the other Gulf squadron shall detain us still less, although this squadron had an immense stretch of coast to watch, from the Bay of Pensacola in Florida down to the boundary of Mexico at the mouth of the Rio Grande. But, on the one hand, Farragut, with some of his best ships, remained on the Mississippi after the capture of Port Hudson; and, on the other hand, the vessels that have remained at sea under the orders of Commodore Bell will be joined to the expedition that Banks, after a luckless attempt, shall undertake against Texas: the narrative of this expedition belongs to the ensuing chapter. Hence a useless cannonade on October 12th against a blockade-runner which had taken refuge under the fire of Fort Morgan at Mobile, and the engagement of the steamer *Bermuda* with a party of Confederates, who captured and then lost on November 14th a Federal schooner laden with coal, are the only incidents that we can mention to terminate this chapter.

CHAPTER III.

THE FAR WEST.

ALL that remains to us now to bring the year 1863 to a close is to speak of the battles that took place during the latter part of this year in the vast regions extending west of the Mississippi. We have already stated that after the fruitless efforts of Johnston, Holmes, and Taylor to release Vicksburg and Port Hudson, every struggle ceased in the valley of the great river. Its waters are travelled over with impunity by the Federal vessels; the Southern forces that had hastened to its banks have withdrawn into the interior, and the Northern soldiers, enjoying a well-deserved rest, have not yet undertaken to pursue them; Grant would like to have shortened this intermission and used the powerful army united under his command to carry war to the very heart of the rebel States by taking Mobile and making this port the base of operations of a new campaign. Banks shares his views, and Grant has therefore hastened to send him, in the early part of August, according to orders received from Washington, the most movable portion of the Thirteenth corps—say about twelve thousand men—under the command of General Ord. He hopes to overcome the opposition of General Halleck, who, as we have seen, thinks of nothing but parcelling out his army to have it undertake at the one time several minor expeditions. But soon certain political considerations interfere with the execution of the great plan he had projected. On the 6th of August the Federal Government, at the request of the Secretary of State, decides that all the available forces stationed at New Orleans shall move upon Texas. Owing to motives independent of military questions, say the official despatches, and which cannot be discussed, the Federal flag must be raised on the soil of that State.

The interference of the Secretary of State can easily be explained.

We can without difficulty and unreservedly broach this subject, as the Mexican expedition has been for some time definitely judged in France. The heroism of our soldiers blinds no one as to the reckless and adventurous policy of which they were the instruments and too often the victims. This policy, forgetful of the sound traditions of monarchy, seemed to speculate on the dangers that threatened the flag served by La Fayette and defended by Rochambeau, in order to acquire a sort of protectorate over the countries that, situated between the two seas, form the centre of the American continent. While the United States Government was engaged in a struggle that absorbed all its strength and paralyzed its action abroad, the French army, victorious at Puebla, occupied the city of Mexico, and the political aim of the expedition at once appeared. On the 10th of July some "Notables," appointed by the provisional government, had proclaimed the empire and offered the crown to Archduke Maximilian. No one could doubt the hostility of the United States against this new power sprung up from European interference; hence the Confederates expected to find on the banks of the Rio Grande courteous neighbors, and if that hostility led to an open rupture, then a powerful support, and perhaps even military co-operation. To deprive them of this hope the Government at Washington wished to separate them from the new empire by raising the Federal flag on the frontier of Mexico. The Government being assured by the refugees that it had yet numerous partisans in Texas, had resolved to strive to subdue the whole State, instead of simply setting foot at the mouth of the Rio Grande. The immense extent of this State, the little resources it offered, the scarcity of railroads, the lack of large streams, were obstacles the more serious as the number of Texans enlisted in the Confederate armies could leave no doubt as to the sentiments of the majority of the population. These difficulties were better understood at New Orleans than at Washington. General Halleck had recommended Banks to penetrate into Texas by way of the northeast, going up along the Red River as far as Natchitoches, or even as far as Shreveport; he expected that he could thus be supported—at quite a distance, it is true—by the expedition Steele was about to lead into the heart of Arkansas. But that would have been

pushing the little invading army into the poorest part of the State, and wantonly removing it from its base of operations. Banks preferred, with good reason, to establish this base by the sea, where the mouths of rivers and short railroads penetrating into the interior offered him good means of communication. But the insufficient means of sea-transportation at his disposal did not permit him to select from along the whole coast of Texas the most favorable landing-place. He decided upon Sabine Pass, which was the nearest, this little Texan town being situated on the very border of Louisiana. A large lake fed by several rivers and close to the coast empties into the sea through a channel likewise called Sabine Pass, which forms an estuary with deep water. Unfortunately, a high bar difficult to pass stretches in the form of a half circle in front of the mouth of the channel and prevents the entering of vessels of great tonnage. Yet there is no safe landing-place except in the roadstead formed by this bar, the coast of Louisiana on the east being too marshy, and that of Texas on the west presenting a straight line without shelter, upon which the breakers dash with the least wind. Banks, to make up for the small number of his transports, expected to collect his army at Brashear City, and when master of Sabine Pass send there only a portion of his forces by sea, whilst the rest, moving up Bayou Têche and passing through Vermilionville, would make its way into Texas, following the unfinished railroad from New Iberia to Beaumont.

The small army that Banks had brought back from Port Hudson, reduced more by sickness than the enemy's fire, had been reorganized and formed the Nineteenth corps, whose command had just been given to General Franklin, McClellan's and Burnside's valiant lieutenant, relieved at last of the unjust disfavor which had fallen upon him after the battle of Fredericksburg. General Ord had brought about twelve thousand men to New Orleans. At last Banks organized a corps of colored troops called the "*Corps d'Afrique*," about which we have already spoken. Grant, who arrived at New Orleans on the 2d of September, promised him, it is true, the rest of the Thirteenth corps and the division of Herron—say another twelve thousand men—but these reinforcements had not yet arrived, and in the mean time he had at his disposal to defend

New Orleans and to subdue Texas but about twenty thousand available men, his ten thousand negroes being as yet only useful, as he said himself, to construct earthworks.

Franklin received orders to embark with five thousand men, the transports not being able to take more, and to repair to Sabine Pass. He was to land in the channel under the protection of the navy, or, if this were not possible, he was to seek under the same protection a better landing-place. Once master of the town and pass, regarding which no doubt was entertained as to his being able to easily take possession of them, he was to advance as far as Beaumont and send back the transports to Brashear for more troops. By this means and the land-route Banks expected to collect fifteen to seventeen thousand men, with which he would march upon Houston and take Galveston by flank or rear, and, leaving there a garrison, would then proceed along the coast to Indianola, and perhaps even as far as the Rio Grande if he was not recalled sooner by military events to New Orleans.

Unfortunately, this fine plan was defective in its basis. The expedition whose command had been unexpectedly given to General Franklin had been badly prepared. The transports for the most part were sailing-vessels, which had to be towed; the steam-vessels were old and rotten; the soldiers were crowded on board; there were provisions and forage for only ten days and water for even less time. Moreover, a misunderstanding delayed the departure of the most important of all the transports, that which carried a party of engineers with the instruments and material necessary to facilitate the landing. To obtain better vessels it would have been necessary to bring them from New York; there was no time for this. Those that Banks had collected, unsafe to undertake a long journey with too great a load, unfit for sailing in convoy, drew, moreover, almost too much water to pass the Sabine bar easily. Franklin's observations on the subject were not listened to, for in order to obey the orders received from Washington it was requisite at any risk to land somewhere on the coast of Texas; and on the 5th of September the fleet left New Orleans. On the morning of the next day it reached Atchafalaya Bay, and immediately resumed its sailing, escorted by four gunboats, the *Clifton*, *Sachem*, *Arizona*, and *Granite City*, which were to pro-

tect it during the voyage and prepare the landing. Each of these vessels carried several guns of large calibre, but two of them were simply river-boats; the other two, built likewise for commerce, could not, more than the latter, offer the least resistance to the enemy's projectiles. Favored by the weather, but delayed in its course by the necessity of waiting for the stragglers, the fleet came, on the 7th, in sight of Sabine Pass. The gunboats had preceded it by twelve hours, bringing the chiefs of the expedition, General Franklin, and Lieutenant Crocker, commanding the naval forces. The instructions of General Banks to the former and those of Commodore Bell to the latter were definite. The naval commander, having been for some time studying this question, was confident of being able to silence and occupy the battery that commanded the entrance to the Sabine Pass channel. The operations were to commence in that direction, and Franklin had promised Crocker a detachment of soldiers intended to embark on the steamers to aid him in this operation. The landing was then to take place under the protection of the naval forces and at such point as they might indicate.

Crocker expected to find in front of the bar a vessel of the blockading squadron that had buoyed the passes, reconnoitred the approaches of the battery, and selected the point for landing; so that, commencing operations immediately on his arrival, the surprised enemy might not be reinforced in time. Unfortunately, the vessel was not there. Lieutenant Dana, who commanded the *Cayuga*, the only vessel that was in front of the bar, gave Crocker all the information he had regarding the defences of the enemy, but they were vague and insufficient. Perhaps in this uncertainty it would have been better to try to land the troops at a certain distance on the coast to flank the works, which had but few defenders. But it was dangerous to cast thus upon an inhospitable shore a few regiments which the slightest tempest would doom to fatal isolation. The landing would have been the more difficult as the *mâteriel* was wanting. Besides, whatever General Banks may have since then said, his instructions and those of Commodore Bell were positive: the naval forces were to commence by destroying the hostile batteries, and occupy them before Franklin allowed his troops to land. Nothing in the situation authorized Crocker

to deviate therefrom, and the recollection of a successful landing he had effected at this point some time before made him fully confident of success. But he could not undertake anything before the arrival of the transports; for, if the naval force was to reduce the enemy's batteries, Franklin's soldiers alone could definitely occupy them. He therefore waited for the fleet. On the morning of the 8th it made its appearance in front of the bar, but the greater number of the vessels could not cross the shallow bottom, over which there was but four and a half or five feet of water. Those that could pass carried about twelve hundred men; the operation was long, and it was more than two o'clock in the afternoon when it terminated.

Meanwhile, Crocker, who did not wish to begin the fight before having by him some of the landing-forces, had made on the *Clifton*, with Franklin, a reconnoissance of the entrance to the channel, but he had not been able to discover the batteries, which the enemy had taken good care not to unmask prematurely. The Confederates had been a long time on their guard; they were few in number—only a few hundred—but among them were some excellent artillerymen, and they had implicit reliance on their powerful guns. Therefore they waited, without responding to the projectiles thrown at random by the Federal vessels, until the latter were within reach.

The Union fleet advances in two columns. On the left is Crocker, in the *Clifton*, following one of the tortuous channels cut through the sands that block up the mouth of Sabine Pass; this channel runs close to the western shore of Sabine Pass and the Confederate works. At a certain distance in rear of her comes the *Granite City*, escorting the transports that have been able to pass the bar. These vessels are, at a given signal, to land on this shore the troops they carry.

The *Sachem* and *Arizona*, carrying long-range guns, had penetrated into another passage situated more to the east, but likewise commanded by these works. A little before four o'clock the eight Confederate pieces suddenly open fire. One of the first shots strikes through the hull and boiler of the *Sachem*, and this vessel disappears in a cloud of steam. She is disabled, cannot steer, stands still, and ceases to fight. Crocker at this sight, inspired

by the examples of his chief Farragut, advances rapidly against the hostile battery, now unmasked, on the shore of the channel which he follows. He knows, in fact, that close cannonading with canister is the only expedient wooden vessels have to reduce land-batteries. But this one vessel alone cannot silence the enemy's fire. Soon a projectile disables the *Clifton* also by cutting the steam-pipes, and Crocker, finding himself at the mercy of the enemy, who might sink him with a few shots, is obliged to haul down his flag. The *Sachem* immediately does likewise, and the *Arizona*, striving to withdraw, also runs aground. If at this moment the Confederates, who have in the channel two steam-vessels clad with cotton, would move them against the transport fleet, they might capture it all; and the more easily as a part of the transports have stranded near the shore, and the captain of the *Granite City* hastened to repair to the high seas with his ship. Fortunately, the Confederates, busy with the capture they have just made, allow night to come upon them, and the transports, protected by the *Granite City*, which has at last returned, recross the bar, followed by the *Arizona*, again released. The failure of the expedition was complete. The capture of the *Sachem* and *Clifton* gave the Southerners naval superiority in the waters of Sabine Pass, and any attempt at landing was henceforth impracticable. Franklin brought his troops back to New Orleans.

The great haste with which Banks had organized this expedition had brought him no success. It became necessary to find another place in Texas whereon he could raise the Federal flag according to the instructions he had received. The enemy keeping henceforth on his guard at Sabine Pass, and the mouth of the Rio Grande being too far distant, he decided in favor of the land-route. Franklin had landed at New Orleans on the 11th of September. On the following day he was on the way to Brashear City with the Nineteenth corps. The Thirteenth corps, commanded by Ord, was to follow closely, with the exception of the division of Herron, which, recently added to this army corps, had been sent to the upper Atchafalaya to watch, near Morganzia, the movements of the Southern general Green. Not being able to proceed by another route, Banks had decided to ascend Bayou Têche with all his available forces as far as Vermilionville, and to endeavor

to reach from there the banks of Sabine River by a long march parallel with the coast. The want of flat-bottomed boats and the lack of water in the Têche greatly retarded this movement. On the 22d of September the Nineteenth corps reached the town of Franklin, and on the 26th the village of Bisland; but on this day Banks had not yet left Brashear City. Finally, General Franklin, having reached beyond New Iberia, had left the banks of Bayou Têche at the point where it ceases to be navigable at this season, and on the 6th of October his advance-guard was on the banks of Bayou Vermilion, near Vermilionville, where, after an insignificant skirmish, he established himself. But Banks, who had followed Franklin as far as New Iberia, was soon able to convince himself of the impossibility of advancing farther in the direction of Texas. On the west of Bayou Vermilion extended an uncultivated, uninhabited, resourceless country, entirely deprived of water in autumn, and where the first heavy winter rainfalls greatly softened the soil; an army could therefore not travel through it at any season without the risk of perishing by hunger or thirst. Another consideration, moreover, might bear upon his resolution. The division of Herron, which he had, as we have said, established at Morganzia on the Mississippi to observe the country through which the upper Atchafalaya flows, had met with a severe check: General Green, whom it was its mission to watch, had deceived its vigilance.

On the evening of the 28th of September, Green secretly crossed the Atchafalaya with three brigades of infantry and one of cavalry to surprise a portion of Colonel Leake's brigade, which Herron had left on the left bank of this stream to watch the passages across it. Leake had posted himself, with two regiments of infantry numbering about six hundred men and two cannon, at nine miles from Morganzia. He had placed his two hundred and fifty cavalry, under Major Montgomery, more to the westward, near the Atchafalaya. Green, sending Major Boone against the latter with a regiment of cavalry, and Mouton's and Speight's two brigades of infantry direct against Leake, had taken a circuitous route with the rest of his troops to attack the latter in the rear and place himself on his line of retreat. Boone, being the first to attack, separated the Union cavalymen from Leake's troops,

and, pushing them in disorder in another direction, did not permit them to give Leake the alarm. At the same time Speight, followed by Mouton, marched rapidly and fell unexpectedly on the Federal infantry. The latter, surprised and hastily drawn up, defended itself energetically. But Boone's cavalry, arriving on its flank after their first success, threw its ranks into disorder, and, not even giving Mouton time to arrive, forced the swarm of fugitives on the ambushade set up by Green. The latter picked up all that had escaped his lieutenants. There were more than a hundred men *hors de combat*, but he withdrew, taking with him two cannon and nearly five hundred prisoners. This bold *coup-de-main* proved the strength and self-reliance of the Confederates; it fore-showed what they would attempt should the bulk of Banks' army penetrate into the wilds of Texas, whether by pursuing it or pushing it back as far as the city of New Orleans.

The plan of reaching Texas by land had therefore to be perforce abandoned. For two months Banks had been seeking in vain some means of executing the orders of his government. Happily, during that time he had received, at New Orleans, the seaworthy vessels owing to the want of which he had been obliged to direct his first attack against Sabine Pass. He could henceforth, without much danger, cross the Gulf of Mexico to disembark a corps of troops at the mouth of the Rio Grande. We have shown how important it was for the Federals to occupy this point.

The naval expedition was at once decided upon. But Banks, in order to divert the attention of the enemy, wished to appear as if persisting in his first project. The old division of Herron (First of the Thirteenth corps), commanded by General Dana, was selected to form the landing-corps, and left the vicinity of Morganzia to return to New Orleans. In the mean while, Franklin, to whom Banks had left the command of the forces collected on the Bayou Têche, moved up this stream and the Bayou Vermilion as if he wished to reach Alexandria by the route that the Federals had taken the preceding spring. He had with him the Nineteenth corps and Lawler's and Washburne's divisions of the Thirteenth. He was to carry on this demonstration as far as Opelousas, then withdraw as soon as he should hear of the departure of the fleet to unite his troops, occupying only the interior line of the Bayou

Tèche, near Brashear City. It was, in fact, necessary that they should be ready to embark at this point if Banks, who accompanied Dana's expedition, summoned them to the coast of Texas.

The latter was at last able to sail on the 26th of October. Franklin, notified beforehand, had recalled the detachments sent in the direction of Alexandria, and by the 27th he had sent Lawler's division on to New Iberia. On the 1st of November he left the vicinity of Opelousas with the remainder of his little army, and camped on the banks of Carrion Crow Bayou, which the road to Vermilionville crosses at an equal distance—say about fourteen miles—from these two towns. At a little distance before reaching it this road crosses another stream parallel with the first, called Bayou Bourbeux. The rearguard was formed of Burbridge's brigade, detached from the Fourth division of the Thirteenth corps; it came from the village of Barre's Landing, at the confluence of the Tèche and Bayou Courtableau, and halted on the north bank of Bayou Bourbeux.

On the following day the Nineteenth corps halted at Vermilionville; the Third division of the Thirteenth corps, commanded by General McGinnis, and Burbridge's brigade, did not break their camps. In spite of a few musket-shots exchanged with some Confederate skirmishers, it was not thought that the enemy were strong in the vicinity: it was an open country; *rideaux* of green oaks, bordering the banks of the bayous, alone broke the monotonous horizon of the prairie. Hence, Franklin did not hesitate to divide his divisions on a line of nearly forty-five miles from Bayou Bourbeux to New Iberia.

The self-reliance of the Federals was such that, Burbridge's brigade not having yet left its camp on November 3d, that day was determined upon by the paymaster arrived from New Orleans to pay several regiments, and also to allow the voting of the Twenty-third Wisconsin, whose soldiers were to take part in their State election.

But the enemy, who had not been consulted, was now to interrupt the election operations in a manner which the legislator had been far from suspecting. Taylor, who had fallen back before the advance of Franklin without striving to contend for the line of the Tèche, had again moved forward as soon as he heard that the lat-

ter was retreating. Joining to his little band the forces of Green, whom he had called back from the banks of the Atchafalaya, he was following from Opelousas the tracks of the Federals, concealing himself after the Indian fashion and seeking the opportunity of crushing one of their detachments before it could be assisted by the rest of the army. The isolated position of Burbridge's brigade, about eighteen hundred strong, on the Bayou Bourbeux offered him this opportunity; he availed himself of it with his accustomed energy. While a regiment of cavalry, the First Texas, moves by a very circuitous route to make a demonstration to hold McGinnis' division on the banks of the Carrion Crow, he advances with the rest of his forces against Burbridge, who is encamped on the prairie, having the Bayou Bourbeux in his rear. The Confederate infantry, masked by the wood which borders the stream, falls suddenly on the Sixty-seventh Indiana, occupying the right of the Union camp. This regiment has not time to form; it breaks without firing a single shot, and leaves a great number of prisoners in the hands of the enemy. The rest of the brigade hastily takes arms and engages in a spirited fight. The artillery, which the Confederates already surround, is saved, except a single piece, which sinks into the mud of the bayou. But the Southern cavalry, arriving at a gallop across the prairie on the side opposite to the infantry, threatens to cut off the retreat of the Federals. The latter then think of nothing but to recross the bayou. They break in disorder, vigorously pressed by the assailants. Soon the prairie beyond the stream is covered with wagons and fugitives, who scatter in all directions. They have already reached the village of Grand Côtéau.

Fortunately, General Washburne, having been informed in the morning by Burbridge of the presence of some hostile parties, had caused McGinnis' division to take arms. Warned of the attack by the sound of musketry shortly after having visited the positions of Burbridge, he has promptly rejoined him, and has in vain endeavored with him to maintain order in his brigade. But he has summoned at the same time the division of McGinnis, who, leaving three regiments on the Carrion Crow to hold out against the First Texas, advances rapidly in line of battle across the prairie. It was time, for the enemy's cavalry, coming at a gallop by

the right on the mass of fugitives, was on the point of completely destroying Burbridge's brigade. At the sight of the approaching long Federal lines it halts, and the Confederate generals, prudently avoiding an unequal fight, give the order for retreat. They had cause to be gratified at their success. The losses they had inflicted upon the Unionists amounted to 26 killed, 124 wounded, and 566 prisoners. They were satisfied with that, and no longer interfered with the march of Franklin's little army.

However, Banks had succeeded on the day before this unfortunate fight in planting the Federal flag on the soil of Texas. The voyage had been ill-fated. A northern gale, first forerunner of the winter storms, which might perhaps have destroyed almost all of Franklin's flotilla, had scattered his transports; three of them foundered, but happily without loss of life. Finally, on the evening of the 1st of November nearly the whole fleet was assembled in front of the low shore extending north of the mouth of the Rio Grande. The entire coast of Texas from this point to Sabine Pass is formed by a strip of sandy shore, generally very narrow, and which is almost everywhere separated from the main land by salt-water lagoons navigable by small vessels. The sea, which has collected these sandbars, strikes constantly upon the shore, and gathers at the mouth of the channels, through which the waters of the rivers and lagoons empty, bars which obstruct the entrance. Hence the channels or passes navigable by vessels are very few. The lagoon of the Madre, which is one hundred and twelve miles long, communicates with the sea only at its two extremities—on the south by the passes near Boca Chica and Brazos Santiago; on the north by that of Corpus Christi. Between these extreme points stretches the long island of Del Padre, simply a barren bank, without vegetation and without drinkable water, beaten on the one side by the unresting breakers of the high sea, and confined on the other by the still sheet of the lagoon. A few miles south of the Boca Chica is the mouth of the Rio Grande, difficult to enter, and on the right bank of the river the village, officially Mexican, but in reality American, of Bagdad. On the north of Corpus Christi pass are the passes of Aransas and Cavallo, which give access to the two deep and navigable lagoons of Aransas and Matagorda. The latter is truly an inland sea, on the margin of

which are the commercial ports of Indianola and Matagorda. Farther on, the banks close to the main land are cut by the mouth of Brazos River; then they form, under the name of Galveston Island on one side and Bolivar Point on the other, the vast bay of Galveston, and finally, separated from the main land by a chain of small lakes, they continue till they end at Sabine Pass. The real coast of Texas, with its numerous indentations, is thus almost always enclosed, except at a few points, back of an insuperable wall. It is therefore easy to any one commanding the sea to occupy this wall and with a small force close its passages, the lagoons offering efficient protection to troops posted near any of the passes formed in the banks. Banks' plan, well conceived this time, was to take possession of these passes successively, commencing at the south.

On the 2d of November he lands a few troops on the shore of Brazos Island, and establishes himself there without interference on the part of the enemy; he thus commands the channel of Boca Chica. On the following day a disembarkation is effected at the mouth of the Rio Grande in front of Bagdad. The Confederates, who have entirely disarmed Southern Texas to protect Galveston and the eastern part of the State, cannot even make a show of resistance. But, the bar not permitting the large transports to penetrate into the river, the landing is effected by means of boats—a long and difficult operation which costs the life of several sailors. On being master of this point, Banks ascends the river with a portion of his troops, and on the 6th takes possession of Brownsville, in front of Matamoras. On the 8th the occupation of Point Isabel, a landing-place situated on the lagoon of the Madre and connecting with Brownsville by a railroad, completes this operation, which in six days and without bloodshed has given the Federals the possession of that part of the coast of Texas most important to them. In fact, masters of Brownsville, they completely intercept the traffic which, by the way of Matamoras, supplied the Confederates with articles contraband of war. This traffic was thoroughly organized, and had as accomplices, it is sad to say, quite a number of Northern merchants, who did not hesitate to enrich themselves by supplying arms to their own enemies. It was pursued on so large a scale that a whole cargo of army-

wagons had arrived at Matamoras from New York, and had been delivered to the Confederates a short time before the occupation of Brownsville. The right bank of the Rio Grande being then almost entirely in the hands of the Liberals or Juarists, Banks experienced no trouble with his Mexican neighbors.

Hence, fearing nothing from that quarter, he now thinks of extending his territory northward. About nineteen hundred men and a battery of artillery have embarked, November 15th, at Brazos Island, and, thanks to the favorable weather, land the next day near the pass of Corpus Christi, into which even the smallest steamers cannot penetrate, the bar having but twenty-nine inches of water. The Federals, under the command of General T. E. G. Ransom, have landed at the southern extremity of Mustang Island, which extends lengthwise about twenty-five miles to the pass of Aransas. To defend this pass, pretty frequently visited by the blockade-runners, the Confederates have constructed works on Mustang Island occupied by a small garrison of about one hundred men. Ransom, starting on the 17th before daylight with two hundred soldiers, moves the length of the island by a forced march, brings together the rest of his troops, landed not far from the works, and presents himself suddenly before the enemy. The little garrison, surrounded on land, bombarded by the fleet, sees the uselessness of resisting and at once capitulates.

On disembarking at Brazos Santiago, Banks had sent a part of his transports back to New Orleans to bring reinforcements. About the 21st of November, General Washburne, commanding temporarily the Thirteenth corps, reached the pass of Aransas with a brigade of his Second division, under the command of Colonel H. D. Washburn. This brigade, joined to that of Ransom, gives him a force of more than three thousand men, with which he will continue to take possession of the important points on the coast. The Corpus Christi and Cavallo passes are about sixty-two miles apart. The banks which extend between them form the two islands of St. Joseph and Matagorda, which are separated by a channel impassable by ships, called Cedar Bayou. At the northern end of Matagorda Island, near the small port of Saluria, is an extensive work with blinded screen—Fort Esperanza—commanding the Cavallo pass. It is armed with powerful artillery and defended

by seven or eight hundred men. Its capture would completely close the ports of Indianola and Matagorda and would secure the Federals the possession of two-thirds of the Texan coast.

General Washburne lands his troops on the 23d at the southern end of St. Joseph's Island, and, accompanied by only twelve wagons, undertakes to travel over the sixty-two miles that separate him from the fort by a march in the sand along a shore whose breakers do not permit him at this season to communicate with the fleet. He will find neither food nor drinkable water. He will have, besides, to cross Cedar Bayou, which is over three hundred yards wide, and into which, when the weather is rough, the waves penetrate unobstructed. However, all these difficulties are promptly overcome. Four boats brought on wagons are fastened together and form a raft, upon which the crossing of Cedar Bayou is effected as soon as the weather permits. Finally, after having exchanged a few musket-shots with the enemy, and having suffered much on account of the long halts they had to make, the Federals appear on the 27th opposite Fort Esperanza and invest it on the land side. The next day they have pushed their trenches as far as the parapet of an advanced work of the enemy. However, the latter might resist a long time, as Fort Esperanza, owing to its situation on the neck of land between the sea and the lagoon, may be compared to Fort Wagner. But to protect its communications with the main land it has not the network of torpedoes which closed Charleston Bay to the Unionists. A heavy norther again drives away the enemy's vessels, but as soon as it has abated, these, braving the fire of the fort, will certainly come to cut off the retreat of its defenders. The latter have understood this, and hasten to evacuate the works during the night of the 28th-29th.

This fortunate *coup-de-main* ended Banks' operations on the coast of Texas. To continue them and attack Galveston, the defence of which General Magruder had prepared with care, would have required much greater forces, which the Federal Government could not give him. Moreover, Halleck, who had not forgiven him for having relinquished the land-route to invade Texas with the co-operation of the fleet, sought all means for quarrelling with him, reproaching him one day for not having waited for his approbation to embark, whilst he had recommended him to

set foot on the Texan soil, no matter how, and as soon as possible ; reproving him another day for having left the chief of his staff alone at New Orleans with the temporary command of the military department. It may be surmised that Halleck, always prejudiced against Franklin, feared that the latter, by virtue of his rank, might happen to be in command, even for a single day, at New Orleans. General J. J. Reynolds was sent from Washington to exercise this command during Banks' absence. He did not arrive in time. Banks had given the management of the entire expedition to General Washburne as soon as the latter had reached the coast of Texas, and without waiting for the result of the expedition against Fort Esperanza.

During his absence General Franklin, having remained on the banks of Bayou Têche, in the vicinity of New Iberia, had, on November 20th, surprised and captured about one hundred cavalry belonging to the Sixth Texas, and Green had reappeared on the left bank of the Atchafalaya. But, on the whole, no serious engagement had taken place. Banks, on arriving at New Orleans, was to occupy himself with the preparation of this expedition on Red River which laid so heavily upon Halleck's heart.

We will give a narration of it in our next volume, but we must mention here the operations undertaken by the Federals likewise on the west of the Mississippi in the autumn of 1863. It was, in fact, the success of these operations that encouraged the Government at Washington to avail itself of the co-operation of Banks to complete the defeat of the Confederate armies in the vast country comprised between the Missouri, the Mississippi, and the Western Plains still uninhabited, forming the States of Missouri, Kansas, and Arkansas, and the Indian Territory. The forces of the two parties contending for this section of country were not, as has already been seen, proportionate to its extent. They encountered each other from time to time, then would lose sight of each other, to keep on the watch, each one in his own way, in the immense regions whose faithfulness, always uncertain, they maintained in favor of their cause. We left them in the early part of July. Missouri and Kansas are again under Federal power: to the invasion of the Southern army have succeeded mere raids by guerillas. The struggle has been carried farther south ; on the

one hand, westward, on the borders of Arkansas and the Indian Territory, in the vast plains overlooked by the hills of Pea Ridge, where the Federal Army of the Frontier has been waging war these two years; and on the other hand, eastward, on the banks of the Mississippi, where the Confederates have just attacked in vain the post of Helena.

We will relate successively the military operations of which these two districts so far apart have been the scene during the second half of the year 1863, beginning with the least important, those of the Army of the Frontier in the Far West, at the limit of the States of Missouri and Arkansas, which has been for a long time that of civilization. On this long line, almost straight from north to south, the United States Government had established a few fortified posts, situated very far apart: on the north, Fort Scott, a little westward of the frontier of Missouri; at the centre, Fort Wayne, in the Indian Territory, in the latitude of Pea Ridge; on the south, Fort Smith on the Arkansas and at the very limit of the State bearing that name. The frequent intercourse with the Indians, more and more concentrated, owing to the system of territorial reservation between Kansas and Texas, having compelled the Federal army to establish itself permanently among some of the tribes, Fort Wayne was abandoned and replaced by a new post well situated at the triple confluence of the Verdigris, Neosho, and Arkansas, on the left bank of these two latter streams. It was given the name of Fort Gibson, which it still bears, but during the war it was more generally called Fort Blunt, a name by which we have, up to the present, designated it. Fort Scott was in the hands of the Federals, and Fort Smith in the hands of the Confederates. At the time of which we are speaking the former occupied also Fort Blunt, but this occupation was constantly threatened by the enemy, who had even established a camp in the vicinity. As we have said in the preceding volume, General Blunt, who had his headquarters at Fort Scott, had sent, in the latter part of June, an important train to supply the garrison of Fort Blunt, then commanded by Colonel W. A. Phillips. The escort, swelled on the way by the addition of several detachments, had reached a strength of sixteen hundred men. In spite of this force, it had been attacked on the banks of Cabin Creek and had experienced

some trouble in making its way. Its arrival had given Phillips the means to cope with his adversaries, who had previously closed upon and blockaded him in his post. The Southern general Cooper, occupying the right bank of the Arkansas, had collected the bulk of his forces at the village of Honey Springs, situated twenty or twenty-five miles south of Fort Blunt on the banks of Elk Creek. He was waiting there for an important reinforcement which General Cabell was to bring him from Fort Smith, and with which he intended to resume the offensive. Meanwhile, at the news of the fight at Cabin Creek, Blunt set off with a mere escort to join Phillips. The reduction of his army not permitting him to send any fresh reinforcements to the latter, he has decided, in order to relieve Fort Blunt, to disturb his adversaries by a bold stroke. During the night of the 15th-16th, although sick, he starts with a detachment of two hundred and fifty horsemen and six cannon, ascends the Arkansas, fords it, scattering the enemy's posts, and redescends the right bank, thus clearing it, until he finds himself again in front of the fort. The crossing by ferry—which, owing to the positions occupied by the Confederates on this bank, could not be attempted before—is at once commenced, and on the evening of the 16th all of Blunt's available forces are assembled on the southern bank. These forces, which are divided between Colonel Judson and Colonel Phillips, amount to about three thousand men, with twelve cannon: Blunt, without losing a moment, sets them on the march, and in the forenoon of the 17th he encounters the outposts of Cooper. Pushing them before him, he comes near the woods bordering the course of the Elk Creek, which traces through the prairie a furrow of sombre verdure. The Confederates await him, lying in ambush on the skirt of the woods; their artillery commands the approaches concealed under the foliage. Behind them the Honey Springs road crosses Elk Creek by a wooden bridge and leads to the village, situated a few miles farther on, where Cooper has collected a large stock of supplies.

Blunt, who has himself reconnoitred these positions, allows his troops some rest; then, toward ten o'clock, he advances them in two columns under Phillips and Judson, the cavalry at the head formed in platoons, the infantry in companies, and the artillery in

sections. At a given signal, at about four hundred yards from the enemy, the two columns deploy quickly in line; the artillery places its guns and commences firing; the cavalry moves to its flanks, dismounts, and penetrates into the woods rifle in hand. The infantry follows closely, in spite of the well-sustained fire of the Southerners, and after a struggle of nearly two hours the latter are driven back on the bridge. They strive in vain to defend this outlet; disorder takes place in their ranks, and Blunt, pursuing them closely, reaches Honey Springs, where the storehouses are on fire. He stops only when the fatigue of his troops does not admit of his going farther. The Honey Springs fight had cost him seventeen killed and thirty-six wounded; Cooper's losses were much greater. Hence, notwithstanding the reinforcement that Cabell brought him that very evening, he continued his retreat in the direction of Fort Smith. Blunt, on his side, satisfied with his success, returned to Fort Gibson, the safety of which was henceforth assured.

To obtain this result he had been obliged to diminish the effective force, already much reduced, of the protecting troops that were defending Missouri and Kansas. The regular forces of the Confederates were too far distant to trouble those States. But the guerillas were not long in availing themselves of the situation, and by the end of July partisan warfare revived in these unfortunate districts, which it had already so cruelly distressed. Quantrell, who is about to acquire a bloody reputation throughout all America, organizes small bands under the Confederate flag to devastate the State of Missouri. On the 30th of July some of his partisans appear in arms far north, in the county of Sabine, on the right bank of the Missouri, and give fight to the local militia. A short time after, on August 30th, the Southern colonel Coffee, with one of these bands, wandering about in search of the Federal trains on the frontiers of Missouri, Arkansas, and the Indian Territory, attacks the post of Pineville in the south-western part of Missouri, and is repulsed with loss by the Sixth Missouri cavalry. Meanwhile, Quantrell has collected his forces on the frontier of Kansas, the young State which, before secession, had already given the example of civil war, and where the two parties have not ceased to be in arms. In order to strike a blow that may spread terror

among the Unionists of this entire region, he has selected the small town of Lawrence, one of the centres of the Abolition party and the residence of Senator Lane. This town, situated on the banks of the Kansas River, was then undefended and without a garrison. By a night-march Quantrell escapes the Federal troops which are pursuing him, and reaches the town on August 21st at daybreak with three hundred men. These latter, who have not been preceded by any alarm, gallop through the still, deserted streets, take possession of all the outlets, and kill without mercy all the inhabitants who, summoned by the uproar, come singly out of their houses. For some hours the unfortunate town is a scene of murder and pillage worthy of the darkest days of the Middle Ages. The guerillas, penetrating into the houses, slaughter indiscriminately the men they meet, notwithstanding the supplications of the women, who strive to save them; but they particularly assault with fury the Germans, accused of being fervent abolitionists, and the negroes, all free in Kansas, and consequently the particular objects of their hatred. Senator Lane escapes them by a miracle. The few who thought of saving their lives by giving money to the wretches are shot in cold blood after it has been extorted from them. The plundering is done methodically. All the fireproof safes are broken into and carefully examined. Finally, Quantrell—who in the mean time has had his breakfast served at the hotel—considering his work as accomplished, gives the order for retreat to his men, whom the bloodshed has intoxicated as much as have the profusely consumed liquors. Before leaving he causes the principal buildings to be set on fire, and the conflagration extends rapidly over the greater part of the town. The unfortunate inhabitants, fearing to be slaughtered, dare not leave their burning dwellings, and several meet their death in them. A horrible sight is offered to those who at last venture in the streets: they wander through the conflagration in the midst of half-calcined corpses, seeking under the smoking ruins the relatives, the friends, whom ruffians have sacrificed to their sanguinary passions. Nearly two hundred houses are destroyed and the number of victims amounts to more than one hundred and sixty.

The effect of the Lawrence massacre was intense, but different from what Quantrell expected. A cry of indignation arose in

the North : the inhabitants of Missouri, wishing to avoid a similar fate, flocked to the recruiting-offices and everywhere took up arms. In the Southern armies, composed of brave and honorable soldiers, the crime of Quantrell was severely censured. A small number of soldiers, hastily collected by Lane, had in vain gone in Quantrell's pursuit, but, supported by a few horsemen quickly arrived from Missouri, they had pursued him so closely that he had not been able to continue his crimes. The ruffian, who had fallen back on the Missouri with part of his companions, was not overtaken, notwithstanding the diligence of the Federals, until the middle of September in the impenetrable thickets that border the Sinabar in Jackson county. He escaped, leaving his camp in the hands of the enemy ; his band dispersed, to reorganize in another region, the Indian Territory, where we shall find it again, increased and bolder than ever.

Eastern Missouri escaped the incursions that had ravaged some other parts of the State, thanks to a happy *coup-de-main* executed by the Unionists a few days after the Lawrence massacre. Two regiments of the Missouri cavalry, one mustered in the Federal service, the other in the local militia, left Greenville on the 22d of August, and by a quick march reached, on the 24th, the village of Pocahontas in Northern Arkansas. The Federals surprised and captured, with a part of his staff, the Southern general Jeff. Thompson, who was just preparing a new expedition, but thought that, being in Pocahontas, he was out of the reach of his adversaries. Unfortunately, the prisoners were the victims of numerous thefts, regarding which both regiments threw the responsibility on each other.

In Central Missouri a few bands also appeared, but the principal one having, on September 12th, attacked the Federal post of Salem in Dent county, was driven back with great loss and soon disappeared.

In the mean while, Blunt, after a long rest at Fort Gibson, seeing that the Confederates have lost all their audacity, has decided upon going to encounter them beyond the Canadian River. He starts in the fore part of August. At his approach Cooper and Cabell separate. The former moves southwardly, closely followed by the Federals as far as the village of Perryville, where he

halts to oppose them on August 26th. But he is driven out of his position, and is obliged to continue his retreat. Satisfied with this success, Blunt turns on Cabell, who with more than two thousand men is on the road to Fort Smith. Crossing the Poteau River without opposition, he descends the right bank, and on September 1st reaches the rearguard of Cabell, who has set an ambuscade at the head of his column, routs it after a pretty sharp fight at the place called Devil's Backbone, and enters on the same day the large village that has formed around the ford. The capture of this post, in which Blunt establishes a garrison, ensures him the possession of the whole upper Arkansas Valley in the State of this name, as well as in the Indian Territory. The tribes, which have sided with the Confederates, seeing the Unionists masters of the place through which they were the most frequently in communication with the whites, submitted, and the settlers of Western Arkansas, finding themselves left to their own resources, were not long in imitating them.

In fact, Blunt, having been apprised that a Federal army from Helena was proceeding to Little Rock and that Cabell had moved to meet it, did not hesitate to forward his cavalry in the direction of the capital. Colonel Cloud, after having proceeded more than halfway down the right bank of the Arkansas, reached Dardanelle on September 9th, and scattered a large detachment of the enemy. Federal rule was now definitely re-established in these regions, for, as will presently be seen, General Steele was entering Little Rock on the following day.

In the mean time, Blunt, by leading his little army into the valley of the Arkansas, has removed it from the frontiers of Missouri and the Indian Territory, and has thereby given a little more confidence to the Confederate partisans, who avail themselves of this absence to renew their raids. Colonel Coffee reappears on the road that joins Fort Scott to Fort Gibson, and again threatens to cut off the latter post; but a detachment of three hundred Federal horsemen attack him on the 15th of September in the district of the Senecas, near the confluence of the Neosho River and Buffalo Creek, and scatters his band. But the arrival of an important reinforcement was about to give the latter the opportunity of reorganizing. Colonel Shelby had collected around him on the south

of the Arkansas a somewhat numerous band in order to be able to cross the line of posts placed *en échelon* by Blunt on this river. He attacks that of Moffat's Store, east of Fort Smith, on September 27th, and, concealing his movement under the feint of a retreat, he, on the contrary, rushes northward into the part of the State of Arkansas east of the Ozark Mountains, which the Federals have not visited for a long time. Continuing thence his march, he reaches Missouri, summons to him Coffee and another guerilla chief called Hunter, and at the head of a band which he increases from day to day he penetrates into the rich districts situated north of the Osage River. He has brought with him a few cannon, which give his band the character and importance of a small army.

It was expedient to put considerable forces promptly into the field to get the upper hand of an adversary who was beginning to become formidable. General Schofield, who was commanding in Missouri, did not lose an instant. By his orders General Brown, mustering all the militia he could mobilize around Jefferson City, marched to encounter Shelby, who was already threatening the town. The Confederate, refusing fight, pushed to the north-west, and reached the banks of the Missouri at Booneville, closely followed by Brown. Not being able to cross the river, he ascended rapidly its right bank, but he was attacked on the evening of October 12th at the crossing of a small stream, the Salt Fork, which empties into the river about eight miles below Arrow Rock. Fearing, doubtless, fatigue for his soldiers, Shelby waited for daylight, and the fight, resumed on the morning of the 13th, ended with his defeat; he lost one gun and about a hundred men. His band, severed in two in this engagement, could not continue its depredations, and had nothing to contemplate but retreat. But Schofield was hopeful of cutting it off. On October 9th he had directed General McNeil—he who had so gallantly fought in Eastern Missouri—to start with all the forces he could bring to Lebanon and those he would gather in the vicinity, to prevent Shelby from reaching Arkansas. The task was a difficult one, for the latter, though closely pressed by Brown's troops, had the choice of way, and the Federals could not wait for him everywhere with sufficient forces. At last, McNeil was informed that

he had recrossed the Osage, and that he was bearing westward with a portion of his troops, whilst Hunter and Coffee were moving southward, following a parallel direction, both closely followed by Federal detachments. In spite of all his diligence, he could not succeed in intercepting them. The two Confederate columns arrived before him at Humansville on the 17th of October. He reached the town of Stockton, in Cedar county, a few hours after the Confederates had departed, leaving there their last gun, and, having gathered around him all the forces in pursuit of them, he drove them into Arkansas. After a pretty sharp fight with their rearguard, he took possession of Huntsville, east of the Ozark Mountains, and penetrated into a much-broken branch of this chain called Buffalo Mountains which bounds the Arkansas Valley on the north. On the evening of the 24th he at last overtook the bulk of Shelby's column, but the latter escaped him during the night, and, though he pursued him very closely, he could not prevent him from recrossing the Arkansas on the 27th in the vicinity of Clarksville. A large portion of the Confederate forces had dispersed during this hasty retreat. Not being able to follow the track of the others, McNeil moved toward Fort Smith, which he reached on the 30th of October with about six hundred men. The remainder of his troops returned to Missouri, where his presence was required to keep down the partisans whose boldness had been revived by Shelby's daring raid. One of their chiefs, Colonel Love, had already signalized himself on the 3d of November by capturing a small post near Waynesville, when the return of some Federal soldiers happened to interrupt his plans and compelled his band to disperse.

Quantrell, on his part, had availed himself of the respite that Shelby's pursuit had afforded him to reorganize his band. Provided with a regular commission and commanding officially a brigade of the Confederate army, he had not, any more than his men, renounced his lawless practices, as will be seen presently. This band once organized, he decided upon taking it south, finding, doubtless, that partisan life was becoming more dangerous than remunerative in Missouri, and proceeded to the Indian Territory, hoping to surprise some isolated post or some train on the road connecting Forts Scott, Gibson, and Smith. This road was

much frequented since the Federals occupied the banks of the Arkansas, and Blunt, who had gone himself to Fort Scott, intended to make sure of its defence by a chain of small fortified posts. One of these posts was to be about halfway between Fort Scott and Fort Gibson, near springs called Baxter's Springs. At the end of September the point indicated, which was not yet fortified, was occupied by only one company of colored troops and a few white horsemen. Induced by the hope of surprising the colored soldiers, so odious to the men of the South, Quantrell moved toward Baxter's Springs with about six hundred horsemen, and reached in the forenoon of October 6th the vicinity of the camp of the Federals. Happily for the latter, they had the day before received serviceable reinforcements: Lieutenant Pond had arrived with a squadron of cavalry and a howitzer. The cavalry, it is true, had left in the morning, escorting a train, but some infantry had remained, and Pond, without losing an instant, had begun to intrench himself. The Federals did not, however, expect to see so formidable an enemy appear; they were badly guarded, and did not notice his coming until a part of the Confederate horsemen, having cleared the slender obstacle which the barricade offered, appeared in their midst.

Nevertheless, the Unionists recover from their surprise, rally, and succeed in driving the assailants from their camp. Quantrell then decides upon making a regular attack. A part of his men dismount, and the fight begins vigorously. The Federals fire with coolness; their howitzer makes many victims. But the Southerners surround them on all sides and close more and more upon them. At this moment Quantrell perceives a small band coming from the northward. It is General Blunt returning from Fort Scott with an escort of about one hundred men, followed by a few wagons and all the employés of his headquarters. Quantrell soon recognizes the rich prey offered him by so singular a coincidence. He at once moves toward this little force with all his men mounted. Blunt, not expecting to find the enemy so near the post, which is concealed from view by an undulation of the ground, takes them at first to be Unionists; he, however, forms his escort for fight, but at the first discharge from the enemy, who advance rapidly, the Federals cowardly disband, abandoning

their chief and all the staff, who tried in vain to rally them. In spite of their flight, the greater part of them fall under the enemy's fire; the wounded are despatched without pity, the prisoners are slaughtered. Among them is Major Curtis, son of the general of that name. Blunt escapes with only about ten men, whom he has grouped around him. But the disaster to his escort has saved the post. The assailants, badly supported, have been repulsed, and in the evening Quantrell again moves southward, leaving about eighty dead Unionists. He remains on the banks of the Neosho River, in front of which we shall soon again find him.

In the mean time, Blunt has been relieved of the command of the Army of the Frontier, which he has exercised with so much vigor and success. McNeil, on reaching Fort Smith, finds the orders which give him this command. Winter has come, and he has nothing to contemplate except strengthening the conquest made by his predecessor. On the 27th of November he received the submission of the principal chiefs of the Cherokee Nation. These latter said to him, with a simplicity full of good sense, that they would willingly take upon themselves the defence of the territory against their enemies, the redskins, if the whites would protect them against the whites. Quantrell, in fact, had not abandoned their territory and neglected no opportunity for plunder. He at last had the audacity, on December 18th, to attack Fort Gibson itself at a moment when it contained no white troops. But about six hundred Indian warriors, enrolled by Colonel Phillips, which formed the garrison, offered a determined resistance, and finally repulsed his assaults. After this check he left the country, where the severity of the winter did not permit him to live, and the year ended in this direction without any further encounter.

The latter half of this year had been marked for the Federals by the conquest of the greater part of the valley of the Arkansas. In fact, whilst Blunt was establishing himself on the upper end of this river, we have yet to relate how Steele, taking more to the east another Union army, reached its banks in the very heart of the State to which it gives its name.

We have said that after the capture of Vicksburg, Halleck, in spite of Grant's advice, had resolved to divide the powerful army which had just caused Pemberton to capitulate, and employ its

fragments in the minor operations which might not have any great influence on the final issue of the war. We have seen that this army, already much weakened by sickness, furloughs, and the occupation of the most important posts on the banks of the Mississippi, had been deprived of the Ninth corps, which Parke had brought back to Kentucky to follow Burnside on the road to Knoxville, and of the Thirteenth, which Ord had taken to New Orleans to assist Banks in invading Texas. A third detachment of this army was to invade Arkansas, taking Helena and the Mississippi as a base of operations. General Steele was detached from the Fifteenth corps to take the command of it, and arrived at this post on the 21st of July. The garrison, which had so valiantly repulsed the attack of Holmes a few days before, had just been reinforced by two brigades sent from the vicinity of Vicksburg. But the fevers had made such severe ravages in these two commands that, after having formed a garrison composed of three regiments and all the convalescents to protect Helena, Steele found himself with but six thousand infantry in a condition to take the field: he divided his force into two divisions under the command of Colonels Rice and McLean.

Fortunately, a numerous and well-drilled cavalry, an essential thing in this region, was placed under his command. General Davidson, who had been guarding for some time the right bank of the Mississippi, commanded a division of more than six thousand sabres, distributed into three brigades under Colonels Lewis Merrill, Glover, and Ritter. He found at Helena twenty pieces of artillery; Davidson brought eighteen. It was therefore with twelve thousand men and forty guns that he was about to penetrate into a rough, unexplored region and undertake to occupy, one hundred miles from the Mississippi, Little Rock, the capital of Arkansas, before an adversary so formidable, a soldier so well tried, as Sterling Price. The latter had remained at Little Rock with all the forces that had attacked Helena, except Walker's brigade of cavalry, which, as we have said, had moved down the right bank of the Mississippi. He therefore had with him his own division of infantry, Fagan's brigade, and Marmaduke's division of cavalry, with a few batteries of artillery. The departure of Holmes had left him commander-in-chief of this little army,

which sickness and the severe loss experienced in front of Helena had reduced in number and greatly discouraged.

White River was the first serious obstacle which the Federal army had to encounter. To prepare its march three steamboats ascended this river and explored it as far as Clarendon, the point where Steele was to cross it, and which they reached on the 13th of August. They effected a few captures, and made sure that the passage of the Union column would not encounter any resistance. The latter, in fact, having reached Clarendon on the 17th, landed without difficulty on the right bank of White River. But it had made but one halt, at about thirty-seven miles, and already numbered in its ambulances more than one thousand sick, so much had the enervating climate of the vicinity of Vicksburg sown morbid germs among the Northern men. It was necessary to establish a hospital at a point which might at the same time serve as a base for provisioning the army. Clarendon was an unhealthy place, badly situated, and the road from this point to Little Rock offered numerous obstacles. Steele resolved to ascend White River to place this dépôt at Devall's Bluff, where the railroad from Memphis to Little Rock crosses the river—a healthy elevated spot, whence he could easily continue the campaign against the capital of Arkansas. The vessels which had joined Steele at Clarendon transported the sick and the trains to Devall's Bluff; the infantry went by land, and reached there on August 23d, whilst the cavalry was marching direct toward Brownsville, a town situated on the line which the army was to follow in advancing against Little Rock. Thanks to the protection of the gunboats and the movement of the cavalry, the transportation by water was accomplished without any difficulty, and an intrenched camp was established at Devall's Bluff on the high cliff commanding the river. During this time, Davidson met the enemy's cavalry under Marmaduke, and, driving it before him on the 23d beyond Prairie Bayou, occupied Brownsville on the 25th. The following day Glover's brigade of cavalry continued advancing in the direction of Little Rock. Eighteen miles south-west of Brownsville is a stream, surrounded by pretty large swamps, called Bayou Metoe, which flows south-east toward the Arkansas. Price, confined in Little Rock with his little army, had directed Marmaduke to defend that line. The

Confederate cavalry, mustering strong, occupied the approaches of the bridge by which the road crossed the swamp and the stream. Glover, who had orders not to engage in a general fight, fell back on Brownsville after having reconnoitred their position.

But the following day Davidson returned with the same troops to endeavor to force the crossing of Bayou Metoe. Marmaduke had prepared to receive him, and was waiting five or six miles off in front of the bridge. The country was woody and easy to defend. The two bodies of cavalry dismounted. Marmaduke disputed step by step the ground with Glover's brigade, which, supported by a regiment of infantry, succeeded in dislodging him from all his positions only after a pretty sharp struggle. Finally, he recrossed Bayou Metoe, destroying behind him the bridge, of which the Federals were trying in vain to take possession. This fight had cost them about fifty men.

Price's army, though weakened by its unfortunate campaign against Helena, was yet in a condition to cope with Steele's; it could be rapidly reinforced by Cabell and all the scattered detachments in Western Arkansas. The Bayou Metoe being only thirty-one miles from Little Rock, the army could easily take this line to dispute it with the Federals. It was probable that it was already holding it by means of strong detachments. Hence the passage of this obstacle by a moving force was a long and difficult operation. A *coup-de-main* was not possible. Davidson brought back his cavalry to Brownsville and awaited the arrival of Steele.

The latter had put Devall's Bluff in a state of defence, while True's brigade, sent to Memphis to reinforce him, was proceeding to Clarendon. It crossed White River on the 31st of August, and on the 1st of September took the direct road from Clarendon to Brownsville, whilst Steele was moving from Devall's Bluff toward the same point. The two forces met the following day. On arriving, Steele saw that he could not, without danger, force the passage of Bayou Metoe and follow the direct road, as beyond the swamps which border it the road runs through a rough country, the defence of which had been for a long time prepared, and terminated in front of a line of works erected on the left bank of the Arkansas three or four miles in front of the bridge leading

to the city of Little Rock, which is situated on the right bank. Price's army was waiting for him within these works. He could not lose any time in uselessly feeling his way, for his army was falling away visibly. He had left all the sick at Devall's Bluff, and already the ambulances were receiving more than one hundred a day. He wished to attempt turning the left flank of the enemy's position by ascending the course of Bayou Metoe in order to reach the Arkansas below Little Rock. To this end, Rice's division made, on the 3d, a vigorous demonstration opposite the burnt bridge behind which Marmaduke was waiting for the Federals. While he thus engaged the enemy, Davidson, taking a very circuitous route, was pushing his reconnoitring, *vid* Austin, close up to the Arkansas. He returned on the 4th, having discovered that to follow this route the army would have to perform a long flank march, which would be very dangerous and would expose its base of operations.

It was necessary either to retire or to reach the enemy without delay by his right wing. Steele resolved upon the latter. He knew that a good road led to Brownsville, *vid* Ashley's Mill, as far as the banks of the Arkansas, about twelve miles in a straight line below Little Rock. This road crossed Bayou Metoe at Shallow Ford, a point easy of access, and which was insufficiently guarded by the enemy. He resolved to follow it, hoping it would allow him to turn the enemy's position, either by ascending the left bank of the Arkansas or by crossing the river, whose waters, very low during the summer, wind along through vast sandbeds. He had with him a ponton-train—a thing quite indispensable, for even at this season the fords are few, dangerous, and submerged at the least rising of the river. The ambulances and the train having been left at Brownsville under the protection of True's and Ritter's brigades, the remainder of the army started on the 6th of September, and by a rapid march reached the banks of the Arkansas the next day. The crossing of Bayou Metoe at Shallow Ford was not disputed. Davidson, having started ahead to clear the road with Merrill's brigade, had forced, after slight skirmishing at Ashley's Mill, the passage of a small stream called Ashley's Bayou. He soon reached the banks of the Arkansas, having captured a few of the enemy's cavalry, and having observed, not without sur-

prise, that their comrades, to escape him, were crossing the Arkansas. The river was fordable at this point. The discovery was a precious one; unfortunately, Davidson had too small a force to be able to avail himself of it.

Steele, who soon joined him, at once decided upon throwing a part of his army beyond the Arkansas. He dared not take it all to the right bank of the river, fearing thereby to give his adversary the opportunity of moving on Devall's Bluff and cutting his communications. These were essential to him to maintain the life of his soldiers, who found no supplies in these wild regions, and were already on half rations. On the other hand, the march on the left bank offered great difficulties. Price's lines, resting on the Arkansas, were flanked by batteries established on the right bank, which commanded all the approaches. It was necessary to turn them. In spite of the boldness of such a decision in view of the enemy being master of the passages of the river, Steele resolved to divide his army and ascend both banks at the same time. While Davidson was crossing the Arkansas with his cavalry and marching on Little Rock, he intended to follow, with the infantry, his movement on this side of the river. The two days of the 8th and 9th were employed in repairing the road which he had followed from Brownsville, and in the evening of the second day the ambulances, the trains, and the escort brigades joined the rest of the army.

The ford not being passable by the artillery, Steele decided upon throwing a bridge over the Arkansas. The river at the point he selected is about three hundred feet wide and describes a bend to the left, chafing on this side a steep bluff nearly thirty-five feet high, and surrounding on the other a vast sandbar which, on a space of twenty-five hundred to three thousand feet, completes the bed formed by the rise of the river in the winter, and extends as far as the other bluff, covered, as all the country is in this region, with thick forests. In the night of the 8th-9th a deep cut was opened in the slope to form the means of access to the bridge. In the morning it was passable; twenty-four guns concealed in the woods above the river commanded not only the entire sandbank, on which no enemy could have ventured without being discovered, but also the woods extending beyond. The construction of the bridge

commenced at once, while Ritter's brigade was making a demonstration a few miles below and exchanging shots with one of the enemy's batteries posted behind an intrenchment made with bales of cotton. The Confederates had attempted to interrupt the work of the Union pontonniers, but Steele's artillery had compelled their skirmishers to re-enter the woods and silenced the few guns they had brought. Before the bridge was completed Price had resolved to abandon Little Rock. He had with him only his division of infantry, composed of Tappan's, Frost's, and McCrea's brigades, Fagan's brigade, and Marmaduke's division of cavalry, comprising Dobbin's brigade and Shelby's. He was expecting, it is true, from day to day Cabell's cavalry, which he had called back in great haste from Western Arkansas, at the risk of giving up to Blunt those extensive regions. But this reinforcement had not arrived, and he did not consider himself in a condition, with his forces alone, to cope with Steele; he feared that, once master of the crossing of the Arkansas, his adversary might march directly upon the town of Arkadelphia, where there were important dépôts and a park of more than six hundred wagons, and thus cut off his route to the south. His decision was approved by Holmes, his chief, who, although present at Little Rock, had given him the responsibility of the command and the entire direction of the campaign. Leaving a few men in the works on the left bank to protect the bridge against a sudden attack, he sent Marmaduke's cavalry against the Federals on the right bank, to stop, or at least retard, their march and give his army time to reach Arkadelphia before them. Fagan's and Tappan's brigades of infantry followed the cavalry to cover the left flank of the column.

The Federals had begun the crossing of the Arkansas. Wood's brigade of infantry had passed the bridge and dislodged the enemy's skirmishers lying in ambush on the other bank. Davidson, recalling Ritter, followed it closely with his entire division, and proceeded in the direction of Little Rock, whilst Steele, leaving his trains and a strong guard near the bridge, ascended on the left bank the winding course of the river.

The cavalry, encountering but detachments which were falling back rapidly before it, advanced quickly on the road to Little

Rock, Glover, at the head, followed by Merrill; Ritter, who had come last, being in reserve. The sight of two steamboats which the enemy had already set on fire by orders of Price, and of which they met the smoking hulls, stimulated the ardor of the Federals.

Marmaduke, soon informed of the direction they had taken, had stationed himself with his cavalry on a stream called Bayou Fourche, emptying into the Arkansas about four or four and a half miles below Little Rock, and the swampy course of which he intended to dispute with him. But his infantry not having arrived, he withdrew, after having stood the fire of Davidson's artillery without engaging in earnest fight, as soon as the latter had deployed his first two brigades.

In the mean time, whilst the Federals were defiling in a long column to pass, on the sandy shore of the Arkansas, the waters of the bayou, whose swamps rendered the banks everywhere else inaccessible, Fagan and Tappan had joined Marmaduke. The latter had immediately assumed a new position, in which he was waiting obstinately for Davidson, his left resting on the high bluff crowned with woods overlooking the dried-up bed of the river. The Unionists were drawing up after having passed the obstacle. Glover had sent ahead the Tenth Illinois with a battery of artillery, which was following on the sand the base of the bluff, and was waiting, with the rest of the brigade, massed near the crossing, till Merrill, whose skirmishers were searching the woods, had completed deploying his left. Ritter had not yet crossed the bayou. Glover's advance-guard, believing, doubtless, all resistance ended, and contemplating nothing but entering Little Rock, was heedlessly and very rapidly moving forward. It had not dismounted a single man to scout the woods, and, neglecting to unite with Merrill's skirmishers, it was much ahead of them. Hence on turning the headland it was surprised by a sudden and close discharge on the border of the wood. Without allowing the Federals time to recover, the Southern infantry which formed Marmaduke's left rush forward into the midst of them, and throw the entire regiment of cavalry into confusion. The battery, invaded by the fugitives, was then abandoned by its gunners before having been able to fire more than a few shots. Two guns and a caisson

fall into the hands of the assailants. The confusion threatens to spread throughout Glover's brigade. Happily, the fire from a battery posted on the sand near Bayou Fourche does not allow the Confederates to advance exposed to the enemy's fire, and gives Glover time to rally his troops in the woods between Merrill and the bluff. The situation is grave. Davidson has behind him an obstacle difficult to surmount, in front of him a well-posted enemy, and the sandy shore, on which he rests his right flank and where his guns and wagons are massed, is exposed to the fire from the other bank if Price, drawn by the sound of the fight, brings a few batteries to this bank. Suddenly smoke is seen above the woods that border it. It is a cannon-shot, and the direction of the projectile will certainly reveal whether it was fired by friends or foes. A few seconds after the Federals notice the shell burst above the heads of their adversaries. There is no further doubt. It is Steele, who, meeting with no resistance, has followed Davidson's march, and comes to give him help at this critical moment, in spite of the river which separates them. This sight makes the Unionists self-reliant. They attack vigorously the enemy's entire line. But the latter resists desperately, and withdraws only step by step in order to give Price time to evacuate Little Rock, forward his trains on to Arkadelphia, and destroy all the *matériel* which he cannot take away. And so they cannonade each other; they fire at one another in the woods without much ground being gained by the Federals. Steele, apprised of Price's retreat, thinks with good reason that the latter, after having evacuated the left bank of the Arkansas and destroyed the bridges behind him, may avail himself of the separation to fall with all his forces upon Davidson. Communicating with the latter by boat, he recommends prudence, and directs him, in case he is pressed by superior forces, to fall back into the bed of the Arkansas, where he will be protected by the artillery posted on the other bank. Useless recommendation, as the Southern army is in full retreat. Marmaduke, having attained the end he had in view, has allowed Fagan and Tappan to depart, and about five o'clock he, in turn, suddenly disappears in front of the Federals, whom he had until then resisted. Davidson an hour afterward enters Little Rock, where Steele very soon joins him. The latter has been enabled to quench the flames of

the bridges, which the enemy has tried to destroy on withdrawing, and his infantry joins the Union cavalry to occupy the capital of Arkansas and snatch from the flames important *matériel* contained in the arsenal. Several locomotives are also saved, but the entire flotilla collected by the Southerners on the Arkansas, and which, after the destruction of the two steamers we have spoken of, still numbered six, is destroyed. Steele has arrived opportunely—not that the citizens attempt the least resistance, but to forestall Cabell, whose advance-guard had already reached the outskirts of the city. The presence of the latter with four thousand men in the ranks of Price's army twelve hours sooner might have changed the issue of the campaign. But it was too late to resume the struggle. Cabell, finding the enemy in front of him, marched by winding roads and joined his chief at Arkadelphia.

Steele could not follow them so far with all his army. On the morning of the next day, the 11th, he forwarded, on the track of Price, his cavalry, which advanced to about eighteen miles south of Little Rock and picked up quite a number of prisoners. The campaign was now most happily ended. It had cost the Federals in killed, wounded, and prisoners but about one hundred men. The railroad from Little Rock to Devall's Bluff was promptly put in order, and communications were thus restored between Steele's army and the dépôts on the Mississippi. The Union generals had nothing more to consider but to establish their power on the whole course of the Arkansas. Blunt occupied the upper part of it, at Fort Smith; Steele the middle part, at Little Rock; and the garrison of Fort Hindman the lower part, near its confluence with White River. These points were connected together; an important post was established at the town of Pine Bluff, situated about forty-three miles in a straight line below Little Rock. The Federal vessels could ascend the Arkansas up to this point, then White River as far as Devall's Bluff. Lastly, an expedition having Vicksburg for its base completed the work accomplished by the Army of the Far West. It was composed of the old Logan brigade, which General Grant sent with a regiment of cavalry to explore the banks of Washita River in the latter part of August while Steele was marching on Brownsville. The Federals, not meeting any enemy, passed the frontier of Arkansas and advanced

nearly as far as the village of El Dorado. They returned to Vicksburg on the 8th of September, after having ascertained that Price's army, concentrated at a few points, such as Arkadelphia and Princeton, had completely abandoned the rest of the country. The Federals were masters of the country everywhere they showed themselves. Discretion, it is true, kept them back on the banks of the Arkansas. Although the city of Little Rock did not show them the sympathy they had expected, they were nevertheless anxious to organize a solid administration composed of their adherents, as they had done at Nashville, and in the spring of 1864 the State of Arkansas, considered as having returned into the Union, was allowed a local government and representatives in Congress.

Price did not seriously annoy his enemies in the possession of the vast regions which he had been obliged to abandon to them. For all the period that elapsed up to the end of the year we have to mention but one single attack, made by Marmaduke against the post of Pine Bluff. This general stationed his division at some distance east of Arkadelphia, and in the latter part of October proceeded by a rapid march toward Pine Bluff, hoping to surprise Colonel Clayton, who was in garrison there with the Fifth Kansas. But the latter had been reinforced by the First Indiana cavalry, which had its force increased to six hundred combatants and kept on its guard; bales of cotton piled up barricaded the streets of the village; the courthouse was turned into a redoubt hastily fortified and defended by nine guns. Marmaduke, advancing in three columns on the morning of October 25th, met with an unexpected resistance. His four pieces of artillery covered the houses with projectiles; he carried several barricades, which he set on fire; penetrated as far as the courthouse, to which the garrison had retired; but he could not force this redoubt, and, giving up the attack, soon retreated. He acknowledged a loss of forty men, and the Federals that of fifty-seven.

At the end of the year 1863 we have penetrated into the East, the centre, the South, and the West. We have now, to terminate this long review, but a few words to say concerning the attacks directed against the Federal posts of the North-west by the Indian tribes, unconscious allies of the Confederates. The great Sioux nation, to use the usual term, comprising the numerous tribes

driven by the whites to the west of Minnesota on the banks of the Missouri, had, in 1862, undertaken against the latter an offensive return. Availing themselves of the absence of the regular troops, which till then had protected the advancing improvements of the settlers, the Indians had invaded the State of Minnesota, whose numerous volunteers had all gone to fight the Confederates, and, extermination being their only aim in their struggle against civilization, they had everywhere marked their footprints by horrible massacres. General Sibley, who had been sent in great haste to chastise the Indians, had taken five hundred of them prisoners, of which more than three hundred were condemned to death and about forty only executed. But the rigor of the season had soon interrupted military operations. The immense plains of Dakota Territory, in the centre of which they lived, were soon covered with a thick snow which protected them. Early in the spring a few daring bands had again penetrated into Minnesota, but their depredations had been stopped. In order to prevent the recurrence of such raids it was necessary to meet them on their own ground and reach the camps that contained their families, their booty, and the provisions accumulated for the following winter; in short, disperse them to make them feel the power of the United States, which they thought destroyed, and to reduce them by starvation.

A small army composed of volunteer regiments was organized by General Pope for this purpose. These forces were divided into two columns. Sibley, with the first, comprising about fifteen hundred foot-soldiers and five hundred Minnesota cavalymen, also a few guns, started early in June from the town of St. Paul on the Mississippi to proceed, marching westward, in search of the Sioux. The second, under command of General Sully, was mustered in the State of Missouri; it was to ascend the river of this name, moving in a north-north-western direction, to attack the Indians in the rear and cut off their retreat by preventing them from passing over to the right bank of the river.

On the 26th of June, Sibley's column reached the borders of Lake Traverse on the western frontier of Minnesota, and, continuing its march, crossed, from the 4th to the 17th of July, the two branches of the Cheyenne River, after having been revictualled

on the 9th by a train sent from Abercrombie, one of the posts established on the frontier. On the 20th it was camping on the borders of Devil's Lake. The Sioux, whose plans of campaign had just been thwarted by the death of their chief, Little Crow, killed by a white man, had suddenly retreated toward the Missouri at the approach of the troops. Sibley, discovering the tracks of this retreat, had started to pursue them, and by forced marches he had at last reached them July 24th on the centre of the high plateau called by the old Canadian hunters Missouri Hill. The savage warriors were numerous—more than two thousand, it is said; they belonged to the principal Sioux tribes. Not expecting the invasion of their territory whilst they were meditating that of Minnesota, they had established their camps near the frontier. Encumbered by the train they were dragging after them, they had not been able to cope in speed with the enemy, and had decided upon fighting, so that the long column of little horses which carried the women and children, the skin tents, provisions, utensils of all kinds, forming their scanty households, might have time to get ahead. They were lying in wait for the whites on the crest of a hill called Big Mound. At the sight of them Sibley had the train parked, and, dividing his forces into two columns, advanced upon them. In spite of the inferiority of their weapons, the savages resisted with courage, but the fire of the rifles, and especially of the howitzer, soon compelled them to retreat. The Federals found the Indian camp abandoned; they were, however, obliged to take one day's rest, granting thereby a precious boon to the enemy, who availed himself of it to push rapidly forward in a south-western direction. As soon as the Federals resumed their march on the 26th the Indians attacked them again near Dead Buffalo Lake at the moment when they were establishing their camp. The Indians had vainly hoped to surprise the whites and take their horses. Although vigorously repulsed, the redskins did not lose courage, and returned a third time to the charge on the 28th, near Stony Lake, this time at the moment the whites were breaking up their camp. The train incurred some dangers, and, although the enemy was scattered, to protect it it was necessary to march in battle array. The Indians by their tenacity had attained the end they had in view. On the 29th their families

and baggage were crossing, in haste, the Missouri at the mouth of Apple Creek near the spot where Fort Rice now stands. They had lost, it is true, almost all their provisions and many tents, but except a few accidents, a few surprises by the Federals on the banks of the river, they had placed their women, children, and horses in safety. A few shots only were fired on the banks of the Missouri, after which Sibley started to march eastward. He could not pursue the Indians any farther; the absence of Sully, of whom he had no tidings, had enabled them to escape him. But their losses were great, and they were no longer in a condition to harass the settlers in Minnesota; the loss of the Federals amounted to only six men.

Sibley was very far out in his reckoning when he expected to meet Sully in the latter part of July in the vicinity of Apple Creek. In fact, whether the forming of his column had delayed him, or whether the time necessary for the march he had to perform had been badly calculated, he had not been able to reach the mouth of the Little Cheyenne River* in Missouri until two weeks later. He was still about one hundred and twenty-five miles from Apple Creek. After having been provisioned by a steamer sent from Fort Pierre, he set forward on the 20th of August, and ascended the left bank of the Missouri; then, having been informed that the Indians had recrossed the river immediately after Sibley's retreat, so as to re-enter their hunting-grounds, he left the river and moved eastward to take them in the rear. He had the good fortune on the 3d of September to surprise the camp in which twelve or fifteen hundred warriors were assembled with all their provisions and baggage. His advance-guard delayed the Indians long enough to give the bulk of the column time to arrive at the moment when the latter, leaving their camp, had just resolved upon a hasty retreat. Soon overtaken by Sully and compelled to fight, they defended themselves with unusual stubbornness, but finally were put to flight, and availed themselves of the night to disperse. This fight, called "the White Stone Hill fight," cost the whites twenty dead and thirty-eight wounded. They destroyed the camp, comprising three

* This must not be mistaken for the Cheyenne River, a tributary of the Red River, heretofore mentioned.

hundred tents and containing an immense amount of provisions, such as over four hundred thousand pounds of dried buffalo meat, and all the booty carried away from Minnesota in the preceding year.

The defeat of the Indians was complete; the unfavorable season was approaching; Sully, satisfied with his success, turned back, reached the Missouri, and moved down its left bank. The campaign was ended.

On the east of the Rocky Mountains, in Idaho Territory, a post called Fort Halleck had been attacked by some Indians of the Ute tribe on the 21st of July, but the garrison, composed of two companies of Kansas volunteers, had repulsed them after a pretty brisk fight.

BOOK IV.—THE WAR IN THE SOUTH-WEST.

CHAPTER I.

FORT PILLOW.

WE commence this book with the year 1864. The cold weather which, from the very beginning of December, has interrupted the great military operations in the valleys of the Rappahannock and Tennessee, continues with unusual severity. The Mississippi is itself covered with ice far below Vicksburg, making navigation at times very dangerous and impeding the supply or victualling of the Federal troops stationed on its banks. Great operations cannot, any more than in the previous year, be resumed until the April sun shall have melted away the ice, reduced the size of the streams, and dried the roads, which at the thawing season are impassable. In a military point of view the year 1864 will therefore not begin until the month of May. The first four months of 1864 are a period of transition, during which, if we may so express ourselves, the belligerents wind up the preceding year by pursuing one another through the southern regions, where the climate does not paralyze their activity. These are Louisiana and Mississippi; those which are situated in the same latitude more to the east, such as Alabama, Florida, Eastern Georgia, and South Carolina, having been, on the part of the Unionists, only the object of naval operations or of operations limited to the coast, which, as in the preceding volumes, will form the subjects of special chapters.

Chronological order requires that we should first follow the Federals on the left bank of the Mississippi.

It will be remembered that at the time when Grant was so suddenly summoned with a part of his troops to the assistance of Rosecrans besieged in Chattanooga he was soliciting, in concert

with Banks, the authority to send a large expedition against Mobile. Although his army was already much reduced, he still could, with the co-operation of the latter and the navy, undertake a campaign which the winter would not have interrupted, and from which he expected the greatest results. Such was no longer the case in the month of January, 1864. There were remaining on the banks of the Mississippi but a part of the Sixteenth corps, united under Hurlbut at Memphis, more than one-third of this corps having, with Dodge, followed the tracks of Sherman eastward, and the Seventeenth, which under McPherson was occupying the vicinity of Vicksburg. These forces, comprising six divisions of infantry, and one of cavalry under Grierson, were too few in number to allow detaching from them for any length of time a whole expeditionary corps. Their presence on the banks of the Mississippi was necessary to defend the course of the river, which the Confederates seemed disposed to close again by a last effort.

In fact, General Polk, who had come to Demopolis to take Hardee's place, had transferred his headquarters to Meridian, a central point at the junction of the two most important railroads in this region, the Mobile and Ohio Railroad and the Southern Railroad. Vast dépôts of provisions, arms, and material had been collected at this place, whilst all the forces forming the nucleus of Polk's little army had been pushed westward to observe as closely as possible McPherson and Hurlbut. Loring's division, seven thousand strong, which had returned from Georgia, was occupying Canton with eighteen guns. French was at Brandon with three thousand men and ten guns; Quarles' and Baldwin's brigades, which had been detached from the Army of the Mississippi during the autumn, had likewise been returned to French, and by the end of January swelled the effective force of his division to five thousand men. In the city of Jackson, General S. D. Lee, who was commanding the cavalry, had established Jackson's division, four thousand strong and comprising Ross', Stark's, and Wirt Adams' brigades; a fourth brigade of cavalry, under Ferguson, was to join him shortly. Farther north, Forrest had collected at Como and Oxford the numerous recruits which he had brought from Western Tennessee. Appointed major-general after his late success and invested with a sort of independent

command, he was rapidly organizing his force, which, divided into four brigades, numbered nearly six thousand men. Everywhere the Confederates were recruiting by fair means or foul—everywhere they were gathering horses, mules, and provisions. The Federals established at Memphis had not only to defend the Mississippi against the army that was thus forming by the side of them, but they had also to be prepared to oppose Kirby Smith, who, master of Red River, might suddenly appear on the banks of the great river, without concerning themselves either about Steele, away in the heart of Arkansas, or about the garrison left by Banks at Port Hudson, and whose rôle was solely to protect New Orleans.

It was painful, however, to Grant and Sherman to confine to a simply defensive part all these veteran troops, whose co-operation would have been so useful to them in the campaign which they were about to undertake. In order to be able to remove a part of them from guarding the Mississippi it was necessary to take advantage of the first months of the year and place the enemy beyond the power of threatening seriously the Federal garrisons on the river. Another consideration was pressing them to act: as we will explain later on, the Federal Government had promised furloughs to all the volunteers who, having but a few months more to serve, would re-enlist immediately. This measure, an excellent one for the future, rapidly thinned then the ranks of the armies of the West. It was therefore necessary, if it was intended to act, to do so promptly, before the time when, by the effect of these furloughs, they would be for some weeks reduced to an insignificant number of effectives. It was agreed between Grant and Sherman that the latter, forming a powerful movable column, should leave Vicksburg to penetrate as far as possible into the State of Mississippi. If he could reach Polk's little army, he was to press, attack, and fight it; if it retreated at his approach, he was to destroy the stores and also the railroads, so that it might not again collect within reach of Vicksburg. Sherman in this case was to push on at least as far as Meridian, and if he could as far as Selma. According to some of Grant's despatches addressed to other officers, it might even be surmised that he had authorized his lieutenant to march on Mobile instead of

retracing his steps. We, however, do not think so; not only has Sherman positively denied it, but everything disproves such a supposition. To undertake the long march from Vicksburg to Mobile with the very small army he could collect would have been, on his part, exposing himself to being crushed by the troops which Johnston could bring together against him from the west, north, and south. Had he succeeded, he would have found himself, after a long and exhausting campaign, out of all the operations in which his part and that of his soldiers were already marked, and to which the return of the spring season was to give the signal.

But Grant, to mislead the enemy, was anxious to keep him in fear of this campaign against Mobile and to draw his forces on this side. He therefore did not hesitate to allow the rumor to spread among his staff, in the ranks of the army, and in the newspapers that Sherman was about to penetrate as far as the shore where the waters of the Alabama disappear into the Gulf of Mexico. He even endeavored to spread it himself. In short, to confirm it he requested Banks to feign landing his troops on that shore, and, the latter not having deemed it practicable to draw from his little army the required detachment, Admiral Farragut took it upon himself to make the demonstration with a few ships.

The first weeks in January were spent in preparing the campaign which Sherman was about to undertake. Hurlbut received orders to abandon his watch of the Corinth road, henceforth useless, and to concentrate in Memphis the troops strictly necessary to garrison the place; the garrisons of the posts situated farther up on the Mississippi and in Western Tennessee were likewise reduced or recalled, and all the remainder of the Sixteenth corps, forming two divisions, was to embark on the 25th with its chief for Vicksburg. The vicinity of this place was occupied by the Seventeenth corps, numbering four divisions. Sherman directed McPherson to have two of these ready to take the field with a strong artillery force, whilst the other two would remain in the place. A single brigade of cavalry, under Colonel Winslow, added to the expeditionary corps, was to increase its effective force to twenty-two or twenty-three thousand combatants of all arms. This brigade could not suffice to fill the rôle pertaining to the

cavalry in an operation of this character ; consequently, Sherman relied upon the co-operation of a numerous corps which General W. Sooy Smith, chief of cavalry of Grant's army, and who was to take the field at the same time with him, had come to organize at Memphis. Colonel George E. Waring, Jr., established with a cavalry brigade of twenty-five hundred men at Union City, an important post from which he could watch over the whole of Western Tennessee, received the order to withdraw it without delay and proceed to Memphis. Sooy Smith had found between Corinth and the latter city Grierson's strong division keeping constantly on the watch in Forrest's vicinity. It numbered nine thousand two hundred and thirty-one men and seven thousand six hundred and thirty-eight horses. Sooy Smith received orders to draw from these elements a column of seven thousand cavalry, at the head of which he was to leave Memphis about the 1st of February, taking with him a few batteries of artillery, but as few wagons as possible. The route marked out by Sherman took him, *via* Pontotoc, to Okolona on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, then along this line, *via* West Point and Macon, across the swamps of Okanoxubee, to Meridian, at which he should arrive, it was agreed, on the 10th. Grierson and his men knew this route well ; it was the one they had gone over the year before. Perhaps, instead of taking a new chief, it would have been preferable to confine the management of this expedition to the one who had already so fearlessly explored this route. The movement of Sooy Smith would necessarily draw Forrest after him, and by a powerful diversion prevent him from troubling Sherman's march as far as Meridian. The junction once effected in this town, the Federal cavalry could feel the route to Selma and open the way for the remainder of the army.

In order to further divert the attention of Forrest and compel him to disperse his troops, Sherman resolved to have a detachment of the Seventeenth corps make a demonstration on the Yazoo River at the time of his departure. Admiral Porter agreed to give him a few vessels to transport this detachment and protect the landing it might undertake to effect. Sherman's intention was that he should move up as far as Grenada, which was now the head of a railroad line and a victualling-centre for the enemy.

Finally, in order to prevent Johnston from sending from Georgia any reinforcements to Polk's little army, Grant promised Sherman to have Thomas make a demonstration in the direction of Dalton, as if he wished, in spite of the season, to resume the offensive movement that had terminated at the end of November, 1863.

Sherman moved forward on the 3d of February. Fully informed by his scouts of the strength and positions of the enemy, he did not expect any very serious resistance on its part. The real obstacle he had to overcome was the impossibility of maintaining his communications with Vicksburg. Indeed, to maintain them, after the example of all the Federal armies which had until then penetrated the enemy's country, it would have been necessary to repair the Meridian Railroad and follow step by step this reconstruction; the entire spring would have been spent for this purpose, and to guard the line would have required the half of his little army. Consequently, Sherman had resolved to undertake with all his expeditionary corps a regular raid, such as those in which the cavalry of the two armies had for some time acquired experience. The experiment was a new one, and it was to be feared that the infantry, proceeding more slowly, might not succeed in finding in the country the subsistence it needed. Not wishing to occupy the regions which he traversed, he intended, above all, as we have said, to deprive the enemy of all the resources which might be found there and might enable him to resume the offensive on the banks of the Mississippi. This operation did not consist alone in destroying methodically the railroads with their bridges, stations, and rolling stock, but as well the stores, arsenals, dépôts, factories, and all that belonged to the Confederate Government. To paralyze the latter, Sherman intended to carry away or destroy on his path all that which, in one way or another, might be useful to his enemy's army—horses, wagons, cattle, grain, mills, all the public buildings, even the hotels, and of course the slaves. It was, as we see, the most rigorous—let us say, the most cruel—application of the laws of war, or, to speak more frankly, of the unlimited rights that a conqueror arrogates to himself. It was in this manner that McClellan had treated Virginia, and Lee Pennsylvania. Unfortunately, the resources with which these vast regions supplied the Confederacy and which

maintained its armies—regions which the Richmond Government no longer protected efficiently, but which were by their very extent defended against a permanent occupation—could be reached only by such a mode of warfare, and Sherman, the indefatigable soldier, was not a man to flinch before such measures when he believed them necessary to hasten the end of the war. The expedition he was undertaking was therefore, in every respect, the first trial of this new system, which he was afterward to apply on a much larger scale in his march to the sea.

It required an extensive train to carry, besides the ammunition, the provisions which prudence demanded should be furnished, and to go afar in search of those the country might supply. A thousand wagons followed the army: they carried twenty days' provisions. The baggage and tents had been omitted. Sherman himself had nothing more than a blanket to wrap himself in near the bivouac-fires when he did not find, to shelter himself, some abandoned house spared by his soldiers.

The army marched out of Vicksburg in two columns. Sherman had taken to the left with the Sixteenth corps, which had reached Vicksburg about the 27th of January: he crossed the Big Black River on a boat-bridge at Messinger's Ferry. McPherson, to the right, was leading the Seventeenth corps, and crossed the river on a temporary bridge near that of the railroad, the scene of a bloody combat the year before. The weather was beautiful and dry, the roads good, and the soldiers were marching with animation. Informed of their approach, General S. D. Lee, whose cavalry was *en échelon* all around Vicksburg, forming a large segment of a circle, collected his forces to contend with them for the roads to Jackson. He had detached, it is true, General Ross with one of Jackson's divisions to observe the Federal expedition now ascending the course of the Yazoo and to protect the important dépôts established at Grenada; but the arrival of Ferguson, who was bringing him a brigade from Okolona, compensated for this detachment. He hoped by retarding the march of the Federals to give Loring's and French's divisions time to reunite in the city of Jackson, so as to dispute with them the passage of Pearl River. Not having been able to forestall the Federals on the banks of the Big Black, he was waiting for them a little in the

rear, Starke occupying, with two guns, the battlefield of Champion's Hill, and another brigade Jefferson Davis' plantation on the road followed by Hurlbut. Winslow's cavalry had, on the evening of the 3d, taken possession of a bridge on Baker's Creek at the foot of Champion's Hill, and McPherson, who had bivouacked at Edwards' Dépôt, had but to deploy on the morning of the 4th a few regiments of Crocker's division to dislodge Starke and open a passage for himself. During that time Hurlbut was also overcoming the resistance against him, and the two Federal columns, pushing vigorously the enemy before them, reached a point beyond Fleetwood and Bolton in the evening. The following day, the 5th, they encountered each other at Clinton after a brisk skirmish with the enemy's cavalry, which Ferguson had reinforced during the night, and which Lee was commanding in person. Taking advantage of Lee's having deployed all his forces to delay the Federals on the highway, Winslow took a cross-road to the southward, attacked him in flank, captured many prisoners and one gun, and compelled him to speedily retreat. McPherson, on his part, was marching rapidly on the tracks of Winslow to support him in case the enemy should attempt to defend Jackson. But the Union cavalry did not require this assistance, and on the evening of the 5th they entered the town almost without striking a blow. Lee was moving northward upon Canton, where he hoped to find Loring. His retreat was so hasty that he had time only to disperse, and not enough to destroy, the boats of the large bridge thrown over Pearl River; which boats the Federal advance-guard hastened to gather. In the night Force's infantry brigade, summoned by Sherman, came to join the cavalry and secure against any return of the enemy the occupation of Jackson.

It was the third time in nine months that this unfortunate town was taken by the Federals. It had already twice severely suffered; it experienced still greater trials the third time, and fire destroyed a great number of its buildings. However, Sherman did not tarry there long. He had prevented French, Loring, and Lee from there uniting. The first was in front of him, the two others on his left. It was expedient to take advantage of their separation to push forward and prevent their preparing for the defence of Meridian. On the 6th the boat-bridge was restored; on the 7th

the whole army was leaving Jackson by a single road and the head of the column was beyond Brandon. On the 9th it was at Morton or Orion, where McPherson was halting for one day to employ his army corps in the destruction of the railroad, while Hurlbut was starting ahead in the direction of Hillsboro'. The Confederate infantry, on the other hand, was making a forced march to reach Meridian before the Federals, leaving to Lee, with only his cavalry, the care of holding them back by harassing their flanks. In this he succeeded, not owing to this intervention, but because the necessity of destroying the railroad slackened considerably the pace of the Unionists. Hence, after having separated from the line at Morton, McPherson, when at Hillsboro', diverged from the main road to renew at Lake Station on this line his work of destruction. After having returned to take before Decatur the rest of Hurlbut's column, he had also to send to the south Force's brigade to disable Chunky Station. Lee, in spite of the activity of his officers and soldiers, had to content himself with capturing a few small detachments and a few wagons that had gone to forage too far away from the column. In the mean while he came near making a capture which would have been better for his cause than the greatest of victories. It was the evening of the 12th of February. The rearguard of the Sixteenth corps was passing through the village of Decatur. The Seventeenth corps was following it at a distance of a few miles. The village being situated at the crossing of a road by which the enemy's cavalry might come, Sherman detached from the rearguard a regiment to guard the crossing, and, trusting in its protection, he established himself in a house in order to enjoy a little rest. In the mean time the colonel of this regiment, in haste to regain his camp, noticing on the road a group of Federal cavalry, takes them to be the head of McPherson's column and moves forward without further information. Scarcely has he left the village when a small party of hostile cavalry, drawn in pursuit of a few detached wagons, enter the village on a gallop. The firing of the Confederates, the shouts of their leaders, suddenly wake up Sherman and his aides-de-camp, who have fallen asleep after having unsaddled their horses. They have but time to rush to a shed, which they will endeavor to defend while waiting for assistance. Fortunately, they have been neither

recognized nor betrayed. The Southern horsemen, instead of rushing on them and capturing them, disperse in the village; a few moments after the regiment which had left so unseasonably, returning at full speed, compels them to ride away as fast as possible and relieves the general-in-chief. A similar adventure, it will be recollected, had already happened to Sherman at Collierville a few months before. Decidedly, it was not the will of Providence that he should fall into the hands of his enemies.

The latter, of course, were not aware of what they had missed. They were only concerned about continuing their retreat, for Polk with his two little divisions of infantry, still reduced by rapid marches, could not think of defending against Sherman's army an open town like Meridian. To quit company with the invaders, the best to be done was, therefore, to leave by railroad; that was the most rapid way and the least fatiguing. On the evening of the 13th, French's division boarded trains for Demopolis; Loring's followed it at daybreak on the 14th. Polk himself started a few hours after, leaving Lee to defend the town for as long a time as possible. The same day, at half-past three o'clock, Sherman, who had got the start with a few squadrons of cavalry, reached the railroad-station. After a few musket-shots the Southern horsemen left it, and, passing rapidly through the little town, disappeared in an easterly direction.

By withdrawing by the Southern Railroad, Polk wished to protect the dépôts of Demopolis, and especially the large military establishments at Selma. His effective forces did not enable him to protect them against any attack of the enemy's cavalry, and if Sherman intended to take his whole army into the heart of Alabama, he fully expected that the long march of one hundred and ten miles the Federals would have to make beyond Meridian would allow Johnston time to come to his assistance. But his retreat completely uncovers Mobile, and the Confederate authorities are convinced—a very natural mistake, as we have said—that this important port is the objective point of Sherman's campaign. On the 11th of February, Polk has asked for powerful reinforcements, that he may be able to take the offensive against Sherman and prevent him from attaining his end. His demands have been answered at Richmond, and the same day Jefferson Davis has

telegraphed Johnston to send him or take him all the forces at his disposal. We have mentioned elsewhere in what condition McClellan's old adversary had found the army of which Hardee had given him the command, and how much it was weakened by the sending of several brigades to the West, by battles, disease, desertion—how greatly its *morale* was shaken by defeat. He could not detach a part of it without abandoning the great gap which opens in the Alleghanies, and the entrance of which he proposed to defend against the victors of Missionary Ridge. He explained this situation to the President; he represented to him that the reinforcements asked for by Polk could not, even by railroad, arrive in time to fight Sherman if the latter marched upon Mobile. But he was not listened to. He received on February 15th positive orders to send General Hardee with Cheatham's, Cleburne's, and Walker's divisions to Polk, and at once set about executing them.

In the mean time, Sherman was only contemplating turning to account the easy conquest he had just made. He was waiting for the arrival of Sooy Smith with his cavalry to send him in the direction of Selma, or move forward himself, if possible, along the Southern Railroad. The greater part of the wagons and locomotives collected at Meridian had been carried away by Polk. There was still remaining, however, considerable *matériel*, which was destroyed with the stores, sheds, arsenals, even manufactories, public buildings, and a great many private houses. The soldiers, seldom watched over by their chiefs, indulged too often in acts of pillage. The town of Meridian was ruined—we might almost say entirely destroyed. Sherman then divided between his two lieutenants the care of making unserviceable the two great railroad lines which crossed each other at Meridian. Hurlbut sent in the direction of Corinth and Demopolis detachments which accomplished this work for a distance of about sixty miles, including eight bridges. Those that McPherson took westward, and especially southward beyond Quitman, also accomplished their work as thoroughly: one hundred and eighteen miles of road were torn up, fifty-three bridges and nearly seven thousand feet of piling in the swamps of the Chicasaha were burned, and nineteen locomotives found on this portion of the line were broken up. More than ten thousand men were thus employed for four days, working with axes and pickaxes,

not satisfied with bending each rail after having heated it, but twisting it, so that it could not again be straightened. Never was any destruction accomplished with so much care. And in consequence its effects were lasting. The Confederates could not repair completely these railroads, and all their operations suffered from it in the course of this year.

Lee's cavalry alone had remained on the right bank of the Tombigbee to watch Sherman's movements, Polk having moved all his infantry to the east of this large river in the vicinity of Demopolis. In order to extend farther around Meridian the zone of destruction, Sherman was waiting for the arrival of Sooy Smith's powerful cavalry, which he intended to push farther than his infantry had been on the different railroad lines, portions of which the latter had already destroyed. We will mention later on why, in our opinion, this co-operation would have been less efficacious than he seemed to think. However, he was waiting the more anxiously for his lieutenant as he had expected to see him arrive at Meridian at the same time he did. He availed himself of this delay to give his soldiers a few days of well-deserved rest. At last, on the 20th, having no tidings of his cavalry, he marched them in the direction of Vicksburg. As will be seen farther on, he had allowed Banks to rely upon his co-operation in the expedition which the latter was preparing to make in the spring on the Red River; he even had informed him that he could embark in the early part of March if Grant approved of it. Since no important matter detained him in Alabama, he was anxious to show himself punctual and wished to hasten back to Vicksburg.

The Confederates did not interfere with his return; they were too glad to see that Mobile was no longer threatened. A part of Hardee's troops were on the way; they came back promptly to Johnston. The Seventeenth Federal corps followed the route taken by the enemy in its forward movement; the Sixteenth moved farther north. They united on the 23d at Hillsboro', and thence by two parallel roads reached Canton. The Unionists thus went over a country they had not yet exhausted, and in which they fared so much the better as the hostile cavalry was no longer there to annoy their foraging-parties. They continued to carry away or destroy all that might be of use to the Southern armies. Sherman

had reached this town on the 26th, after having crossed Pearl River on the 25th on temporary bridges. He found there Winslow's cavalry brigade, which he had sent north as far as Louisville in hopes that it would meet Sooy Smith. Winslow was returning without having heard anything of the latter. Sherman, going ahead, entered Vicksburg on the 28th, and started at once for New Orleans. His troops reached the banks of the Mississippi a few days after. Hurlbut brought one of his divisions back to Memphis. The other, under General Mower, remained in Vicksburg to form, with one of McPherson's, commanded by A. J. Smith, the expeditionary corps intended to embark shortly for Red River.

Thanks to the clear and dry weather which had been prevailing during the whole month of February, the march of the Federals had been easy. Neither the soldiers nor the horses had suffered; the sanitary condition of the column on its return was excellent. The losses in men had been insignificant on either side. The Federals had picked up about four hundred prisoners. They were bringing also a long column of refugees—about a thousand whites who had compromised themselves by manifesting Union sentiments, and more than four thousand negroes of all ages who were fleeing from bondage. This exodus was a sure sign of the downfall threatening the Confederacy.

We must now follow Sooy Smith's cavalry in the campaign which it has so uselessly undertaken to rejoin Sherman at Meridian. The latter expected that his lieutenant should leave Memphis on the 1st of February. He has asserted that he gave him the formal order to do so. He had, as we have said, directed the latter to form a corps of seven thousand well-equipped cavalry by adding for the campaign the most able men of Grierson's division to the twenty-five hundred men which Waring was bringing from Union City. He does not appear to have doubted that this brigade would arrive in the vicinity of Memphis before the 1st of February, and had not foreseen that it might be delayed. But whether the length of the march was erroneously calculated or the order for departure had not been duly sent to him, Waring did not leave Union City until the 23d of January. The cold weather still continued. The roads were covered with snow; the

rivers which were to be forded were frozen over; those which were crossed by ferryboats were obstructed by enormous blocks of ice. Under a hard stratum the ground, overflowed and soaked during the autumn, concealed a deep and semi-liquid mud, into which the horses soon sank. The march of the brigade was most laborious, and in spite of all his efforts Waring could not reach until the 8th of February the village of Collierville on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which had been assigned to him as the place of rendezvous. He had, in spite of so many obstacles, travelled over two hundred and seventeen miles in seventeen days. Sooy Smith had waited for him. Before the arrival of Waring he had but five thousand available cavalry. He did not deem it advisable to take the field with these forces against Forrest, who had nearly six thousand. It was a serious mistake on his part, for the disproportion was not so great that Forrest, once deceived, as it was easy to do, by a few feints and rapid marches, could obstruct the passage of the Federal column. The latter might have destroyed the railroad with a little less care, but would probably have rejoined Sherman at Meridian, which was the principal object of the expedition. By postponing his departure, Sooy Smith seems to have entirely renounced this, and to have considered his expedition as being entirely independent of Sherman's, unless he expected, on the part of the latter, a delay which was hardly in accordance with his habit.

However that may be, he did not set forward until the 11th of February, after having given two days' rest to Waring. The latter proceeded by a direct road from Collierville to New Albany, where he was to meet Grierson, who with his two brigades had left Germantown, near Memphis, accompanied by Sooy Smith. In spite of this lamentable delay, the Union cavalry might yet have rejoined Sherman at Meridian if it had accelerated its pace. In fact, by following the route laid out for it, it had about twenty-two miles to travel—that by making halts it would have arrived on the 20th at the rendezvous, where it would still have found the whole army, and the rapidity of its march would not have allowed Forrest to stop it. But that would have required the abandonment of the systematic destruction of the railroad and contentment with burning the bridges, as had been done in other

raids. Smith appears to have thought that this complete destruction was the principal object of his enterprise.

We have said that Sherman, before leaving Vicksburg, had organized an expedition which was to ascend the Yazoo River and threaten Grenada. His aim was to draw in that direction a part of Forrest's forces. In order to divert still more his attention from Sooy Smith's column, a brigade of infantry under Colonel McMillen was sent in the early part of February from Memphis, *via* Hernando, in the direction of the Tallahatchie; it appeared on the 7th in the vicinity of Wyatt, near this river, and feigned to undertake throwing a bridge across it. Forrest's troops, as we have said, were distributed somewhat to the south of this river, the banks of which were guarded by his outposts. This general had succeeded, not without some trouble, in organizing the division whose command he had just received. He had had to contend against the want of discipline of the partisans massed around him and to provide for their equipment, which the military department had so singularly neglected. He had overcome these difficulties, and was making ready to remain encamped. At the news of the departure of the Union expedition, which was ascending the Yazoo, he sent, on the 7th, the brigade of his brother, Colonel Jeff. E. Forrest, to occupy Grenada. The following day, being informed of McMillen's movement, he disposed his three other brigades along the Tallahatchie, the course of which he proposed to defend between Panola and Abbeville. It was when in this position that he received the news of the departure of the two columns of hostile cavalry from Germantown and Collierville. He surmised at once that their objective point was the town of Meridian, in the direction of which he knew that Sherman was already marching, and that the other movements of the hostile forces were only feints intended to detain him on the Tallahatchie. With his usual decision he resolved to give up everything else to pursue and hold back if possible these two columns. The three brigades stationed behind the Tallahatchie had orders to concentrate at Oxford, whence they could proceed quickly toward the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. This movement was retarded by McMillen's demonstration on Wyatt, which was supported by a regiment detached from Grierson's division. The Southern horsemen, being

vigorously attacked on the 12th, thought that McMillen wished to force the passage of the river. They remained to defeat it, and did not arrive at Oxford till late on the 13th. Hence, Forrest, who had no further doubt as to the direction taken by the Federal column, could not, in spite of his impatience, move forward until the afternoon of the 14th. He directed Chalmers to take the road to Columbus, *via* Houston and West Point, with Richardson's and McCulloch's brigades, in order to reach the right flank of this column and harass it as much as possible in its march. He had sent to his brother, who was at Grenada, orders to proceed directly from that town to West Point, and, taking with him Bell's brigade, he marched rapidly on the tracks of the latter, hoping to rejoin him and by this means overtake the enemy on the railroad.

He had no time to lose, for on that day, the 14th, at noon, Grierson's division reached New Albany, and without meeting resistance, without striking a blow, was taking possession of the crossing of the Tallahatchie. But Waring was not at the rendezvous; he was still far off. Sooy Smith, compelled again to wait for him, slackened the speed of his men while continuing to follow in the direction of Okolona on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and did not reach Pontotoc until noon on the 17th. He halted the head of his column a few miles farther on. His rearguard had left New Albany on the 16th. Waring did not join until the next day at a short distance beyond this town. Having left Collierville on the 11th, he had in seven days travelled only some fifty odd miles; that is, about seven and a half miles a day. This slowness is unaccountable and inexcusable. If his force had been so greatly worn out that it could not proceed faster, it would have been better to leave it at Collierville, as the delay in his arrival at New Albany, where he should have been on the 14th, at the same time as Grierson, was the final cause of the failure of the whole expedition. He made impossible the timely arrival of the column in the vicinity of Meridian, and enabled Forrest to gain upon it an advance which was to prove fatal.

The latter, in fact, had not lost a moment. Chalmers, travelling more than eighteen miles a day, was at Houston on the 16th and at Palo Alto on the 17th. He was entering the fertile region

through which the Tombigbee flows, and which extends, on the right bank of this river, from Okolona—a region which the Federals wished to reach to devastate, but in which meanwhile his men and horses found all that was required to make them forget the fatigue of a long march. The troops led by Forrest and his brother had made like haste. During the day of the 18th the former reached Starkville, and the latter, passing more to the north, had crossed the railroad to reach Aberdeen on the banks of the Tombigbee, and placed himself on the left flank of the Federal column. The latter was completely outmarched, for it was not until the 10th, after having allowed himself to be delayed by the destruction of the wheat and corn stores, that he reached Okolona Station on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. He had encountered, it is true, a band of militia of about six hundred men under the command of General Gholson, who had endeavored to keep him back, but after having easily repulsed it he had left the Houston road to proceed eastward to Okolona, and, avoiding a swamp of which Gholson wished to dispute the passage, had promptly passed him by.

Smith, then, had arrived in the fertile region of which we have spoken; he had reached the railroad which he intended to destroy, but he had allowed Forrest to outstrip him and to place himself between him and Meridian with all his forces, for on that same day, the 18th, Chalmers reached Tampico and connected his outposts with those of his chief. Smith does not seem to have concerned himself about it, and once at Okolona, instead of pushing forward to pass through the hostile forces and endeavor to crush the detachments that would be on his road to reach Meridian, he seems to have forgotten Sherman and to have attended to nothing but to destroy the railroad and annihilate the resources accumulated in this country. In fact, on the 19th, he divided his column. Grierson, with Hepburn's brigade, proceeds south-eastwardly to occupy Aberdeen, and even trusts one detachment on the left bank of the Tombigbee. With his two other brigades he follows the railroad, but does not in the evening go beyond Egypt Station. He has thus travelled during the day only about six miles, pushing slowly before him Colonel Forrest's brigade, which has evacuated Aberdeen on the approach of Grierson. The next day his

march is somewhat more rapid ; he reaches, at three o'clock in the afternoon, the village of West Point, fifteen miles south of Egypt. Hepburn's brigade, which he has summoned from Aberdeen, is not long in joining him. But he cannot make up for lost time. Forrest has made all his preparations to stop the progress of the Federals. He hopes even to engage them and detain them until General Lee—who, as we have said, has remained between Selma and Demopolis—may come to join him to crush them. The character of the country seems suited to this combination. A very swampy river, the Okatybbeeka, flowing from west to east, empties into the Tombigbee a little below Columbus ; the railroad crosses it at a point situated five miles south of West Point. A little distance from this point it receives, on the left, the waters of an important stream, the Sookatonka, also called Chootkatonkchee, which, from the height of Okolona, flows from north to south parallel to the Tombigbee. The beautiful country through which the railroad passes is compressed between these two watercourses. By penetrating it along the railway Sooy Smith entered a real cul-de-sac formed by the Tombigbee, a large river navigable eastward, the Sookatonka on the west, and terminated by the Okatybbeeka. It was in this cul-de-sac that Forrest had resolved to stop him. Fearing that the Federals might, from Aberdeen, wish to reach Columbus by the left bank of the Tombigbee, he had caused Bell's brigade, then commanded by Colonel Barteau, to pass over to this bank. Barteau having heard, on the 20th, of the movement of Hepburn toward West Point, had halted at Waverly, at the point where the road which leads from this village to Columbus crosses the Tombigbee ; he thus occupied the crossing of the river and could operate on either bank. Forrest, on his part, with his two other brigades, proceeded very early in the morning of the 20th from Starkville to the banks of the Sookatonka to support his brother's brigade, which was withdrawn, step by step, toward West Point, opposite the Federals. The latter, deployed in battle in the fine plain traversed by the railroad, had, as we have said, arrived about three o'clock opposite this village, and were pressing closely Colonel Forrest's little band. His elder brother arrived in due time to reinforce him and allow him to withdraw without being pursued. General Forrest, in

allowing the Federals to advance in the cul-de-sac, did not wish to be entrapped in it himself and engage in earnest fight, having in his rear rivers difficult to cross. The Okatybbeeka, swelled by recent rains, was inaccessible and impassable. There was between its confluence with the Sookatonka and Tombigbee but one bridge, that of the railroad. The Sookatonka offered also a formidable obstacle. It could be crossed but on two bridges—one very near the confluence, which Forrest had captured on his coming from Starkville, and beyond which the road crossed a large swamp, forming thus a long and narrow defile; the other, more accessible, was situated about four miles up the river, near the village of Siloam. Forrest recrossed first with his three brigades, and went himself with a part of Richardson's brigade to take possession of the second one, from which he dislodged a hostile detachment. He occupied, therefore, on the west the only bridges by which Sooy Smith, if he wished to turn back, could retrace his steps out of the cul-de-sac into which he had penetrated.

The latter, after having ascertained in the evening that these points were strongly held by the enemy, appears to have immediately decided upon retreating. Whether he considered the object of his expedition as being reached or not, he had quickly understood the dangers of the position in which he had placed himself. His numerical superiority, though trifling, however, over Forrest, enabled him to encounter him advantageously on open ground, but he could not undertake to force, in spite of him, the passage of rivers so difficult of access as the Okatybbeeka and Sookatonka. If he had only thought of rejoining Sherman, if he had been certain not to find any other adversary than Forrest in penetrating southwardly, he might have turned the Sookatonka to reach Houston, and from there Louisville, the town where, two days later, Winslow was going in search of him. But he must have thought Sherman already far from Meridian, and he might apprehend that Lee would come with his division to join Forrest, as the latter requested him. He was therefore right to retrace his steps, and by promptly deciding upon this he probably avoided an irreparable disaster. But it was nevertheless a sad extremity, the result of several delays that had marked first his departure, then his march

after the crossing of the Tallahassee.* On the other hand, finding himself at the head of such a strong force, he should not have given his movement the appearance of a real retreat. He should have, for its effect, as well as the moral welfare of his column, returned to Memphis by a new route, and not have followed that which his soldiers had marked by carrying away or destroying everything on their march, and which could no longer offer them any resources. Above all, he should have sought and seized the first favorable opportunity to attack Forrest, so as to paralyze him, if it were possible, and thus prevent him from making new incursions into Tennessee. Sherman had given him positive orders, and, putting him on his guard against the unusual vigor with which the latter made his first attack, whatever might be his numerical inferiority, he had recommended him, after having repulsed this attack, to take, in his turn, the offensive. As will be seen, Sooy Smith gave little heed to these recommendations or did not think himself able to follow them.

On the 21st, at daybreak, a train composed of draught animals started in the direction of Okolona. It was accompanied by a very great number of horses and mules—three thousand, it was said—which had been picked up on the road, and which carried the fruits of the plunder which the soldiers and many of the officers had freely indulged in. To this column, already so heavy, was joined that of the fugitive negroes whom Smith had imprudently welcomed and protected, and who also numbered several thousand. It was quite natural that Sherman's army, making infantry halts and having, after all, nothing to fear, should receive and even invite the unfortunate ones it was thus snatching out of slavery. But a column of cavalry should have closed its ranks to the fugitives, in order not to be in the alternative of either abandoning them to preserve its mobility or sacrifice it to save them. The train, encumbered with this undisciplined crowd, was becoming troublesome to the Federals. Smith gave it McCrillis' brigade as an escort, Waring followed it, whilst Grierson, with Hepburn's brigade, was making a strong demonstration against the country around the Sookatonka to mask the retreat.

* He had travelled, on an average, less than twelve miles a day since his departure from the vicinity of Memphis.

Forrest did not allow himself to be deceived by this demonstration: in the morning he crossed with his brother the bridge on the Starkville road, of which he had watched the outlet, and soon discovered the movement of the Federal column. Summoning at once McCulloch's brigade, he pressed hard on Hepburn, who had commenced to fall back on Okolona, and directed Chalmers to ascend the right bank of the Sookatonka with Richardson and all the troops remaining at Starkville, to prevent the Federals from coming out of the cul-de-sac by crossing this stream. He hoped that they would not risk themselves so soon to retreat, and that he might be able to hold them until Lee's arrival, which was announced for the next day, at Starkville. But these hopes were soon disappointed, and, after having exchanged a few shots with the Federals near West Point, he saw that he had nothing left but to avail himself of their retreat to harass them and create confusion in their march.

Great diligence was necessary to avoid being outstripped by them, the more so as the roads, broken up by thousands of horses, made the march of the cavalry very arduous. Fortunately, Forrest received at this decisive moment an important reinforcement. Barteau, seeing that the enemy did not show himself on the left bank of the Tombigbee, crossed the river and joined Forrest with his brigade. Although it was reduced to about twelve hundred men, it gave Forrest the means of attacking vigorously the enemy's column, for it brought up to thirty-five hundred the number of combatants which he could bring into line. While Barteau, by his orders passing to the east of the railroad, endeavors by rapid marching to get ahead of the Federals and to threaten their right flank, he starts in pursuit of them with the rest of his troops, and strives, by pressing closely on Hepburn's brigade, to retard its speed.

After several skirmishes, in which he always takes the lead, he at last compels this brigade to deploy in order to cope with him. Causing about one thousand of his horsemen to dismount, he approaches quickly the Second Iowa and the Seventh Illinois, which are waiting the attack. These two regiments resist Forrest's much greater forces, and, deploying step by step in good order, cover the retreat of the column. When the night comes

to separate the combatants the latter makes its bivouac a few miles south of Okolona.

The following day, at daybreak, preparations are making on both sides for the struggle. Forrest, with his usual audacity, wishes, in order to annoy the Federals, to make them believe that they are surrounded by enemies in greater numbers than they are. Pushing, then, Barteau on their right flank, and reserving to himself the harassing of their rearguard with only McCulloch's brigade, he directs his brother to take a road on the left and to make a forced march to overtake the head of the enemy's column and cut off his retreat between Okolona and Pontotoc. He knows that this head is the weak point of the column, since it escorts the train and the fugitives, and that it will be easy to interrupt its progress. If Sooy Smith had remembered Sherman's advice, before continuing a retreat that had become necessary he would have endeavored to put Forrest in such a condition as might prevent his being annoyed by him. Everything seemed to invite him to this. He had behind him a woody, rolling country, and only one road on which he had to stretch his whole column—a ground very favorable to surprises and very difficult to clear. Around Okolona, on the contrary, was a vast plain, well cultivated, very open, which was therefore well suited for the evolutions of a numerous cavalry. It was in this plain that Smith, availing himself of his superiority, should have waited for and fought Forrest, even should the latter have united all his forces to attack him. The opportunity was the more favorable as these forces were divided, and as he might have been able to crush successively Barteau and McCulloch, beginning with either the one or the other. He did nothing of this, and, thinking of nothing but of accelerating his retreat, he began at nine o'clock in the morning to move his troops in a single column, without even endeavoring to feel for the enemy and estimate his forces. The soldiers, whom Grierson had not accustomed to serve a campaign in that manner, seeing this march, which resembled a flight, and hearing musket-shots now behind them, now on the right, now on the left, naturally believed that their chief was concealing himself in front of overwhelming forces, and hence they lost all their ardor, and discouragement was not long in taking possession of them. This

day the advance-guard and the escort of the train are entrusted to Hepburn. Waring follows him at some considerable distance; McCrillis brings up the rear. Forrest had halted with his two brigades fourteen miles south of Okolona; he had thus allowed the Federals to gain some ground. But he made up for it by setting forward at four o'clock in the morning, and overtook their rearguard while it was passing the town of Okolona. The moment had come to attack them vigorously. Seeing at a distance Barteau's troops, which have formed north of the town, on the right flank of the enemy's column, he leaves McCulloch to rejoin them and direct their movements. During this time the Federals, finding themselves pressed, have taken a fighting position. Waring, continuing the march with the train, has detached on the right the Seventh Indiana to support the Fourth regulars, which covers on this side the flank of the column against Barteau. McCrillis posts himself in a line with them on leaving the town. Hepburn has halted six miles farther on in a very good position. One brigade and a half only is thus in line to cope with Forrest. The latter, encouraging by his presence Barteau's soldiers, who up to the present time have been satisfied with exchanging a few musket-shots with the enemy, leads them against the Fourth regulars and the Seventh Indiana. The first attack is repulsed, and the Federals hold themselves in the last houses of Okolona, which McCulloch has not yet been able to reach. But Forrest returns to the charge with the greater part of the brigade, and, outflanking the line of the two Federal regiments, whose retreat he threatens to cut off, he dashes on McCrillis' brigade. The latter, attacked at the same time by McCulloch, thinks himself flanked and disbands in an instant. An entire battery, overturned in the ditches on the road, is abandoned, and the whole band in the greatest confusion rushes on this road in the direction taken by the remainder of the column. The Confederates avail themselves of this easy victory to pick up a number of prisoners, a great deal of booty, and push before them the dismayed crowd, which offers no further resistance. Finally, the Seventh Indiana and the Fourth regulars, under the leadership of Grierson, succeed in re-forming; Hepburn's brigade, coming to their assistance, opens its ranks to allow the crowd of fugitives to pass, and waits resolutely for the enemy in a good

position. This is a hill covered with underbrush, flanked on the right and left by a swamp, and accessible only by a crest which follows the road from Okolona to Pontotoc. They are about six miles from the latter town. Barteau's troops, a goodly number of whom have been outmarched, are suddenly stopped. The moment is an important one for Forrest, who has remained at their head. He happily sees the remainder of his forces arrive. His brother, who has not been able to get in advance of the enemy, finds him on debouching into the road after having made the required détour. McCulloch rejoined his chief a few moments after. Forrest soon deploys their two brigades, the first on the right, the second on the left, of the road. Leaving to his brother the direction of one wing, he proceeds to take that of the other near McCulloch, and at three o'clock gives the order for the attack. The approaches of the position of the Federals are promptly carried on the right, but their well-sustained fire causes the assailants to fall back. Colonel Forrest is killed at the head of his soldiers, whom he encourages in vain before McCulloch can come into line. General Forrest, who has hastened to witness his brother's last moments, leads his brigade again to the assault. This time the Federals retire, but step by step, inflicting considerable losses on the enemy, and soon make another stand. Hepburn with his cavalry and the Fourth regulars holds back Forrest's brigade, and it requires the arrival of McCulloch to compel him to move forward. He, however, surrenders yet but little ground, and proceeds to re-form behind Waring's brigade, which, in its turn, has halted to cover the retreat. It may be feared, in fact, that this retreat will soon degenerate into a complete rout. McCrillis' brigade has not been able to rally. The runaway soldiers, whose number has increased at every step, mingle with the train and the negroes, and form an immense mass rebellious to all authority, which encumbers the road. Before coming to take part in the struggle Waring has endeavored to turn and hold it back in a glade neighboring the road. He did not succeed in this, and the distracted crowd has by its sole impetus broken through two of his regiments. His brigade and Hepburn's alone have to bear the whole burden of the fight. If the line is broken the whole column is lost for ever. But Smith and Grierson

cause them to take, on Jay's farm, a position in which they will be the better able to repulse the enemy's assaults, as the latter have themselves suffered much. Animated by the heat of the pursuit and burning with anxiousness to avenge his brother, Forrest has not ceased crossing swords with the Federals without looking back to see if he is followed. Barteau's brigade has remained behind to re-form its ranks; two regiments only of Forrest's brigade have been able to keep pace with the Southern general. The latter, leading them, attacks on his right the enemy's position, and directs McCulloch, who arrives, to deploy his brigade on the left and to likewise attack the enemy. This force advances, in spite of the fire from a battery of the Fourth Missouri, and takes possession of a ravine through which it can move forward under cover. But it is not able to resist the counter-charge of the latter regiment. McCulloch is wounded and his brigade repulsed. Forrest, who has advanced on his side, has experienced additional losses; the force that follows him is reduced to three hundred men, almost all infantry. McCulloch's retreat leaves Forrest isolated at the moment when the Federals take the offensive to support the Fourth Missouri, whose fire has kept him back in his pursuit. The Seventh Indiana, crossing at a gallop the glade in which Forrest has advanced, compels him to promptly take shelter in the prolongation of the glade which McCulloch has abandoned on the left. The Confederates avail themselves of their position to receive the hostile cavalry with a well-sustained musketry fire. But they are much exposed, as Smith might unite all his forces to crush them, and it would be the moment to follow Sherman's advice; but darkness, coming on then, does not enable the Federals to discover the weakness of their adversaries, whose position they have overreached on the right, and McCulloch, in his turn, taking them in flank, disengages his chief.

Night has come; both parties are exhausted. The Federals think only of retreating; they abandon all their wounded and broken cannon, and set forward to rejoin the train and fugitives that have preceded them on the Pontotoc road. They do not halt until they come near that place at midnight, and after a few hours' rest, during which Smith and his lieutenants endeavor to re-establish order in the column, the latter receives again

the order for departure. Thanks to this hurried retreat, it reaches, on the 23d at noon, the banks of the Tallahatchie at New Albany; in the evening Waring's brigade, relieving Hepburn's as the rearguard, crosses in its turn the bridge and destroys it. The Federals had henceforth nothing more to fear; but, after having allowed themselves to be beaten by forces much inferior in number, after a too hasty retreat in which they had offered the sight of a most shameful defeat, they seem not to have even perceived that the enemy had renounced pursuing them. Convinced that they would be safe only in their old encampments, they did not slacken their pace before having crossed, on the 24th, the Tippah River. Grierson's division returned to Germantown on the 25th; Waring's brigade, passing through Collierville, reached Memphis on the 27th. The losses in men were not great. They amounted to four or five hundred—three hundred in the combats fought on the 22d near Okolona—but nearly one-half the cavalry were on foot, having left their foundered horses behind them. All the wounded and seven cannon had remained in the hands of the enemy. These troops, so fine on starting, were deeply discouraged and unfit for some time to reassume the offensive. They had, it is true, destroyed an important railroad and impoverished a fertile region, but were fully aware that the object of the expedition had been missed.

Forrest on the 22d was not in a condition to continue the pursuit, and a daring adversary might have made him pay dear for his boldness. He contented himself with forwarding on the tracks of the enemy the seven hundred men whom Gholson brought quite opportunely at this time, and who picked up a goodly number of stragglers. During this time he retraced his steps, with the remainder of his troops, to join Chalmers and give his division the rest of which it was so much in need before undertaking a new expedition which he was already contemplating. He found at Starkville, with Chalmers, General Lee and a part of his division. The latter, seeing Sherman again take the road to Vicksburg, and having no longer to defend that of Selma, had promptly reached the banks of the Okatybbeeka in the hope of still finding Forrest and Smith struggling near this stream, and to complete the defeat of the latter. The prompt retreat of the Federals as far as Okolona baffled

this design. Forrest, however, had his revenge to take. After having repulsed the invasion he was anxious, in his turn, to invade the State of Tennessee, disarmed by the concentration of the Federal armies.

Before following up this new campaign we must say a few words regarding the demonstrations made by the Unionists against Grenada, Dalton, and Mobile to divert the attention of the adversaries while Sherman was marching against Meridian.

The expedition which the latter had organized to ascend the Yazoo River was composed of two regiments of infantry—one white, the other black—and of two hundred horsemen, under the command of Colonel James H. Coates, embarked on five transports and five gunboats detached by Admiral Porter under the command of Captain Owen. It left Haynes' Bluff on the 31st of January. Coates' instructions directed him to take possession of the Yazoo River, Fort Pemberton, and, if it were possible, Grenada. He was thus to annoy Forrest, and compel him to leave on this side a part of his forces, and avail himself of his absence to disperse the bands of partisans that he might have left in that country. Owen, while supporting him, was to survey the navigable water-courses which unite to form the Yazoo River.

The flotilla on the 4th of February reached the village of Liverpool, situated about twenty-five miles above Haynes' Bluff. A high hill crowned by a few works commanded the river; it was occupied by hostile troops, who immediately opened fire on the Federal vessels. Coates landed a regiment, the Eleventh Illinois, to dislodge them, but these troops were repulsed after having lost thirty-three men, and compelled to re-embark promptly. This check did not stop the expedition, as the flotilla took advantage of the night to force the passage, and arrived on the 9th opposite Yazoo City, which was found defenceless. Two days after Coates re-embarked his troops to continue ascending the Yazoo, and without impediment reached the village of Greenwood, where he disembarked his cavalry. Fort Pemberton, situated in the neighborhood, was destroyed; there could be seen here and there on the river the hulls of the few vessels which the Federals had abandoned the year before, and of some which the Confederates had themselves destroyed after the capture of Vicks-

burg. But the water was too low to allow navigation above this point. The cavalry, pushing to within a few miles of Grenada, announced that this town was occupied by Ross' brigade, sent in this direction, as we have said already, by S. D. Lee. The object of the expedition was now attained; there was nothing left but to return. But instead of retiring promptly, as prudence required, after having ventured into the vicinity of a superior force and so far from any assistance, the Federals spent several days, contrary to the strict rule established by Sherman, in gathering cotton and loading their vessels with it. After having disembarked at Yazoo on the 28th of February, they sent these vessels to carry their booty to Vicksburg. They were near paying dear for their imprudence. A little above Yazoo City, Coates had landed his cavalry for the purpose of seizing all the roads leading therefrom. A detachment of this force encountered a part of Ross' brigade, which had left Grenada and outflanked the flotilla by a rapid march; it was quickly driven back into the town. If Ross, who, it is said, had fifteen hundred men under his command, had pushed forward, he would have found the Union infantry in the act of disembarking, and would certainly have driven it into the river. Instead of that, he hesitated, parleyed, and was satisfied with skirmishing and investing the town while waiting for the arrival of reinforcements which Forrest had promised him.

The latter, in fact, immediately on his arrival at Starkville had sent his division to the encampment it had occupied during the winter behind the Tallahatchie. Richardson's brigade had received orders to help Ross to fight the Federals on the Yazoo. It joined him on the 4th of March. But Coates had availed himself of the respite which was allowed him to fortify his position. A large redoubt protected by a ravine and situated near the town had been repaired and occupied by the Eleventh Illinois, a white regiment. Not being able to post all his forces in it, Coates had established himself in the town with the Eighth Louisiana, a negro regiment. The Confederates attacked him early on the 5th after having easily driven back his outposts. Richardson, who had taken the command of all the Southern forces, proceeded toward the town with a part of his brigade, and directed Ross to take the remainder of his own troops to attack the redoubt. He

penetrated rapidly into the streets and took possession of a part of the houses, from which his soldiers fired briskly upon the negroes, who were endeavoring to re-form in the streets. A light battery which accompanied it promptly put to flight a squadron of marines who had landed with a howitzer, and soon riddled Coates' headquarters with canister shot. The situation of the latter was critical, but his soldiers, regaining courage from his example, valiantly sustained the fight. During this time Ross had established himself in the approaches to the redoubt; he was occupying the ravine and pouring shells on the works, but when he endeavored to take it by storm he was repulsed with loss. Having undertaken in vain to intimidate the defenders and compel them to capitulate, he renewed his assault, but with as little success. He was satisfied then to keep himself close enough to the outer parapet occupied by the Union cavalry to maintain his fire on the redoubt, and awaited the result of the fight engaged in by Richardson. This was a great mistake. If, leaving only a detachment in front of the works to keep in the garrison, he had taken the greater part of his forces to the assistance of the latter, he would certainly have crushed the Eighth Louisiana, after which he would have been able to invest completely the garrison and compel it to surrender. But his inaction allowed Coates to regain the advantage, notwithstanding the small number of his men. A demonstration made by one company only in the rear of the Confederates engaged in the town spread confusion among them; the Unionists recaptured the howitzer and used it with success. Richardson was dislodged, and his retreat involved that of Ross. He acknowledged but about fifty men *hors de combat*—a number evidently much below the truth. The Federals lost one hundred and thirty. They were preparing to sustain another fight when on the following day, the 6th, they received an order calling them back to Vicksburg. Sherman, having returned to this town, had no further reason to leave them at so distant a post. They embarked on the 7th without being annoyed.

We have said that Grant had promised Sherman to make, during his expedition against Meridian, a demonstration which would prevent Johnston from sending any reinforcements to Polk. We must therefore turn back for a moment to the upper Tennessee

Valley, which the Federals now hold entirely from Knoxville, whence Foster with the Army of the Ohio observes Longstreet, *vid* Chattanooga, the headquarters of General Thomas and of the Army of the Cumberland, to near Decatur. General Logan with the Fifteenth corps guards the railroad between this town and Stevenson. Behind this line, thus strongly occupied by Grant's soldiers, extends the vast region conquered by them for now two years, and in which the Confederate flag is carried no longer than by guerillas or by parties of cavalry. The former even seem to welcome the truce which the rigor of winter imposes on the combatants. Bands of partisans are recruited and organize in view of new expeditions, but we have in the first two months of the year only two insignificant engagements to mention—one on the 13th of January at Mayfield, Kentucky, south of Paducah, and another at Sparta, near McMinnville, Tennessee, on the 7th of February. On the side of the Confederate cavalry they are preparing to resume the offensive on the first opportunity. General Roddey, whose brigade has been reinforced to almost the strength of a division, gathers boats below Florence and sends detachments down the river from this town on the right bank of the Tennessee. On the 26th one of these detachments encounters a Federal regiment at Blue Water, and is compelled to retreat after a brisk skirmish. On the other hand, Johnston, judging with good reason that the cavalry may do much greater service by being united to his army than by fighting at random far from the great battlefields, was not long in recalling Roddey to the vicinity of Dalton. It is true that scarcely has the latter arrived when an order from Richmond requires him to return to the vicinity of Florence. Nearly one month has thus been lost by this going to and fro.

During this time the severity of the weather renders the least operation impossible in the upper valleys of the Alleghanies. The Confederates have experienced it. General Vance, having endeavored to penetrate from North Carolina into the Tennessee Valley at the head of a small force of five hundred cavalry, of whom one hundred and fifty were Indians, crossed the chain of the Smoky Mountains, and, coming down near Knoxville, captured a Federal train near Jetersville; but the enemy starting at

once to pursue him, he finds himself driven to the foot of the mountains, which the snow and the ice render impassable. He divided his force: one detachment succeeded in getting back to North Carolina. The remainder under his direction endeavored to pass through the gap of Big Pigeon River, but, soon overtaken by the enemy, the Southerners after a small fight were compelled to surrender January 15th.

In the mean time, the weather having moderated in the more southern regions through which flows the Tennessee, the Federals have made the demonstrations which Grant had promised Sherman. We have said that the Fifteenth corps occupied, not far from the right bank of the Tennessee, the railroad from Stevenson to Decatur. On the 25th of January, General Logan, who commands it, causes a boat-bridge to be thrown over the river at Larkin's Ferry. Upon the occupation by a strong advance-guard of the surroundings of the bridge on the left bank and the approaches of the high chain called Sand Mountain, which borders the valley on the east, he causes a part of his troops to pass over. General Smith moves into these mountains with the main column, whilst a strong detachment proceeds to occupy, farther down, the town of Guntersville. Smith, in spite of the rain which breaks up the roads and compels him to leave his artillery behind, crosses Sand Mountain on February 2d and penetrates the pass leading into Will's Valley. He occupies Lebanon and Rawlinsville, but, not having succeeded in meeting Thomas' cavalry, which was to come from Trenton to lend him help, he turns back the following day, followed by Roddey, who dares not attack him, and recrosses the Tennessee on February 4th.

On his part, Thomas had directed General Palmer—who, with the Fourteenth corps, occupied Chickamauga Valley—to make a demonstration against Dalton. He advanced beyond Ringgold on January 28th, but finding the enemy firmly established on the heights of Tunnel Hill, he hastened to return.

These insignificant movements could not deceive Johnston, who, moreover, knew himself to be protected for at least a few weeks by the unfavorable weather; and it was for other reasons that he did not wish to weaken the Army of the Tennessee for the benefit of that of the Mississippi. We have seen that his recommenda-

tions had not prevailed. The Union general-in-chief had foreseen this with a rare judgment, for it was not until the 16th of February that Johnston received orders to send Hardee to Demopolis, and on the 14th, Grant, countermanding the instructions he had given Thomas in view of a long campaign against Longstreet in East Tennessee, directed him to march upon Dalton with sufficient force to dislodge Johnston and drive him back to the south if, as he supposed, the latter had sent a part of his forces to assist Polk.

The weather was bad, the roads broken up, the draught animals had not yet recovered from the privations they had suffered during the siege of Chattanooga. The four divisions designated by Thomas for this operation could not set off until the 22d of February.

No important change has taken place in the position of the Federal troops since they have taken up their winter quarters. The Eleventh and Twelfth corps, under Hooker, are established between Bridgeport—where they support Logan—and Chattanooga. The Fourteenth corps has its quarters east of this city. The Fourth corps occupies the entire lower part of East Tennessee, from Cleveland, where Stanley's division, commanded by General Cruft, is, to Loudon, where it connects with the Army of the Ohio. Under protection of these two divisions the section of the railroad comprised between Cleveland and Loudon is promptly repaired; Matthies' brigade of the Fifteenth corps has just relieved, in the latter town, Cruft, who has advanced south as far as Red Clay in the direction of Dalton. Long's cavalry is posted at Calhoun on the Hiawasse, between the two divisions of the Fourth corps. The railroad between Stevenson and Chattanooga being again in order, direct communication is thus established between East Tennessee and Nashville—a most essential condition for the safety of the Army of the Ohio.

The Confederate army also has not left its winter quarters. After the battle of Ringgold, experiencing no further pursuit, it has halted, and each division has remained in the position which had been assigned to it to cover the retreat on Dalton. The cold weather having come, the soldiers have built cabins in these positions without any thought on the part of Bragg or Hardee to modify them. Johnston, on taking the command of the army, would have

caused it to evacuate Dalton and have brought it back as far as Calhoun to protect its front by the deep waters of the Coosawhatchie. But the Richmond Government has not permitted it. And yet the departure of Hardee with Cleburne, Cheatham, and Walker has reduced his army by nearly one-half, whilst his artillery is threatened with inactivity, its horses, still more used up than those of the Federals, having, for the most part, been sent to the rich Ottawah valley to recruit. It is therefore with four divisions only that he is to defend the approaches to Dalton. The task is a difficult one. This little town, situated on the railroad in the valley called Crow Valley, is covered on the west with a high, steep ridge, Rocky Face Ridge, the culminating point of which bears the name of Buzzard Roost. The railroad between Chattanooga and Dalton, after having crossed the gorge of Taylor's Ridge, passes through, as we have seen above, a somewhat large valley, then passes through a tunnel under a narrow and low hill called Tunnel Hill. The latter is only a spur of Rocky Face Ridge, which it follows in a parallel direction for a short distance from its eastern face. Beyond the tunnel the road penetrates obliquely into the main ridge, and, continuing south-easterly, passes across it, following the deep gap known by the name of Mill Creek Gap. Rocky Face Ridge thus offered positions easy to defend, but also easy to flank, and consequently without any strategic value. In fact, on the one hand the ridge terminates abruptly three or three and a half miles north of Mill Creek Gap, which allowed the enemy emerging from Ringgold to reach Crow Valley without difficulty; on the other hand, the neck of Snake Creek Gap, which on the south separates this same ridge from the Chattooga Mountains, being crossed by the road from La Fayette to Resaca, the Federals could by the very shelter of the wall of Rocky Face debouch on the rear of Johnston and threaten the large Coosawhatchie bridge. Fortunately, the Federals were very inferior to the Confederates in number, the re-enlistment furloughs having much reduced the effective force of the divisions. Moreover, by a coincidence still more fortunate, at the very moment when his outposts signalled the movements of the Federals, Johnston was informed that Hardee's troops were returned to him, the greater part having already reached Demopolis. On the morning of the 23d he made

preparations to meet the attack. Stewart's and Breckinridge's divisions posted themselves on the eastern declivity of Rocky Face at the entrance of the defile of Mill Creek Gap. Hindman remained in reserve behind them in the gorge. Wheeler with his sixteen hundred cavalry and his artillery occupied Tunnel Hill. Stevenson's division established itself north of Dalton across Crow Valley.

On the same day the Union general Palmer, having assembled Johnson's, Davis', and Baird's divisions of the Fourteenth corps in the vicinity of Ringgold behind Taylor's Ridge, advanced toward Tunnel Hill, and, after having reconnoitred in the evening Wheeler's position, encamped a few miles north-west of this position. Cruft, reinforced by Matthies' brigade, advanced from Red Clay, where he was established, in the direction of Tunnel Hill, leaving the railroad on his left, and halted at Lee's house near the road from Ringgold to Dalton. General Long, summoned from Loudon with six hundred cavalry, followed the railroad from Cleveland to Dalton, and penetrated into Crow Valley to within four miles of the latter city, but, having encountered considerable force, he was compelled to fall back on Varnell's Station.

The presence of these troops on the two sides of Rocky Face Ridge inspired Palmer with extreme prudence. He advanced but a few miles during the day of the 24th. Johnson's and Baird's divisions, formed in three columns, were for a long time kept in awe by Wheeler's artillery posted on Tunnel Hill. The latter, on seeing himself threatened on his two flanks, fell back at last toward Mill Creek Gap. Davis followed him as far as the entrance of the defile, where he was stopped by the hostile infantry which was guarding its approaches. Fearing little on this side, Johnston sent Wheeler's batteries and a brigade of Stewart's division to reinforce Stevenson in Crow Valley.

It is there, in fact, that Palmer proposes to bring his main effort to bear on the following day. Cruft, who on the 24th has not stirred from the vicinity of Lee's house, penetrates on the morning of the 25th into Crow Valley, where he finds again one of his brigades and Long's cavalry. Baird leaves Tunnel Hill at three o'clock, passes round Rocky Face Ridge, and comes to join him. Palmer, who directs this movement in person, places Baird

on the right of Cruft, and advances thus toward Dalton, preceded by Long, who pushes before him the enemy's scouts. Johnson and Davis have orders to hold, by strong demonstrations, the enemy in the positions at Mill Creek Gap from which it seems impossible to dislodge him, and a regiment of mounted infantry, the Thirty-ninth Indiana, under Colonel Harrison, proceeds to occupy Snake Creek Gap, through which these two generals will pass if the manœuvre of the left wing is successful.

But, although the wall of Rocky Face was flanked, this wing encountered serious obstacles, of which Hindman will know how to avail himself in order to hold it back. The valley situated east of this chain is divided lengthwise by a steep hill, and thus forms two passages—one the Crow Valley proper, through which the railroad from Ringgold to Dalton passes after having crossed Mill Creek Gap; the other, narrower, is on the east of the hill. A spur of Rocky Face narrows the Crow Valley a few miles south of the bridge where the Union infantry have penetrated into the valley. It is there that Hindman is awaiting them. He has placed on this spur Clayton's and Reynolds' brigades. Stevenson, with the three brigades he has remaining, occupies on the right the hill which borders the valley on the east. His position is a very strong one; it covers completely the approaches to Mill Creek Gap and the Ringgold Railroad, winding twelve or fifteen hundred feet back. But it must be preserved at any price, for should it be lost the troops that defend the other reverse of Rocky Face will be irrevocably flanked. Palmer, who has deployed his cavalry forces on the central hill, his right in Crow Valley, his left resting on the Cleveland Railroad, meeting in this central hill a gap which separates him from Stevenson, halts and feels for a long time the enemy's positions. At last he decides upon approaching them by his right, whose success, if it succeeds, will be decisive. Cruft will confine himself to engaging, on the left, Stevenson's troops. About three o'clock Baird sends Turchin's brigade to assault the spur: the Federals, following the woods which fringe the base of Rocky Face, reach the foot of this hillock, scale it, and dislodge Clayton's brigade, which was occupying it.

But the latter, re-forming near Reynolds, resumes the offensive and carries the position in no less time than it has lost it. Pal-

mer, finding the enemy too numerous and too well established, does not deem it expedient to renew the fight, and gives the order for retreat. The Federals leave Crow Valley, and in the night reach again the Ringgold road. Johnson and Davis confined themselves, as they had orders to do, to cannonading the enemy's position and engaging with their skirmishers. On the extreme right Harrison has established himself in Snake Creek Gap, which he has found occupied, but Johnston cannot allow the enemy to be master of this passage. Fortunately, he was informed in the evening, at the same time that he heard of the occupation of the defile, of the soon-expected arrival of Cleburne's division. He causes a brigade of this division, under Granberry, to disembark at Tilton, and forwards it upon Snake Creek Gap. On the 26th, at daybreak, he easily dislodges Harrison and drives him out of the gap.

The appearance on his right flank of Cleburne's soldiers, whom he thought at Demopolis, finally convinced Palmer of the uselessness of any further effort against Johnston. He could not contemplate taking Dalton by main force, and his demonstration had no further object, since the troops which might have been forwarded against Sherman had just disclosed their presence in front of him. He started his army corps on the 26th, and established himself on the 27th in the valley of the Chickamauga—Davis at Rossville, Johnson at Tyner's Station and Graysville, and Baird at Ringgold. Cruft returned to Red Clay, and Long halted at Cleveland. We will leave them in these positions until Sherman comes to lead them to new combats.

Before relating the expedition undertaken by Forrest shortly after the check of Sooy Smith we must conclude in a few words the enumeration we have promised of the demonstrations made to support Sherman's campaign against Meridian. The projected landing in the vicinity of Mobile having been abandoned, Farragut undertook to attack this place with the flotilla alone, so as to retain within its walls the troops which Maury might have been induced to send to Polk's assistance. He appeared on the 20th of January with several vessels in front of Mobile. This demonstration was to enable the Union admiral to reconnoitre the approaches of the place and prepare the extensive naval ope-

ration so long projected, and which he was to execute with so much *éclat* a few months later.

We have said that the fine Federal division of cavalry which Sooy Smith had taken as far as West Point, Mississippi, had returned to Memphis after having many trials in this fruitless expedition. Of the seven thousand men that composed it, there were remaining, for want of horses, but two thousand two hundred in a condition to take the field. All the others were on foot. Grierson, to whom Smith had given the command of it, was in consequence no longer in a condition to cope with Forrest. The latter knew also that behind this thin screen of cavalry there were remaining between the Tennessee and the Mississippi only abandoned posts or those occupied by insignificant garrisons.

Grant and Sherman, who knew how to sacrifice opportunely the accessory for the principal, had drawn from these posts all the organized regiments to increase the effective force of their armies. Hurlbut, who commanded at Memphis, after having sent back to the North, on re-enlisting furloughs, the greater part of his dismounted cavalry, had, to form his garrisons, only white or black regiments recruited in the region he commanded. Nothing, therefore, was easier for Forrest than to penetrate into Western Tennessee, and even establish himself in that part of Kentucky comprised between the two rivers, and which forms a triangle whose summit is Paducah. Everything seemed to invite him to avail himself of this opportunity. His soldiers, almost all natives of this country, were inflamed with the desire to see it again. It was for them like a sort of furlough to go and wage war in the midst of their own people. They were sure to find there the horses and equipments they needed and to pick up new recruits. In short, they had many wrongs to avenge on the Federals, who with impunity imposed upon their families. However, before taking the field Forrest wished to increase the efficiency of his troops, all of whom he could not take into Tennessee. He spent two weeks in scouring the country comprised between the Tombigbee and the Tallahatchie to get back deserters, to muster new recruits, and to remount and re-equip his men. He received at the same time from the east a reinforcement of seven hundred men. General Buford, who brought them to him, added one of his bri-

gades to enable him to form a second division. The first, under Chalmers, was composed of the two other brigades. The two divisions thus formed a perfectly organized corps numbering nearly seven thousand men, the greater part experienced and well commanded. With such a force Forrest might have caused great dismay on the long line which supplied the Union army massed at Chattanooga. His attack upon the railroads of Central Tennessee would have compelled Sherman to detach a considerable part of his army to protect them, and would have weakened it. That was what Johnston wished—that was what Sherman feared above everything else. These two great soldiers, equally clear-sighted, were of one accord on this point. The Richmond Government decided otherwise. It does not seem to have understood how much more frail an army is when resting on a railroad than when on a river. A cavalry corps, reaching a railroad, passes through like a storm which leaves behind it ruins requiring a long time to repair. To prevent this disaster, if an equal force as well mounted cannot be brought to oppose it, it is then necessary to occupy with a numerous infantry all the vulnerable points without exception. On the banks of a river, the course of which man can neither stop nor divert, communications are interrupted only as long as the enemy occupies one or more of the positions which command it. If this enemy is established in a permanent manner, it is easy to bring together up or down the river the forces necessary to dislodge him. If he retires, from the instant of his departure all traces of his passage are obliterated. It is for this reason that Sherman, far from apprehending the invasion of Western Tennessee by Forrest, seemed desirous to promote it by directing the abandonment of all the posts which until then had seemed to be necessary to the Federals to ensure the free navigation of the Mississippi. Hurlbut and General Brayman, commanding the District of Cairo, did not seem to have understood these tactics. Fort Pillow, situated a few miles below Fulton, after having been abandoned by its garrison, which had been summoned to Vicksburg, received a new one about the 15th of February. Major Bradford established himself there with about two hundred and fifty men, forming the Thirteenth Tennessee cavalry; he was, while occupying this post, to recruit his regiment among the in-

habitants of the vicinity. The post of Hickman was entrusted to about fifty soldiers only, Island No. 10 to a hundred and sixty, and Columbus to Colonel Lawrence with six hundred men. The most important of all these, by its position as well as by the dépôts of *matériel* which it contained, Paducah, a small town situated at the confluence of the Tennessee and the Ohio, had seen its defenders, whom Colonel Hicks commanded, reduced to a less number than seven hundred, of which about one-third were negroes. Out of this number there were not one hundred who had once been under fire. Besides, a small band of about five hundred men, with whom Colonel Hawkins occupied at Union City the intersection of the Hickman and Mackenzie and the Columbus and Jackson railroads, had ventured far from the protection of the gunboats.

These small garrisons, thus scattered, were the more exposed as the works entrusted to their protection had been constructed for a much greater number of defenders. It had been necessary to abandon a part of them. Lastly, the Federals were surrounded by spies, the greater part of the inhabitants being determined to aid with all their might the Confederate cause. And yet if these small posts *en échelon* along the Mississippi prevented the Southern partisans from firing their muskets, or perhaps even a cannon-shot, on the Federal vessels, they served, on the other hand, as a base of operations for an intercourse, scarcely disguised, which supplied the enemy with not only provisions and goods, but even equipments and arms. It may be supposed that the suppression of this intercourse, which Sherman looked upon with good reason as fatal, had something to do with the order he had given to abandon the greater part of these posts.

However that may be, Forrest, fully aware of their weakness, knew that by first surprising his adversaries by the boldness of his movements he could afterward allow his soldiers all the leisure they needed to see again their families. Whilst Chalmers had returned to Grenada and Panola to regain the line of the Tallahatchie and keep watch on Memphis, he had remained inactive at Columbus since Sooy Smith's retreat. In the morning of the 15th of March he suddenly left this town with the Buford division, reinforced by two regiments—say about thirty-five hundred

cavalry. He crosses the Charleston Railroad near Corinth, then the frontier of Tennessee, and on the 20th the head of his column enters suddenly into Jackson. But, notwithstanding the hearty welcome of a population sympathizing with his cause and person, he halts in this city just long enough to collect his people, and on the 22d his troops halt, some at Trenton, others a little in the rear at Spring Creek. The Federal post at Union City is close by. The garrison does not suspect the proximity of the enemy; advantage must be taken of this. Its numbers, as we have said, nearly five hundred men, but Forrest knows personally Hawkins, whom he has already taken prisoner in December, 1862, and he knows that it requires but little to intimidate him. Hence he sends against him but one detachment of less than six hundred men, under Colonel Duckworth.

While the main body of the column continues its march northward, Duckworth proceeds, in the night of the 23d-24th, to the vicinity of Union City, carries at daybreak Hawkins' outposts, and promptly invests the works. These consist of an enclosed work which surrounds the camp, and is protected by a small fort which may serve as a redoubt. Its profile has but little extent, for the Federals have no artillery. But Duckworth also has none, and his first assault, although vigorously conducted, is easily repulsed. He returns several times to the charge, and always in vain. The Federals know that the telegraph before being cut has informed General Brayman at Cairo of their situation, and that they will soon be relieved. They fight with confidence and ardor. Duckworth has experienced severe losses, and despairs capturing the position by main force. But before withdrawing he tries a cunning artifice to which only the character of Hawkins could give any chance of success. A flag of truce is sent to summon the latter to surrender in the name of Forrest, who, the bearer says, before storming the place with all his forces wishes to prevent useless bloodshed. Hawkins asks to speak to Forrest. He is answered that an officer of his rank does not stoop so low as to parley with a simple colonel, and Duckworth presents himself as his plenipotentiary. He speaks of the forces of his chief, of his powerful artillery, of the horrors of a capture by storm. The unfortunate Hawkins, who the night before was unwilling to abandon

the place and withdraw to Hickman, asserting that he was able to defend himself for several days, returns, all disconcerted, to consult his officers. These wish to continue the fight; the more timid add, "Providing the enemy has no artillery." Hawkins sends an officer to discover this imaginary artillery. The latter at last perceives an ambulance, which his chief takes, doubtless, for a caisson. That suffices him: about eleven o'clock he returns to Duckworth and signs with him a shameful capitulation, which surrenders to the enemy, as prisoners of war, the entire garrison with about three hundred horses—a precious capture for the Confederates. This garrison had lost in the fight but one man killed and three or four wounded. It was forwarded with a strong escort to Jackson, and from there, *via* Corinth, toward Demopolis. At the moment when it was thus sacrificed by its chief, deliverance was near by. As General Veatch's brigade was passing through Cairo on its way to Tennessee, General Brayman had taken with him a part of it on board of steamers, and, landing at Hickman, was marching upon Union City to raise the blockade of the garrison and bring the latter with him. He was but a few miles distant when he heard of the disaster. His infantry not being able to pursue the enemy's cavalry, he promptly returned to his vessels.

Duckworth, in fact, was already far away, and was hastening the pace of his men to rejoin his chief. The latter during the day of the 24th had reached the village of Mayfield, whence his presence had been communicated to the Federal authorities, and the following day, about two o'clock, he arrived in sight of Paducah. He had thus, in ten days, travelled more than two hundred and fifty miles. For two days Colonel Hicks, an experienced officer, had been expecting his appearance. Hicks' troops, quartered for the most part in the city, had orders to muster at the first signal of alarm in the square work situated near the city and down the river at thirteen hundred yards from the banks of the Ohio. Its profile was extensive; the ditch and the abatis which surrounded it, and especially the six pieces with which it was armed, made it a formidable citadel. The precautions taken by Hicks were not useless. A reconnoitring-party which he had sent in the morning on the road to Mayfield had just returned without having met the enemy, but scarcely had he sent a second one when this latter

hastily returned, announcing the approach of Forrest, and a few minutes later the latter was entering the city after it at the head of his cavalry. The fight begins in the street between it and the Federals, who have taken up their arms in haste and fall back toward the fort while exchanging musket-shots with the assailants. While Forrest is taking possession of the town, speedily evacuated by Hicks, Thompson with his brigade approaches the fort. Forrest had accustomed his soldiers to attack without hesitation an enemy's works rifle in hand. His eulogists, taking advantage, perhaps rather generously, of the fact that Thompson could not reply to them, have pretended that Forrest had not given him the order to attack Fort Anderson: Thompson, it appears, was only to reconnoitre and invest it. But his family belonged to Paducah, where he had been brought up; his soldiers were all Kentuckians, and the desire to snatch this town from the Federals would have made them go beyond the orders of their chief. However that may be, they advance boldly upon the counterscarp of the fort. But Hicks has had time to post his men on the parapets, and a heavy discharge of musketry assails the Southerners, who experience heavy losses. While they strive in vain to surmount the obstacle, two Federal gunboats, the *Peosta* and the *Pawpaw*, which Captain Shirk, on returning from Tennessee the day before, has very fortunately left in front of the city, open fire on the assailants, which their balls strike on the flank. Thompson is killed by one of these projectiles. His soldiers are obliged to take refuge in the houses commanding the fort, and from the tops of which they continue the fight with the defenders.

At the news of this bloody defeat Forrest rushes forward: a glance suffices to show him the uselessness of another attack. He will therefore confine himself to keeping the enemy in check while a part of his troops will gather in the town of Paducah provisions, arms, equipments, horses—in short, all that partisans arriving from the heart of Mississippi may wish to appropriate in a hostile country.

First, he wishes to undertake anew the operation in which Duckworth succeeded so well in front of Union City. The firing ceases, and a flag of truce comes to summon Fort Anderson to surrender. This summons, written in Forrest's own hand, ends

with the following threat : " If you surrender, you shall be treated as prisoners of war ; but if I have to storm your works, you may expect no quarter." It has been said, to excuse the Southern general for having spoken like a redskin or a *condottiere* of the fifteenth century, that he merely wished to intimidate the enemy, and well knew that his threat was meaningless, since he had no intention to attack by storm. But we shall soon see what the consequences of these indiscreet and censurable words were. Forrest had laid down as a rule that the garrisons of forts taken by storm should be put to the sword. He had not shaken old Hicks, who indignantly rejected his demands ; but, although addressed to the Federals, these words were not lost upon his soldiers, who only asked to take their meaning literally.

In the mean time, the Confederate skirmishers who had slipped along the river-bank, mingling with the women and children escaped from the town, have taken advantage of the armistice to establish themselves in the houses that border the river. They begin firing upon the gunboats. The latter cannot dislodge them, but clear the streets, which they rake throughout their whole length. During this time Thompson's soldiers, resuming the fight as soon as the flag of truce has returned, exchange with the defenders of the fort a brisk fire. In this wise the day passes. In spite of the shells which burst in the streets, the Confederates have emptied the Federal magazines, plundered many houses, and destroyed a vessel which was on the stocks. During the night Forrest deems it prudent to evacuate the town, and gathers his soldiers a little distance to the south, out of the reach of the gunboats.

The situation of the Federals is a grave one. It is true that the military and naval authorities at Cairo, promptly informed of the attack, have done everything to help them. Several vessels of war proceed to Paducah, and a regiment comes during the night to reinforce the garrison of the fort. But the latter is short of cartridges, and has only three thousand when, about nine o'clock in the morning of the 26th, Forrest sends another message to offer an exchange of prisoners and another demand for surrender. Although the ammunition asked for from Cairo cannot arrive before evening, Hicks declines any parley. The prisoners whom they

wish to return him are sick men remaining at the hospital ; moreover, he is not authorized to conclude an exchange, and his soldiers, who, black or white, have vied in courage, have resolved, if necessary, to defend themselves at the point of the bayonet. In view of this energetic resolution, Forrest decides upon withdrawing. He carries with him a considerable amount of booty, and takes also—unnecessary cruelty—the sick whom he had found in their beds. He has never acknowledged his losses, which, we think, may be estimated at not less than three hundred men. For two days yet the detachments he left behind him to intimidate the Federals remain in the vicinity of Paducah, and the latter, in order to facilitate the defence of the fort, destroy the houses from which the enemy had fought them. Their losses amounted to fourteen killed and forty-six wounded.

In the mean time, Forrest, now assured that his adversaries would remain for some time on the defensive, had dispersed all his troops, leaving the Kentuckians in the vicinity of Mayfield and taking more to the south the Tennessee regiments. At the end of ten or twelve days' furlough his soldiers reunite at Trenton, rested, well equipped, and bringing with them numerous recruits. The moment had come again to take the field, for the arrival of the first division of his corps in West Tennessee enabled Forrest to operate against the enemy with all his forces.

Chalmers, who commanded it, had well employed his time since his chief had left him on the line of the Tallahatchie. On the 23d of March the latter had sent him from Jackson orders to advance in his turn. McCulloch's brigade was to halt at Waterford, south of Holly Springs, and to occupy the country situated south of the Charleston Railroad, while Neely should penetrate into Tennessee and establish himself at Brownsville. They could thus observe the movements of the Memphis garrison. Hurlbut, who had about four thousand infantry in this town, with good reason did not wish to rush them at the heels of Forrest, but as soon as he knew that the latter had passed the frontier of Tennessee, on returning in haste from Cairo, where he happened to be by chance, he ordered Grierson to move his cavalry forward on the enemy's tracks. He could, as we have said, mount scarcely more than two thousand men. The first engagement took place on the 29th

of March between a detachment of Unionists and the Neely brigade at the moment when the latter was establishing itself at Bolivar. It repulsed easily the assailants with a loss of twenty wounded and thirty prisoners. The following day Chalmers rejoined Neely in this town, for, informed of Grierson's movements, Forrest had summoned him on the 27th, directing him to leave only two battalions on the Tallahatchie. The division thus united was employed to escort the Federal prisoners into the State of Mississippi, out of reach of the enemy. Grierson did not deem it advisable to make any attempt to rescue them nor to molest Forrest. Ignorant, doubtless, of the dispersion of the latter's forces, and fearing failure with his small force in a country full of enemies, who would assemble from all sides to surround him, he moved forward with extreme caution, and after an insignificant skirmish, which took place on the 2d of April near Summerville between his outposts and a small Southern detachment commanded by Colonel Crews, he hastened to reach Raleigh and Memphis.

Forrest was henceforth entirely free in his movements. The inhabitants of Jackson, where he had his new headquarters, urged him to rid them of the proximity of the garrison of Fort Pillow. All the soldiers of this garrison and Major Bradford were natives of Tennessee—the greater part even of the vicinity. The inhabitants, having remained Southerners at heart, called them, very naturally, deserters or traitors. A passionate hatred animated both; it gave their hostilities the personal character peculiar to a real civil war—an individual war of vengeance and retaliation. It had just received fresh strength in the arrival, on March 29th, of four companies of artillery, sent by Hurlbut to reinforce the Thirteenth Tennessee and commanded by Major Booth, an experienced officer, who was to take the command. These companies were composed of negro soldiers, and were to be recruited among the slaves who would take refuge in the Federal lines.

In the first week of April, Forrest concluded to forward against Fort Pillow Bell's and McCulloch's brigades, which were in the vicinity of Jackson. Neely remained at Bolivar to cover the southern route. Buford, who occupied Trenton with Thompson's brigade, was authorized to make some demonstrations against the Federal posts in East Kentucky, intended to divert the attention

of the enemy from the main operation. A Northern newspaper, indiscreet like all its contemporaries, had informed him that the Government stables had escaped the pillage of Paducah. The Confederates had been induced to believe that the horses belonged to a rich secessionist. Disappointed at having missed this capture, and above all vexed at having been baffled, Buford resolved to have his revenge, and on the 8th of April moved northward. On the 12th he passed near Columbus, and, to draw in this direction the enemy's forces, he sends his escort to convey to Colonel Lawrence first the advice to withdraw from the town the women and children, then the demand for its surrender. This last summons surpasses that which Forrest addressed to Hicks. If the place surrenders without fighting, the negro soldiers, again reduced to slavery, shall be returned to their masters; if it defends itself and is captured, they shall all be put to death. While Lawrence humanely causes the women and children to embark, the Confederates, not being able to recapture their slaves, carry off a few horses and rush away, without waiting for the answer to their foolish threat. Buford, on his part, has continued his march, and on the 14th, at one o'clock, he suddenly enters Paducah. Hicks is better prepared to defend himself than at the time of the last attack: he has received reinforcements and four gunboats watch the river. Consequently, Buford does not contemplate attacking him in the fort, nor even dislodging him from the part of the city which the Federals have not voluntarily evacuated. While he draws upon the remains of this unfortunate town the fire of the fleet and fort, a party proceed to carry away the horses, numbering one hundred and forty, whose stable has been pointed out to them; and, this deed once done, he falls back southward, covering his retreat under the summons addressed to the enemy to have the women and children removed from the town. Returning promptly into Tennessee, he halts at Dresden on the 18th.

Forrest, on his part, has left Jackson on the morning of the 11th of April, followed by Bell's brigade and a battery of artillery. In the afternoon he rejoins Chalmers at Brownsville, and directs him to start on the road to Fort Pillow with McCulloch's brigade. An extraordinary ardor animates the Confederates, for at daybreak, in spite of a dark and rainy night, they have trav-

elled over the thirty-seven miles which separate them from the fort, and taken almost all the small posts that watch its approaches.

Like all the works constructed on the Mississippi by the Confederates, the old enceinte of Fort Pillow was of much too great an extent for the garrison which was in it at that time. This enceinte, which was not continuous, crowned an elevation the culminating point of which was situated seven hundred and sixty yards east of the river, and stretched to the south-westward of it, nearing it gradually to within two hundred and twenty yards. This elevation commanded completely the centre of the position, a high bluff, the foot of which was constantly washed by the waters of the Mississippi brought upon it with force by a change of direction, and which terminated thus on the east by very steep slopes, yet accessible by infantry. This disposition of nature, which deepened the channel of the river under the bluff itself, constituted the importance of the position, from the top of which artillery had a plunging fire. The bluff was separated from the elevation of which we have just spoken by a rather deep depression interspersed with small ravines covered with underbrush. Isolated on all sides, it inclined toward the west, forming gentle and regular slopes, but the southern declivity was divided by a small deep ravine penetrating as far as the middle of the plateau which occupied the entire summit of the hillock. On this plateau were the frame barracks occupied by the different Federal garrisons which had succeeded one another at this point. But they were not included in the new system of defence. This system was limited to a small part of the plateau commanding the river on the north of the barracks. It was composed of a broken line forming a kind of hornwork, the gorge of which rested on an escarpment above the river. The left branch, situated at the top of the slope and protected on the north by a small brook, Coal Creek, then overflowed, was difficult of access, but could be enfiladed by the fire of the enemy if the latter placed himself on an opposite height about one hundred yards only to the north-west. This height was then undefended, but it would undoubtedly have been included, in case of an attack, in the system of fortification of the Confederates. The right branch was partially commanded by the part of the plateau upon which the barracks stood, and the ravine, which inclined south-

ward, enabled the enemy to approach under cover to within one hundred and sixty yards. The work had a bold relief of eight feet and a ditch six feet and a half deep and seven feet wide. It was not two hundred yards in extent, which was little even for the strength of the garrison, and was armed with six cannon. The crest of the plateau was crowned on the east by a light breastwork, from which the depression of the ground limiting it was in sight, but it was quite insufficient to cover this position, which ought to have been defended at any cost, as only from it could the enemy be prevented from coming up by the ravine to within the short range of a musket-shot from the parapet. The situation of the Federals entrusted with the watching of this point was therefore a very perilous one, although Booth had written to Hurlbut that he could defend himself in it for two days; and it would have been much preferable had he taken his troops back to Memphis instead of exposing them in this manner.

McCulloch has received orders to turn, on the south, the height occupied by the old Confederate works, and thus reach the bank of the river, and establish himself, if possible, at the foot of the plateau in the spot where the depression limiting it meets the bluff, near a few frame houses built by sutlers, tavern-keepers, and cotton-dealers, and which was pompously called the town. Forrest has recommended him not to make his attack until he heard the musketry fire on the north. Bell, who follows him closely, is to land on this side, going down the left bank of Coal Creek. But whilst McCulloch takes the position assigned to him, driving the enemy's skirmishers before him, Bell on his march meets unforeseen difficulties, and the attack is thus retarded. The Federals avail themselves of this to abandon the old Confederate works, which they cannot defend, and to form on the plateau around their quarters.

Forrest himself at last arrives, about nine o'clock, and advances in the midst of the skirmishers to reconnoitre the enemy's position. He proceeds to reconnoitre the ravine which inclines from the plateau toward the south, and finds on this side the hostile forces briskly engaged, for two horses are killed under him, and, besides, Major Booth—who with as much courage rides over the line of his outposts—falls mortally wounded almost at the same moment.

He is succeeded in his command by Bradford, who has neither his experience nor his coolness.

As soon as his reconnoissance is ended, Forrest causes Bell to occupy the heights situated north-east of the fort, while McCulloch reaches the plateau protected from the enemy's guns by going up the ravine which inclines southward. The Federals, too few in number to fully man the slopes of the ravine, or badly placed to command its approaches, are quickly dislodged from their out-works and hastily fall back to the fort. Bradford orders the burning of the barracks, which are at a distance of only sixty yards from the parapet, but a portion only can be destroyed, as the Confederates are already masters of the rest. Bell, having taken possession of the heights pointed out to him, assists McCulloch, and the fort is thus invested on all sides; the garrison, straitened in a narrow space where it is greatly exposed to the shots of the assailants, cannot make efficient use of its artillery. The position is a desperate one. Forrest causes the firing to cease, and sends a flag of truce to propose an honorable surrender. Bradford, after some parley, refuses to surrender. Must we believe that he did not trust in the promises of his adversary—that he feared to fall himself into the hands of personal enemies resolved to satisfy their hatred in defiance of a sworn oath? That is possible, but we prefer to allow him the merit of a courageous resolution. He hoped, moreover, if the enemy forced his line, to save the garrison by reaching quickly the bank of the river. A gunboat, the *New Era*, was stationed near this bank. Its guns had already greatly inconvenienced McCulloch in the position he occupied before climbing the plateau; then its commander, Captain Marshall, ascending the river, had taken up a position at the entrance of Coal Creek and had fired briskly on Bell's right wing. It had been agreed between him and Booth that in case of any disaster he would move near the bluff to cover by his firing the garrison sheltered on the bank of the river. Bradford, as a last resort, relied upon this combination—a very chimerical one, as the space comprised between the steep slopes of the bluff and the deep waters of the Mississippi was only thirty to forty feet wide.

During the suspension of hostilities both parties perceived two

steamers, which, ascending the river, were rapidly approaching. They were the *Olive Branch* and the *Liberty*. The former carried, besides many passengers, a battery of artillery. The other in the morning had passed in front of Fort Pillow, and had afterward been met by the *Olive Branch*, on board of which was General Shepley: the latter, informed of the fight which was going on, had gone on board to reconnoitre. Both the Federals and the Confederates thought these vessels were bringing assistance to the garrison: this thought perhaps induced Bradford to reject Forrest's propositions; and, on the other hand, the assailants saw therein a violation of the truce, of which, however, the vessels could have no information. The Southerners took advantage of this specious pretext to violate it openly and in an inexcusable manner. McCulloch advanced his left wing upon the western slopes of the bluff in such a way as not only to oppose a disembarkment, but also to outflank the fort on the side of the river.

In the mean time, the decisive moment has come: the flag of truce is lowered. At a signal from Forrest the entire Confederate line commences firing on the fort and promptly silences the guns of the defence. At a second signal his line rushes forward, reaches the ditch, climbs the parapet, and after a few minutes' hand-to-hand struggle invades it on all sides at once. Resistance is henceforth impossible. The Federals rush in confusion toward the river hotly pursued by the assailants, who halt only to fire on the mass of fugitives. At the moment when the latter, leaving behind a number of dead and wounded, think they have reached a place of safety they are met by the fire of the troops that McCulloch has brought forward during the truce, and they see at the same time the moving off of the gunboats upon which they relied for protection. Marshall has noticed too late that he could not execute the manœuvre agreed upon without exposing himself to the fire of the artillery of the fort fallen into the hands of the enemy. He has since pleaded the want of ammunition and the position he occupied up the river to excuse his hasty departure. As to the two other vessels, they disappeared before the renewal of hostilities in the direction of Cairo, on the advice given by Marshall, doubtless on account of the truce, not to stop. They

could not, at any rate, have been of any assistance to the garrison, as they were not armed, the field-pieces they carried could not have been landed in due time, and the artillerymen had no muskets to defend themselves.

The unfortunate Federal soldiers are therefore at the mercy of their adversaries, who are exasperated against the whites, whom they accuse of a thousand crimes more or less imaginary, and against the blacks, capable of the greatest of all crimes in their eyes—that of having taken up arms against their masters. Quite a number of negroes throw themselves into the river, where the enemy's balls strike them every time their curly heads appear above the water. A few of them among the least wounded succeed in hiding themselves under the bluff. The mass of fugitives, although the greater part have thrown away their arms, have not ceased running to reach the shore in spite of the enemy's murderous fire. A few, however, halt and surrender, but the Confederate soldiers, intoxicated with fighting and passion, answer them by musket- or pistol-shots before they approach. At the same time the assailants mingle with the vanquished, who, not knowing whither to flee, run distracted in all directions or throw themselves suppliant at the feet of their conquerors. For some moments an indescribable scene of confusion and murder prevails on the bloody bank of the great river. Here a Federal, whom a Confederate summons to surrender or who has already given himself into his hands, is killed by a companion of the latter more bloodthirsty than himself. Forrest's soldiers have not discerned the moment when the enemy, equally unable to fight or to flee, becomes sacred to the victor. How could they, since their chief has not ceased exciting in them the most violent passions against the enemy—since he has, in his official communications, announced that he would give no quarter to the garrisons of forts taken by storm? Hence, although he endeavors, with the greater part of his officers, to stop the bloodshed, history must hold him responsible for the savage deeds which have dishonored his troops. All resistance has ceased; a few isolated pistol-shots only are heard. But here a sick man is mutilated by the sabre on his pallet in the hospital; there a wounded man, lying on the ground, is despatched by the thrust of a bayonet. Meanwhile, the passion for plunder has suc-

ceeded that of murder. The prisoners are stripped of all they possess. Still, they must esteem themselves fortunate to have their lives saved. They are collected together and led, under an escort, toward Brownsville, numbering two hundred and fifty, among which are a few wounded. All their companions are lying on the ground, some dead, the others severely wounded. It may be reckoned that of five hundred and fifty-seven men there are four hundred *hors de combat*; the vanquishers have about one hundred.

In the mean time, Forrest, far from wishing to occupy the post he has just conquered, as Hurlbut feared, seems to have no other thought than to leave it at the earliest moment. He starts for Brownsville before sunset, leaving Chalmers in command, with orders to evacuate the fort the following day, after having cared for the sick, buried the dead, and taken with him the enemy's cannon and the prisoners. Knowing the temper of his soldiers, he should himself have watched the execution of this task—of which they acquitted themselves in an infamous manner—unless, however, he felt himself powerless to impose it upon them. However that may be, the dead and the dying were thrown pellmell into the ditches of the work and covered over with a little earth—so hastily that at least one of the victims of this premature burial succeeded in coming out of the common grave during the night, and managed to escape. The greater part of the wounded Federals remained, for want of surgeons perhaps, without any assistance during the entire night under the boards of the barracks, to which some charitable Southern soldiers have carried them after having tried in vain, by means of signals, to have the *New Era* return to take charge of them. At last the dawn breaks upon this mournful scene. One of the numerous Federal gunboats that plough the river, the *Silver Cloud*, is soon signalled. She nears the shore, and, seeing the enemy's flag, throws a few projectiles upon the fort. At once the Confederates set on fire the barracks, which have been turned into hospitals. It has been stated that a number of wounded were burned on this occasion, either by accident or even by a horrible excess of cruelty. This has not been proved, in our opinion; therefore we do not admit it. But it is positive that the fire was started when the wounded were still lying in the places of refuge, and that several were taken

out with some difficulty. In the midst of the confusion which ensues a few prisoners attempt to escape. Thereupon, some of the Southern soldiers, not content with stopping them by firing, pursue the negroes, who endeavor to hide themselves in the inequalities of the ground, and kill several of them; in short, they attack even the wounded, who have been lying on the ground since the day before, and pitilessly despatch them.

Fortunately, an officer sent by Forrest with one of his prisoners when he heard the roar of the cannon arrives at the fort, and, hoisting a flag of truce, communicates with the *Silver Cloud* and a Federal transport, the *Platte Valley*, which in the mean while had arrived. By this time order is restored. All the wounded are carefully gathered and taken on board: the greater part arrived still alive at Cairo, while Chalmers, on his part, withdrew from the bank of the river, leaving behind him only corpses, silent witnesses of the victory so valiantly won and so cruelly stained by his soldiers.

The narratives of the survivors, and still more the very sight of their wounds, caused in the North a deep and legitimate impression. The negro soldiers swore to avenge the massacre of their brethren. As always happens in similar cases, the recollections, at times quite vague, of eye-witnesses, whose emotion had often dimmed their sight, were worked up by the imagination of the narrators, magnified by the hundred mouths of Fame, and there sprang up at once on this subject a legend mingled with truth and error. The Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War sent at once to Cairo, Memphis, and Fort Pillow itself, a sub-committee directed to make an inquiry, which gathered with little discernment a great amount of evidence, and in its report gave the legend an official authority. The evidence itself received by the commission is interesting, and has been of great assistance to us.

Forrest, who had returned to Jackson on April 14th, remained some time yet in Western Tennessee, availing himself of the agitation which his new victory had created among the Federals to give rest to a part of his troops and recruit his regiments. But no action signalized this sojourn. Chalmers was not long returning into Mississippi, taking with him the Fort Pillow prisoners.

Forrest, summoned at last by Polk, set out on the 2d of May to proceed on his track with the Buford division. His force had wonderfully increased by recruiting, for in spite of its losses it numbered one thousand combatants more than when it took the field. An immense train following it, laden with provisions, effects, and even liquors, proved that the expedition had been fruitful in every respect.

CHAPTER II.

MANSFIELD.

WE have just related the exploits of which the country comprised between the Mississippi and the Alleghanies was the scene during the earlier months of the year 1864, previous to the opening of the decisive campaign which Sherman is about to undertake in Georgia. To end this book we have yet to follow, during the same period, the belligerent armies west of the great river and to recapitulate in a few words the operations of which the coast of the Southern States on the Atlantic has been the theatre.

We have seen above that immediately after the capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, General Halleck had turned his attention to the vast regions extending west of the Mississippi. This was persisting in the plan which had already caused him to fall into so many errors, and of which his quarrel with Hooker regarding the occupation of Harper's Ferry is a striking example: it was forgetting once more that everywhere in the fields contended for by two armies, as in the ensemble of the operations that cover a whole continent, the combatants should endeavor, above all, not to take possession of a post or a territory, but to destroy the military strength of their adversary. The really formidable armies of the Confederacy were on the east of the Mississippi. It was against them that all the efforts of the Federal soldiers should have been concentrated. On the west of the great river the armies of the Southerners did not muster strong, and could not exert any decisive influence on the issue of the struggle. It was the more easy to hold them in check as the Mississippi permitted, in case they advanced as far as its banks, to unite against them without effort troops drawn from Memphis, Vicksburg, or New Orleans. To wrest from them the vast country which they occu-

pied, or rather in which they wandered, it required, on the contrary, a great number of men and a great deal of time. It required that the forces intended to conquer it should be proportionate to its extent, and not to the number of its defenders; and to maintain such forces in a poor and sparsely-peopled country it was necessary to supply the insufficiency of means of communication by completing or constructing several branches of railroad. In order to be able to undertake this long and costly campaign, Halleck has aggravated the error he had already committed by dismembering Grant's powerful army the day after the victory. A strong detachment of this army has been led by Steele to Little Rock. Banks' troops, whose effective force has been doubled by the arrival of the Thirteenth corps, being intended to occupy Texas, Halleck at once wished that this operation should be effected by land, in order to take advantage of the opportunity to conquer Upper Louisiana. We have seen with what perseverance he has fought against Banks—who this time was rightly inspired—to force his view upon him. After the defeat at Sabine Pass he has compelled him to ascend Bayou Têche, and at the moment when the latter was delayed by insurmountable difficulties on the Houston road, Halleck has pushed Steele forward beyond Arkadelphia, luring him with the vain hope that he would meet Banks on the bank of the Red River. He has greatly censured the combined operations of the navy and army which have secured to the Federals almost all the ports of Texas, and he has directed Banks to bring back without delay to New Orleans the greater part of the forces employed in these operations. In fact, at the end of December, 1863, the moment seems to him to have at last come to prepare the great expedition which is to wrest the Trans-Mississippi from the Confederates.

Two important streams, tributaries of the great river, flow through this region, which is bounded on the north by the deep waters of the Missouri, and on the south by the low shores of the Gulf of Mexico. These two rivers, the Arkansas and the Red River, are very similar: both, true rivers considering the length of their course, and mere torrents by the irregularities of their volume of water, have their source in the still-uninhabited vast plateau covered with the high prairie grass, and, flowing in a

south-eastward direction, traverse obliquely the two States of Arkansas and Louisiana. Both receive on the left, near their conjunction with the Mississippi, an important tributary which flows down from the north almost parallel with the great river; the tributary of the Arkansas is the White River, and that of the Red River the Washita. The efforts of Blunt and Steele had made the Federals masters of the basin of the Arkansas; they had yet to gain possession of that of the Red River. This was the object Halleck had in view. To attain it it was necessary to act in concert with Steele's forces on the north and Banks' on the south against Price's and Taylor's small armies, which formed the command of Kirby Smith, but being dispersed over a vast extent of country, separated the two Federal generals from each other. Too weak to operate singly, they were also too far apart to co-operate effectually with each other. But a favorable circumstance at last enabled Halleck to guarantee them the reinforcements necessary to undertake this difficult campaign with some chances of success. The severity of the winter prevented Grant from resuming before the end of April the great operations which he was preparing in the Tennessee Valley. Sherman, as we have said, had returned with the greater part of his command to the banks of the Mississippi. By leaving sufficient garrisons in the places protecting the navigation of this river, he could put in the field an army sufficiently strong, and above all well inured to war, which the climate of the South permitted him to use actively during three months before the time when Grant would again need it. In order that the latter might take on either bank of the Mississippi all the troops for which this river was used as a base of operations, the Army of the Arkansas and the garrison of Helena had been placed temporarily under his command. Halleck fully expected in the early part of January that all these forces would join, without delay, either Sherman or Banks, in order to undertake, in conjunction with them, the campaign he had been so long projecting. But some difficulties which he might have foreseen came to again thwart his design. On the one hand, the great severity of the winter this year rendered, according to Steele's saying, military operations impossible in the State of Arkansas. On the other hand, the waters of the Red River, which

swells generally from the beginning of the year until April or May, were still too low to allow the Federal gunboats to ascend this river. It would now have been the opportunity to turn against Mobile all the land and naval forces which were between Vicksburg and New Orleans. But Halleck, who had not relinquished his design, assured Banks that his army should have no other destination than the Red River, and Sherman, left with merely his own forces, undertook the campaign of Meridian related in the preceding chapter. As soon as it was ended he proceeded to New Orleans to organize with Banks the Red River expedition, for Halleck, not being able to communicate rapidly with them and with Steele, had directed them to concert together—a rather difficult matter for three generals independent of one another, and whose letters took one to two weeks to reach from one army headquarters to another. Hence, they had been corresponding for more than two months without having been able to settle upon any one essential regarding the expedition. Sherman's visit cut short all difficulties. He promised Banks the co-operation for one month of a corps of ten thousand men, which, ascending the Red River, would meet him at Alexandria. The 16th of March was appointed for the rendezvous, Grant having insisted upon the 15th of April for the return to Vicksburg of the troops thus loaned rather reluctantly to Banks, and which he expected to use in the beginning of spring east of the Mississippi. Not willing to be separated for too long a time from the lieutenant in whom he placed full reliance, nor to leave him under the command of Banks, who inspired him with but little confidence, he did not allow Sherman to lead his troops in person. These were to be escorted by the best part of Porter's fleet and by Ellet's marine brigade, numbering then about three thousand combatants. Banks' army, comprising the Thirteenth and Nineteenth corps, a strong division of cavalry, and a few negro regiments, had been, like all the Federal armies, much weakened by the re-enlistment furloughs, but five or six regiments and seven or eight batteries had come from the North and increased the number of his effective forces. Established on the Têche between Brashear and Vermillionville under the command of Franklin, it was to ascend this stream, *via* Opelousas, as far as Alexandria, taking the route fol-

lowed by Banks the preceding year. As the two principal corps were to unite at this point, Steele promised to proceed down the Washita with the third until he was within communicating distance of them.

The plan was the only practical one, but the conditions under which the expedition was about to be entered upon made its success not the less extremely doubtful. Although the town of Alexandria was in a hostile country and protected against the Federal navy by Fort de Russy, recently retaken by the Confederates, the junction of Banks' and Sherman's troops was easy to effect, for it might have taken place, if necessary, below the fort. But such was not the case, for the Army of the Arkansas was too far distant to give the latter effectual assistance. As soon as Steele was informed of the date of the expedition, he declared that he could not, before being reinforced, proceed down the Washita, for fear of exposing Little Rock. He proposed making with a part of his army, as soon as the weather would permit, a mere demonstration on the road direct from that city to Shreveport *via* Arkadelphia, Washington, and Louisville. His army had been reduced, as Pope's had been, by re-enlisting furloughs, and, moreover, politics interfered, as usual, with the plans of military operations. In order to give Arkansas a government which could allow proclaiming its readmission into the Union, something like an election had to be resorted to. The 14th of March had been appointed as the date for this election, and, as General Steele said in appropriate terms in an official despatch, "The President is anxious for the success of this election, and without the co-operation of troops in registering the electors, taking the oath of allegiance, and protecting the voters it will not meet with success." He received the formal order not to rely simply upon a demonstration, but in allowing him to move upon Shreveport, instead of proceeding down the Washita, Halleck made his co-operation delusive, as it was giving him for the rendezvous with the bulk of the army the very point of concentration of the enemy's troops. Nevertheless, Banks' and Sherman's forces would have doubtless sufficed to ensure without him the success of the campaign if, on the one hand, the Union generals had not taken too little account of the difficulties which Nature might place in their way, and if,

on the other hand, they had not, under a seeming understanding, entertained the most opposite ideas on the object, importance, and duration of the campaign.

A few words by way of explanation are necessary on this subject, and we must commence with a short description of the country which Banks proposes to subdue. We are to concern ourselves about the Red River only from its entrance into the north-west angle of the State of Louisiana. Its waters, holding in suspension an ochrey earth which has given it the name of *Red River*, wind along between the vast lakes which swell them when they are low, and which at the time of their freshets serve them, on the contrary, as outlets, thanks to an inextricable network of large and small channels. On one of these channels, which joins the river to Cross Lake, is the town of Shreveport, a well-situated entrepôt at the limit of navigation of the Red River, on the borders of Texas and at the end of the roads which run into the prairies of the Indian Territory. The railroad intended to connect the Texan network with the Mississippi was to pass through Shreveport. Two sections only were finished in 1864—those running from Marshall to Shreveport, and from Monroe, on the Washita, to De Soto opposite Vicksburg. From the lakes to its mouth in the Mississippi the Red River passes through a rather flat and generally very fertile country, thanks to the rich soil which it has spread around. Yet the fruitful zone varies greatly in extent. A line of sandy undulations, in which may perhaps be seen the vestiges of the coast formation of the Gulf of Mexico at a remote geological period, extends from the north-west to the south-east: from the frontier of Texas between Marshall and Shreveport it extends in length about seventy-five miles, as far as an old fort called Fort Jesup: it is divided at this point. The main branch, keeping its direction, joins the new accretions washed up by the waters of the sea; the other, extending to the north-east, allows the passage of the waters of Red River at Grand Écore, and separates on the left bank of the river its direct tributaries from those of the Washita. These old downs form a permeable soil deprived of water, rebellious to cultivation, capable of sustaining only thick pine forests, and whose barrenness contrasts with the richness of the alluvial soil above which they

emerge. But for this very reason they have been selected over which to lay out the road followed by the emigrants, whose heavy wagons had, above all, to avoid the sloughs of the alluvial ground. They separate the basin of the Red River from the streams which flow directly to the Gulf of Mexico—the Sabine, Calcasieu, and others of less importance. The part of the basin of the Red River comprised between the river and the downs is similar to the lower course of the Mississippi. Instead of having tributaries to swell their volume, these waters leave the main bed to feed channels of derivation, which, after having followed the same direction, open out in proportion as the downs are farther away from the Red River, and by the name of Bayou Cocadrie and Bayou Bœuf finally unite to form the Bayou Tèche. From Shreveport to Grand Écore, in a line extending seventy-five miles, the tributaries of the Red River form on the right bank the Bayou Pierre, which is compelled, owing to the hills we have spoken of, to return and fall into the main bed. The city of Grand Écore is situated above the gap in these hills, on a bluff about one hundred and twenty-five feet high, from which it derives its name Écore, a term still used in Normandy, signifying in Old French a high bluff. The river divides immediately after having passed through the gap. On the southern branch, the most important one when Louisiana was settled, is the town of Natchitoches, an old French town, notwithstanding its Indian name. The northern branch, called the Rigolets du Bon Dieu, has developed at the expense of the other, which bears the name of Cane River; it is the only navigable one at present. These two branches unite sixty miles farther down, to divide again and feed the Bayou Tèche. The town of Alexandria is situated on the right bank seventy miles below Grand Écore; twenty-five miles farther down is Fort de Russy. Between this point and the Mississippi, only twenty-five miles in a straight line, the Red River winds zizagging, receiving on the left the waters of the Washita, also called the Black River, and emptying on the right into the Atchafalaya. All this region is cut up by numerous bayous, the largest of which is Bayou Glaise, in which the Mississippi flows back at the least rise. Nothing is more uncertain and more irregular than the volume of the waters of the Red River. When the melting of the snow in the prairies

and the spring rains have swelled them, navigation is easy as far as Shreveport; when the heat of summer causes them to fall, they expose numerous sandbanks and mud, and there emerge from the bottom of the river trunks of trees called snags which damage the hulls of vessels; then they rush at Alexandria into a series of rapids, where for a distance of half a mile the river, strewn with rocks, has a fall of more than nine feet, which renders navigation impossible. As we have already said, the rise of Red River begins at the end of winter and continues until May, but at times it does not take place, and the river remains very low, whilst all the other tributaries of the Mississippi are full. This phenomenon had taken place in 1846 and 1855. Thanks to the warmth of an almost tropical climate and the moisture of the soil, the cultivation of sugar and cotton had rapidly developed in the district of Red River, which before the war was one of the wealthiest in all the Southern States. But this wealth had not contributed to the improvement of the means of communication by land; almost all the plantations were situated near the river, and planters disposed of their products by water at the time of the rise of the river.

A river closed to navigation during eight months, freakish in its rise, surrounded with a maze of channels and of branches difficult to cross, unfinished railroads, farm-roads broken into sloughs, the only passable road crossing a country without resources and without water,—everything seemed to unite to render unusually difficult the march of an invading army in this region. However, perhaps these difficulties might have been surmounted if the object, the nature, and duration of the expedition had been plainly determined and a single chief had had the charge of conducting it. Its importance could be reduced to that of a mere raid, or, on the contrary, a conquest of the whole region could be undertaken. In the former case rapidity of action was the first element required for success. First of all, it would be necessary to capture Fort de Russey by a combined attack with the army and fleet, and make it the base of operations; thence send forward one or two very movable columns, having them escorted by a flotilla of light vessels carrying their provisions. By keeping near the river the Federals could reduce their trains to a small size, and consequently have less difficulty on the bad roads that border it.

They would have to be prepared to turn back if they encountered too great a resistance, or, the contrary being the case, to push as far as Shreveport, to retrace their steps immediately after having destroyed that place, the arsenals, dépôts, and the gunboats under its shelter. This plan presented grave difficulties: the Confederates had above the Alexandria falls two armored vessels which could not fail to disperse the Federal flotilla should the latter not be protected by some of Porter's ironclads, and they had erected around Shreveport fortifications which it would have been difficult to reduce without attempting a regular siege by the fleet and the army at the same time. A light expedition would therefore run great risks of failing before Shreveport, the only military post whose destruction it was worth while to undertake. On the other hand, it would be necessary to proceed methodically, as had been done in the case of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Mississippi. If that of the Arkansas had been so easily wrested by Steele from the Confederates, the reason was that the upper part had been for a long time threatened by Blunt, and that the latter thus outflanked Holmes' defences at Little Rock. The same was not the case in regard to Red River. The Confederates on this river were flanked by Texas, and this offered them both a means of retreat and a base of operations. It would therefore be expedient to occupy successively the most important points on Red River—Fort de Russy, Alexandria, and Grand Écore; also to proceed in company with Porter's fleet, if it could ascend the river; if not, then establish along its course, while advancing, batteries which would protect the light boats laden with provisions against any offensive attack on the part of the Southern ironclads. It would also be necessary to carry on a regular siege against Shreveport, and during that time to put in working order the railroad from De Soto to Monroe, and complete for a length of fifty miles that from Monroe to Shreveport. This work could be accomplished in three months: at this cost the Federals would be sure to have a direct line of one hundred and twenty-five miles connecting them with the Mississippi at all seasons, without having to concern themselves about the navigation, so long, so dangerous, and so uncertain, of Red River. They could concentrate their forces in front of Shreveport, capture the place, and establish

themselves there. They would then be masters of the whole of Louisiana and of Arkansas, and could pursue Kirby Smith's army into Texas. The campaign thus conducted would give great results, but for this no time nor force was to be spared. It was so that Banks had conceived it, and he was careful to specify, in a despatch to Halleck, the conditions which, in his opinion, were essential to success : to wit, the co-operation of the fleet, and consequently the ability of the latter to ascend Red River ; the construction of the railroad from De Soto to Shreveport ; and the unity of command. To obtain this latter point he generously offered, notwithstanding his seniority, to serve under the command of Sherman or Steele. Grant, on the contrary, considering, with good reason, that all the available forces in the West should be devoted from the beginning of spring to the great campaign which the Army of the Tennessee was about to undertake, seeing in the expedition but a sort of outwork, as we have seen, had consented in order to accomplish it to lend a part of his forces only on the condition that it would be ended in one month's time. Halleck could not decide between two opinions so opposite, nor give only a single chief to the enterprise, and thus allowed a misunderstanding to exist which was to paralyze the action of his lieutenants.

None of the conditions which Banks considered as essential to the success of the expedition were fulfilled : he already had several times refused to undertake it, notwithstanding the solicitations of Halleck. This time, again, the latter had beset his orders with limitations intended doubtless to shield his responsibility, and which allowed his lieutenant not to follow them. It may be asked why Banks yielded on this occasion without making any remarks, and hastened to execute the instructions received from Washington. The motive must be sought in political and commercial considerations totally foreign to strategy, but regarding which we cannot forbear saying here a few words, notwithstanding the clouds with which they have been surrounded. The inquiry made by the Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War after the failure of Banks' expedition has thrown some light on this delicate subject, which was the object of violent discussions. We will strive to judge of it as impartially as possible.

We have seen that the blockade of the Southern States by sud-

denly stopping the exportation of cotton had brought much disturbance of European industry. The product of India and Egypt not being sufficient to supply it, whatever cotton escaped the blockade was the higher in price as it was more scarce and the more in demand. These excessive prices stimulated, on the one hand, the adventurous commerce of the blockade-runners, and, on the other hand, gave an equivalent value to the vast supplies which remained blockaded on the Confederate soil. This value, though rather fictitious, since the sudden opening of the Southern ports would certainly have depreciated it, had not remained entirely unproductive. We have explained elsewhere how the Richmond Government had accepted in exchange for other values considerable quantities of this product, useless then to the planters, to give it in turn as a pledge to capitalists who had the imprudence to subscribe to its loan in England and deposit hard cash in the hands of its agents. There was therefore in the Southern States the cotton of private parties and that of the State mortgaged to its lenders. The Federal Government of course seized the latter wherever it found it, and it was to its interest to throw the former on the market from the Southern ports of which it had taken possession. If it had been successful, as was expected on the capture of Port Royal and New Orleans, it would have wrested a powerful weapon from the hands of its adversary and appeased the sufferings of European industry, on which its enemies relied to induce the intervention of France and England in their favor. Hence the counter-blockade instituted by Mr. Davis around all the Union possessions in the South to prevent any export of cotton from the Confederate lines; hence the strict order to destroy all the cotton that stood any chance of falling into Federal hands, whoever might be the owner. This measure was, of course, of a nature to provoke retaliation on the part of the Federals. The latter, seeing that the enemy considered all cotton as contraband of war, without any regard to the rights of private parties, dealt with it in the same manner whenever their expeditions penetrated into the regions not yet stripped of this article, and seized all they could snatch from the torch of Confederate soldiers. But, on the contrary, in the regions permanently occupied by them, and where the authority of the Washington Government was formally acknow-

ledged, they favored the sale of cotton by private parties, provided it was proved that such a sale was not effected for the profit, direct or indirect, of persons bearing arms in the enemy's army. The oath of allegiance was exacted of all who wished to bring this article on the market. Notwithstanding minute regulations published on this subject by the Secretary of the Treasury, these two systems, so different, applied according to the military occupation of the country, and the very limitations with which the second beset the so-called free-cotton trade, gave rise to numerous abuses, without, however, preventing entirely the trade carried on indirectly to the profit of the enemy, which these limitations were intended to prevent. The allurements of immense profits quickly realized soon drew in the train of the armies of the West and of the Gulf of Mexico a swarm of speculators, who were their scourge wherever the honest and energetic chiefs, imbued by their education with true military spirit, such as Grant and Sherman, could not nip the evil at its root. These speculators, in consequence of their influence in the elections, were too often spared by generals who had the fault of mingling political matters with the duties of their command. They followed the armies to buy at a low price from the Southern planters the cotton which, after having escaped the Confederates, was threatened with seizure by the Union agents. When it succeeded in reaching the market they realized enormous profits. It would have required a relentless discipline to prevent many an officer from encouraging this traffic by a connivance amply paid for. The disgrace of several generals who were deprived of their commands in the West without any public explanation must be attributed, it is said, to this connivance, which honest Mr. Lincoln had made up his mind not to tolerate whenever positive proofs allowed him to punish it. But the temptation was so great that these few acts of severity did not discourage the speculators. New Orleans by its ancient commercial importance, its situation in the heart of the richest cotton districts, and the very effort the Government was making to revive its market, had become the centre of operations of these speculators. When Banks' troops had been repulsed from the greater part of these cotton districts they had maintained therein an intercourse which the Confederates favored, as they found a profit

in it. They knew exactly the quantity of cotton which the districts contained, the places where it was stored, and the names of the owners. The latter had it carried to some unfrequented spots on the banks of the Mississippi, where boats came secretly to take it, unknown to any one or with the tacit permission of the Federal commanders, to New Orleans, where it was sold at extravagant prices. The owners, almost all officers in the Confederate ranks or guerilla chiefs, were often paid "in kind," and received through the same channel provisions, clothing, and even arms and ammunition, which served to maintain and equip the enemy's army. This trade assumed such a development that the Confederate authorities themselves profited so directly by it that one day General Pemberton, before the siege of Vicksburg, dared to complain that a shipment of cotton had been seized in New Orleans which had been shipped to be sold, being consigned under the name of an English subject, a merchant of that city. In order to be better able to combat these abuses, General Banks was not disposed to enforce the regulations enacted in January, 1864, by the Secretary of the Treasury, which, in spite of their restrictions, would have bound his hands. But in spite of the discretionary authority which he had maintained, he felt himself constrained. He then conceived, and proposed to the President, a very ingenious combination, it must be admitted, to enable the Government to profit by a traffic which he could no longer prevent. He was informed that the quantity of cotton belonging to the Confederate Government amounted, in the State of Louisiana alone, to more than one hundred thousand bales, and estimated that there was as much in Texas and Arkansas. Cotton being worth then from fifty to sixty-five cents a pound, and a bale weighing about two hundred and twenty pounds, this stock, if sold at the then market price, would not have amounted to less than twenty to twenty-eight million dollars. It was this large capital that Banks wished to wrest from the enemy, to place the greater part of it in the Federal Treasury. To attain this object he did not hesitate to propose to interest in the profits of the operation the enemy's officers who had this cotton in their possession. Those who would deliver it were assured a share of eighteen cents per pound, say about forty-eight dollars per bale; this share would be depos-

ited with the Federal quartermasters, and they would be authorized to have it cashed by proxy, providing the latter could prove that the money would not be used by the enemy for war purposes. Banks thought that the majority of the officers of the Southern army beyond the Mississippi, discouraged and eventually separated from the Confederacy, would be captivated by this combination, which rested on both theft and treason, and that they would be seen continuing to fight the armies of the Union while they would openly carry on a lucrative trade in joint account with its agents. Nothing proves that such a supposition was justified. But Banks, besides this operation in cotton belonging to the Confederate Government, requested the President to authorize the inhabitants of the districts occupied by the enemy to bring without restraint to New Orleans the cotton of which they had remained the owners, and sell it, provided one-third of the price remained in the hands of the Federal agents until the seller had proved that this price would not be used for war purposes. Banks' propositions were laid aside. In spite of their specious aspect, they were particularly dangerous. The first, which is surprising as emanating from a man wearing the uniform of the Government, would certainly have demoralized the army by the strange spectacle, if the enemy's officers had accepted it, of generals exchanging promissory notes while their soldiers were killing one another. The second would have rendered all control impossible, and would have enabled the Confederate Government itself to negotiate under borrowed names the sale of its cotton in the New Orleans market. The speculators would have realized the most of the profits in these vast operations.

Therefore, they did not consider themselves beaten, and beset Banks more than ever with new combinations. The latter, whilst rejecting them, had not relinquished his favorite idea, his plan of taking possession, in some way or other, for account of his Government, of the cotton belonging to private persons, and of inducing, moreover, the owners to sell it under his authority. But he had recognized the fact that in order to realize this it was first necessary to occupy the principal districts in which such cotton was to be found. The richest of these was that of Red River. This consideration seemed to have removed all his objections to the

campaign projected by Halleck. Once master of the banks of Red River, he could at his ease look for the cotton bearing the mark of the enemy's government, the letters "C. S. A.," or sometimes a large "X," and protect, for account of the owners, the loading of all the rest for New Orleans. Yet how could the Confederates be prevented from burning all this cotton before withdrawing? how could it be exempted from the formal orders from Richmond which prescribed its destruction? Banks doubtless expected to obtain by collusion the connivance of the Confederate authorities, and probably thought he could obtain it in return for this singular participation in the profits of the sale which he had conceived. We have not upon this any precise data, but it is positive that some secret negotiation was begun on this subject, probably on the information given by the cotton speculators, who had a foot in every camp. One or two emissaries, provided with passes signed by President Lincoln himself, crossed the Federal lines several times; they were in communication, at least indirectly, with Kirby Smith, and they certainly brought back the promise that the cotton would be spared by the Confederate soldiers, provided Smith was guaranteed, in return, against any confiscation on the part of the Federal authorities. The scrupulous execution of this kind of convention by the enemy, his retaliation, and the complaints of Banks when they were violated by the navy, are positive proofs of its existence. Banks, faithful to his ideas, meant to have all the cotton which was to be found in the districts invaded by his army forwarded to New Orleans, and to consign it there provisionally into the hands of the Federal agents, with authority to sell it, or to pay over the price of it, if it was already sold, to those who should prove themselves to be the legitimate owners, provided such sales were not for the benefit of the Confederate Government.

We cannot say whether Kirby Smith was informed of this plan, but he was certainly assured that the owners could utilize the large capital which under the form of cotton was then unproductive in their hands. Although the speculators, buying this cotton on the spot from owners little ready to confide in the words of the Federals or the equity of their agents, were to realize as their profit a good share of the returns of the operations, there would

have remained enough to add to the wealth of a region greatly impoverished by the blockade. As Kirby Smith did not feel himself to be in a condition to defend it, but as he fully expected to regain possession of it, he had every reason to secure it these advantages without giving any cause of suspicion as to his integrity. The political faithfulness of one who was the last to hold up the Confederate flag is beyond all suspicion. But it may be credited that he availed himself quite cleverly of Banks' credulity and of his absolute reliance on human probity. The Federal general by his overtures had already very clearly acquainted him with his plan of campaign on Red River. It appears certain, from the very manner in which Banks conducted it, that he fully expected not to encounter any opposition in front of Shreveport. This strong conviction, which was one of the principal causes of his failure, having nothing to justify it, could have been inspired only by the secret agents who returned from Shreveport—whether some shrewd conversation carried on in their presence had, as if by chance, revealed to them the project of immediate retreat, or Kirby Smith himself had given them to understand formally that to ensure the safety of the cotton and spare the country he would avoid any engagement with the invaders. Many indications seem to favor this latter hypothesis. It is the more plausible as Kirby Smith had fully made up his mind not to defend the course of Red River below Shreveport. He knew that the Federals, since the taking of Vicksburg, could muster, to ascend the river, a numerous army and a formidable fleet. He could not resist them at the time when the rise of the waters in spring opened Red River to the ironclads, but he hoped to draw them in front of Shreveport, and hold them there until the time when the falling of the river would deprive them of the co-operation of their fleet. If they persisted, in spite of this, in continuing the campaign, deprived of ready communications with the Mississippi, he expected to inflict upon them a well-deserved defeat. If they decided upon retreating, Kirby Smith would pursue and harass them, and end the campaign victoriously by entering Alexandria. It was therefore his interest to inspire his adversaries with a dangerous self-reliance. He succeeded fully in this, although a favorable opportunity, cleverly seized upon by one of his lieutenants, as will be

seen presently, thwarted this plan by giving him, sooner than he expected, the decisive victory which he looked for in a retreat. This manœuvre was, moreover, imposed upon him by the weakness and dispersion of his army. Properly speaking, he had under his command not an army, but only a few small divisions accustomed to operate separately, and which were then very far apart. He could not completely remove his force from any of the three States entrusted to his care, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas. Not knowing to what point the Federals, masters of the sea and of the Mississippi, would direct their forces, he could not concentrate his troops until the campaign had opened; and as this concentration must take place very slowly, he had to withdraw in order to gain the time necessary for its accomplishment. Walker, established at Marksville with his division, was guarding Fort de Russy, the mouth of Red River, and its derived branch the Atchafalaya. A brigade attached to this division watched the course of the Washita; it had for its chief Prince Camille de Polignac, who, drawn to America as many other Frenchmen were by the attraction which a war so novel in its kind exerted on minds eager to learn, had joined the Confederate ranks. Lately arrived in Louisiana after having served under Bragg, he had just been given the command of some Texans—steady soldiers, inured to fatigue, but rebellious to discipline, and led by officers to whom neither social position nor education gave any authority. After a difficult beginning he was enabled, thanks to his disposition, his energy on the battlefield, his mind fertile in expedients, to gain their confidence, and we shall see to what advantage he turned this confidence. Mouton's infantry brigade occupied Alexandria; this and Liddell's brigade of cavalry, united under Taylor's command, did not number more than six thousand men, which, with the officers, gave this corps an effective force of about six thousand five hundred, with batteries of artillery. The forces in Texas under Magruder's command were somewhat numerous, but they included a large portion of the troops raised in each district, which were admirable for local defence, but could not be called away, as they would have refused to leave the soil of their State. Kirby Smith could recall to Louisiana only Greer's division of cavalry, about three thousand strong, which had already operated in this region and had recently been

detached from it. Holmes occupied the south of Arkansas with the two corps of Price and Marmaduke, the first comprising two divisions of infantry, the second three divisions, one of which was cavalry—say, about ten thousand men.

Kirby Smith's headquarters at Shreveport were well supplied and well fortified, but numerous staffs and a numerous administration gave an exaggerated importance to it, as they said in the Southern army.

We have shown why Banks had so suddenly joined in Halleck's plans, and with what concern, foreign to military questions, he was about to undertake this expedition so often deferred. Politics and speculation had triumphed over all his objections. The campaign was opening under the most untoward conditions, without any plainly-defined object, without a chief to conduct it, without the possibility of Banks and Steele communicating with each other or of acting in concert in their movements. But before resuming our narrative we must say a few words regarding the isolated exploits which marked the first ten weeks of the year in the vast regions situated between the Mississippi, the Missouri, and the Rocky Mountains.

In New Mexico, finally abandoned by the Southerners, the Federals had, as before the war, no other adversaries than the Indian tribes that did not yet recognize their authority. Other Indians who had submitted claimed their protection. Among these were the Apaches, who had been gathered around Fort Sumner. These were attacked on the 4th of January by the Navajoes. The little garrison hastened to their assistance, and easily mastered the savages, who were armed with only bows and arrows. The latter lost about sixty warriors. Two days after, Colonel Kit Carson, well known for his experience in Indian wars, left Fort Canby with four hundred men to punish these savages. He penetrated into the deep valleys or *cañons* which were their abode, and where careful farming—a rare thing among Indians—secured them valuable resources, and dispersed them, bringing the greater part of their families to the territory protected by the Federal forts.

We have no incident to mention regarding the coast of Texas since the occupation of the principal points on this coast by the troops of the Thirteenth corps, of which McClermand, relieved

from arrest without being reconciled with Grant, will resume the command in the early part of March. The Confederates do not feel sufficiently strong to recapture these posts, and Halleck's orders do not allow the Federals to extend their occupation. At the end of February a part of the Thirteenth corps is summoned to Louisiana, and proceeds to disembark at Brashear City to reinforce the army intended for the campaign on Red River, whilst McClelland remains with some reduced garrisons in the positions whose care had been entrusted to him.

Steele at Little Rock, engaged in reorganizing politically the State of Arkansas, and not endeavoring to penetrate into the southern part of this State, had to contend only against the bands of partisans who had remained north of the river after Price's retreat. A detachment of about one hundred men sent from Batesville in the early part of February to disperse one of these bands commanded by Freeman experienced a severe defeat, and was quickly brought back after having lost half of its effective force.

We have said that Prince de Polignac had recently taken the command of a Confederate brigade having charge of guarding at Harrisonburg the course of the Washita River. Having no enemy near at hand, and wishing to lead to battle as quickly as possible his brave though undisciplined soldiers, he resolved to attempt a *coup de main* against the Federal post at Vidalia, situated on the right bank of the Mississippi opposite the city of Natchez. This post was occupied by one regiment, the Thirtieth Missouri, and two negro battalions, with a few pieces of artillery. After a march of thirty-eight miles the Confederates appeared in front of Vidalia on the 7th of February. The Federals, warned of this movement, were on their guard. They were waiting for the attack behind a ditch dividing a large opening in the woods through which the enemy must come; several gunboats moored in the river could with their guns cover this position. Polignac's attack was spirited; the Federals faltered for a moment, and one of their guns was dismounted. But they held out behind the ditch; the negroes fought with tenacity, and the guns of the fleet spread some confusion among the Texans. Meanwhile, the fight having been seen from the top of the Natchez bluffs, which

commanded the entire right bank, reinforcements were promptly sent to Vidalia, and were landing when the young Confederate general gave the order to retreat. He had not been able to surprise the Federals, and could not expect to make a regular attack, but he had greatly alarmed them by his boldness. He had attained a twofold object: his soldiers, having witnessed his gallantry in the fight, no longer disputed his authority, and the Unionists did not attempt to annoy the region comprised between the Mississippi and the Washita over which he had been watching.

But shortly before the time definitely fixed upon for taking the field on Red River, Admiral Porter resolved, in his turn, to encounter the enemy on the Washita, and thus clear the way by which Steele was expected to come to take part in the campaign. A large part of Porter's fleet had already collected near the mouth of Red River, its services on the Mississippi being limited henceforth to mere patrol duty and cruising between the Federal fortified places. On the 29th of February the admiral himself arrived in front of Red River, and at once ordered Lieutenant Ramsay to ascend this river with six war-vessels and penetrate into the Washita. We have said that this latter stream, often called Black River beyond its confluence with the Tensas, falls into Red River about thirty miles above the point where their waters fall into the Mississippi, and below Fort de Russy. The Federal fleet—a formidable one, for it comprised a monitor and carried seventy guns—was therefore enabled, without striking a blow, to enter the Washita. On the 1st of March it appeared in front of the small town of Trinity, situated at the confluence of the last-named river and the Tensas, nine miles below Harrisonburg, and which was occupied by a part of Polignac's brigade. The Confederates having very imprudently placed on the bluff in front of the city several guns which opened fire on the fleet, the latter replied at once by a bombardment which destroyed a considerable number of houses. The Southern detachment, abandoning some unfinished works, fell back on Harrisonburg, to which the Federals soon pursued them. The Confederates had done their best to put this point in a state of defence, and with time and more resources they would have made it a formidable place. Two miles below the city several little hills which border the right bank had been crowned

with small works connected by a covered road; the bluff, quite high at this point, would give a plunging fire to the pieces which might be placed there. But the Southerners had only one field-battery and a few cannon of large calibre, which were not yet in position. They endeavored, nevertheless, to hold back the Federals. Polignac's six field-pieces opened fire on the *Hindman*, which was moving at the head of the fleet, and inflicted upon her severe damage. The infantry, deployed as skirmishers, did their best to support them. But if the *Hindman*, under the bluff, could not reply to them, the other vessels, taking them obliquely and at a distance, soon crushed them with their fire. How could they resist more than sixty pieces of large calibre? After having struggled stubbornly, Polignac was obliged to withdraw his troops and keep at a distance from the river. Ramsay landed a few sailors, who destroyed the works and captured two or three abandoned cannon; he did the same thing at Trinity when passing by, and entered Red River on the 5th of March. He had reached but a few miles beyond Harrisonburg when, the waters of the Washita having rapidly receded, he feared he could not again get down the river. Immediately after his departure Polignac returned to Trinity, but he remained there only a few days, and was recalled to Alexandria, as we shall presently see.

During this short expedition Porter had finally collected all the available war-vessels at the mouth of Red River. The return of Ramsay increased the effective force of this powerful fleet to three monitors, seven ironclads, three rams, and seven light steamers. Another fleet, composed of twenty large transports carrying A. J. Smith's troops, joined him on the 11th. A part of these troops, the two brigades of the Seventeenth corps, had not returned to Vicksburg until the 7th of March, and had embarked with the promptness and order which distinguished the army formed in the great school of Grant, Sherman, and McPherson. Porter and A. J. Smith, always ready to act promptly and vigorously, did not lose an instant. Fort de Russy commanded the course of Red River: nine miles below a strong dam had been established across the river to defend the approaches. In order to demolish it, it would be necessary to attack it at the same time by land and water. The two fleets arrived on the 12th in the deep bay fed by

both the Mississippi and Red River, and which receives on one side the principal branch of the latter river, of which it is, as it were, the mouth, and on the other empties into the Atchafalaya. Nine ironclads, followed by all the transports, penetrated into the latter stream, and proceeded down its course, to the great astonishment of the Confederate videttes stationed to observe their movements, as if to reach Brashear City. But about noon they "laid to" opposite the little town of Simsport. During this time the vessels drawing the least water entered, under Captain Phelps on board the *Eastport*, the winding and rugged course of Red River. The very high level then of the Mississippi caused the Atchafalaya to flow full, and also caused the backing of the waters of Red River, and rendered the lower part of the latter sufficiently navigable. But nothing indicated in the river itself the rise which the Federals had expected.

On the morning of the 13th, A. J. Smith disembarked at Simsport the greater part of his forces; he was at this point only about eighteen miles from Fort de Russy in a straight line, and about twenty-five miles by the Moreauville road. He was to take this road to invest the fort, while Phelps, following the windings of Red River, would come to cover him with the fire of his vessels.

The presence of the transports at the mouth of Red River had been promptly signalled to the Southern generals. But their cavalry having ceased observing General Franklin on the Têche, Taylor imagined that the latter had embarked on the Mississippi, and that all of Banks' army, united with the forces arrived from Vicksburg, whose departure he was aware of, was disembarking on the banks of the Atchafalaya. Smith had really not landed more than five or six thousand men; he could not have landed nine thousand.

Walker, contending with the Federals for the crossing of Bayou Glaise, a muddy channel to which the alternate currents had given a great depth, could have ensured Polignac and Mouton time to join him in front of Fort de Russy, and, protected by this formidable work, he could have checked the progress of the invaders. He might even have inflicted upon Smith's small force a serious defeat before the arrival of Franklin. But, persuaded that Walker had at least thirty thousand men in front of him, Taylor did not

care to endanger his little army, and Walker received orders to fall back without fighting behind Bayou Bœuf. Polignac's brigade, recalled in great haste from Trinity, on the 7th of March joined Mouton's to take up a position also behind this stream, west of Alexandria. Taylor did not expect to defend this town : all his *matériel* was embarked on steamers that were above the falls, and which were in readiness to start for Shreveport at the first signal.

Walker's detachments had been stationed near Simsport ; having been cut off by the enemy, he had not been informed of Smith's landing, and was not aware of his force. But as soon as he knew that the enemy's fleet had entered the Atchafalaya he fell back directly upon Bayou Bœuf. Smith, who had set off, without losing a moment's time, during the night of the 13th-14th, was therefore not troubled. The passage of the bayou, over which it was necessary to throw a bridge—an operation which the enemy might have made difficult—delayed him three hours ; however, he arrived before sunset within sight of the fort. This fort was composed of two works, closed at the gorge and connected by a covered way. One of them, situated on an elevation, commanded the approaches on the land side ; the other, on the bluff, commanded the course of Red River. The latter had a covered battery protected with railroad rails. But the armament comprised only eight large cannon and two field-pieces ; four of these cannon only were turned toward the land side. The garrison that Walker had left in the place could have coped with the fleet by using the six pieces facing the river, but the three hundred men composing it were totally insufficient to defend the extended front of the two works. Walker had not presumed to evacuate without fighting a place which had been named, after many others, "the Gibraltar of the West," and not wishing to expose too great a number of men by confining them there, he had sacrificed this small detachment in the hope that he might hold back the enemy for a certain time. This hope was deceptive. The Federals did not allow him the leisure to prepare for fight. Scarcely arrived in front of the work commanding the land approaches, Smith, without taking into account the fire of its guns, formed his lines and ordered the assault. In an instant the work was flooded with Federal soldiers,

and the garrison captured and disarmed after an insignificant fight which cost the assailants but thirty-four men; the garrison lost but nine men. The batteries commanding the river were immediately occupied at the moment when Phelps, who had just arrived with his naval division, was preparing to attack them. The dam had detained him but a few hours; he had easily dispersed a few hundred men engaged in watching the approaches. Red River was opened to all the Federal vessels sufficiently light to cross the bars which the rise of the rivers had not covered over. Alexandria was immediately evacuated; the Confederate steamers ascended the river to Shreveport; and the last cavalry posts withdrew to the Bayou Rapides, in front of Bayou Bœuf, behind which Taylor reunited all his forces. Polignac's and Mouton's brigades were united in one division under the command of the latter. Liddell's cavalry alone remained on the left bank of Red River.

Captain Phelps had promptly ascended the river in the hope of surprising Alexandria before its evacuation was completed. He arrived on the evening of the 15th, a few hours too late. His approach, however, sufficed to compel the Southerners to burn one of their vessels stranded below the falls. Porter's entire fleet, with the exception of three or four vessels kept back by their draught, followed Phelps on the morrow, and the following day, the 17th, Smith had re-embarked at Fort de Russy after having dismantled it, appeared in front of Alexandria, and his troops occupied the town. He was punctual at the rendezvous. If Franklin had likewise been so, Taylor, outflanked on Bayou Bœuf, would have found himself in a difficult position, and would have experienced a great defeat. But Banks had not shown the same diligence. Far from calculating the almost inevitable delays which may be experienced by an army setting out after a long inaction, he had been so long deferring to inform Franklin of his design that the latter did not receive until the 10th the despatch directing him to start on the 7th. General Lee's division of cavalry, which had proceeded to New Orleans to join Franklin, dragging after it an immense train, which was before long to play a disastrous rôle, did not reach Franklin until the 11th or 12th. The two small divisions of the Thirteenth corps just

returned from Texas had consumed several days preparing for a new campaign : they lacked means of transportation. Fearful weather had broken up the roads. Nevertheless, Franklin succeeded in moving forward the heads of his columns on the 13th. Lee's cavalry, which was not under his command, preceded him at a short distance. Passing through Opelousas, it reached Alexandria on the 25th of March, without meeting any hostile party : the direct route which Franklin had followed from Cheneyville had, in fact, led him along the left bank of the Bayou Boeuf, which the Confederates had abandoned several days before.

Banks, who was informed of the delay of his troops, embarked at New Orleans on the steamer *Black Hawk*, and arrived at Alexandria on the 24th. Admiral Porter has affirmed, under oath, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, that the general-in-chief's vessel was "loaded with cotton speculators, bagging, roping, champagne, and ice," and that "the whole affair was a cotton speculation." We leave him the responsibility of this assertion, which we believe has never been questioned ; but it is certain that this manner of taking the field did not resemble much that of the general who had captured Vicksburg.

A brigade of Southern cavalry, under Colonel Vincent, had observed at a distance Franklin's march, and, keeping Taylor posted as to his movements, had enabled him to withdraw in time to avoid being outflanked by the Federals before they had crossed Bayou Boeuf. Taylor, at the head of Walker's and Mouton's divisions, left Cheneyville on the 16th of March, and reached, on the 18th, Carroll Jones' plantation, a little to the south of the village of Hineston, where a dépôt of provisions had been established. This point was of certain strategic importance, as it was situated at the junction of the Shreveport road, which Taylor was to follow in order to keep in communication with his chief, and the road which leads to Texas, crossing the Sabine River at Burr's Ferry. It was necessary to cover the Texas routes in order to allow Green's division, summoned in the greatest haste, as we have said, to rejoin promptly the army that was to oppose Banks. Vincent joined Taylor the following day, and was at once sent northward to occupy the banks of Bayou Jean-Jean, one of the channels which feed Bayou Boeuf, and which

branches from Red River twenty-three miles west of Alexandria. The road which the Federals were to follow in order to ascend the right bank of Red River crossed this stream, and Vincent was to watch their movements, and a battery of artillery was sent on the 21st to reinforce him. But the Federals, who had just occupied Alexandria, had in A. J. Smith a chief who was in the habit of acting promptly and vigorously. On the 21st he had recognized Vincent's position, and resolved to dislodge him in order to ensure the army the passage of Bayou Rapides. General Mower had charge of this operation with his division of infantry and a brigade of Lee's cavalry, which, preceding Franklin, had arrived at Alexandria on the 19th. Vincent had established himself at Henderson's Mill, a little above the village of Cotile. Mower, skilfully concealing his march, arrived by night in the vicinity of the enemy's camp. He was guided, they say, by one of Taylor's couriers, who, meeting him ahead of his column, took him for a Southern officer. However that may be, Vincent, whose camp was badly guarded, was completely surprised, and his force was dispersed before it had attempted to defend itself. The darkness of a rainy night favored his flight, but he left his artillery and more than two hundred prisoners in the hands of the Federals, who had but few men *hors de combat*. Among these was one of Banks' aides-de-camp, Colonel Horace B. Sargent. After this fortunate stroke Mower returned without delay to the vicinity of Alexandria, which he could not allow to remain unguarded, awaiting the arrival of Franklin. But Taylor, having good reason to be alarmed, and fearing that the Federals might cut off the road to Shreveport, at once began to retreat on this road, and on the 22d established himself at Beaseley, a village situated at the junction of the roads which led, on the one hand, to Fort Jesup by the hills, and on the other to Natchitoches by the valley of Red River, and crossed Cane River at the ford called Monet's Ferry.

Franklin did not reach Alexandria until the 26th: we have shown that he could not be responsible for this delay of eleven days. The Confederates were about to avail themselves of it to unite their forces, but the Federals had nothing to regret, for, even though Franklin had arrived at Alexandria at the same time as

A. J. Smith, he could not have left that city a day sooner. In fact, the Alexandria rapids still offered Porter's fleet an insuperable barrier. The waters of Red River were rising, it is true, but with discouraging slowness. The ancients would have said that the deity of the river, an accomplice of the Confederates, delighted in inciting the impatience of the Federals while maintaining their hopes, and every one knew in the Union navy that Admiral Porter was not of a patient temper. Banks could not undertake by land the long march from Alexandria to Shreveport without being certain that the fleet, ascending at the same time Red River, would be able to revictual him on the march and would keep open his communications with his base of operations. If, therefore, Red River was impassable, the expedition would have to be abandoned—the more so as the junction with Steele became each day less probable, for no news had been received of his taking the field, although he had really already set forward. On the other hand, of the four weeks at the end of which A. J. Smith was to leave Banks, eight days had already elapsed. But if the march against Shreveport was to be given up, it would be necessary to abandon Alexandria and return to New Orleans the troops of Franklin, which were to serve in a campaign against Mobile in the spring. Banks could not resign himself to it, and Porter, watching the level of the river, still gave him the hope of a tardy rise. He did not wish to have his light vessels cross the rapids prematurely, as they were too weak to resist alone the two ironclads carrying the Southern flag on the upper part of the river. Finally, on the 26th he succeeded, by hard work, in having the gunboat *Eastport* clear the obstacle; others, of a lighter burden, followed her easily, and on the 29th he had six vessels above the falls. If the waters should keep at the same level, he was sure to be able to proceed as far as Shreveport; but, unfortunately, they had ceased rising, and for two days had even slightly receded. A large vessel used as a hospital, the *Woodford*, had been destroyed in attempting to go through after the *Eastport*. The most powerful vessels of the fleet were brought to a standstill. The expeditionary corps was by this fact to become greatly reduced. In fact, it became necessary, on the one hand, to establish dépôts at Alexandria, and organize a transshipment service near the rapids for all the mate-

rial brought as far as this town by the large transports; on the other hand, Banks was obliged to be deprived of three thousand men of Ellet's marine brigade. The latter, not having any teams, could not take the land route, and, being on board of large vessels, could not go beyond the rapids by water. Moreover, suffering from the ravages of the smallpox, it was not in a condition to take the field: finally, it was summoned by McPherson on the Mississippi to defend the posts *en échelon* on that river, all threatened by Forrest with the cruel fate of Fort Pillow.

It was, however, decided to proceed. Ellet was sent to the Mississippi; Mower's division, three thousand strong, was left to guard Alexandria. Banks had lost no time in setting his army in motion. The day after Franklin's arrival, the 27th, A. J. Smith, moving up the right bank of Red River, had passed Bayou Rapides, and had established himself at Cotile, near the spot where Mower on the 21st surprised Vincent's cavalry. Franklin followed the same road one day later. The Federals could not be reproached with having lost any time, as the twenty transports which were to accompany them in this expedition did not complete the passage of the falls until the 2d of April. But the forced delay of the army and the fleet at Alexandria had been properly utilized. On the one hand, Banks had, immediately on his arrival, hastened to order the election of delegates to the State convention which he had called to repeal the secession ordinance: this election farce, which deceived no one, uselessly compromised persons who were to be abandoned for the second time a few weeks later. On the other hand, the military and naval authorities concerned themselves a great deal too much about cotton during that short delay. Banks, pursuing the plan we have already explained, ordered the delivery to his quartermaster of all the bales of cotton to be found in the occupied territory. No public sale was authorized at Alexandria: these bales were to be sold at New Orleans, and the profits divided between the Government and the owners. But the speculators, whom orders more or less honest had not prevented from reaching Alexandria either on board the transports or in the train of the army, alighted like birds of prey upon this cotton, and presented to its owners such a picture of the difficulties they experienced in getting paid in New Orleans that

the latter, naturally distrustful, sold it to them at ridiculous prices. It was, however, so much gained for the country, and the Confederates would doubtless have closed their eyes on these transactions in the interest of the planters had not the Federal navy come to hinder and upset all these combinations. The Mississippi fleet had been accustomed, for the last eighteen months, to see the Confederates burn unsparingly the cotton as far as they could see the star-spangled banner float at the tops of its masts. Therefore, not satisfied with seizing the bales which had escaped destruction, it enforced upon these goods the provisions of the maritime code. A court sitting at Cairo, and which appears to have been impartial, decreed the validity of the capture. If the owner had taken the oath of allegiance, his goods were returned to him in kind or in money; if not, the capture was declared valid and the cotton sold, not for the benefit of the Government, but of the crew that made the capture. Admiral Porter, having arrived first at Alexandria, hastened to apply this system there. The sailors, to whom the condition of the river allowed some leisure, employed it in gathering cotton under the eyes of the army, sometimes at a great distance from their ships; they even captured the ginning-machines, to utilize that the preparation of which had not been completed. The soldiers naturally felt hurt to see the sailors indulge under their protection this profitable trade, from which they were themselves excluded: a certain animosity between the two services resulted therefrom. On the other hand, when the Confederates found that the cotton, instead of being sent to New Orleans to appear in sales of which a part of the profit was assured to the planters without any guarantees for their faithful execution, was seized by the navy to be adjudicated by courts requiring of the owners the oath of allegiance, they considered themselves tricked. The planters, who had expected a tacit understanding between the authorities of the armies for the protection of their property, complained bitterly, and the Southern generals, changing suddenly the orders they had given, directed their soldiers to resume the work of destruction. Fires on all the plantations around Alexandria soon informed the Federals of this new resolution. Banks should have concluded from this that the enemy now refused to allow him to occupy the rich region of Red River,

since he applied himself to ruining it. But even this destruction by fire did not dissipate the Union general's dangerous illusions.

In the mean while, Taylor had not received any reinforcement from either Texas or Shreveport; therefore, on hearing of the arrival of the Federals at Cotile he hastened to retreat. The bulk of his forces took the road to Fort Jesup, and, going beyond this point, halted on April 1st at the village of Pleasant Hill, where he joined them after having waited at Natchitoches for the arrival of the Federals. This town was occupied on the 31st of March by Lee's cavalry. Franklin was following. Lee with all of his small command having halted but one night on the banks of Bayou Jean-Jean, A. J. Smith, on his part, embarked with all his forces on the 2d of April, near the entrance of the bayou, on the transports which had already brought him as far as Alexandria, and which, ascending the Rigolets du Bon Dieu, landed his troops at Grand Écore on the 3d. Franklin's infantry on the preceding day had entered Natchitoches. A further advance of sixty miles had thus been made in the direction of Shreveport, the distance from which was now but sixty miles in a straight line, but about eighty-eight miles by the road. However, this latter distance was more difficult to get over. Banks, still expecting, doubtless, not to meet any severe resistance before reaching Shreveport, had decided to follow the main road, which passes through Pleasant Hill and Mansfield, and which, to keep on the sandy slope, diverges considerably from Red River. It was, in our opinion, a grave mistake. Even at the risk of finding worse roads he should have kept in close connection with the fleet, as it was the union of these two forces that constituted the real superiority of the Federals. Instead of availing himself of it, Banks, without even endeavoring to explore the banks of the river and reconnoitre the roads which might be found there, resolved to lead, on the one hand, his army into a resourceless region, and, on the other hand, his fleet into a narrow, shallow, and dangerous river. It was consequently necessary to organize an enormous train to supply the army, and to detach a division (Kilby Smith's) to protect the fleet—a double cause of weakening. Notwithstanding the arrival of a brigade of negro soldiers from Port Hudson, Banks' forces were much below the number he had counted upon. The negroes, num-

bering about twenty-four hundred, did not compensate for the three thousand men of Ellet's brigade. The Third and Fourth divisions of the Thirteenth corps numbered, the one eighteen hundred, and the other twenty-eight hundred, combatants. The Nineteenth corps was reduced to Emory's single division, five thousand strong. A. J. Smith since Ellet's departure had but seventy-five hundred men remaining under his command. Lastly, the army had left a certain number of sick at Alexandria. Banks could therefore not bring into line more than five thousand cavalry and about twenty thousand infantry and seventy guns. But Kilby Smith's detachment left him in all but twenty-five thousand available men for the march he was about to undertake toward Mansfield. This was doubtless more than his adversary could bring against him. However, if Banks had looked more to the general welfare than to the campaign from which he expected to gain—very legitimately, doubtless—personal glory, he should have halted at Grand Écore. In fact, he had already received at Alexandria, on the 27th of March, a despatch from Grant containing positive instructions for him to send A. J. Smith's troops to Vicksburg and to abandon the attempt on Shreveport if the campaign was to be prolonged ten or fifteen days beyond the time appointed for the absence of these troops: a message from Sherman, which reached him on the 3d of April, informed him that this extended time expired on the 10th. General Corse, bearer of this message, had orders to take, with Smith, all the necessary steps to bring back these troops to the left bank of the Mississippi, where their presence might decide the issue of the war. It was quite evident that even by obtaining a delay of one or two weeks Banks could not end the campaign in time to give up his troops; his duty was therefore to renounce the campaign. Instead of boldly making up his mind to this, he took so little account of his obligation and of Grant's and Sherman's advice that he did not start even one day sooner from Grand Écore. The expectation of the rise of Red River, which he seemed to rely upon with so much faith, prevented him, as he has said himself, from hastening his departure. The train was loaded and the flotilla formed which was to go beyond Grand Écore; cotton was picked up, and even a great deal of molasses; and finally they again had elections.

Whatever Banks may have said since, his resolution can be excused but by the conviction—shared, in fact, by many of his officers and the majority of the people of the country—that the Confederates would not make any serious resistance, and they would evacuate Shreveport to withdraw into Texas. In this case the campaign would have been reduced to a military excursion, and, the dépôts at Shreveport once destroyed, Banks would have been able to send in due time A. J. Smith to his original superiors. We shall see presently that these conjectures could have been realized, but they were not such as a general has a right to expect in making his plans. Yet he relied so much upon them that on the 2d of April, after having written to Halleck that he believed the enemy would not defend Shreveport, he added that he would pursue him, if he could, through Texas, expecting doubtless to have Steele's co-operation to reinforce his army reduced by the departure of Smith's. Steele, in fact, according to the news received at Alexandria, had already reached Camden on the Washita, halfway between Little Rock and Shreveport. It was in front of this town that Banks expected to meet him.

The cavalry made good use of these few days: on the morning of the 2d Lee set forward with his three brigades to reconnoitre the Mansfield road. Taylor's forces were completing their reunion; Walker and Mouton had arrived at Pleasant Hill, a very strong position to which wells and a few cisterns gave a great importance in that country. General Green, advancing his division, had also rejoined Taylor, but his three brigades, arriving from Texas by forced marches under Major, were four days behind, with the exception of one regiment, under Colonel Debray, who had started on the Fort Jesup road. The latter was attacked by Lee on his march: the cavalry, which covered his right, taking advantage of the woods in order not to allow itself to be attacked, beat an orderly retreat as far as Crump's plantation, a point situated eighteen miles from Natchitoches on the road from Fort Jesup to Mansfield, where Debray, with the help of a few troops of Mouton's division sent to his assistance, succeeded in intimidating the Federals, who fell back after an insignificant engagement. They had gathered useful information as to the enemy's positions. Two days after, Gooding's brigade of cavalry,

passing on the left bank of Red River, attacked and put to flight a detachment of the Southern cavalry which under Liddell was watching that bank.

Finally, on the 6th, Banks moved the heads of his columns, although the waters of Red River, deceiving his hopes, had commenced to recede. Admiral Porter with his lightest vessels, numbering six, and twenty transports, was to weigh anchor the following day; he gave up the idea of taking his ships beyond Grand Écore, and agreed with Banks to "lay to" at the entrance of a channel called Loggy Bayou which near Mansfield connects Red River with Bayou Pierre, a large sheet of water fed by the stream of that name, which, as we have said, flows to the south-west of this river. Kilby Smith, landing a part of his forces, was to take possession of a bridge on Bayou Pierre near the outlet of Lake Carnissia and wait until the army, on its arrival at Mansfield on the 9th or 10th, opened communications with him by Springfield.

Taylor had not waited for this movement of his adversaries to take another backward step: his numerical weakness and the orders of his superior made it a duty for him to do so. On the 4th and the 5th his two divisions had fallen back on Mansfield. It was there that he was at last joined by Green's cavalry, which, having delayed answering the summons of Kirby Smith, and not having left Hempstead, Texas, until the 15th of March, had been compelled to make a détour northward and to cross the Sabine River at Logansport, a point from which this river forms the frontier of Louisiana. The position of Mansfield was of special importance to the two parties. The cross-roads that wind in the pine forest parallel with the post-road to Fort Jesup lead to Mansfield; from this point also radiate, to the west in the direction of Texas, east in the direction of Red River, north in the direction of Shreveport, numerous communicating roads running through a rich and well-irrigated country. Three of these roads connect Mansfield with Shreveport. Once master of the first point, the Federals would therefore have an excellent base from which to advance in several columns against the second, after having secured the support of their fleet. If the principal vessels of this fleet were detained owing to the state of the river, the lighter ones could follow and provision the army. This army while advancing would, on the

one hand, threaten the communications between Shreveport and Texas by the section of railroad leading to Marshall, and on the other be within reach of Steele. Banks and Steele once united, Kirby Smith would run a great risk of not being able to cope with them in an open fight. He would then be obliged to shut himself up in Shreveport or to evacuate this place and withdraw into Texas. In the first case, his army would have been reduced to immobility, soon invested, and condemned to the same fate as Pemberton's. In the second case, it would have been powerless and unable to seriously annoy the enemy, as the soldiers from Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri, who composed three-fourths of his effective force, would have left the service rather than cross the frontier of Texas if Kirby Smith had appeared to relinquish the defence of the two former States. The Federals, once established at Shreveport or even only in front of this place, could in a few months repair the Natchez Railroad, and thus dispense with Red River to secure their supplies. They would then be definitely masters of all the country. Such were the chances they could expect if once arrived at Mansfield. It is true that this programme could not be realized without retaining, far from the Mississippi, the troops that were before summer to operate against Mobile and Atlanta; but the Confederates were of course ignorant of the instructions that ought to have already checked Banks' march, and they might have had reason to fear that, by continuing to allow the enemy to advance the better to crush him, Kirby Smith would have to pay very dear for his too skilful combination. The latter, in fact, if on the one hand he refused to reinforce Taylor, had on the other hand greatly weakened the forces that Price might bring to bear against Steele in Arkansas; he had taken from him his old division composed of two Missouri brigades under the command of General Parsons, and two from Arkansas under General Tappan. General Churchill had arrived at Shreveport on the 21st at the head of this little corps. However, after having kept it two weeks Kirby Smith had at last decided upon sending it to Taylor. This important reinforcement had been moved upon Mansfield on April 4th: the announcement of its departure could be considered by Taylor as authorizing him not to hold back any longer. He asked nothing more to take the first opportunity to

measure his strength with his adversary, of whose military inexperience he was but too well aware.

Banks was going to encourage him by giving him from his first start the proof of his inexperience, or rather of his ignorance of the true principles of warfare. On the evening of the 5th he had placed his cavalry and Dickey's colored brigade under the leader who already commanded the Thirteenth and Nineteenth corps, and directed this general to set forward the following day with all his troops. Leaving Gooding's brigade to cover the infantry's flank, General Lee left Natchitoches for Pleasant Hill with about thirty-three hundred sabres. Unfortunately, this body of cavalry did not possess all the qualifications required to fill the part imposed upon it by circumstances and the nature of the ground. One of Lee's three brigades was composed of infantry who had very recently been supplied with horses, but knew very little about riding and taking care of them, and were totally ignorant of all the details in the use of their weapons. This ignorance seems, moreover, to have been shared by their companions and the greater part of their chiefs. They neither knew how to explore the country, how to scout, nor how to make bold dashes or operate in isolated groups. Finally, they dragged after them an immense train composed of three hundred and fifty wagons, which, marching in close file, did not measure less than two and a half miles in length, and were accompanied by a small army of mounted negro servants and sutlers. They carried, besides ammunition and the most varied baggage, ten days' provisions and three days' forage. As the horsemen were not in the habit of carrying two or three days' rations on their saddles, the train had to be close enough to revictual them every day. The field-pieces were excellent—well commanded, well supplied, well harnessed—but too numerous for the wooded country into which they were penetrating. The infantry was composed of very mixed elements. The Thirteenth corps was represented by a detachment of only forty-six hundred men, who, being scattered during the whole winter on the coast of Texas, had lost their *esprit de corps*, and among whom discipline had suffered much. The First division of the Nineteenth corps had acquired excellent qualities in the hands of Franklin and Emory. A. J. Smith's soldiers brought with them strong tradi-

tions of Grant's army, and were anxious to maintain the high reputation they had acquired in front of Vicksburg. But the general service of the army was badly organized, and there was, especially on the part of the soldiers and officers, a lack of confidence in the capacity of the chief of the expedition. This condition of things was calculated to aggravate considerably the difficulties of the campaign in a country where the scarcity of water imposed very long marches on the army.

General Lee, after having bivouacked at Crump's Corner, reached Pleasant Hill on the morning of April 7th. Taylor had directed Green, under whose command all the cavalry had been united into three brigades, to watch and defend, inch by inch, the road from this point to Mansfield. This cavalry was eminently suited for the kind of warfare in which it was called upon to engage. The soldiers, little disciplined, but accustomed to live at haphazard, far from the towns, far from the *dépôts* and trains, penetrated everywhere, and assembled at the voice of their officers to go foraging, dismounted to skirmish, availing themselves of the configuration of the ground, and remounted their horses to disappear in front of an enemy superior in numbers. Green had placed General Major's brigade at Pleasant Hill. The latter fell back step by step, and, finding a good position at Wilson's farm, halted there to retard the enemy's progress. The first charge overthrew the head of Lee's column, who, notwithstanding his numerical strength, confused by such a brisk attack, sent in haste to Franklin for the assistance of a brigade of infantry. But after a brief engagement, which cost the Federals about fifty men, among them a lieutenant-colonel, Major continued his retreat as far as the only flowing stream which the road crosses between Pleasant Hill and Mansfield. This branch of Bayou St. Patrice, a tributary of Sabine River, flows about seven miles from the former place. It was an important position. Major found Green there, who was waiting for him with his two other brigades. This force easily held back till toward evening Lee's column, and prevented him from establishing his camp near the stream. A violent storm which had followed the valley of Red River had broken up the roads between Natchitoches and Pleasant Hill, and rendered the march of the infantry the more difficult as the latter had been

delayed by the cavalry train which was in front of it. Its own train was at a distance in the rear, escorted by the colored brigade. The whole of the wagons belonging to Banks' army, and of which those of A. J. Smith constituted a relatively small portion, amounted to not less than eleven hundred—say one wagon for every twenty men. This immense column of *impedimenta* could not, owing to the unavoidable prolongation of the march, occupy on the road a total length of less than twelve miles. In spite of the difficulties of these first two halts, the infantry closely followed the cavalry.

General Franklin bivouacked at Pleasant Hill on the 7th, and A. J. Smith, who had left Grand Écore in the morning, halted midway between the two bridges. During this time Kilby Smith was embarking his division, and on the morning of the 7th his transports began ascending Red River in the rear of Admiral Porter.

Banks, who had been desirous to be present at this departure, promptly rejoined Franklin's column. He modified at once the dispositions taken by the latter, and, hearing that he had refused the brigade of infantry claimed by Lee, he ordered him to accede to the request of the cavalry chief. He wished, he has said himself, that the three arms should be represented in his advance-guard, "so that the cavalry should give its mobility, the artillery its strength, the infantry its stability." He forgot that this advance-guard was not such as the main body could support promptly, and in which the cavalry, detached in the front, played the part of scouts. It was a complete cavalry corps, which by its composition and because of the nature of the country was to operate far ahead of the main body and very independently. Too large a body of artillery and a detachment of infantry would impede and encumber it without giving it any strength or solidity. Since they were marching on the one road, Banks should have had it scouted in front of his infantry by a single brigade of cavalry, ready to fall back in case of any great resistance, and make use of the rest of Lee's division in looking for cross-roads to annoy the enemy on his flanks, even should it disperse for that purpose or spread out as far as the banks of Red River. The brigade of infantry intended for Lee came back to Franklin in the evening,

but the latter received orders to send him another the following day before daylight.

The First brigade of the Fourth division of the Thirteenth corps was appointed for this duty. The remainder of the corps set forward very early in the morning of the 8th. Emory's division was to follow a few hours after. Franklin, who left in the cisterns at Pleasant Hill only the quantity of water necessary to last one night for Smith's soldiers, expected to halt his long column on the banks of Bayou St. Patrice: he would find abundance of water there. The halt, quite short, afforded the needed rest to his soldiers, worn out after two long marches. Finally, although he did not yet expect any serious resistance on the part of the enemy, he was anxious to reduce the advance he had over Smith in order to facilitate a concentration in case of a fight.

Taylor, on his part, had taken all his measures for the fight which the silence of his chief seemed to authorize him to engage in. His enemy was advancing in a single long column across a country where the lack of water would render, on the first repulse, a retreat necessary. He had no further reinforcement to expect: he therefore had to act promptly. The Federal army not having even made the attempt to divert his attention, and the road from which it did swerve being known, all that was to be done was to choose on the road a favorable point at which to wait for it and compel it to fight. Taylor's choice fell upon a spot called Sabine Cross-roads, situated within three miles of Mansfield. It is formed by the intersection at right angles of the main road and a road leading from the banks of Red River to those of the Sabine. Two cross-roads which follow, at a few miles on the right and the left, in the direction of the main road terminate at the other road. The Federals had not discovered these, but the Southerners knew them well, and it was very important to them to occupy their outlets. The cross-road was on the border of a wood, beyond which extended, on the side of Pleasant Hill, a valley twelve to thirteen hundred yards long and about nine hundred yards wide. In this valley a rather deep ravine cut the main road perpendicularly, and separated two hills whose uncovered slopes were likewise crowned with thin pine woods. On the side of Pleasant Hill the skirt of the wood was marked by a strong enclosure. On this same side

and north-east of the road was a second valley, smaller than the first; it was separated from it in the direction of the valley by a small curtain of woods.

Taylor resolved to wait for his adversaries on the hill upon the top of which was the cross-road. The road between the Sabine and the Red River afforded great facilities to defend this position, which commanded Mansfield. Walker's and Mouton's divisions occupied it early on the 8th. Green received orders to leave but a small detachment in front of the Federal cavalry, and to come promptly and join them, so that all the army might be posted when the enemy should make his appearance. Lastly, Churchill was summoned in haste. He had twenty-eight miles to travel from Keatchie to Sabine Cross-roads, and consequently could not arrive in time to take part in the fight on the 8th. But Taylor well knew that Banks also could not engage all his forces that day, and Taylor relied upon Churchill to resume the fight on the second day if the Confederates did not gain the victory on the first. Walker had deployed his three brigades on the right of the road; Mouton's two brigades were on the left. Each of these two divisions was supported by two batteries of artillery. Green's battery was not long in arriving, and, placing itself on Mouton's left, thus prolonged the line of battle into the second valley. Each of the cross-roads was occupied by a regiment of cavalry; a third remained in reserve with one battery. Taylor's forces in the field amounted to only five thousand three hundred infantry, three thousand cavalry, and five hundred artillery—say eight thousand eight hundred soldiers, or nearly ten thousand combatants, counting the officers, as did the Federals.

The Union cavalry had set forward at daybreak with the brigade of infantry that Colonel Landram had brought. The position he was leaving is about sixteen miles from Mansfield, and consequently only twelve miles from Sabine Cross-roads. The road, which is rather narrow, passes through a number of glens the passage of which would delay the trains. It is bordered with pine woods, very thin on the heights, and in the low ground covered with thickets. The Confederates having abandoned Bayou St. Patrice, and having left in front of Lee but a mere curtain of

scouts, the latter might have pushed rapidly forward, as Franklin had directed him to do. But, thinking he had again before him all Green's forces, he allowed himself to be deceived by the obstinacy of the enemy's rearguard. The loss of a few men, among them a lieutenant-colonel, confirmed him in this opinion, and he placed two of Landram's regiments in the first rank immediately in the rear of the scouts. Thus, not only did the cavalry not explore the country, but it was preceded and covered by the infantry. It followed up in a column with the rest of the infantry a very little in the advance of its immense train, whose guard absorbed not less than one thousand to twelve hundred men. Lee had wished, it is true, to get rid of his proximity to the guard of this train, and had asked Franklin to allow him to leave it in the rear of the infantry. Franklin refused this: if the cavalry's wagons had been placed as Lee wished, between his own train and the infantry, the latter would have been so far away from it that it could not have been provisioned. Franklin ought to have required the commander of the cavalry to divide his train and keep but a few wagons with him, letting his men take provisions on their horses, and sending the rest of the teams to the rear of the whole column. But it was the general-in-chief's duty, not his, to give this order, and Banks, it seems, had not thought of it.

In the mean time, the remainder of the army had begun to move. Smith was nearing Pleasant Hill, and Franklin had halted between ten and eleven o'clock Ransom's and Emory's forces to have them encamp near Bayou St. Patrice. But Banks, who, after having joined him at this point and approved the choice of it, had followed the cavalry, was not long in sending him an order to forward the second brigade of Landram's division to support Lee. The latter, in fact, when approaching Sabine Cross-roads, found more or less resistance: Green was anxious to retard his march in order to gain time to occupy the position assigned to him by Taylor. Franklin sent Ransom with the new reinforcement, recommending him not to engage his two brigades at the same time, and to relieve the one which, bearing almost alone since the morning all the weight of the enemy's cavalry, had need of rest. But Banks, who had got beyond the cavalry train without having given it the order to halt, was to decide otherwise.

Lee a little before noon had reached the valley back of which Taylor, with all the forces he had been able to gather, was in wait for him. When he had attempted to cross it he had been promptly checked by the fire from the enemy's cannon. Taylor kept himself on the defensive, but fully resolved no longer to give ground. The train, whose head was only at a short distance, was held back by Lee, the latter having understood at the first glance that he was in presence of considerable force. But Banks, who had in the mean time arrived, only thought of pushing forward, forgetting that his divisions of infantry were *en échelon* on the road at such distances apart that they could not sustain one another efficiently. He sent word to Franklin to move forward at once the Thirteenth corps, and directed Lee to maintain himself in his position until it arrived. Without taking into account the fatigue of the infantry brigade which had been in advance of the cavalry since morning, he allowed it to deploy on the right when Ransom came about two o'clock to form the balance of the Fourth division holding both sides of the road. This line, established in the middle of the glade on the slope of the hill in a good position, was reinforced by several batteries of artillery, and was flanked on the left by Lucas' cavalry, and on the right by Dudley's; the latter extended into the second glade. Robinson's brigade of cavalry remained in reserve near the train.

For nearly two hours the two adversaries watched each other without any movement. If Lee had not been hindered by the infantry, the artillery, and the train, he might easily have fallen back on the bulk of the army, but his position no longer permitted him either to advance or to retire. Taylor, who is in no hurry to take the offensive, avails himself of this delay to rectify his line of battle. He withdraws Randall's brigade from the line occupied by Walker to reinforce on the left that of Mouton, which appears to him threatened. Finally, Banks, informed of the approach of Cameron's division, suddenly decides upon making an attack. But, fortunately for him, while Lee is endeavoring to dissuade him from so rash a design, his adversaries do not give him time to accomplish it. Taylor, who wishes to compel him to fight before the arrival of all his infantry, directs Mouton to set his column in motion. Polignac on the left, Gray in the

centre, and Randall on the right of the road advance, supported by Major's cavalry, who have dismounted to deploy in the woods beyond the glade. At the sight of this movement, Ransom, to forestall it, carries his right to the enemy's front; he has less than two thousand five hundred men in line, and he can escape only by a bold stroke at the critical moment. The fight begins in the glade. The galling fire of Vance's Federal brigade checks for a moment the Southerners. In order to sustain it against the superior forces which threaten to crush it, Ransom is obliged to weaken his left and summon a part of Emerson's brigade. Thanks to this reinforcement, the Federals, who have been promptly driven back as far as the skirt of the woods, re-form and offer energetic resistance. The Southern officers expose themselves as an example to their soldiers. A great number of them fall. Mouton is one of the first among the killed. Three colonels meet the same fate as he. The struggle is for a moment indecisive. But Taylor's right, in its turn engaging in the fight, will easily win the victory, for it has in its front but a few hundred of Emerson's infantry and dismounted cavalry, who are too much concerned with the fate of their horses to offer the enemy a solid line of battle. At the first shock Waul's and Scurry's brigades, directed by Walker, overthrow the Federals, climb up the hill, and capture Nims' battery, whose horses have been reached and whose officers allow themselves to be shot at their pieces. The assailants reach the skirt of the wood at the moment when Franklin arrives on the battlefield with the first companies of Cameron's division. He has diligently responded to Banks' summons, and this division has travelled almost constantly at a double-quick the distance from Bayou St. Patrice to Sabine Cross-roads. But it comes too late to repair a disaster which, after all, it would have been unable to prevent, as it does not muster more than fifteen hundred combatants. Rapidly re-formed on the right and left of the road, it holds back Taylor for a moment on the skirt of the woods, and supports the troops which resist Taylor's left wing. But the vigor and the number of the assailants soon drive it back into the woods. Flung upon the road, it finds it encumbered by Lee's trains; the three batteries which still cover the front of the Federals can neither fire nor manœuvre in the wood: their drivers

abandon them to the enemy, and thrust themselves with their teams in the midst of the train-wagons, which in vain endeavor to turn and flee. The cavalry, who have again taken their horses, press upon and scatter the infantry. The confusion of the left extends to the right, which finds itself pressed upon in the rear, and which Polignac, succeeding Mouton, directs with the spirit and clear-sightedness worthy of a veteran. The rout is complete. Banks endeavors in vain to check it with a personal courage which, unfortunately, does not redeem his military faults. Franklin and Ransom, who do their best to assist him, are both wounded. The fugitives disperse in the woods, abandoning to the Confederates, with the road, the possession of the train, which strives in vain to escape them: a few overturned wagons obstruct the way and Taylor's soldiers capture about two hundred and fifty. They have, besides, gathered nearly two thousand five hundred prisoners, twenty cannon, and several flags. Federal muskets everywhere strew the ground. It is five o'clock: one hour has sufficed to secure them a complete victory, and, notwithstanding the losses they have sustained at the beginning of the action, they continue to press the enemy so as not to give him time to rally.

Emory had reached about three o'clock a small tributary of Bayou St. Patrice, within two miles of the bridge where the Nineteenth corps had halted and established its camp, when, three-quarters of an hour after, he received the order to proceed in all haste with two days' provisions on the track of this corps. This order, forwarded by Franklin at the moment he was starting for Sabine Cross-roads with Cameron's division, had experienced an unaccountable delay, which might have been followed by disastrous consequences. Emory, without losing an instant, had set in motion his splendid division; he was on the way a few minutes after four o'clock, marching by the flank, the only formation compatible with the narrowness of the road. Whilst he thus advances in good order toward the enemy the swarm of distracted fugitives rushes in the opposite direction.

Already Emory has received a message from Franklin directing him to halt immediately as soon as he finds a good defensive position, and to establish himself there. But such positions are

scarce in the heart of this wooded country. He quickens his pace, and is soon surrounded by a host of horsemen and footmen, scattered or in small groups, of negroes, officers' servants, and sutlers, who carry to the rear of a beaten army the confusion of the battlefield. A moment after the road is encumbered with ambulances, wagons, artillery caissons, which rush through the column. The crowd of fugitives, who draw along with them the bravest with irresistible force, rapidly swells. Emory, to make his way through, causes his soldiers to cross bayonets, and the demoralized crowd turns aside without halting and without being impressed by this good example. Already a few of the enemy's balls fall into their ranks when they at last come across a small stream, an affluent of Bayou St. Patrice, behind which they will receive Taylor's assault. There is not a moment to lose: the One Hundred and Sixty-first New York, which is at the head of the column, deploys to cover the formation of the division. It is severely tried, as the Confederates, coming, as is their custom, in close lines, overthrow it and capture a great number of prisoners. But Emory has had time to form his troops. Dwight's brigade is in the centre, behind the glade called Peach Orchard; Grover's, holding both sides of the road, which he leaves open for the fugitives; and Benedict's, on the left.

The Confederates, who have not seen these fresh troops arrive, taking them for the rear of the fugitives, rush blindly upon them, without time to re-form their ranks. More than four thousand men await them with a galling and murderous fire, which checks their enthusiasm. They return, however, to the charge, and press upon Dwight's right so vigorously that Emory causes McMillan to advance to support him. During this time Benedict repulses all the assaults directed against his left. This fight, which has not lasted more than half an hour, has been a very slaughterous one, for it was an almost muzzle-to-muzzle fight. The Federals have lost three hundred and fifty-six men; the Confederates have suffered much more: before resuming the attack they must prepare for it. But Taylor's battalions have become scattered during the pursuit; the best men, who alone stood by their chiefs, are few and wornout. Night comes before the fight can be renewed.

Emory's timely arrival has saved the remains of the Thirteenth

corps and of the Federal cavalry. While Banks and Franklin remain with him, Lee and Cameron, who has succeeded Ransom, rally their soldiers; the latter, feeling that they are protected, consent to halt. But Emory's position is too precarious to allow him to keep it after daybreak. Not being able with his one division to resume the offensive, it was necessary for him to fall back on Pleasant Hill in order to join Smith's troops, which had been unable to reach that point before evening. Toward midnight, after having gathered all his wounded men, he moved forward, and reached Pleasant Hill in the morning of the 9th without having been annoyed.

The village of Pleasant Hill, which numbered two hundred inhabitants, is situated on the sandhills which we mentioned elsewhere extending in a south-western and north-western direction parallel with that of Red River. The road from Fort Jesup to Mansfield runs from the south through the village, follows the crest of the hills as far as the culminating point situated at its western extremity and bearing the name of College Hill, then, zigzagging down into the plain to take a north-western direction, crosses a rather deep ravine before entering the thick forest, from which it has deviated for a short distance. It crosses on the summit of College Hill a road which leads in a westerly direction to Sabine River, and continues in a north-easterly direction to meet Red River above the large swamp called Spanish Lake. This part of the road, which is sixteen miles long, crosses Bayou Pierre at Jordan's Ferry and reaches Red River at Blair's Landing. On the western and northern sides the slope of Pleasant Hill is a mile and a quarter long. Its approaches are open; on the south-west low underbrush has taken the place of abandoned cultivation on the slopes of College Hill, and extends as far as the forest; it separates the ravine which cuts the Mansfield road from another ravine lower and filled with a thick vegetation, and which, sloping on the side of College Hill toward the south, seems to be marked out expressly to protect against a flank movement the defences of this position. It is the more difficult of access as it runs through a rather large glade; it cannot be reached under cover except by going about eight hundred to eight hundred and fifty yards below College Hill to attain a point where the

woods which border the glade are here and there much closer together.

The Federals could in this position await the enemy without fear. Banks had around him twelve to thirteen thousand experienced infantry soldiers; Gooding's brigade of cavalry, which had not been engaged; and a numerous artillery. Unfortunately, there was a lack of water. It was therefore expedient to decide upon resuming on the 9th the march upon Mansfield, or reaching without further delay the banks of Red River. The Thirteenth corps and the cavalry were totally disorganized; the eight hundred and fifty wagons which the enemy had not taken could not be left at Pleasant Hill; they had to be moved forward in order to clear the road for the following day if retreat became necessary. Banks moved all the train on Grand Écore, and gave it as an escort the colored brigade, the conquered of Sabine Cross-roads, which he did not dare to bring again into a fight. This long column got in motion on the morning of the 9th in the midst of such great confusion that all the ambulances and the medical stores of the Nineteenth corps, which ought to have remained near the combatants, started with the wagons and baggage. During this time Emory was occupying the approaches of College Hill; Dwight was deploying on the right of the Mansfield road, the extremity of his line being flanked by the first ravine; McMillan, then Benedict, had formed on the left at some distance behind this ravine. About the middle of the day Shaw's brigade of the Sixteenth corps came to relieve McMillan, who had been in reserve, and in order to have a better position it advanced as far as the edge of the ravine, thus outstretching by a few hundred yards Dwight's line on its right and Benedict's on its left. The latter, who faced the south-west, stretched on the left of the Sabine River road on the skirt of the wood which separated the two ravines. This was favorable for the attack against the Federals' left. This was the weak point of their position; therefore, to cover Benedict, Smith had posted two brigades in a second line behind him in an oblique direction from the north-east to the south-west; Moore, on the right, was flanked by the village; Lynch, on the left, outstretching Benedict, extended as far as the second ravine. Hill's brigade was in reserve in the village.

In the mean time, the day advances without any sign of the enemy's disposition to take the offensive. It is known, however, that he is not far, for Gooding's cavalry have found him strong beyond the ravine. A few rifle-shots, partial movements to rectify positions, do not suffice to deceive the Federals, who, self-reliant, become impatient at waiting so long under arms. It is certainly not fear which holds back their adversaries. But Walker's and Polignac's soldiers, after engaging in two fights during the day of the 8th, have before noon travelled over the fifteen miles that separate Peach Orchard Grove from Pleasant Hill; Churchill's men, who, having left their bivouac in the rear of Mansfield at three o'clock in the morning, have rejoined them on the way, have marched thirty-seven miles since the preceding day. Taylor hopes that this day will complete Banks' defeat; he sees at last all his troops massed around him; the arrival of Churchill has increased the number to thirteen thousand combatants. But Banks has, this time, the twofold advantage of numbers and position: the Confederate infantry must therefore be given a few hours' rest before they are led to the assault of his position. While they are filling their canteens and enjoying rest behind the curtain formed by Green's cavalry, Taylor explains to his lieutenants the plan of the fight. Walker on the right of the road, protected on it by twelve cannon and to the left by Debray's and Buchel's brigades of cavalry under the command of General Bee, will attack the position of College Hill; Polignac with his two brigades will keep in reserve in the rear of Bee, ready to support this attack. While this operation will divert the Federals' attention to their right, Churchill with his fresh troops will turn their left. Making a large détour to reach unseen the Sabine River road, he will deploy on the right of this road and follow it in order to reach the village of Pleasant Hill by the south-west, under cover of the woods extending on that side. Finally, Major at the head of two dismounted brigades of cavalry will stretch out on the left, through the woods, in a north-eastern direction, to occupy Blair's Landing road, which the Federals, it would seem, must follow if they wish to get back to Red River.

After two hours' rest each general proceeds to take his position. At half-past four o'clock Taylor is informed that Churchill has

reached the road on which he is to form. He at once gives Walker the signal for the attack. The fire of the twelve guns posted near the road, about seven hundred and fifty yards only from the Federals, suddenly informs the latter of the opening of the fight, which they were beginning to believe would not take place. Walker advances his three brigades *en échelon* by the right; the artillery follows him. Major has penetrated by the north into the woods. Nearly at the same time shouts, mingled with the musketry-shots of Churchill's soldiers, reply to Walker's cannon. The latter deploys his three brigades—Randall on the left on the road, Gause in the centre, and Scurry on the right. He crosses the ravine which divides the road, and his first effort bears upon Shaw's brigade, which, being in an advanced position, is assailed on all sides at once and promptly driven back. The losses of Shaw are considerable, and his retreat on this side makes a breach in the Federal line. Dwight, on the road, is in turn attacked by Walker, whilst Green threatens his right flank, but the timely arrival of McMillan, whom Emory brings to his assistance, enables him to sustain himself.

Churchill, on his part, once arrived on the Sabine River road, has deployed Parsons' two Missouri brigades on the right—that is to say, beyond this road. Tappan and his two Arkansas brigades form on the left, and a regiment of cavalry scouts the extreme right. Churchill's soldiers are full of animation and courage, but he directs them without judgment. Taylor has justly reproached him for not having borne sufficiently to the right to completely outflank the enemy's left, and for having left half of his forces this side of the road. But—a still greater mistake—he does not know how to co-ordinate the movements of his two divisions. While Tappan's division has not yet come into line, Parsons has already crossed the ravine which slopes on the south and bisects the Sabine River road, as the other bisects the Mansfield road, in spite of the firing of two Federal batteries which defend the approaches. His brave troops, inured to war by the rough campaign they have served under Price, carry the batteries, and, crossing the glade, fall on the left of Benedict, whose right is already pressed by Scurry.

Benedict, who exposes himself in this unequal struggle, is killed

at the very outset of the action ; his line is quickly broken. Colonel Fessenden with the left falls back in good order toward the position occupied by Lynch ; the remainder is driven back in confusion on the fragments of Shaw's brigade, which the latter has been able to re-form on the left of Dwight. The success of the Confederates seems to be complete. But it is just then that the fortune of war decides against them. Churchill, who thinks he has outflanked the whole of the enemy's line, pushes quickly his right, whose ranks were broken in the fight, when suddenly it is attacked obliquely by Lynch and Fessenden, who advance against it. Their galling fire is not long in throwing it into utter confusion at the moment when it was about to reach the village.

A. J. Smith, with the clear-sightedness of an experienced soldier, avails himself of this instant to move forward Moore's brigade. The Missourians are driven back beyond the ravine even before Tappan has crossed it ; they leave in the hands of the Federals a great number of prisoners and three of the guns following them. Bee, who lacks the judgment necessary to command on the battlefield, believes himself able with his cavalry to break through Dwight's and McMillan's line, which falls back in good order in front of Walker's superior forces. He attacks it at the head of his two brigades, but a galling fire breaks his ranks and strews the ground with dead and wounded. The valiant Buchel is killed, and the cavalry is unable to renew the fight in consequence of this inopportune attack. Major, it is true, has advanced as far as the Blair's Landing road, but he is too far from the battlefield to be able to repair the disaster. It is in vain that Polignac moves forward his two small brigades weakened by the struggles of the day before ; he cannot break through the Federals, who, encouraged by their success, have taken the offensive. Walker, to attack them, has formed his troops in line by columns of regiments. This consummate order has given his first assault a great force, but has caused him to sustain severe losses ; he has been himself severely wounded, and his division, being in the greatest disorder, retains with difficulty the ground it has just gained. Tappan, in his turn, has debouched from the woods which separate the two ravines, and at last crosses that which traverses the Sabine River road at the moment when the Mis-

sourians, having abandoned it, were re-forming under the protection of Churchill's cavalry. But his troops, less experienced than the others, have been promptly stopped by the fire of Smith's two brigades. A part of them rush in disorder on Scurry's brigade, and draw it into a hasty retreat. Gause's brigade, uncovered by this retreat, is exposed to Shaw's fire, and it is only by a vigorous renewed attack by Randall and Waul against Dwight that it is saved. But this effort cannot be sustained. Coming darkness increases the confusion of the Confederate ranks. Churchill's attack having been definitely repulsed, the Federals opposite Walker re-form, rally on the left of Dwight, and gain ground over the enemy. Night has come; the fight, which has ceased in front of Smith, lingers before the remainder of the line, and Taylor, acknowledging his defeat, gives his troops the order to fall back as far as the banks of Bayou St. Patrice, the only point where they can find the water needed by the soldiers after this hard day's fighting. Bee remains on the ground with his cavalry to cover this retreat: the Federals are not in a condition to hinder it. It is quickly effected. Churchill on one side, and Polignac on the other, with the two divisions of which he had the command owing to Walker's wound, were united near Wilson's farm, the theatre of the fight engaged in on the 7th by the cavalry of the two armies.

The losses by the two combats of the 8th and 9th of April were, for the Confederates, two thousand two hundred men and three cannon; those of the Federals amounted to three thousand nine hundred and sixty-nine men and twenty cannon, besides their train. The defeat of the former in front of Pleasant Hill was indisputable. It was due to the firmness of the Federal troops, but also to the manner in which the attack of the right had been made, to the lack of spirit displayed by Tappan's soldiers, and, above all, to the mistake made by Churchill in not extending sufficiently his line beyond the Sabine River road, so as to overlap the enemy's left. Instead of entrusting to a subordinate this decisive manœuvre, Taylor should have conducted it himself; he has in a very remarkable and instructive work acknowledged this error. However, the battle of Pleasant Hill did not make him lose all the advantages obtained by that of Mans-

field. The invading army, severely repulsed on the 8th, could not, it is true, have been dislodged on the 9th from its position. But every one knew that owing to the want of water it could not maintain itself there more than over night ; it therefore became a necessity, weakened as it was by its losses and the disorganization of the troops engaged on the 8th, to effect a retreat, as if it had been vanquished at Pleasant Hill. No one in the Confederate army doubted, especially the generals, who looked upon Banks as a formidable adversary. Meanwhile, the latter, who before the fight had resolved to withdraw, since he had directed his train and his numerous escort not to halt before reaching Grand Écore, had regained his self-reliance on seeing the battle terminate in his favor. The men of the Sixteenth and Nineteenth corps were full of ardor, and only asked to resume the offensive. A. J. Smith no longer spoke of the recall orders he had received, esteeming it henceforth important, above all, to wipe out the recollection of his defeat at Mansfield by taking all possible advantage of the success obtained the following day. But Franklin and all the chiefs of the Nineteenth corps did not share these sentiments. They had, it must be said, lost all confidence in Banks' military talents ; they did not believe him able to lead a campaign to a successful end ; and to avoid new disasters, which under these conditions seemed inevitable, they unanimously decided upon a retreat.

However, Franklin proposed, instead of falling back as far as Grand Écore, to reach by a short flank march Red River at Blair's Landing. This movement had the advantage of reuniting more promptly the army and fleet, of covering the latter against any attempts the enemy might make to cut off the retreat upon Grand Écore, and finally, of taking a position as near Shreveport as was Pleasant Hill, and from which the march could be resumed by another road as soon as the tracks of the retreat were obliterated. Perhaps in their own consciences those who gave this opinion hoped that the sojourn at Blair's Landing would enable the Federal Government to give them another chief. Banks, after having listened to them, decided upon a retreat, but, having no tidings of the fleet, and not wishing to separate from his train, whose direction he could no longer change, he gave his troops orders to follow him on the road to Grand Écore. He made a great mistake in not listening

to Franklin's advice, as he thus exposed the fleet to the greatest dangers. He aggravated it by the haste with which he caused the retreat to be effected. The troops received before midnight the order to set off at once, and almost all the wounded were left on the battlefield. This haste, quite useless after the success which had just been obtained, surprised and deeply grieved the soldier : it is, in his sight, the finishing-stroke of disgrace for the general-in-chief.

CHAPTER III.

ALEXANDRIA.

THE retreat of the Federals on Grand Écore was an admission of their defeat. They had abandoned the offensive, never to resume it in the whole course of the campaign. Whatever illusions they still cherished, they had met with a decided check. For all that, they would have been greatly astonished had they then known of the measures which the enemy had at the same time decided on. Kirby Smith, hurrying up with all possible speed from Shreveport, had joined Taylor again about ten o'clock in the evening near Bayou St. Patrice, by the side of which the whole Confederate army was enjoying a well-earned repose. The news of the battle of Mansfield had taken him by surprise, and, though a victory, was a sore disappointment. He blamed his able and successful lieutenant for allowing his impatience to prevent Banks from falling into the trap that had been prepared for him. We have told above how dangerous were the calculations of Kirby Smith, and have shown how opportune was the moment chosen by Taylor for striking a decisive blow. This censure was therefore unfair. But Kirby Smith did not stop at this. Whatever might be thought of the opening of the campaign, in the conduct of it energy and despatch became matters of necessity. The question was to take advantage of the plight in which he found Banks' army and Porter's fleet in order to keep them apart and get the better of them successively. On the one hand, it was necessary to push the land forces so hard as to make them believe themselves no longer safe at Grand Écore, and to drive them back to Alexandria, and farther still if that were possible. On the other hand, it was necessary to employ a strong detachment in hovering about the fleet, in cutting off its

retreat, and in this way compelling Porter to abandon all his ships and retreat by land along the left bank of Red River with the troops which he had taken on board.

This plan of Taylor's, so much in accord with common sense and reason, did not meet with the approval of his superior officer. The latter, in his solicitude for the capital of his department, surrendered himself to worriment over imaginary dangers. He was fearful lest Porter's fleet on the one hand, and Steele's small army on the other, would, in spite of Banks' retreat, continue their movement against Shreveport; he distrusted his ability to put the finishing-touch to the latter's defeat, and did not care for the sake of it to be lured too far away from his base of operations. So he concluded to leave in his front only a force sufficient to keep an eye on Steele, well assured that he would not undertake any offensive operations, with the further resolve to lead back the rest of his troops to Shreveport as a starting-point for a new campaign against Steele, whose little army he hoped to surprise and annihilate on the borders of Arkansas. This was abandoning the substance for the shadow. Taylor's solicitations did not avail in the least to alter his fatal determination. By his orders all the infantry and Bagby's brigade of cavalry marched toward Mansfield on the morning of the 10th, and reached that town by evening. The two armies thus turned their backs on each other in retreat, with equal reluctance on both sides. Taylor's soldiers did not understand why they were made to forego all the fruits of the victory on the 8th. Green alone remained with a part of his cavalry in the neighborhood of Pleasant Hill, and on the morning of the 10th occupied the position abandoned by the enemy. He detailed Bee, with his two brigades, to follow the Federals. But Bee was not able to give them any annoyance on their march, which brought them, without any difficulty, to Grand Écore on the evening of the 11th. The army was in this way reunited, with the exception of Kilby Smith's division, on the banks of Red River. At Grand Écore it found its convoy and the vessels which had not succeeded in passing this point, and Banks at once began to throw up earth-works around his position. He had no news of Porter's fleet and the troops escorting it. He had, to be sure, sent an officer with the news of his retreat, but the situation in which he had placed

them by falling back on Grand Écore after his orders to meet near Mansfield was not the less dangerous.

Porter and Smith, in fact, had been on time at the rendezvous. After laborious navigation they had reached on the afternoon of the 10th the mouth of Loggy Bayou. A detachment of infantry had been landed immediately, and the rest of the force was preparing to follow it, while the crew was busy in removing from the channel of Red River the hull of a foundered vessel, when the officer bearing Banks' despatches reached the fleet. There was not a moment to lose in getting back to Grand Écore. If Taylor's advice had been listened to, two divisions of infantry, with a large force of artillery, would have been posted the next day on the bluffs of Red River, and would have made this retreat impossible. Luckily for the Union troops, the only annoyance he could give their fleet was by means of detachments of cavalry. On the morning of the 11th he sent Bagby from Mansfield to Grand Bayou Landing with his cavalry and a battery of artillery, who, delayed in crossing Bayou Pierre, reached the banks of Red River several hours too late, when the fleet was already down the stream. He followed it in vain, and in spite of all his efforts did not succeed in overtaking it. Green, for his part, leaving Bee on the road to Grand Écore, remained himself at Pleasant Hill. On the 11th he received orders to go to Blair's Landing to await the passage of the fleet there. He started that evening, but, encountering Bayou Pierre, with its width of nearly three hundred feet, he was delayed as Bagby was, and, though advised of the approach of the enemy's vessels, all he could take on the 12th to await them on the banks of the river were three cannon and a hundred men. Taylor blamed his chief for having caused this delay, in that he left the pontons of the army at Shreveport. But it would have sufficed to avoid it had Kirby Smith given the order to march twenty-four hours earlier.

In the mean time, the Federal fleet moved down Red River in the face of the greatest difficulties. In this river, with its windings and its frequent shoals, the helm was so crippled by the current as to render its navigation downward more dangerous than it had been upward. Every minute it became necessary to stop and raise one sunken vessel or to steer clear of another; at one time the

fleet had to be divided in order to avoid collisions, and at another the heaviest gunboats had to be towed by the most powerful transports. When Green arrived on the 12th, about four, at Blair's Landing, the greater part of the ships of war had already passed this point, likewise all the transports with the exception of six. These were in a critical position: the *Hastings* had broken her rudder; the *Clara Bell* and the *Emerald* were trying in vain to drag the *Alice Vivian* off a sandbank; and, finally, the *Rob Roy* ran into the stern of the *Black Hawk*, which was engaged in raising the sunken monitor *Osage*. The gunboats *Lexington* and *Neosho* were less than a mile up the stream. Green boldly proceeded to bring his three guns into action on the bluffs, and, posting his skirmishers in the underbrush along the edge, he opened fire on the Federal vessels. There were some victims of these ambushes among Smith's soldiers, surprised as they were by the sudden attack; but they quickly rallied, and, taking shelter behind the bags of oats and bales of hay and cotton that fortified the decks, they returned a sharp fire. The guns mounted on the poop-deck replied to those of Green, which were badly handled, while the cross-fire of the *Lexington* and the *Osage* soon silenced the latter. The combat was too unequal for the Confederates to sustain it for any length of time. They would have needed a considerable number of troops to keep up from the bluffs a skirmish-fire capable of preventing any manœuvre and so arresting navigation. Besides, the death of their leader soon demoralized them and caused them to abandon the struggle. Green, killed by a grapeshot, was one of the few victims of this battle between the cavalry and the fleet. Not more than twenty men fell on each side. The Confederates contended that they had seen the decks of the Federal vessels strewn with the dead and the dying. The sound of Smith's and Porter's cannonade was heard at Grand Écore, and served to increase the uneasiness which officers and soldiers felt about the fate of their comrades. All would have willingly hastened to their assistance, but Banks, solely absorbed in protecting himself, did not give them the order. On the morning of the 13th, Admiral Porter arrived at Grand Écore with a part of his ships, but the rest of the fleet was not in sight, and toward noon the report of cannon announced that it had again come to blows

with the enemy. Colonel Shaw, crossing Red River, set out—on his own account, it was said—to march to its relief at the head of a thousand men. It is asserted that Banks, having met him at the head of his force, and having thus learned of his expedition, gave it his sanction in a dilatory order. A battery of Southern artillery, reinforced by a part of Liddell's cavalry, had taken position on the left bank of Red River near Campiti and cannonaded Smith's transports. The latter, continually aground and having only two ships of war to support them, found it hard to reply. But as soon as the Confederates were informed of the approach of Shaw, who had crossed the river and was advancing up the left bank, they beat a hurried retreat, and Smith arrived that same evening at Grand Écore without suffering further annoyance. The Confederate cavalry restricted itself to watching the positions taken by the Federal army around the town, and Bee, who commanded it in the interim, established his headquarters at Natchitoches.

Such was the feeble barrier that sufficed to check the Federal forces, for there was trouble among the generals, discontent among the rank and file. Banks had lost the confidence of his army. He was aware of the fact, and worried over it, but made no effort to regain that confidence. He had felt the need of two scapegoats. On the one hand, he had taken from Lee the command of the cavalry and given it to General Arnold; on the other, the brave but unfortunate General Stone, who was not responsible for the mistakes committed in the campaign, but who had not yet outlived the memories of Ball's Bluff, was deposed and General Dwight appointed in his place. Franklin had profited by his wound to keep in his tent, and A. J. Smith spoke openly of putting Banks under arrest and getting rid of him by sending him North under escort. The army was accordingly in no condition to resume offensive operations. The decided check encountered in the campaign could no longer be a matter of doubt to any one.

The waters of Red River instead of rising had perceptibly fallen. Finally, the date fixed by Grant for Smith's return was at hand. The latter had found at Grand Écore a peremptory order from Sherman to return to Vicksburg, so that Banks was obliged to take it upon himself to detain him and assume the

responsibility of this disobedience—a responsibility, moreover, in which Smith had a share, for it was perfectly clear to him that he could not at this moment abandon the fleet and the army. All he asked was to set himself right at headquarters, whose approval was not open to question, but it was in the hope of resuming immediately an offensive campaign and seeking prompt revenge for the disaster at Mansfield. Banks, on the contrary, hesitated; he dared neither to advance nor retire: he was looking every moment for the enemy to make a grand attack, and intrenched himself as if it lay with him to remain in this position, which the falling of the waters, however, was soon to render inaccessible even to the smallest craft.

If Kirby Smith had indeed, in thinking better of it, attempted a general attack, it would still have been in his power to inflict upon the Federals an irreparable disaster and to capture their fleet, which the Union army, because so badly handled, would not have been able to defend perhaps. But, now assured of the safety of Shreveport, which was no longer menaced on any side, his only thought was to turn his forces against Steele, in spite of the distance that lay between them. The news that the latter, having learned, as we shall tell farther on, of Banks' defeat, was falling back on Little Rock, ought to have stopped him, for by going in pursuit of him he was losing all chance of returning in time to Red River to give the finishing-stroke to Banks' defeat. On the contrary, it hastened his departure. The divisions of Churchill and Walker had left Mansfield on the morning of the 14th for Shreveport; on the 16th, Kirby Smith put himself at their head to march northward. There was left to Taylor only Polignac's division, reduced by this time to twelve hundred muskets, and the cavalry reinforced by Steele's brigade recently arrived from Texas. Green had been succeeded by Wharton, an experienced and enterprising officer, whom we have seen at work in Tennessee. Polignac had left Mansfield on the 14th with his infantry for the purpose of making a junction in front of Grand Écore with the cavalry that stood in the way of Banks' army. Any other adversary would have made him pay roundly for his hardihood in posting himself at the head of a mere handful of foot-soldiers and a thousand or so of cavalry in the face of more than twenty thousand fighting men. But the Union general had no further

thought than of retreat, and lay still for fear of provoking an enemy who, he believed, was prepared to attack him, wishing to give to Porter time to conduct the fleet of war-vessels and the transports to Alexandria, where the army was to halt. Oftener than once had the navy reason to believe that he was going to abandon them, so many were the signs around him of preparations for an immediate departure. At the end of eight days retreat became at last a possibility. Thanks to the unflagging efforts of the officers and the ponton-trains, all the vessels, with a single exception, had cleared the principal obstacles that hampered navigation between Grand Écore and Alexandria. The *Eastport*, the largest of the gunboats and the most strongly armored, had foundered on the 17th in consequence of a large leak, the work either of a torpedo or a snag, and had been raised only to run aground repeatedly in a channel that was far too narrow and too shallow for her. Porter, after having conducted the other vessels to Alexandria and issued orders there to send to Fort Pillow, recently taken by Forrest, a part of the division stationed near the mouth of Red River, had returned to Grand Écore, in order, as soon as the army was on the march, to bring down the lighter craft which he had left there and assist the *Eastport* in her laborious voyage.

As we have said, the only route open to Banks for reaching Alexandria after passing Natchitoches and following the right bank of the arm of Red River, called Cane River, shifts to the left bank about sixteen miles below the latter city; then, nine or ten miles farther down, it crosses Cane River again at a place called Monet's Ferry. Thanks to the subsidence of the waters, these two crossings were fordable. But the second one offered the Southerners positions very easy of defence. At Monet's Ferry Cane River encounters the line of sandbanks which, we have said, choke up and cut in two the valley of Red River between Grand Écore and Alexandria. Almost perpendicular to the stream they obstruct Cane River, and force it to reunite with Red River, whilst above Monet's Ferry, by damming the waters, they form impassable swamps. They offer, in addition, commanding positions well wooded and easy to defend. Taylor had ordered Bee to shut Banks up in Grand Écore and cut him off

from Alexandria, and had directed him, to that end, to take a position in the rich valley of Red River between these two points. He had particularly urged upon him to study the situation of Monet's Ferry, where he would be able to prevent forces much stronger than his own from crossing Cane River. The Federals were none the less aware of the strength of this position. Accordingly, Banks, still believing himself to be surrounded by Taylor's entire army, was fearful of meeting a resistance which he could not overcome, and of being obliged to cross to the left bank of Red River. In order to conceal his retreat from the enemy he feigned an offensive movement. A. J. Smith received orders to occupy Natchitoches on the 20th of April and to push forward reconnoitring-parties along the route to Pleasant Hill. His soldiers, full of eagerness, were already rejoicing in the expectation of soon getting their revenge. But Taylor, on learning of this demonstration when he arrived on the 21st at Polignac's headquarters, was not its dupe. He comprehended at once that Banks was going to fall back on Alexandria. It was too late to send Wharton with the rest of the cavalry to the support of Bee at Monet's Ferry, but there was reason to hope that the latter could hold the enemy in check long enough to give the rest of the little army, despatched in pursuit, sufficient time to follow close and hem him in between the two arms of Red River.

The Federals left Grand Écore during the 21st and 22d, hoping thus to cloak their retreat, but the setting of the town on fire by some stragglers speedily betrayed them. A part of the cavalry took the lead, followed by the Nineteenth corps; the Thirteenth, and behind them the wagons, formed the centre of the column, which this time marched in as close order as possible. As soon as they had passed Natchitoches—that is to say, toward seven in the morning—A. J. Smith fell in behind them; Lucas' brigade of cavalry brought up the rear. As soon as the movement declared itself, Wharton with Steele's cavalry entered Natchitoches, which the Federals had scarcely left, and dashed off in pursuit. He followed them so close that Lucas was obliged to appeal for help to Kilby Smith, whose division formed the rearguard. Ward's brigade of infantry broke the force of Wharton's attacks, who came to a halt at a point called Twenty-four Mile Ferry, where the road for the

first time crosses Cane River. However, Banks, once on the march, seemed as if he never meant to stop, so great was his haste to reach Monet's Ferry; he marched his soldiers thirty-seven miles at a stretch, without allowing them the least halt, to Cloutierville, while the rearguard did not arrive till three in the morning. He started on the 23d before daylight, while the soldiers of A. J. Smith renewed their march at seven o'clock; so that, after being on their feet for twenty consecutive hours, they had only four hours for rest. It was only to meet the enemy that they were accustomed to march at this rate, not to run away from him.

When the head of the Federal column reached Monet's Ferry it found Bee posted with about thirty-five hundred men on a steep hill which overlooks the right bank of Cane River; his artillery commanded the ford. A reconnoissance made by Colonel Bailey, whose name will soon reappear under our pen, proved that it was impossible to force the passage of Cane River below this point. General Emory, who was filling the place of Franklin, still suffering from his wound, at once made every preparation to dislodge Bee from his position. He remained before Monet's Ferry with two brigades of his division and all his artillery, while General Birge, with a brigade of Cameron's division and the third of Emory's division under the orders of Colonel Fessenden, tried to turn the flank of the enemy above the ford. Cameron was to support this movement at the head of the rest of the Thirteenth corps. Birge succeeded in crossing the river nearly two miles above Monet's Ferry, and, clearing for himself a road through almost impassable swamps and brakes, he issued from it, toward three o'clock, on the left flank of Bee.

The Confederates were posted on this side on a wooded eminence behind an enclosure, their two flanks protected, the left by a lake, the right by the river. The combatants were separated by a bare slope extending to the underbrush through which the Federals had just advanced. This strong position was defended by several pieces of artillery. However, the attack had to be made in front. Birge, without a moment's hesitation, springs to the charge at the head of his two small brigades. They are decimated by a terrific fire. Fessenden falls dangerously wounded, but in a few minutes the position is carried. The Confederates

fall back as quick as they can on the hill which commands the ford, and which Bee occupies with the rest of his forces. But, seeing that his flank is turned, he does not even make an attempt to defend it, and gives the order to retreat before the assailants could overtake him. His losses are insignificant, while the Federals have several hundred men *hors de combat*. Bee's feeble defence has frustrated all the plans of Taylor. The latter, indeed, hoped by a forced march of Polignac's infantry on the right bank of Cane River to overtake Bee on the morrow in good time at Monet's Ferry, and thus to close effectually to Banks the direct road to Alexandria. Wharton, for his part, in order to retard Banks' march, had made a spirited attack upon his rearguard on the 23d. If the latter was checked before reaching the ford, he could have made it very difficult for him to retreat on Rigolets du Bon Dieu. In order to cope with Wharton, A. J. Smith had to bring into play all his resources, and Wharton, on the other hand, in order to retard Banks' march, had made a brisk attack upon his rearguard on the 23d. If the latter had stranded at the ford, he would have been able to make his retreat upon Les Rigolets de Bon Dieu very difficult for him. In order to hold his own against Wharton, A. J. Smith was obliged to bring all his resources into play, and to reply with several attacks himself, attended with little bloodshed, but sufficient to prevent him from reaching Cane River before night.

In the mean time, after making a poor defence, Bee had committed a fresh blunder. Instead of retreating step by step before the enemy on the road which he was sure to follow, and of seeking some new position to defend, he left the way clear to him by falling back to the south-west on Beaseley, where Taylor was not slow in rejoining him. It was too late after that to disturb the retreat of the Federals: their rearguard on the 24th passed Cane River after a trifling engagement with Polignac's infantry. The latter did not pursue them any farther. Banks crossed Bayou Cotile without any difficulty, and on April 28th his army found itself reunited at Alexandria. Admiral Porter had preceded him there with the whole fleet, the *Eastport* excepted, but his retreat had been difficult and dangerous. In fact, Banks' forced march after quitting Grand Écore had left the admiral very far in his

rear, who with three gunboats of light draught had overseen the departure of the last transports loaded with the material and commissary stores of the army. These vessels arrived safe and sound at Alexandria, but Porter was making but little headway, owing to the *Eastport*, which frequently grounded in spite of all that was done to lighten her. Finally, on April 25th she stopped in the very middle of the channel for want of sufficient depth of water: it was necessary to blow her up the next morning. But precious time had been lost; only half the distance between Grand Écure and Alexandria had been traversed, whilst Banks' whole army had already passed Bayou Cotile in spite of A. J. Smith's protestations against this abandonment of the fleet. Prince Polignac, not being able to follow the enemy's army any farther, had sent parties to the shores of the river which had already harassed Porter and hastened the destruction of the *Eastport*. The principal detachment, comprising two hundred sharpshooters under Colonel Caudle and Cornay's battery of four pieces, awaited the Federal vessels five miles above the mouth of Cane River. These vessels were three gunboats—the *Juliet*, the *Cricket*, and the *Fort Hindman*—overloaded with the material taken from the *Eastport*, and two towboats, the *Champion* and the *New Champion*. On the afternoon of the 26th they had just passed an elbow of the river when the *Cricket*, which with the admiral on board led the advance, was saluted by the fire of the enemy's battery. It replies to the best of its ability, but Cornay's guns, more rapidly served, are soon dealing death and destruction on the deck of the *Cricket*, whose hull is pierced at every discharge. The gunners, the engineers, the pilots, are killed; the vessel is disabled. Finally, Porter, who is at the helm himself, succeeds in getting her past the enemy's battery, and continues down the river till he meets the *Lexington*, another gunboat which had just had an engagement with the enemy's sharpshooters below the mouth of Cane River. But the rest of the flotilla, checked by Cornay's fire, could not follow him; the *New Champion* was sunk, and at nightfall the other vessels remained above the battery in order to repair their injuries. On the morning of the 27th their turn is come to run the gauntlet. At the first volley they are riddled with shot, to which they can make no effective reply. The *Fort Hindman*,

which is towing the *Juliet*, has no steerage way, and runs several times against the bluff on which the enemy is posted, but by a miracle the two vessels, floating with the current, finally pass the battery without having either grounded, sunk, or taken fire. But the *Champion* was not so fortunate. This transport, which was unarmed, was loaded with about one hundred and fifty fugitive slaves whom the Federals had imprudently induced to run away, and whom they now preferred to expose to the most cruel danger rather than abandon them to their former masters. At the first shot the boiler of the *Champion* was pierced, and the scalding steam which escaped caused nearly all the unhappy fugitives, who were crowded between decks, to die in the most horrible agonies: only twenty survived. To render the scene still more appalling, the vessel takes fire while the enemy's projectiles rain upon the deck. Finally, the *Champion* runs aground on the left shore. The few survivors of the disaster leap ashore, where they are made prisoners by Liddell's cavalry. The gunboat *Neosho*, sent by Porter to the rescue of the vessels which he left behind him, arrived too late. The losses of the Federals were great. The two *Champions* were destroyed. The three other vessels were pierced with shots. The *Cricket* and the *Juliet* had lost each more than half of their crews. The Southerners had only one killed, but it was the commander of the battery. "Cornay," says General Taylor, "with Mouton, Ormand, and so many other Creoles, proved by his brilliant courage that the military qualities of the old French race had not degenerated on the soil of Louisiana."

On arriving at Alexandria the fleet had not reached the end of its trouble. The waters of Red River had been falling for a month, and the rapids which it had ascended presented now an impassable obstacle. Its way was blocked, and, as there was nothing to warrant a hope of a fresh rise of the river, it seemed doomed to certain destruction when the army abandoned it. Happily, Taylor did not have the necessary forces to compel Banks to a premature retreat. But the Federal general did not believe in the weakness of his adversaries, and, besides, by remaining indefinitely at Alexandria he was certain naturally to attract them around him by the allurements of so rich an amount of plunder. The sailors, who felt themselves the victims of the blunders of the general, complained

loudly and bitterly: the soldiers reproached the sailors no less sharply with the capture of the cotton and the loss of their prospective share of prize-money. The speculators, for their part, bought up the precious staple and sought by every means to send it to New Orleans. The Mississippi was rising, and its waters backed up almost as far as Alexandria. But those of Red River remained still as low as ever. In the mean time, the news of Banks' check had reached Washington. Grant had just assumed the supreme direction of the war in place of Halleck, reduced to the rôle of a head clerk under the title of major-general, chief of staff. Grant had always disapproved of the expedition, and severely criticised in his official correspondence the conduct of the campaign. Comprehending that the army could not abandon Porter's fleet, he had given A. J. Smith the order not to quit Alexandria so long as Porter would be unable to re-enter the Mississippi; but after having made this sacrifice, which brought a great disarrangement of his plans, he had demanded of the President the deposal of Banks. Political considerations having hindered Mr. Lincoln from gratifying his demand, he had sent General Hunter to Alexandria to keep an eye on the commander whom he judged incapable, and in case of need to take his place.

We shall leave Banks penned in at Alexandria, as he had been at Grand Écore, by Taylor's little band, to follow Kirby Smith in the campaign which he had undertaken against Steele immediately after the battle of Pleasant Hill. We left the Union general in the middle of March, at the moment when Fort de Russy had fallen into the power of Smith and Porter, preparing to obey the formal orders which he had received from Washington. These orders oblige him, contrary to his opinion, to set out upon the march, with all the forces at his command, to sustain Banks in his campaign on Red River. Instead of seeking to join him near Alexandria, as the latter requested of him, by descending the Washita, taking Monroe on the way, he decided to cross this river at Arkadelphia, and to march directly to Shreveport, the objective point of the campaign. He gives up, consequently, the idea of uniting himself with the Army of the Gulf before appearing before the central position of the enemy; and not having any means of combining his own movements with those of Banks, he offers Kirby Smith the

opportunity of combating separately the two columns directed against him. After having assured the defence of Little Rock and of Pine Bluff, a post situated lower down the Arkansas which it is necessary to retain in order to protect the navigation of the river, he has only eight thousand men to take the field with. The half of his force consists of cavalry commanded by General Carr. He starts on March 24th. Three days before, General Thayer, who commanded the Army of the Frontier, had left Fort Smith to join him. The rendezvous was at Arkadelphia, on the banks of the Washita. Lower down this river is the town of Camden, which Price had fortified with great care. A detachment of the garrison of Pine Bluff, under Colonel Clayton, had orders to march on this position and to occupy it as soon as the movements of Steele should have obliged the enemy to evacuate it: this occupation was necessary to cover the communications of the latter if he advanced toward Shreveport. After marching as far as Sabine River on the first day, then on the 26th to Rockport, Steele crossed the Washita on the 27th, and reached Arkadelphia the next day. Thayer, retarded by the absence of roads and the bad weather, was still far away, and had not been able to send him any word. Steele was not in need of this reinforcement for opening the campaign, for the departure of Churchill's and Parsons' divisions took away from Price the means of offering him a serious resistance. These two divisions, recalled by Kirby Smith, had arrived at Shreveport on the day that Steele had left Little Rock. The infantry that Price had retained, belonging to Fagan's old division, was concentrated at Spring Hill, a village situated at a short distance from the left bank of Red River and south of Washington, on the direct road from Arkadelphia to Shreveport. His cavalry, divided between Generals Fagan and Marmaduke, was guarding the Washita: the one was near Camden, the other above and below Arkadelphia. The latter had pushed his outposts to within twenty-five miles of Little Rock, but naturally he had not been able to oppose himself seriously to the march of the Federals. Cabell's brigade, which belonged to his command, had been detached to watch Thayer's movements if he penetrated Arkansas, and occupied the town of Paraclifta to the west of Washington, on the road from Fort Smith to Shreveport. The

troops which Blunt had driven beyond the Canadian River at the close of 1863, before taking possession of Fort Smith, had remained in the Indian Territory near the border of Texas, and formed two brigades of cavalry which under General Maxey covered the frontier against all direct attack.

For this campaign, which he was unwillingly undertaking, Steele had the choice of several routes. We have said that he had at the very first dismissed as impracticable the plan which would have produced the most certain results in assuring his junction with Banks near Alexandria, and which consisted in descending the Washita. After having proposed to gain the banks of the upper Red River in Arkansas, going by way of Washington in order to descend the river, and to approach Shreveport from the other side, he wound up by joining in the opinion which Sherman, with his usual sagacity, had given him at the very start, and had decided to march by way of Camden and Overton. The possession of the first of these two lines assured him easy communications with Pine Bluff. In going by way of the second he could assist Banks before Shreveport without having to traverse the marshy flats intersected by the lakes and bayous into which Red River spreads out above this city. But, informed of the fortification of Camden, he resolved, instead of marching directly on this place, to reduce it by drawing away Price's forces on the other side; he wished, moreover, to avoid following the course of the Washita, the valley of which, inundated by the winter's rains, was almost impracticable. He chose the Washington road, and, not having any news of Thayer, whom the condition of the roads had obliged to change his course, he left Arkadelphia on April 1st. On the very next day he found in front of him Marmaduke, who had reunited his division by recalling Cabell. The Confederates were able to harass the Union army and retard its advance, but not to stop it. They tried in vain to dispute with it the marshy banks of the Little Missouri, an affluent of the Washita: Steele, after a feint of wishing to cross this river on the Washington road, turned suddenly to the left and took possession of the crossing called Elkins' Ferry while Marmaduke was waiting for him farther up with the bulk of his troops. Seeing himself deceived, the Southern general sent Shelby, who had remained on the north

bank, to follow up the enemy's column. The Southern cavalry on the evening of the 2d overtook his rearguard at Terre Noire Creek, but they were vigorously repulsed, and on the next day the whole Union army had crossed the Little Missouri. It was high time, for a sudden and considerable rise in the river had covered all the fords. Steele, not wishing to leave an obstacle like that between Thayer and himself, decided to wait for the latter, while his soldiers constructed a "corduroy road" (a roadway of trunks of trees) which traversed the whole inundated valley of the Little Missouri: a bridge had been thrown across this river. It was finally learned that the Army of the Frontier had on the 5th reached at Rockport the road from Little Rock to Arkadelphia. It was much behind time, and could not join Steele before the 9th. On the next day the latter set out upon the march; the weather was fair again, the roads were better, and the Federals, knowing their numerical superiority, marched boldly into a country hitherto unknown to them and as yet little more than a wilderness.

Price, for his part, went to meet them with all the forces at his disposal. Kirby Smith had directed him to make a determined stand at Camden, but only in case he believed the place able to hold out, and to send a brigade to the other side of the Washita to interfere with the enemy's line of communication. He had taken advantage of the latitude allowed him in the first part of this order to evacuate Camden, and had not deemed it possible to comply with the second. He had—very wisely, we believe—concentrated all his forces and left to guerillas the business of harassing the enemy's wagon-trains. Maxey himself, recalled from the Indian Territory, has brought to him his two brigades. At several miles beyond the Little Missouri, on the plateau which separates this river from the Terre Rouge, there is a vast extent of prairie-land, bounded by a stream with wooded banks, to which the early French trappers, who had scoured this country, gave the name of Prairie d'Âne. After crossing it you reach, in the very skirts of the woods, an important cross-road: the road followed by the army, and which leads to Spring Hill, crosses at this place that from Washington to Camden. In order to cover as much as possible these two points, Price had resolved to defend the cross-roads.

The bulk of his forces were deployed in the prairie; his reserves occupied a line of earthworks thrown up on the edge of the woods. It was almost night when the Federals discovered the enemy's line of battle. They put off the attack till the morrow, and confined themselves to bombarding it during the evening. This fire having clearly revealed the position of their artillery, the Confederates, who had acquired in the Indian wars the taste—which had become a habit—of surprises by night, tried to capture it under cover of the darkness. But the Unionists were on their guard and vigorously repulsed the attack. The Southerners withdrew immediately within their line of earthworks along the woods, and there daybreak found them. The position was a strong one, and Steele, not daring to attack it in front, resolved, after having examined it, to extend his right so as to turn it. The lay of the land permitted him on this side to enfilade Price's left. This the latter knew beyond a doubt, and, besides, he feared above all to be cut off from Washington, for when, on the morning of the 12th, after a day of preparation, he saw the indications of Steele's intended movement, he promptly fell back on that town, without seeking to defend his position.

The road to Camden was clear. The Federals took it at once—it was all they wanted—while only their cavalry followed the enemy in the opposite direction. The latter were not slow to perceive the state of affairs. Price was not able to contend seriously with Steele for the possession of Camden, but he sent Marmaduke with Cabell's and Shelby's brigades to make a *détour* and head him off on the road to that town, in order to retard his march as much as possible. Price himself started in pursuit, and on the 13th made an attack on Steele's rearguard at the moment when he was crossing the difficult *Terre Rouge*. Thayer, who with his division formed this rearguard, easily repulsed the attack, while Steele, driving Marmaduke before him, entered on the 15th the works of Camden, which the enemy had been able neither to defend nor to destroy. His soldiers and his horses had suffered much on this last march for want of rations and forage. His quartermaster's department had given out, and the country afforded nothing for the subsistence of an army. It was necessary, therefore, to procure supplies from Pine Bluff, more than seventy-

five miles distant from Camden by road, and to wait for news from Banks before penetrating farther into the enemy's country. But this news soon confirmed the stories picked up by the Federals for several days past from the few inhabitants they had seen on their march. On the 15th one of the scouts that Steele had sent out on an errand of discovery rejoined him finally at Camden, after having traversed the whole country to the north of Red River. He had left Banks on the 13th at Natchitoches, and brought back with him orally the official account by which the latter sought to disguise his defeat; but he had seen the army, had talked with the soldiers, and the statements which he made to his chief could not fail to enlighten him as to the true situation of Banks' army. Steele understood that the expedition was a failure, and decided not to venture beyond Camden. However, he did not believe that he ought yet to take up his march for Little Rock.

In fact, Banks would be able, as long he remained at Natchitoches, to resume the offensive if a rise in Red River opened the way to Shreveport to the navy, and formal orders obliged the Army of Arkansas in this case to act in co-operation. Accordingly, although his concentration would have left the field free to the enemy's guerillas, Steele resolved to wait for more precise information at Camden or for other instructions from headquarters. But, as we have said, Kirby Smith was preparing already to bring against him all the forces at his disposal. After having massed them on April 16th at Shreveport, he started off at their head the very next day by three different roads. Walker had taken on the right that which goes through Minden; Parsons, in the centre, was making for Benton; Churchill, on the left, was to advance up the left bank of Red River and after a march of thirty-seven miles turn to the right in order to reach the town of Magnolia in Arkansas. Kirby Smith, however, soon halted the first of these three columns. Having learned that Banks was fortifying himself at Natchitoches and had thrown a bridge across Red River, he feared lest the latter was trying to join Steele, and directed Walker to take a position nearly twenty miles beyond Minden in order to watch his movements. This was a great mistake, for this division, the best of the three, was thus

placed too far both from Natchitoches and from Camden to operate either against Banks or against Steele. Kirby Smith made the matter worse by sending his ponton-train to Taylor, of which the latter had no need, and the absence of which was going to paralyze his own movements. Besides, he did not appear to have meant to make a thorough campaign of it, for when, after four or five days' marching, the two other columns were only twenty-five miles from Camden, he halted them likewise, not daring to advance farther so long as Banks should be at Natchitoches. Thus, after having prevented Taylor from reaping the fruits of his victory over the latter under pretext of heading off Steele, who was weaker and easier to crush, he does not dare attack him, and confines himself to watching him at a distance, while the vanquished at Mansfield are only too glad to retreat to Alexandria in spite of the inadequacy of the forces arrayed against them.

In the mean time, the position of Steele is a perilous one: if the Confederates are not going to seek him behind the solid works of Camden, they are making it more and more difficult for him to maintain his line of communications with his base, and they are preparing to starve him out by not permitting him to live upon the country. As early as the 18th, in fact, a Union detachment which was on a foraging expedition was attacked by Maxey's cavalry near Poison Springs, only twelve miles from Camden: the Federals were put to flight and all their wagons captured. Soon a more serious affair happened to enlighten Steele upon the dangers of his situation. Kirby Smith, in order to disguise the inactivity of his infantry, had directed Fagan to cross to the left side of the Washita with his three thousand five hundred cavalry, and to push as far as the banks of the Arkansas in order to annoy the garrisons at Little Rock and Pine Bluff, and to cut off Steele's communications with those places. He succeeded completely. A large wagon-train coming from the latter post had on the 20th brought the Federals the stores of which they were so sorely in need. On the 22d, Steele, on sending it back empty, gave it a strong escort composed of six hundred infantry, four hundred cavalry, and a battery of four pieces, under the orders of Colonel Drake. These forces seemed more

than sufficient to cope with Shelby's brigade, which alone had been reported on the way from Pine Bluff. But Fagan, having learned of the departure of the train, makes a forced march to overtake it, and, taking Shelby along, he ascends the left bank of Bayou Moro, a wide creek with marshy shores which flows from north to south halfway between Camden and Pine Bluff, about thirty-five miles from each. He is aware that this obstacle will bring the Federal column to a halt. In fact, though it arrived at a place called Marks' Mill, near Bayou Moro, on the 23d, it is not yet entirely across on the afternoon of the 24th. The sappers and miners are repairing the road through the marshy bottoms in which the wagon-train, stretching out for more than five miles, is mired at every step. A regiment forms the rearguard. The bulk of the escort has already passed the defile when Fagan, arriving unexpectedly, attacks it with vigor. While the Federals, surprised in the midst of their halt, are forming themselves in line of battle, Fagan, who has more than five thousand cavalry under him, extends his two wings so as to cut off their retreat. This manœuvre is completely successful. The small troop of cavalry alone succeeds in escaping in the direction of Pine Bluff. The regiment forming the rearguard tries ineffectually to come to the rescue of the rest of the infantry, but is surrounded on every side, and returns to Camden with the news of the disaster. Drake and the majority of the officers are wounded. The victors have in their possession three hundred prisoners, four cannon, and more than two hundred wagons.

The news of the battle of Marks' Mill reached Camden on the 25th. Steele had not a moment to lose in retreating, for he learned at the same time of the approach of Kirby Smith. Walker, at the news of Banks' evacuation of Grand Écore, had started on the march to rejoin his chief, and the latter at the head of his three divisions appeared on the 26th in sight of the place. He made ready to invest it, but Steele, master of the passage across the Washita, was already in full retreat: his rearguard had destroyed before daylight the bridge thrown across the river. The Confederates, not having their ponton-train, lost twenty-four hours in restoring the passage, and thus let the Federals get an important start. Steele profited by it, and, quickening the step of his soldiers, marched

them on one stretch, by the way of Princeton, to the banks of the Sabine River, a large affluent of the Washita which, like the Bayou Moro, flows from north to south. This river, which he had reached at Jenkins' Ferry, more than halfway between Camden and Little Rock, was the only serious obstacle in his way. The Union army arrived exhausted, for it had travelled in twenty-four hours more than fifty miles, but it had seized the crossing without striking a blow, and on the morning of the 28th it was engaged in making it practicable for the wagons and the artillery. It was high time, for Fagan, by Kirby Smith's orders, started immediately after the battle of Marks' Mill for the Sabine River, and tried to cross this stream in order to occupy the left bank and dispute it with the Federals. Luckily for them, he had not been able to find a ford, and, passing by Jenkins' Ferry, he had been seeking a crossing higher up, near Benton; but having, it appears, run short of forage, he had turned aside, in spite of the instructions of his chief, for the purpose of seeking it in the neighborhood of Arkadelphia. He had thus missed the opportunity of holding Steele in check on the banks of the Sabine until Kirby Smith had been able to come up with all his army. The latter marched more slowly than the Federals. On the evening of the 29th it was écheloned between Princeton and Tulip, and did not appear till the afternoon of the 30th on the hills which command the wide valley of the Sabine, after a march begun at one o'clock in the morning and rendered very laborious by the rain.

Steele was still in the valley, for it had become needful to give his soldiers rest and to construct at both ends of the bridge of boats thrown across the river a corduroy road nearly five miles long. But this undertaking was finished on the 30th, and a part of the army, with all its equipments, had already crossed the bridge, and a single regiment, the Thirty-third Iowa, forming the rearguard, occupied the edge of the woods which fill the valley and extend along the two banks of Sabine River in a thick belt. Without losing a moment, Kirby Smith, astride on the road followed by his column, deploys Churchill's division, which is at the head of it. Dockerey's brigade, which its commander had left in Arkansas and found again before Camden, is formed on the left beyond a creek which flows parallel with the road, and will seek

to turn the Federals' right; but the natural obstacles of the place retard his march. The rest of the division makes a spirited attack upon the Thirty-third Iowa, forces it back upon the Fiftieth Indiana, which was coming to its rescue, and advances into the woods, driving these regiments before it. But the Federal reinforcements are promptly on hand. The Ninth Wisconsin and the Twenty-ninth Iowa serve as a check upon Churchill's impetuosity. The surface of the forest, intersected with quagmires and covered with underbrush and fallen trees, favors the defence. On the one side, Parsons, who was close behind Churchill, advances to his support; on the other, Steele strengthens his line, which nothing can shake. The artillery which the Confederates have sent into the woods is of no benefit to them, while the creek near which Churchill made ready for action, forming in the woods an impassable slough, throws their efforts out of gear. The Forty-third Illinois and the Fortieth Iowa profit by this to fall upon Dockerey's brigade and compel it to a hasty retreat. The first attack came to naught: in order to renew it, Kirby Smith sends to Walker—who, starting from Princeton, had had a long march to make—an order to hurry up, and with Scurry's and Randall's brigades to take a cross-road on the right which is sure to bring him out on the left flank of the enemy, while Waul's brigade is posted behind Parsons and Churchill. But the latter generals, whose soldiers fight as tamely as they did at Pleasant Hill, are driven back in disorder before Walker finishes his flank movement. Leaving several cannon in the hands of the enemy, they abandon the woods and fall back behind Waul. General S. A. Rice, to whom Steele had left the command on this side, profits by this to turn all his forces against Walker at the moment when he is beginning an attack with his two brigades. Waul advances in his turn to their support, and enters the woods on their left. Walker's division—the whole of it in action—is thus soon reunited, but is unable to dislodge the Federals, who, as we have said, have the advantage of position. At the end of an hour's fighting Waul is repulsed; Scurry and Randall, after some success at the start, are unable to make any further advance, for the struggle in the woods has thrown their ranks into the greatest confusion. Steele, satisfied with the results obtained, slowly withdraws his troops and gets

them safely across the river, but, fearing the approach of the enemy, he is obliged to abandon a small detachment that had stayed behind to bury the dead, and to sacrifice some of his pontoons. His losses are about seven hundred men—those of the Confederates about eight hundred. If he has left behind him some of his wounded, he has captured from the assailants three cannon. These have lost a fine chance to deal him a fatal blow. They will not find another, for they cannot cross the river, and Fagan, to make worse the blunder which led him to Arkadelphia, has returned to Jenkins' Ferry on learning of Steele's arrival, instead of seeking to outmarch him on the road to Little Rock by crossing the Sabine at Benton. He appears on the battlefield an hour after the last Federal soldier has set foot on the opposite bank. Realizing his powerlessness, Kirby Smith gives his wornout soldiers the order for retreat.

The battle of Jenkins' Ferry closed in a humiliating manner a campaign which was expected to assure the destruction of Steele's army, and to which Kirby Smith had sacrificed the more certain hope of making the victory at Mansfield complete. Without showing a disposition to acknowledge his mistake, he sought to repair it, but it was too late. Steele, on his side, after having despatched Carr with all his cavalry on the road to Little Rock for exploration, and to protect the train which he was impatiently awaiting, set out slowly on the march. His famished soldiers finally saw the train arrive, and on the 2d of May they re-entered in low spirits the capital of Arkansas. So, then, their campaign had miscarried, but through the fault of another.

It was time that it closed in order to allow them to pursue the guerillas who had profited by their concentration to reorganize and renew their depredations. A few words will suffice us to recount the hostilities on a smaller scale caused by the presence of some of the bands of guerillas during the six weeks that this campaign lasted. At the end of March a guerilla chief, General McRae, had established his headquarters at Augusta, on the White River, in the north-western part of the State of Arkansas, where he was disturbing the line of communication established between Little Rock and Memphis by the Devall's Bluff Railroad. Colonel C. C. Andrews with one hundred and eighty infantry and fifty cavalry

went on March 30th from Little Rock to the latter point, where he embarked and ascended the White River to Augusta. On the 1st of April he landed his troops and penetrated into the interior in search of McRae. The latter made no delay in attacking him with superior forces in a place called Fitzhugh's Woods. McRae was not able to rout him, but forced him to beat a hasty retreat after a loss of twenty-nine men. Andrews returned immediately after to Little Rock. A little later another expedition was organized against this same band. Andrews disembarked again at Augusta on the 20th of April, dispersed near Cotton Plant the small detachments of the enemy which he met, and, not having been able to overtake McRae, he returned on the 24th to Little Rock. Finally, elsewhere the banks of the Arkansas above Fort Smith were incessantly drenched with blood that was shed by small bands that surprised isolated posts, captured detachments, pillaged the farms of inhabitants suspected of sympathy with the Union, and, not giving any quarter, spread terror everywhere. On the 4th of April one of these bands attacked in vain the little post of Roseville. It was driven off with loss, but it wreaked its vengeance in new massacres.

We must now return to Alexandria, where we left Banks and Taylor facing each other, whilst Kirby Smith after the battle of Jenkins' Ferry finally decided to bring back to this point the army which he had so mal apropos dragged to the very centre of Arkansas. The Union fleet, reunited on the 28th of April above the rapids of Alexandria, consisted of a monitor, eight ironclads, and a large gunboat. It had, we have seen, cleared this obstacle a month before with some difficulty; but since then the water had fallen over six feet, leaving the rocks bare for a distance of a mile and a quarter, in the midst of which Red River flowed seething like a torrent. The narrow and winding channel through these rocks, with which the experience of the pilots had made them familiar, presented, as did all the rest of the river, only an insignificant sheet of water, and the nature of the bottom did not admit of deepening it. It seemed as if no human power could get the fleet past such an obstacle, and that its deliverance was only to be expected from a sudden rise in the river. But summer was approaching, and there was every reason to fear that nothing short

of a miracle could procure a rise before the following winter. The crews which had boldly enlisted on Red River to support the army, and which, through the fault of the army's commander, instead of entering the waters of Shreveport as conquerors, now found themselves in a veritable trap, loudly demanded that the army should not abandon them, even if it had to intrench itself at Alexandria and settle down there as if to stay.

As for Banks, badgered as he was by the orders which kept pressing him to terminate a useless campaign, and paralyzed by the silent verdict of disapproval which he read in the faces of all his subordinates, his sole concern was to reconduct his army as quickly as possible to New Orleans. It was no longer in his power, as at Grand Écore, to seek to delude himself by planning a counter-attack upon the enemy, and, without making an open admission of it, he had evidently resigned himself to a sacrifice of the fleet, since it was decided to leave Alexandria at an early date. This abandonment, which would perhaps have permitted the Confederates to resume, with Red River as their base, naval operations on the Mississippi, which, in any case, would have conferred on them a new prestige, and by that means have attracted thousands of fighting men to re-enlist under their flag, would have been a cruel humiliation to the Federals—one not to be measured by the money value of the exposed vessels. The safety of the soldiers and the sailors would have been its sole justification. In Banks' situation nothing could have excused such a resolution. Grover's fine division, which he had left at Alexandria, was there on his return. On the 27th he had seen the arrival of McClelland with several thousand soldiers of the Thirteenth corps, whom an order from Grant had recalled from the coast of Texas, so that he had around him, without counting the crews of the fleet, nearly twenty-five thousand soldiers, and was in a position with these forces to disperse the feeble detachments which had the audacity to invest him in Alexandria. After having sent A. J. Smith to Vicksburg in obedience to Grant's urgent demand, he would still have had enough men to defend Alexandria indefinitely against all the attacks of Kirby Smith—against all the troops which the latter would have been able to collect from the west of the Mississippi.

But the ingenuity of the Yankees, schooled in a struggle with the forces of Nature, was soon to spare him the painful alternative of abandoning the fleet or of letting himself be tied down by it at Alexandria. Immediately upon the appearance of the difficulties attending the navigation of Red River numerous plans had been brought forward and discussed in the army, around the camp-fires, for enabling the vessels to surmount the difficulties which they encountered. Among the officers who thus employed themselves with conceptions more or less chimerical was one who had a right to claim a hearing. It was a former civil engineer, Lieutenant-colonel Bailey, attached to the staff of General Franklin. The year before, after the capture of Port Hudson, two steamboats had been abandoned by the Southerners in a small tributary of the Mississippi called Thompson's Creek; but the boats having become completely imbedded in mud in consequence of a falling of the waters, they were on the point of being destroyed when Bailey by means of a skilful arrangement of dams succeeded in disengaging them through the action of the current and setting them afloat. When the *Eastport* foundered below Grand Écore he had proposed to raise it in the same manner, but the officials had not listened to him, and had been forced to destroy this fine vessel. The success which he had obtained at Thompson's Creek gave great weight to his words when he came to assure his superiors that he would undertake to get the whole fleet past the rapids in fifteen days. Nevertheless, he was received with incredulity. Franklin alone and his chief of staff, Colonel Hoffman, who were equal to a proper appreciation of Bailey's character and capacity, believed what he said. The authority of the former, who passed with unequivocal title for an excellent officer of engineers, while not convincing any one, triumphed over all difficulties. General Hunter, who had just arrived, commissioned by General Grant to render him a personal report of the situation of the army, was the first to recommend a trial of Bailey's plan. Banks and Porter, equally incredulous, both consented to this trial, while each subsequently boasted of having used every argument upon the other to obtain his consent. Bailey proposed to construct across the rapids a dam over which the water passed by a weir, and which would thus raise it sufficiently to submerge the obstacles in the way of

the fleet. The river is about seven hundred and fifty feet wide, from one to seven feet deep; the water runs at the rate of ten miles an hour; the length of the rapids is a mile and a quarter, and their total fall is thirteen feet; the slope is unequally distributed, and becomes much more strongly pronounced at the lower end. It is above this last portion of the rapids that Bailey wanted to build the dam, so as to have to raise the work only seven feet. Two vessels were brought together in the kind of reservoir formed near the dam: he counted without doubt on opening the latter partially, so as to obtain a powerful current which would carry the fleet to the lower falls and enable it to pass them. The plan appeared chimerical; the most confident believed it would take months to carry it out.

On board of the fleet, especially, every one was a critic: the sailors did not believe that the army could devise means to extricate them which they had not imagined themselves. However, it was necessary to try everything before abandoning the best part of the squadron of the Mississippi: this the most sceptical understood, and Bailey, having received *carte blanche*, found in all the ranks of the army a hearty co-operation. He set to work on the 1st of May with the aid of Colonel Wilson, and Banks, once the work was begun, was the most assiduous in following its progress, the most impatient to see it finished—in short, the most confident of its success. He is even open to the reproach of letting himself become so much absorbed in it as to have forgotten his duties as general-in-chief. In fact, after having thrown a bridge of boats across Red River and established on the 30th of April the troops of A. J. Smith on the left bank in order to cover on this side the approaches to Alexandria, he left his army in the most incredible inactivity.

Waiting with feverish impatience the extrication of the vessels in order to start the army on the march, Banks appeared to take no longer any notice of what was going on around Alexandria, save, when seized with a sudden uneasiness, he announced aloud his intention of abandoning both the fleet and the dam, whose construction was not proceeding at the rate which suited him. The soldiers who were not engaged in the latter work constructed on the right bank a long series of intrenchments, behind

which they had orders to remain in concealment, just as if they were besieged by a powerful army. In the city, according to the story of all the eye-witnesses, the chief employment was speculating in the cotton which was waiting for the departure of the fleet to be carried by it down Red River and either to Cairo or to New Orleans. This strange inaction permitted Taylor, who had less than five thousand men under him, to invest and fight by blockade an army five times larger than his own. Three brigades of cavalry, each containing a thousand men, sufficed to establish this blockade. They separated for that, taking with them several batteries of artillery. Steele's brigade was ordered to watch the approaches to Alexandria on the west, on the line of Bayou Rapides; Bagby on the south, on that of Bayou Boeuf; whilst Major, going down the stream below the city, posted himself at David's Ferry in order to cut Banks' communications with the Mississippi and close the navigation of Red River to the enemy's transports. Polignac with his twelve hundred infantry was placed so as to serve as a reserve for the one or the other of the last two, who were the most exposed, inasmuch as they occupied the enemy's two lines of retreat. On the left bank, Liddell with his seven hundred cavalry watched at a distance the Federals under Smith, but the absence of the artillery which Kirby Smith had taken from him did not permit him to give an effective backing to Major down Red River.

The Federals, penned up in the environs of Alexandria, found some bales of cotton to pick up, but they could not get together the necessary stores and forage for the army: luckily for them, Red River was still open to their transports. The next necessary step for the Confederates was to close it, thus completing the bold blockade by which Taylor hoped to force the Federals to quit Alexandria and sacrifice their fleet. Major soon found an opportunity to do so. On the 30th of April he had taken position on the right bank of Red River a little above Fort de Russy and within reach of Marksville, where he had his base of operations. On the 2d of May, West's horse-battery, composed of four pieces, had joined him. On the next day the steamboat *City Belle*, with three hundred Ohio soldiers who were on their way to join Banks, arrived in front of the point where he was posted with the battery.

No one on board had a suspicion of the enemy's presence, who had not yet been observed. Accordingly, the boat, which was without either escort or armament, was disabled at the very first fire, and obliged to surrender with all on board. Colonel Warren, who had just landed at Simsport with a detachment of the Thirteenth corps, and was going by land to Alexandria, having learned of this disaster, and having no means to know the force of the enemy, threw himself into Fort de Russy, which Major had neglected, and which he thus occupied very opportunely. However, the news of the loss of the *City Belle* having not yet reached Alexandria, the Federals did not even know of the danger which threatened the navigation of Red River. So it came about that on the 4th of May they sent off without fear four hundred discharged Ohio soldiers on the transport *Warner* under the sole escort of the small gunboat *Covington*. The next day the *Warner* was joined by the advice-boat *Signal* bearing despatches, and the three vessels, in the order which we have enumerated, were proceeding down the winding course of Red River when, about nine o'clock in the morning, they reached the bend of the river occupied by Major. The latter had established the two sections of his battery at a certain distance apart. Several hundred dismounted cavalry occupied the bluff. The two cannon placed up the stream at a place called Dunn's Bayou opened fire upon the Union vessels, and hit them several times, without, however, being able to stop them. But while Lieutenant Yoist with his two pieces, rapidly limbered up, runs them up the best he can on the bluff, a little lower down Lieutenant Lyne, in command of the other section, is more successful. His first discharge cripples the *Warner*, which, left exposed without defence to his fire, is borne down the stream and quickly runs aground. She is soon riddled, her machinery is broken, and a hundred and twenty-five men, dead or wounded, are lying about between decks. At the same time the *Covington* and the *Signal* have encountered Lyne's artillery, but, as the *Warner* bars their way, they are obliged to turn up the stream and to abandon the *Warner*, which, because of the wounded who encumber it cannot be set on fire, hoists the white flag. In the mean time, the two gunboats have been so much damaged as to be unable to continue their course. In vain the *Covington* tries to tow the *Signal*; they

are both obliged to stop and come to anchor under the left bank, in the hope that the bend of the river and the high bluffs which border it on the right will protect them from Lyne's fire. But at this moment Yoist arrives with his section, and, running it boldly up within less than four hundred yards of the enemy's vessels, riddles them with shots. The Federals are bewildered and make a feeble reply; their pieces cease to work. Lyne joins his fire to Yoist's; Major's soldiers, posted on the bluff, keep up such a lively fusillade that the Federals imagine themselves in presence of a whole division. Seeing their vessels riddled, and not being able either to manœuvre or to defend them, they set them on fire after landing their wounded, and make their escape to the woods on the left bank. The greater part of them regain Alexandria after a most fatiguing and dangerous march.

This time the blockade was complete: the stories of the fugitives, the activity of Taylor's cavalry and artillery, completely deceived Banks. He believed himself invested by the whole of the army he had encountered at Mansfield, and, seeing his forage rapidly diminishing, he made ready for an early abandonment of Alexandria. It would appear from a despatch addressed to Admiral Porter that he had even fixed upon the 10th of May as the date of this evacuation. Happily for the Federals, they were to be spared this cruel humiliation. In spite of their original incredulity and the derision of the enemy, Bailey's work advanced rapidly. He had undertaken, in order to form the projected dam, to build two wings, one from each bank, which met in the middle of the river. On the left, where there was plenty of wood, the wing was composed of large trunks of trees with their principal branches left on them, between which were thrown brushwood, fascines, and then stones to ballast them. On the right bank mills, sheds, and abandoned houses were pulled down and the woodwork taken to construct frames which were filled with stones and then sunk one after the other. The foundation of the two wings once formed in this way with the aid of boats and barges, the workmen advanced into the water on this frail structure as far as they could to complete it, consolidate it, and raise it.

Three thousand men and two hundred teams were constantly employed at this work; the squads were furnished by the whole

army and worked in frequent relays. The banks of Red River presented a strange and novel spectacle for these regions, which the feverish activity of the Northerner has not turned upside down as it has other parts of the United States. On one side was seen a detachment tearing down dwellings and loading up the débris on lumber-wagons; on another, the century-old trees were falling by hundreds under the axes of lumbermen from Maine. On the north bank the white soldiers were working with that steadiness which constitutes their force; on the south bank the workmen, furnished for the most part by the black regiments, brought to their work the noisy turbulence of the African blood. These felt an ardent rivalry from the start, but in proportion as the wings gained in height confidence spread among even the most sceptical, and every one seemed personally interested in the success of the dam. The soldiers went into the ice-cold water in spite of the force of the current, and with their heads exposed to a burning sun. The darkness of the night did not retard their energies. Great fires built on the bluffs furnished light and revealed to the enemy, who were unable to hamper them, the progress of the great enterprise which was to rob them of their prey.

Finally, on the 8th of May the two wings met. Boats loaded with bricks and sunk at the extremity formed the connecting-link over which the waters of the river poured with violence. These waters thus dammed up rose rapidly on the upper side, and covered the rapids above which the fleet was stopped. The decisive moment had arrived. But although the rapids were practicable, the navigation of them was, for all that, exceedingly difficult. The sole channel which the vessels could follow was narrow and winding from one end to the other. These vessels, lightened of their heavy artillery and of the heaviest part of their cargoes, which had been put ashore, could only proceed one by one, and avoid the rocks by now making fast to one bank and now to another. Three vessels, the *Fort Hindman*, the *Neosho*, and the *Osage*, passed in this manner, and reached by evening the deep waters accumulated in front of the dam. But the darkness soon rendered the navigation of the rapids impossible, and the passage of the other vessels had to be put off till the morrow. In the mean time, the waters

kept rising against the dam. Banks, who had followed the building of it with feverish anxiety, visited it at eleven o'clock at night, and soon remarked that the pressure was increasing at a rate that did not augur well for the safety of the work. He ran to the point above the rapids where lay the seven vessels which were still awaiting their deliverance. Everything was quiet; feeble rays of light were all that were reflected on the surface of the water. The crews, full of confidence, were resting, to be ready for the next day's work. But the river, irritated by the obstacle that impeded its course, declined to rest and was noiselessly sapping this obstacle. All the results of persistent work were on the point of being thrown away. In fact, at the break of day two of the sunken boats which formed the centre of the dam were lifted up and violently hurled to one side; the waters, bursting through the breach thus opened, fell rapidly. Porter, who had been forewarned by Banks during the night of the danger which menaced the dam, was a witness of this accident. He mounted a horse and quickly reached the other vessels, hoping they might yet succeed in passing before the fall of the water had rendered the passage impracticable. He gave orders to the *Lexington* to shoot the rapids immediately, and to risk everything to reach the dam, and, without stopping, clear the open breach through which the water was furiously surging. There is not a moment to lose in carrying out this perilous order, for already the rocks of the cataract, covered a moment before, begin to appear all around. The brave sailors of the *Lexington*, without a moment's hesitation, close all their portholes and launch their vessel into the current, now accelerated by the falling of the river. Borne along with immense speed, it clears the passage as if by a miracle: as in a fairy tale, the passage immediately closes behind it, and without suffering any injury it reaches the neighborhood of the dam. Thousands of spectators hail its approach with mingled admiration and alarm, for among the laborers who have laid down their tools, among the soldiers who have deserted their camps, among the inhabitants of Alexandria who had flocked to the spot, the news had spread that the vessel was going to try to pass the breach. She is seen, in fact, to steer under full steam for the yawning gulf. As she advances farther the noisy crowd is hushed: at the moment when the ves-

sel, lifted by the vortex, passes between the ends of the two wings, it was like being in a desert, according to the reports of eye-witnesses, so great was the silence. The fall has more than three feet, but the force of the current and the volume of the water cover the shelves of rock which would otherwise have been impassable with a liquid inclined plane—such as is formed when the sluice of a mill is suddenly opened—which hastens to mingle with the deeper waters below these last rapids. The *Lexington*, lifted like a straw by the current, rocks two or three times, remains for a moment balanced on the boiling waters near a rock; then, hurried on anew, she reaches the deep and tranquil waters, where she rides unharmed. A deafening shout greets this successful venture, the almost certain pledge of the deliverance of the whole fleet. However, everything is suddenly hushed again, for another vessel is about to take its turn in trying the difficult pass. Porter, in fact, had given orders to the three vessels arrived the evening before to hold themselves ready to follow the *Lexington* if she passed successfully. The *Neosho* is now approaching the breach: she is already caught by the irresistible current; it is the moment when boldness is prudence—when, as the admiral directed, the vessel must be put under a full head of steam in order to outstrip the current and so get steerage-way. But at the sight of the raging waters the pilot of the *Neosho* loses his head and stops the engines. The vessel is at once tossed about; it disappears two or three times submerged in the midst of the waves, collides with the jetties and the rocks, but finally reappears at the end of the pass, seriously damaged, it is true, but afloat, her machinery intact and without having lost one of her crew. This time the emotion of the spectators has been greater than before, for all of them, the admiral included, have for a moment believed the *Neosho* lost. The pilots of the *Fort Hindman* and the *Osage*, profiting by this dangerous experiment, follow the example of the *Lexington* and meet with equal success. Four vessels, then, have reached the part of Red River where no serious obstacle hinders them from reaching the Mississippi. But the others are still blockaded above the rapids, which once more present only a series of rocks and surging waters. Not one has had time to follow the *Lexington*.

At the sight of their work destroyed in an instant and two-

thirds of the fleet still prisoners for want of a few more hours to profit by the artificial rise of the waters, the Federals would have been excusable in yielding to a very natural discouragement. There was all the more good reason to fear discouragement among the soldiers, who in a truly extraordinary undertaking had just been lavishing their strength and health without being properly seconded, as they accused the sailors, whether rightfully or not, in an enterprise designed exclusively for the safety of the fleet. What now was to be done? Must they, after so many efforts, after being so near success, confess themselves beaten by the elements? Did it devolve upon them to struggle against these difficulties by the same means and try to close the breach which the power of the waters had opened, at the risk, if successful, of causing the dam this time to be carried away entirely. Of these two alternatives the one was cruel, the other inadmissible. At this difficult juncture Bailey's practical spirit was not at fault. If it preserved its dimensions, the breach formed, as experience had shown, a current which permitted the vessels to accomplish the last stages of the rapids. Instead of closing it, he proposed then to restrict the breach to a width of fifty-two feet by strengthening the extremities of the wings. The hulls of the boats which he had sunk at these extremities to connect them had been thrown by the current upon a very dangerous rock, and by a lucky chance thus formed a buffer which protected navigation against this reef. Everything favored, then, the passage, provided the water could be raised sufficiently in the upper part of the rapids. To accomplish this, Bailey no longer proposed to do violence to the river by damming it completely, but, if it is so permitted to speak, to compromise with it on the basis of narrowing its course without barring it. Three or four large stockades or dikes, projecting at a decided angle down the stream, were to extend from the banks opposite each other, and so form so many partial dams, veritable stages, connected by portions of the canal where the mass of the confined water was expected to afford the necessary depth for navigation. The plan was happily conceived; it was that which had already succeeded at Thompson's Creek, but the rapidity of its execution was really a prodigy. The work was commenced on the afternoon of the 9th, after the *Lexington* had cleared the dam,

and forty hours after the passage was practicable. It is true that the sailors, inspired this time with confidence, had without relaxation been at work lightening their vessels. The plates of their iron mail not necessary to protect the machinery had been taken off and thrown as secretly as possible by night in the deepest places of the river. The ironclads, thus relieved of an enormous weight, sailed easily through the midst of all the dangers presented by the passage of the rapids. All were successful in passing the breach of the dam under the eyes of an immense crowd which never wearied of the touching spectacle, and on May 13th at ten A. M. the whole fleet was reunited below the dam. One of the most remarkable operations of the war was thus accomplished. It had not cost the life of a single man. The navy and the army overflowed with the warmest tributes to Bailey—tributes which were repeated from one end of the Union to the other, and a general's stars were the just reward accorded by a grateful Government. The Confederates, promptly informed of his success, were utterly disappointed to see slip from their hands the powerful fleet whose destruction they had discounted, but mingled with this sentiment was a certain pride arising from the reflection that Europe would learn with astonishment of this unheard-of achievement in military history wrought by the genius and industrial aptitude of Americans.

Before the end of this memorable day all the vessels of the fleet had reshipped their cargoes and were moving away from Alexandria, preceded by the transports. They left behind them the now useless wing-dams, perishable witnesses of their undertaking which the first rise of the river was to carry away. By way of a souvenir there was taken a series of photographic views. There was not a moment to lose in reaching the Mississippi, for Banks, showing a haste in his situation inexplicable, had already set his whole army on the march. The departure from Alexandria was marked by sorrowful incidents. All the inhabitants who had compromised themselves by their exhibitions of sympathy were abandoned to the vengeance of the Confederates; nay, more, the Federals left them the work of fire as a souvenir of their stay. The fire, started by some stragglers in some buildings adjoining the wharf, spread with fearful rapidity, owing to a high wind.

The Federals were unjustly accused of having designedly applied the torch, but the haste of their departure, which resembled a precipitate retreat, favored the spread of the fire.

Banks in leaving Alexandria had taken the road to Simsport, for he was in a hurry to gain the banks of the Mississippi, near which, and nowhere else, he believed he would be in safety. Taylor, however, was not able to contest with him seriously his line of retreat. He did all he could with his feeble band to retard his march, in the vain hope that Kirby Smith would yet come up in time to attack the enemy before he was out of reach of its blows. The Federals marched slowly, for they pushed before them an immense train. Polignac, overtaking them, boldly placed himself with Major across their path in a vast undulating plain called the Prairie d'Avoyelles, which extends between Mansura and Marksville, while Wharton with two brigades of cavalry harassed their rearguard, made up, as it was always at critical moments, of Smith's corps.

Banks followed the right side of Red River as far as beyond Wilson's Ferry; then, leaving Fort de Russy, whose improvised garrison came to join him on the left, he moved in the direction of Marksville to resume the road followed by Smith two months before.

On the morning of the 14th the Nineteenth corps, which formed the advance-guard, found Mansura occupied by a detachment of the enemy, and captured it after quite a brisk engagement, while Smith, delayed by the wagon-train, was obliged to form into line to repulse Wharton's attacks. The length of his column did not admit getting it all promptly together to enter the fight which Polignac seemed bent on, for the latter had by a skilful deployment of his forces again succeeded in deceiving Banks as to his numerical weakness. Smith, summoned to come up with all haste with the bulk of his forces, could not arrive in line before the 15th. The Prairie d'Avoyelles offers a magnificent field to manœuvre the very largest armies. Banks made haste to form his own—Smith on the right, Emory on the left at the head of the Nineteenth corps, McClermand in reserve with the Thirteenth corps and the train. Wharton, who had joined Polignac with his cavalry and horse-artillery, wished to hoodwink the Union general as long as

possible. On the east of Mansura, on the road which strikes the ford of Bayou Glaise, the prairie is bounded by woods which crown quite a high hill visible from a great distance. Wharton posted his batteries on the edge of these woods, in the depths of which it was easy to imagine the presence of a whole army, and from these he cannonaded the Federals, who were advancing slowly, for a long time. Finally, toward evening, seeing that Smith threatened to cut off his retreat, he fell back in a southerly direction.

On the next day, the 16th, the head of the Union column reached Simsport on the Atchafalaya. But the army could not in its entirety embark at this out-of-the-way place on a river of difficult navigation. Banks was in a hurry, as we have said, to bring it to the shores of the Mississippi, where numerous transports could easily come from New Orleans to take it there. But the Atchafalaya presented a formidable obstacle. Its width of nearly seven hundred yards was a good place for drilling the ponton-train. A rise of the Mississippi was pouring in an enormous mass of water. Banks had again recourse to Bailey in this emergency. The latter proposed to construct a bridge of boats, making use, however, not of simple pontoons, but of all the transports which to the number of twenty had come to meet the army at Simsport. His plan was immediately adopted. The large boats, anchored side by side, were joined together by rough, hewn logs and by stout timbers on which a flooring was placed. The passage thus constructed across the gunwales over everything which encumbers the deck of a vessel might be expected to be very uneven, the boats which support it not having the same height above the water. It was not, for that, the less practicable, and was opened on the 19th. During its construction Smith remained on the borders of Yellow Bayou, a small tributary of the Atchafalaya which flows westward from Simsport, in order to protect it and cover the rest of the army. The enemy, in fact, became more and more enterprising in proportion to their belief that the Federals were on the point of getting away. On the 17th, Wharton, starting in pursuit of them, had made a spirited attack upon their rearguard near Bayou Glaise, and one of his regiments, following close, captured some wagons from it that evening in the very

neighborhood of Yellow Bayou. The next day, Taylor, who had come up with Polignac's infantry, was resolved to make a last effort to give the Federals trouble before they had crossed the Atchafalaya. Toward evening he made a vigorous attack upon A. J. Smith in the position which the latter had taken on Yellow Bayou. The latter, not expecting this attack, had gone to Simsport, and had left the command of his troops to General Mower. A desperate combat was soon begun. In spite of the repeated charges of the Confederates, which General Polignac with rare bravery led in person, the position of the Federals was not seriously disturbed. The assailants, it is true, remained masters of a part of the battlefield, but they were forced to abandon it immediately afterward. Their losses were considerable. They had four hundred and fifty-two men disabled, among whom was Colonel Stone, commander of Polignac's old brigade. The loss of the Federals was two hundred and fifty men. Colonel Lynch, commanding a brigade, a very brave officer, who has since played a part in the schemes of the Fenians, was seriously wounded on this occasion.

On the 19th of May the army began to cross Bailey's bridge, and on the 20th Smith in his turn crossed. The transports then started, and reached Morganzia on the Mississippi, where all of Banks' forces were mustered for the last time. The laborious and unfortunate Red River campaign was at an end.

On the 19th, General Canby, assigned as commander-in-chief of the whole new department of the Trans-Mississippi, had reached Simsport. The authority with which he was invested, and that which his vast experience conferred upon him, were guarantees that henceforth the Federal armies of the Far West were going to be handled with a thoroughness which up to that time had been lacking. But for the moment they were taking a passive part which the great events we shall relate in the following volumes will not permit them to lay aside till the close of the war. On May 22d, Smith took passage on his transports, with all his troops, to report at Vicksburg, where he disembarked on the next day. This tardy arrival did not permit him to take part in the campaign undertaken by Sherman. The latter was thus at a critical moment deprived of the co-operation of an important part of his

old army. Banks, placed henceforth under Canby's orders, returned by water with his troops to New Orleans, where Grant, who did not wish to entrust him with any military operation, let him continue in the exercise of his functions. His vast plans, based on the sale of cotton, were abandoned, while the sole result of a campaign which had cost his Government so many men and so much money was to enrich a number of speculators.

As for Kirby Smith, when he learned of the evacuation of Alexandria he quietly led back his forces from Arkansas to Shreveport, where no one made it his concern to go after him. The fate of the Confederacy was to be decided east of the Mississippi, and by his own fault he had lost the last chance of seriously disputing with the Federals the possession of the great river which separates into two parts the Southern States.

To close this volume there remains only a few words more to say about the operations of which the sea-coast of the Confederate States was the theatre in the first four months of 1864. This is rendered necessary by chronological order, for before the end of spring we shall find again, under the immediate orders of Grant in Virginia, some of the troops which figured previously in these operations. The purely naval part will be reserved for the following volume.

After the fruitless attempts made in the fall of 1863 to get possession of the inner harbor of Charleston, Gillmore, as we have said, led back the bulk of his forces to Hilton Head, not leaving on the islands and in the woods so laboriously captured a few months before any more than the necessary forces to anticipate any offensive operations of the enemy. The other posts which he holds on the sea-coast as far as St. Augustine in Florida do not require numerous garrisons, for they are all of them not easily accessible on the land side. Instead of leaving in idleness on an unhealthy coast Gillmore's little army, it was possible to find them useful employment elsewhere by sending them to North Carolina, where the greater part of them had been called the year before, and where General Peck, who had succeeded Foster since the latter's departure for Knoxville, found it difficult to hold his own: he was, in fact, threatened at Suffolk, at Plymouth, at Washington, at Newberne—posts very much exposed to the attacks of

the enemy because they were accessible on many sides and did not admit of easy intercommunication. What would have been better still, reinforcements could have been drawn from the Army of the South for the Army of the Potomac. But the chief concern of the Government at Washington, instead of applying itself to a concentration of its forces, seemed to be, as we have seen, to scatter them for the sake of multiplying the posts occupied in the enemy's territory, while General Halleck, far from combating this fatal tendency, was the first to share it. So it was decided to employ Gillmore's troops without making them leave his department. As early as the 23d of December he had been asked to attend to this matter in concert with Admiral Dahlgren. As he made no haste to reply, the President prevailed upon him on January 13th to devote a part of his forces to the re-establishment of the Federal power in Florida, where he believed a goodly number of Unionists to be. Whether it was that his message travelled fast or that Gillmore anticipated the President's desires, he wrote to him on the 14th a proposition for an expedition into the interior of Florida. With every latitude allowed him to direct and organize it, he embarked on February 6th at Hilton Head with Seymour's division. This, divided into three infantry brigades under Colonels Barton, Hawley, and Montgomery, comprised two regiments of cavalry under Colonel Henry and four batteries of artillery—about seven thousand men, all told. The convoy, composed of twenty transports escorted by two gunboats, entered the next morning a deep estuary known by the name of the St. John's River. No one had expected the Federals on this side, so that before the end of the day the whole of their little army had disembarked upon the wharves of Jacksonville without striking a blow. This was the third time that they were taking possession of this unhappy city. Accordingly, there was hardly more left than some ruins inhabited by less than thirty families. This time the occupation was a permanent one; the Federal flag never again ceased to wave over Jacksonville to the end of the war. But it was not simply for the sake of raising it over so insignificant a place that Gillmore had undertaken this expedition. The necessity was felt to exist of giving the pretended Unionists of the interior an opportunity of showing themselves, and of assuring

them of efficient protection after taking the oath of allegiance and signing their names on the registers, of which Mr. Lincoln had forwarded from Washington whole bales. It seemed necessary for a semblance of civil government to be set up without any delay, to the end that those who had taken the oath, and whose vote had been discounted in advance, might take part in the Presidential election in November.

Gillmore, accordingly, did not lose a single minute. On the morning of the 8th he put his troops in motion in the direction of Baldwin. This place is situated about nineteen miles to the west of Jacksonville, and at the intersection of the only two railroads that Florida possessed at that time—that from Fernandina to Cedar Keys, and that from Jacksonville to Tallahassee. These two roads, which traverse the most fertile part, Northern Florida, connect the Atlantic coast with that of the Gulf of Mexico. Gillmore counted on following the first far enough to drive the enemy back toward Tallahassee, to hinder them from enlisting troops, from collecting stores, turpentine, and cotton in the eastern part of the State, from carrying off the rails of the railroad, which they intended, it is said, to use in the repair of their military roads: the Union general finally was to protect the political and commercial operations of which the banks of the St. John's River were to be the theatre. The Southern general, Finegan, who was in command of the militia, the only troops then to be found in Florida, and who was very active in organizing them, had distributed them among the camps of instruction, and was unable to muster them in time to oppose Gillmore's march. But he appears not to have believed that the march would be made so promptly, for he suffered two camps situated between Jacksonville and Baldwin to be surprised by Colonel Henry and his cavalry during the night of the 8th and 9th. Five pieces of artillery and a considerable amount of plunder were the prize of this successful sudden attack, accomplished without the effusion of blood. On the morning of the 9th, Henry took possession of Baldwin, where the infantry joined him the next day. As soon as he was master of this point, Gillmore resumed his march with the main body of his column, preceded by his cavalry, which had left on the 10th in the direction of Lake City. This little town, the only one on the route from Jacksonville to

Tallahassee, is situated on the railroad pretty nearly midway between these two points. The whole country traversed by the railroad is absolutely flat. To the east of Lake City it is sandy ; although intersected by numerous swamps, the ground is hard there, while the high pine trees do not offer any insurmountable obstacles to the passage of troops. The railroad, which keeps company with the highway all the way, at about fifteen miles from Baldwin reaches Barber's Station, crosses near by one of the tributaries of the St. Mary's River, and strikes about nine miles farther on the village of Sanderson. Between this village and Lake City the distance is fifteen miles. These two points are situated, the one on the watershed of the Atlantic, the other on that of the Gulf of Mexico, and, as always happens when the dividing-line is not accentuated by any ridge, the waters do not find any natural outlet from vast swamps. The railroad crosses one of these swamps, called Ocean Pond, near the village of Olustee, nine miles from Sanderson and six from Lake City.

Henry rapidly reached Barber's Station, forced the passage of the St. Mary's River after a slight skirmish, and arrived at Sanderson on the evening of the 10th. On the 11th he advanced to Olustee, but having learned that Finegan was holding Lake City with some infantry, he had no desire to attack it, and returned to Sanderson. He found General Seymour there with a part of his division. Gillmore, after having left a guard at Baldwin, had led back the rest of his troops to Jacksonville, his means of transportation not permitting him to subsist his troops so far from his base of operations. In fact, he had far too few conveyances. The railroad, it is true, was in good condition, and he captured at Baldwin a certain number of cars, but he had not been able to get possession of a single locomotive, and the one he had brought with him, foreseeing this, was unserviceable. As it was out of his power in this state of affairs to think of advancing into the interior, he directed Seymour to fall back on the 12th from Sanderson to Baldwin, and to hold this post with might and main. This order was promptly executed without the Federals suffering any molestation at the hands of the enemy, and the bridge over the St. Mary's River destroyed. Henry with his cavalry pushed forward a reconnoissance along the Cedar Keys Railroad as far as Gainesville, where he dispersed a

detachment, while several vessels, ascending the St. John's River, took possession of the small towns of Picolata and Palatka, situated on an arm of the sea. The co-operation of the fleet rendered the victualling and defence of these places an easy matter. Having thus assumed the occupation of the country which he proposed to guard, Gillmore embarked on the 13th for Hilton Head, after having directed Seymour to complete the occupation without any thought of extending it.

But as soon as the chief was gone, Seymour, forgetting his wise instructions, determined to resume the campaign. Although his means of transportation were still as insufficient as ever, he suddenly gave an order on February 18th to the troops assembled at Jackson to start in the direction of Lake City. It is difficult to divine the motives which determined Seymour upon an open violation of Gillmore's orders: the only one he alleged was the desire to stop the enemy from taking and carrying off the rails of the Florida Central Railroad. It was his duty, however, to know that Finegan had received reinforcements, mustered all the militia, and would dispute with him determinedly the road to Lake City. He foresaw so well the danger to which he was exposing his troops that in announcing his resolution to Gillmore he asked him to see that naval and military demonstrations on the coast of Georgia were made, so as to divert the enemy's attention. It was rather late to be asking for this diversion on the day he was taking the field.

The preparations for this expedition and the manner in which the march was conducted bear the marks of the precipitation with which Seymour made up his mind. The trains could not carry stores for more than ten days beyond the dépôt formed at Baldwin; victualling became impossible. The medical department was not organized; instruments, medicines, conveyances were wanting. From the very start Seymour imposed too long marches upon his soldiers. In two days he made them accomplish thirty-seven miles over roads often swampy, and made them bivouac the evening of the 19th at Barber's Station. Instead of granting them a short rest after two such fatiguing days, he gave them again the order to march on the morning of the 20th. He entertained the hope, no doubt, thanks to his rapidity, of surprising Finegan

before the latter could have had time to prepare the defence of Lake City, and force him thus to evacuate the place or give battle under unfavorable conditions. Moreover, beguiled by a treacherous degree of confidence, he was convinced that by dint of rapid marches he could dispense with the precautions necessary to be taken in the presence of the enemy. The whole division, which counted a little less than five thousand men, was marching in three columns, preceded at less than three-fifths of a mile by Henry's cavalry. He had no skirmishers on his flanks; the three columns, each composed of artillery and infantry, were forced to re-form in single column whenever the principal route crossed a swamp or lay along the railroad. Finally, instead of giving rest to his soldiers and keeping them always ready to form in line of battle, Seymour made them march the whole morning without a halt, went through the village of Sanderson without stopping, and arrived about ten o'clock with his columns long drawn out, a fatigued and famished force, in the neighborhood of Ocean Pond. The railroad crosses the head of this swamp. The highway in order to avoid it passes from the south to the north of the road, and extends toward the north-west, leaving on the right another chain of swamps. It penetrates open fields having the shape of a right-angled triangle, of which the latter line of swamps would form the hypotenuse and the railroad the perpendicular. An elbow of the railroad and some woods bound it on the west, forming the base of the triangle. It was on this base, before Olustee, that Finegan had taken his stand. His little army, reorganized within fifteen days, was at least as strong as that of the Federals, although it had not more than four pieces of artillery. Forewarned in time of Seymour's offensive movement, he had left Lake City to await him at the base of the triangle in an excellent position, and force him to fight with the narrow pass between the two swamps in his rear.

The Federals, imagining they had in front of them an insignificant force, enter the narrow pass. Henry with his cavalry pursues the enemy's skirmishers, whose mission is to draw him farther on, and Hawley's brigade follows close behind him without having even taken care to load. Consequently, the head of the column is surprised by the enemy's fire on approaching the position in which

he is strongly intrenched. The Seventh Connecticut, which is in the van, is brought to a sudden halt. The Seventh New Hampshire comes to its rescue, but the repeating rifles of this regiment have been taken from them and their place supplied with others of less value. The soldiers, who have lost confidence in their arms, break ranks, and the Eighth colored regiment has to be sent up to support Elder's and Hamilton's batteries, which are posted, the one on the right, the other on the left, at less than one hundred and seventy yards from the enemy. An equally short distance permits the Confederates to direct against them a concentric fire, and if on the one hand the Federals force them to remain under cover of the woods, on the other hand they are sustaining considerable loss. The colored troops, well commanded, stand the test bravely, but they are forced to lengthen their front on the right to lend a helping hand to the Seventh Connecticut. Barton's brigade, which has cleared the narrow pass, comes to their support and prevents the enemy from assuming the offensive, without being able, however, to charge the positions which he holds. In the mean time, profiting by the advantages afforded by the ground which he had the skill to select for the battlefield, Finegan extends his right to menace the narrow pass over which is the Federals' real line of retreat, and which is only covered by Langdon's battery of regulars. The latter sees all his gunners shot around him, and is unable single-handed to cope with the enemy. Fortunately, Montgomery, who has remained in the defile with his brigade, hearing the noise of the battle, moves forward, and arrives opportunely to check the enemy's movement. He seizes the railroad, along which is hurrying a stream of wounded men and fugitives. But he cannot prevent a retreat now become inevitable. The Federals, caught in a cul-de-sac, in the face of positions which they cannot even approach, exposed on open ground and at short range under the deadly fire of an enemy who is shooting them down with unflinching aim, have uselessly exhausted all their strength. The greater number of the horses are killed. Out of Langdon's and Hamilton's ten pieces, five are abandoned for want of means to get them off the field. Had the battle lasted fifteen minutes longer, every one of them would have been left on the field. It fortunately ends as soon as Seymour gives the order to retreat. Protected by the

cavalry, the little army about six o'clock in the evening returns over the road it came by. The wounded are so numerous that the ambulances are not sufficient to serve them. The fugitives obstruct the road, the regiments are in confusion, and the whole force, leaving the battlefield strewn with the dead and the wounded, marches all night in the greatest disorder to reach Barber's Station before daylight; and had it not been for the relief provided at Baldwin by the Sanitary Commission—that good angel of the American army—it would have been doomed to unutterable sufferings. But the defeat of the Federals is none the less complete and decisive. Out of five thousand men they have lost more than twelve hundred. The Confederates did not have more than two hundred and fifty men disabled.

Without stopping at Barber's Station, Seymour during the 21st leads his troops back to Baldwin, and evacuates this post after destroying all the stores which he cannot carry away, all means of conveyance being absorbed in the ambulance service, and on the 22d re-enters Jacksonville without having been pursued in earnest by the enemy. The support of the fleet permitted the Federals to remain masters of the banks of the St. John's River. They contented themselves with this occupation, and gave no further thought to extending it. There was no longer any question of a political campaign which was to bring Florida back into the Union.

The battle of Olustee proved once again how useless on the one hand and destructive on the other were these campaigns, half-political and half-military—how imprudent it was to scatter and expose to partial defeats forces which consolidated could have assured victory on the battlefields where the issue of the war was to be decided. Nevertheless, while General Seymour was recalled as a punishment for his disobedience and his defeat, his troops were left in Florida. Grant had to be invested with the supreme command before the ideas of Lincoln and Halleck yielded to the principles of sound strategy. We shall see it brought into play in our next volume.

NOTES.

NOTE A.

BOOK I., CHAPTER I.

AMONG the companions of Morgan was Captain Gurley, who had killed General McCook the preceding year, when he was commanding a band of guerillas. This act was considered by the Federals a murder, and the father of the victim, a vigorous old Kentuckian, though more than seventy years of age, enlisted among the volunteers mustered to pursue Morgan. Always on the outposts, he had sworn that Gurley should die by his hand. He was killed at Buffington Ford. A few hours after, Gurley was made prisoner. His trial was conducted with the greatest care; he was authorized, for his own defence, to bring before the council of war witnesses belonging to the hostile army provided with passes. He was able to prove that McCook, sick and lying in an ambulance, had been surprised by his men, but that, instead of halting, the wagon had fled, and that he had fired the fatal pistol-shot a few seconds only before McCook had given the signal of his surrendering. He was therefore clear on this count, but he could not prove that he or his companions were enlisted, even as mere sharpshooters, in the service of the Confederates. Not being a case of self-defence, he had therefore acted as an outlaw and not as a soldier. He was on this account sentenced to be hanged. Mr. Lincoln confirmed the sentence, but deferred the execution, and, the war coming to an end, Gurley's life was spared.

NOTE B.

BOOK I., CHAPTER V.

On the 1st of September, Bragg—having under his command Cheatham's and Hindman's divisions of Polk's corps, Cleburne's division of Hill's corps, Liddell's and Gist's divisions of Walker's

corps—shows an effective force of more than thirty-five thousand infantry ; which, adding one-tenth for the officers, gives a total of thirty-nine thousand men. From the 1st to the 20th of September his army is augmented, on the one hand, by the return of Breckinridge's division, thirty-seven hundred and sixty-nine men strong according to the report of its chief, and, on the other hand, by the arrival of Buckner's corps and of Longstreet's. This latter general, having united these two corps under his command, besides Hindman's division, estimates his forces as being twenty-two thousand eight hundred and fifty-two officers and men.

The division of Hindman, which, according to the official report, showed a total of six thousand one hundred and two men, being included in the muster-roll of September 1st, must be deducted here. The two corps of Buckner and Longstreet give, therefore, together, an effective of sixteen thousand seven hundred and fifty combatants. Finally, on the 20th of September Gist's brigade, nine hundred and eighty men strong, joined Walker's corps. The total of Bragg's infantry will therefore comprise the following :

Polk's corps, Walker's corps, Cleburne's division	39,000 men.
Breckinridge's division	3,769 "
Buckner's corps, Longstreet's corps	16,750 "
Gist's brigade	980 "
Total	60,499 men.

ADDENDA BY THE EDITOR.

Organization of Troops in the Department of the Cumberland, commanded by MAJOR-GENERAL WM. S. ROSECRANS, U. S. Army, June 30, 1863.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

10th Ohio.....Col. Joseph W. Burke.
1st Battalion Ohio Sharpshooters.....Capt. Watson C. Squire.
15th Pennsylvania Cavalry.....Lieut.-col. Charles B. Lamborn.

Pioneer Brigade.

Brig.-gen. James Saint Clair Morton.

1st Battalion.....Capt. Charles J. Stewart.
2d Battalion.....Capt. Correl Smith.
3d Battalion.....Capt. Robert Clements.
4th Battalion.....Capt. Milton Kemper.
Bridges' (Illinois) Battery.....Capt. Lyman Bridges.

FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

Maj.-gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS.

Escort—1st Ohio Cavalry, Company L. Capt. John D. Barker.
Provost Guard—9th Michigan, Col. John G. Parkhurst.

FIRST DIVISION.

Maj.-gen. Lovell H. Rousseau.

First Brigade.

Col. Benjamin F. Scribner.

38th Indiana.....Lieut.-col. Daniel F. Griffin.
2d Ohio.....Col. Anson G. McCook.
33d Ohio.....Col. Oscar F. Moore.
94th Ohio.....Col. Stephen A. Bassford.
10th Wisconsin.....Maj. John H. Ely.

Second Brigade.

Col. Henry A. Hambright.

24th Illinois.....Col. Geza Mihalotzy.
79th Pennsylvania.....Maj. Michael H. Locher.
1st Wisconsin.....Lieut.-col. George B. Bingham.
21st Wisconsin.....Lieut.-col. Harrison C. Hobart.

Third Brigade.

Brig.-gen. John H. King.

15th United States, First Battalion.....	Capt. Henry Keteltas.
16th United States, First Battalion.....	Maj. Sidney Coolidge.
18th United States, First Battalion.....	Capt. John W. Smith.
18th United States, Second Battalion.....	Capt. Henry Haymond.
19th United States, First Battalion.....	Capt. Augustus H. Plummer.

Artillery.

Col. Cyrus O. Loomis, Chief of Artillery.

4th Indiana Battery.....	Lieut. David Flansburg.
1st Michigan Battery.....	Lieut. George W. Van Pelt.
5th United States, Battery H.....	Capt. George A. Kensel.

SECOND DIVISION.

Maj.-gen. James S. Negley.

First Brigade.

Brig.-gen. John Beatty.

104th Illinois.....	Col. Absalom B. Moore.
42d Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. William T. B. McIntyre.
88th Indiana.....	Col. George Humphrey.
15th Kentucky.....	Col. Marion C. Taylor.
3d Ohio.....	Col. Orris A. Lawson.

Second Brigade.

Col. William L. Stoughton.

19th Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Alexander W. Raffin.
11th Michigan.....	Lieut.-col. Melvin Mudge.
18th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Charles H. Grosvenor.
69th Ohio.....	Col. Marshall F. Moore.

Third Brigade.

Col. William Sirwell.

37th Indiana.....	Col. James S. Hull.
21st Ohio.....	Col. James M. Neibling.
74th Ohio.....	Col. Josiah Given.
78th Pennsylvania.....	Lieut.-col. Archibald Blakeley.

Artillery.

Capt. Frederick Schultz.

2d Kentucky Battery.....	Capt. John M. Hewett.
1st Ohio, Battery G.....	Capt. Alexander Marshall.
1st Ohio, Battery M.....	Capt. Frederick Schultz.

THIRD DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. John M. Brannan.

First Brigade.

Col. Moses B. Walker

82d Indiana.....	Col. Morton C. Hunter.
17th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Durbin Ward.
31st Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Frederick W. Lister.
38th Ohio.....	Col. Edward H. Phelps.

Second Brigade.

Brig.-gen. James B. Steedman.

10th Indiana.....	Col. William B. Carroll.
74th Indiana.....	Col. Charles W. Chapman.
4th Kentucky.....	Col. John T. Croxton.
10th Kentucky.....	Col. William H. Hays.
14th Ohio.....	Col. George P. Este.

Third Brigade.

Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer.

87th Indiana.....	Col. Newell Gleason.
2d Minnesota.....	Col. James George.
9th Ohio.....	Col. Gustave Kainmerling.
35th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Charles L. H. Long.

Artillery.

4th Michigan Battery.....	Capt. Josiah W. Church.
1st Ohio, Company C.....	Capt. Daniel K. Southwick.
4th United States, Company I.....	Lieut. Frank G. Smith.

FOURTH DIVISION.

Maj.-gen. Joseph J. Reynolds.

First Brigade.

Col. John T. Wilder.

98th Illinois.....	Col. John J. Funkhouser.
123d Illinois.....	Col. James Monroe.
17th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Henry Jordan.
72d Indiana.....	Col. Abram O. Miller.

Second Brigade.

Col. Albert S. Hall.

80th Illinois.....	Lieut. Herman Steinecke.
68th Indiana.....	Maj. John S. Scobey.
75th Indiana.....	Col. Milton S. Robinson.
101st Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Thomas Doan.
105th Ohio.....	Maj. George T. Perkins.

Third Brigade.

Brig.-gen. George Crook.

18th Kentucky.....	Lieut.-col. Hubbard K. Milward.
11th Ohio.....	Col. Philander P. Lane.
36th Ohio.....	Col. William G. Jones.
89th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. William H. Glenn.
92d Ohio.....	Col. Benjamin D. Fearing.

Artillery.

18th Indiana Battery.....	Capt. Eli Lilly.
19th Indiana Battery.....	Capt. Samuel J. Harris.
21st Indiana Battery.....	Capt. William W. Andrew.

TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS.

Maj.-gen. ALEXANDER McD. McCOOK.

FIRST DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. Jefferson C. Davis.

First Brigade.

Col. P. Sidney Post.

59th Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Joshua C. Winters.
74th Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. James B. Kerr.
75th Illinois.....	Col. John E. Bennett.
22d Indiana.....	Col. Michael Gooding.

Second Brigade.

Brig.-gen. William P. Carlin.

21st Illinois.....	Col. John W. S. Alexander.
38th Illinois.....	Col. Daniel H. Gilmer.
81st Indiana.....	Col. William W. Caldwell.
101st Ohio.....	Col. Isaac M. Kirby.

Third Brigade.

Col. Hans C. Heg.

25th Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. James S. McClelland.
35th Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. William P. Chandler.
8th Kansas.....	Col. John A. Martin.
15th Wisconsin.....	Lieut.-col. Ole C. Johnson.

Artillery.

2d Minnesota Battery.....	Lieut. Albert Woodberry.
5th Wisconsin Battery.....	Capt. George Q. Gardner.
8th Wisconsin Battery.....	Capt. Henry E. Stiles.

SECOND DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. Richard W. Johnson.

First Brigade.

Brig.-gen. August Willich.

89th Illinois.....	Col. Charles T. Hotchkiss.
32d Indiana.....	Maj. Jacob Glass.
39th Indiana.....	Col. Thomas J. Harrison.
15th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Frank Askew.
49th Ohio.....	Col. William H. Gibson.

Second Brigade.

Col. Joseph B. Dodge.

34th Illinois.....	Col. A. P. Dysart.
79th Illinois.....	Col. Allen Buckner.
29th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. David M. Dunn.
30th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Orrin D. Hurd.
77th Pennsylvania.....	Col. Thomas E. Rose.

Third Brigade.

Col. Philemon P. Baldwin.

6th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Hagerman Tripp.
5th Kentucky.....	Col. William W. Berry.
1st Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Bassett Langdon.
93d Ohio.....	Col. Hiram Strong.

Artillery.

Capt. Peter Simonson.

5th Indiana Battery.....	Lieut. Alfred Morrison.
1st Ohio, Battery A.....	Capt. Wilber F. Goodspeed.
20th Ohio Battery.....	Capt. Edward Grosskopf.

THIRD DIVISION.

Maj.-gen. Philip H. Sheridan.

First Brigade.

Brig.-gen. William H. Lytle.

36th Illinois.....	Col. Silas Miller.
88th Illinois.....	Col. Francis T. Sherman.
21st Michigan.....	Col. William B. McCreery.
24th Wisconsin.....	Col. Charles H. Larrabee.

Second Brigade.

Col. Bernard Laiboldt.

44th Illinois.....	Col. Wallace W. Barrett.
73d Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. William A. Presson.
2d Missouri.....	Maj. Arnold Beck.
15th Missouri.....	Col. Joseph Conrad.

Third Brigade.

Col. Luther P. Bradley.

22d Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Francis Swanwick.
27th Illinois.....	Col. Jonathan R. Miles.
42d Illinois.....	Col. Nathan H. Walworth.
51st Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Samuel B. Raymond.

Artillery.

Capt. Henry Hescok.

1st Illinois, Battery C.....	Lieut. Edward M. Wright.
11th Indiana Battery.....	Capt. Arnold Sutermeister.
1st Missouri, Battery G.....	Capt. Henry Hescok.

TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS.

Maj.-gen. THOMAS L. CRITTENDEN.

FIRST DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. Thomas J. Wood.

First Brigade.

Col. George P. Buell.

100th Illinois.....	Col. Frederick A. Bartleson.
58th Indiana	Maj. Joseph Moore.
13th Michigan.....	Maj. Joshua B. Culver.
26th Ohio.....	Maj. William H. Squires.

Second Brigade.

Brig.-gen. George D. Wagner.

15th Indiana (and detachment Fifty-first Indiana).....	Col. Gustavus A. Wood.
40th Indiana.....	Maj. Henry Leaming.
57th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. George W. Lennard.
97th Ohio.....	Col. John Q. Lane.

Third Brigade.

Col. Charles G. Harker.

3d Kentucky.....	Col. Henry C. Dunlap.
64th Ohio.....	Col. Alexander McIlvain.
65th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Horatio N. Whitbeck.
125th Ohio.....	Col. Emerson Opdycke.

Artillery.

Capt. Cullen Bradley.

8th Indiana Battery.....	Capt. George Estep.
10th Indiana Battery.....	Lieut. William A. Naylor.
6th Ohio Battery.....	Capt. Cullen Bradley.

SECOND DIVISION.

Maj.-gen. John M. Palmer.

First Brigade.

Brig.-gen. Charles Cruft.

31st Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. John T. Smith.
1st Kentucky.....	Col. David A. Enyart.
2d Kentucky.....	Col. Thomas D. Sedgewick.
90th Ohio.....	Col. Charles H. Rippey.

Second Brigade.

Brig.-gen. William B. Hazen.

9th Indiana.....	Col. Isaac C. B. Suman.
6th Kentucky.....	Col. Walter C. Whitaker.
41st Ohio.....	Col. Aquila Wiley.
124th Ohio.....	Col. Oliver H. Payne.

Third Brigade.

Col. William Grose.

84th Illinois.....	Col. Louis H. Waters.
36th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Oliver H. P. Carey.
23d Kentucky.....	Lieut.-col. James C. Foy.
6th Ohio.....	Col. Nicholas L. Anderson.
24th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Armstead T. M. Cockerill.

Artillery.

Capt. William E. Standart.

1st Ohio, Battery B.....	Capt. William E. Standart.
1st Ohio, Battery F.....	Capt. Daniel T. Cockerill.
4th United States, Battery H.....	Lieut. Harry C. Cushing.
4th United States, Battery M.....	Lieut. Francis L. Russell.

. *Unassigned.*

110th Illinois (battalion).....	Capt. Ebenezer H. Topping.
---------------------------------	----------------------------

THIRD DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. Horatio P. Van Cleve.

First Brigade.

Brig.-gen. Samuel Beatty.

79th Indiana.....	Col. Frederick Knefler.
9th Kentucky.....	Col. George H. Cram.
17th Kentucky.....	Col. Alexander M. Stout.
19th Ohio.....	Col. Charles F. Manderson.

Second Brigade.

Col. George F. Dick.

44th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Simeon C. Aldrich.
86th Indiana.....	Maj. Jacob C. Dick.
13th Ohio.....	Col. Dwight Jarvis, Jr.
59th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Granville A. Frambes.

Third Brigade.

Col. Sidney M. Barnes.

35th Indiana.....	Maj. John P. Dufficy.
8th Kentucky.....	Lieut.-col. James D. Mayhew.
21st Kentucky.....	Col. Samuel W. Price.
51st Ohio.....	Col. Richard W. McClain.
99th Ohio.....	Col. Peter T. Swaine.

Artillery.

Capt. Lucius H. Drury.

7th Indiana Battery.....	Capt. George R. Swallow.
Independent Pennsylvania, Battery B.....	Capt. Alanson J. Stevens.
3d Wisconsin Battery.....	Lieut. Cortland Livingston.

RESERVE CORPS.

Maj.-gen. GORDON GRANGER.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

1st Missouri Cavalry, Company F.....Capt. James Clifford.
Signal Corps.....Lieut. Washington W. Hopkins.

FIRST DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. Absalom Baird.

First Brigade.

Col. Smith D. Atkins.

92d Illinois.....Lieut.-col. Benjamin F. Sheets.
96th Illinois.....Col. Thomas E. Champion.
115th Illinois.....Lieut.-col. William Kinman.
84th Indiana.....Col. Nelson Trusler.
40th Ohio.....Col. Jacob E. Taylor.

Second Brigade.

Col. William P. Reid.

78th Illinois.....Lieut.-col. Carter Van Vleck.
98th Ohio.....Lieut.-col. John S. Pearce.
113th Ohio.....Lieut.-col. Darius B. Warner.
121st Ohio.....Lieut.-col. Henry B. Banning.

Third Brigade.

Col. Henry C. Gilbert.

33d Indiana.....Lieut.-col. James M. Henderson.
85th Indiana.....Col. John P. Baird.
19th Michigan.....Lieut.-col. William R. Shafter.
22d Wisconsin.....Col. William L. Utley.

Artillery.

1st Illinois, Battery M.....Capt. George W. Spencer.
9th Ohio Battery.....Capt. Harrison B. York.
18th Ohio Battery.....Capt. Charles C. Aleshire.

SECOND DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. James D. Morgan.

First Brigade.

Col. Robert F. Smith.

10th Illinois.....Col. John Tillson.
16th Illinois.....Lieut.-col. James B. Cahill.
60th Illinois.....Col. William B. Anderson.
10th Michigan.....Col. Charles M. Lum.
14th Michigan.....Col. Henry R. Mizner.

Second Brigade.

Col. Daniel McCook.

85th Illinois.....	Col. Caleb J. Dilworth.
86th Illinois.....	Col. David D. Irons.
125th Illinois.....	Col. Oscar F. Harmon.
52d Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Charles W. Clancy.

Third Brigade.

Col. Charles C. Doolittle.

18th Michigan.....	Maj. John W. Horner.
22d Michigan.....	Col. Heber Le Favour.
108th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Carlo Piepho.

Artillery.

2d Illinois, Battery I.....	Capt. Charles M. Barnett.
1st Ohio, Battery E.....	Lieut. Stephen W. Dorsey.
10th Wisconsin Battery.....	Capt. Yates V. Beebe.

THIRD DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. Robert S. Granger.

First Brigade.

Col. William P. Lyon.

83d Illinois.....	Col. Arthur A. Smith.
71st Ohio.....	Col. Henry K. McConnell.
13th Wisconsin.....	Lieut.-col. James F. Chapman.
2d Illinois Artillery, Battery C.....	Capt. James P. Flood.
2d Illinois Artillery, Battery H.....	Lieut. Jonas Eckdall.

Second Brigade.

Brig.-gen. William T. Ward.

102d Illinois.....	Col. Franklin C. Smith.
105th Illinois.....	Col. Daniel Dustin.
129th Illinois.....	Col. Henry Case.
70th Indiana.....	Col. Benjamin Harrison.
79th Ohio.....	Col. Henry G. Kennett.
5th Michigan Battery.....	Capt. John J. Ely.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Artillery Reserve (Nashville).

Capt. Warren P. Edgerton.

12th Indiana Battery.....	Capt. James E. White.
20th Indiana Battery.....	Capt. Milton A. Osborne.

Camp Spears (Nashville).

Col. Alvan C. Gillem.

17th Kentucky.....	Col. Alexander M. Stout.
1st Tennessee.....	Col. Alvan C. Gillem.
3d Tennessee Cavalry.....	Col. Samuel W. Pickens.
4th Tennessee Cavalry.....	Maj. Meshack Stephens.

ADDENDA.

Clarksville.

Col. Sanders D. Bruce.

28th Kentucky.....	Col. William P. Boone.
102d Ohio.....	Col. William Given.
8th Kentucky Cavalry (battalion).....	Maj. James W. Weatherford.
1st Tennessee Battery.....	Capt. Ephraim P. Abbott.

Gallatin.

Col. Benjamin J. Sweet.

106th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Gustavus Tafel.
13th Indiana Battery.....	Lieut. Truman W. Hall.

CAVALRY CORPS.

Maj.-gen. DAVID S. STANLEY.

FIRST DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. Robert B. Mitchell.

First Brigade.

Col. Archibald P. Campbell.

4th Kentucky.....	Col. Wyckliffe Cooper.
6th Kentucky.....	Col. Louis D. Watkins.
7th Kentucky.....	Col. John K. Faulkner.
2d Michigan.....	Maj. John C. Godley.
9th Pennsylvania.....	Col. Thomas J. Jordan.
1st Tennessee.....	Lieut.-col. James P. Brownlow.

Second Brigade.

Col. Edward M. McCook.

2d Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Robert R. Stewart.
4th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. John A. Platter.
5th Kentucky.....	Lieut.-col. William T. Hoblitzel.
1st Wisconsin.....	Col. Oscar H. La Grange.
1st Ohio Artillery, Battery D (one section).....	Capt. Andrew J. Konkle.
2d Tennessee.....	Col. Daniel M. Ray.

SECOND DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. John B. Turchin.

First Brigade.

Col. Robert H. G. Minty.

3d Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Robert Klein.
5th Iowa.....	Lieut.-col. Mathewson T. Patrick.
4th Michigan.....	Maj. Frank W. Mix.
7th Pennsylvania.....	Lieut.-col. William B. Sipes.
5th Tennessee.....	Col. William B. Stokes.
4th United States.....	Capt. James B. McIntyre.
1st Ohio Artillery, Battery D (one section).....	Lieut. Nathaniel M. Newell.

Second Brigade.

Col. Eli Long.

2d Kentucky.....	Col. Thomas P. Nicholas.
1st Ohio.....	Col. Beroth B. Eggleston.
3d Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Charles B. Seidel.
4th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Oliver P. Robie.
10th Ohio.....	Col. Charles C. Smith.
Stokes' Illinois Battery.....	Capt. James H. Stokes.

Unattached.

39th Indiana Infantry (mounted).....	Col. Thomas J. Harrison.
--------------------------------------	--------------------------

Casualties in the Union Forces engaged in the Middle Tennessee Campaign, June 23—July 7, 1863.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND.							
Maj.-gen. WILLIAM S. ROSECRANS.							
FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS.							
Maj.-gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS.							
FIRST DIVISION.							
Maj.-gen. Lovell H. Rousseau.							
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Col. Benjamin F. Scribner.							
38th Indiana	1	1
2d Ohio	1	...	1	2
33d Ohio	4	4
10th Wisconsin	3	3
1st Michigan Light Art., Battery A	1	1
Total First brigade.....	...	1	...	10	11
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. Henry A. Hambright.							
79th Pennsylvania	12	12
Indiana Light Art., 4th Battery...	1	1
Total Second brigade.....	13	13
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Brig.-gen. John H. King.							
16th United States	3	1	1	5
18th United States	2	13	15
19th United States	5	5
Total Third brigade.....	...	3	3	19	25
Total First division	4	3	42	49

Casualties in the Union Forces, etc.—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
SECOND DIVISION.							
Maj.-gen. James S. Negley.							
First Brigade.							
Brig.-gen. John Beatty.							
104th Illinois.....	...	1	...	1	2
42d Indiana	1	1
88th Indiana	1	1
15th Kentucky.....	...	1	...	2	3
Total First brigade.....	...	2	...	5	7
Second Brigade.							
Col. William L. Stoughton.							
19th Illinois.....	1	1
11th Michigan.....	1	1
18th Ohio.....	2	2
69th Ohio.....	1	1
Total Second brigade.....	4	1	5
Total Second division.....	...	2	...	9	1	12
THIRD DIVISION.							
Brig.-gen. John M. Brannan.							
First Brigade.							
Col. Moses B. Walker.							
82d Indiana.....	...	1	...	1	2
17th Ohio.....	...	2	...	20	22
31st Ohio	2	...	13	15
38th Ohio	6	6
1st Michigan Light Art., Battery D	...	1	...	1	2
Total First brigade.....	...	6	...	41	47
Second Brigade.							
Brig.-gen. James B. Steedman.							
10th Indiana	11	11
4th Kentucky.....	5	5
10th Kentucky.....	1	1
14th Ohio.....	2	...	1	3
Total Second brigade.....	19	...	1	20

Casualties in the Union Forces, etc.—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer.							
2d Minnesota.....	2	2
35th Ohio.....	1	1
Total Third brigade.....	1	2	3
Total Third division.....	...	6	1	62	...	1	70
FOURTH DIVISION.							
Maj.-gen. Joseph J. Reynolds.							
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Col. John T. Wilder.							
98th Illinois.....	...	1	...	4	5
123d Illinois.....	...	2	...	4	6
17th Indiana.....	...	6	1	18	25
72d Indiana.....	1	1	...	12	14
Total First brigade.....	1	10	1	38	50
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. Milton S. Robinson.							
68th Indiana.....	...	1	1	5	7
75th Indiana.....	2	2
101st Indiana.....	6	6
105th Ohio.....	1	1
Total Second brigade.....	...	1	1	14	16
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Brig.-gen. George Crook.							
18th Kentucky.....	...	2	...	3	5
92d Ohio.....	...	1	...	1	2
Total Third brigade.....	...	3	...	4	7
<i>Artillery.</i>							
18th Indiana Battery.....	1	1
19th Indiana Battery.....	1	1
Total Artillery.....	2	2
Total Fourth division.....	1	14	2	58	75
Total Fourteenth army corps...	1	26	6	171	1	1	206

Casualties in the Union Forces, etc.—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS.							
Maj.-gen. ALEX. McD. McCook.							
FIRST DIVISION.							
Brig.-gen. Jefferson C. Davis.							
First Brigade.							
Col. P. Sidney Post.							
22d Indiana	3	3
Total First brigade	3	3
Second Brigade.							
Brig.-gen. William P. Carlin.							
21st Illinois	1	1
38th Illinois	3	2	17	22
101st Ohio	2	2
Total Second brigade	3	2	20	25
Third Brigade.							
Col. Hans C. Heg.							
35th Illinois	1	1
Total Third brigade	1	1
Artillery.							
2d Minnesota Battery	2	2
Total First division	3	2	25	...	1	31
SECOND DIVISION.							
Brig.-gen. Richard W. Johnson.							
First Brigade.							
Brig.-gen. August Willich.							
89th Illinois	1	2	...	10	13
32d Indiana	7	...	19	26
39th Indiana*	1	3	4
15th Ohio	1	7	1	23	32
49th Ohio	1	4	...	15	20
Total First brigade	3	20	2	70	95

* Detached with Third division, Twentieth corps.

Casualties in the Union Forces, etc.—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. John F. Miller.							
Col. Thomas E. Rose.							
34th Illinois	1	2	1	23	27
79th Illinois	1	5	5	36	47
29th Indiana	1	5	6
30th Indiana	1	1
77th Pennsylvania	1	3	3	32	39
Total Second brigade.....	3	10	10	97	120
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Col. Philemon P. Baldwin.							
6th Indiana	1	12	13
5th Kentucky.....	...	2	2	6	10
Total Third brigade.....	...	2	3	18	23
<i>Artillery.</i>							
20th Ohio Battery.....	...	1	1
Total Second division	6	33	15	185	239
THIRD DIVISION.							
Maj.-gen. Philip H. Sheridan.							
27th Illinois.....	1	1
73d Illinois	1	1
2d Missouri	1	1
15th Missouri.....	1	1
Total Third division	4	4
Total Twentieth army corps ...	6	36	17	214	...	1	274
.							
TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS.							
Maj.-gen. THOMAS L. CRITTENDEN.							
97th Ohio.....	1	1

Casualties in the Union Forces, etc.—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlist-d men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
CAVALRY CORPS.							
Maj.-gen. DAVID S. STANLEY.							
FIRST DIVISION.							
Brig.-gen. Robert B. Mitchell.							
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Col. Archibald P. Campbell.							
4th Kentucky.....	2	2
6th Kentucky*.....	1	1	1	4	7
2d Michigan.....	2	...	3	5
9th Pennsylvania.....	1	1	...	2	4
1st Tennessee.....	...	2	...	1	...	1	4
Total First brigade.....	2	4	1	11	...	4	22
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. Edward M. McCook.							
4th Indiana.....	2	2
5th Kentucky*.....	6	...	1	7
2d Tennessee.....	1	1
1st Wisconsin.....	2	2
Total Second brigade.....	11	...	1	12
Total First division.....	2	4	1	22	...	5	34
SECOND DIVISION.							
Brig.-gen. John B. Turchin.							
Staff.....	1	1
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Col. Robert H. G. Minty.							
3d Indiana.....	...	1	1	2	4
4th Michigan.....	1	7	...	2	10
7th Pennsylvania.....	1	4	1	10	16
5th Tennessee.....	1	1	...	1	3
4th United States.....	1	1	2
Total First brigade.....	1	5	5	21	...	3	35

* Detached with Third division, Twentieth corps.

Casualties in the Union Forces, etc.—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. Eli Long.							
2d Kentucky	1	2	...	2	5
1st Ohio	2	...	1	3
3d Ohio	6	6
4th Ohio	1	4	5
Total Second brigade	1	2	1	13	...	2	19
Total Second division	2	7	7	34	...	5	55
Total Cavalry corps	4	11	8	56	...	10	89

RECAPITULATION.

Fourteenth army corps	1	26	6	171	1	1	206
Twentieth army corps	6	36	17	214	...	1	274
Twenty-first army corps	1	1
Cavalry corps	4	11	8	56	...	10	89
Total Army of the Cumberland.	11	73	31	442	1	12	570

*Organization of the Troops in Department No. 2, GENERAL BRAXTON
BRAGG, C. S. Army, commanding, July 31, 1863.*

POLK'S ARMY CORPS.
Lieut.-gen. LEONIDAS POLK.

CHEATHAM'S DIVISION.

Maney's Brigade.
Col. J. A. McMurry.

1st and 27th Tennessee Col. H. R. Feild.
4th Tennessee (Confederate)..... Lieut.-col. R. N. Lewis.
6th and 9th Tennessee..... Col. George C. Porter.
24th Tennessee Battalion..... Capt. Frank Maney.
Smith's (Mississippi) Battery..... Lieut. William B. Turner.

Wright's Brigade.
Col. John H. Anderson.

8th Tennessee Lieut.-col. C. C. McKinney.
16th Tennessee..... Col. D. M. Donnell.
28th Tennessee..... Col. S. S. Stanton.
38th Tennessee..... Lieut.-col. A. D. Gwynne.
51st Tennessee..... Lieut.-col. J. G. Hall.
Tennessee Battery..... Capt. W. W. Carnes.

Smith's Brigade.
Brig.-gen. Preston Smith.

11th Tennessee..... Col. G. W. Gordon.
12th and 47th Tennessee..... Col. W. M. Watkins.
13th and 154th Tennessee..... Col. A. J. Vaughan, Jr.
29th Tennessee..... Col. H. Rice.
Scott's (Tennessee) Battery..... Lieut. A. T. Watson.

Strahl's Brigade.
Col. O. F. Strahl.

4th and 5th Tennessee..... Lieut.-col. A. J. Kellar.
19th Tennessee..... Col. F. M. Walker.
24th Tennessee..... Col. J. A. Wilson.
31st Tennessee..... Col. E. E. Tanail.
33d Tennessee..... Col. Warner P. Jones.
Mississippi Battery..... Capt. T. J. Stanford.

WITHERS' DIVISION.

Anderson's Brigade.
Brig.-gen. Patton Anderson.

7th Mississippi..... Col. W. H. Bishop.
9th Mississippi..... Maj. T. H. Lynam.
10th Mississippi..... Lieut.-col. James Barr, Jr.
41st Mississippi..... Col. W. F. Tucker.
44th Mississippi..... Col. J. H. Sharp.
9th Mississippi Battalion..... Maj. W. C. Richards.
Robertson's Battery..... Lieut. S. H. Dent.

ADDENDA.

Walthall's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. E. C. Walthall.

24th Mississippi.....	Lieut.-col. R. P. McKelvaine.
27th Mississippi.....	Col. J. A. Campbell.
29th Mississippi.....	Col. W. F. Brantly.
30th Mississippi.....	Lieut.-col. H. A. Reynolds.
34th Mississippi.....	Col. Samuel Benton.
Alabama Battery.....	Capt. W. H. Fowler.

*Deas' Brigade.**

Col. J. G. Coltart.

19th Alabama.....	Col. S. K. McSpadden.
22d Alabama.....	Col. John G. Marrast.
25th Alabama.....	Lieut.-col. George D. Johnston.
39th Alabama.....	Col. Whitfield Clark.
50th Alabama.....	Lieut.-col. N. N. Clement.
17th Alabama Battalion.....	Capt. James F. Nabers.
Alabama Battery.....	Capt. James Garrity.

Manigault's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. A. M. Manigault.

24th Alabama.....	Col. N. N. Davis.
28th Alabama.....	Maj. W. L. Butler.
34th Alabama.....	Maj. J. N. Slaughter.
10th and 19th South Carolina.....	Col. J. F. Pressley.
Waters' (Alabama) Battery.....	Lieut. W. P. Hamilton.

HILL'S ARMY CORPS.†

Lieut.-gen. D. H. Hill.

CLEBURNE'S DIVISION.

Maj.-gen. P. R. Cleburne.

Wood's Brigade.‡

Col. M. P. Lowrey.

16th Alabama.....	Maj. J. H. McGaughy.
33d Alabama.....	Col. Samuel Adams.
45th Alabama.....	Col. E. B. Breedlove.
32d and 45th Mississippi.....	Lieut.-col. R. Charlton.
Sharpshooters.....	Maj. A. T. Hawkins.
Alabama Battery.....	Capt. H. C. Semple.

* Brig.-gen. Z. C. Deas reported as commanding, July 20.

† Formerly Hardee's.

‡ Col. Samuel Adams reported as commanding, July 20.

Liddell's Brigade.

Brig-gen. St. John R. Liddell.

2d Arkansas.....	Col. D. C. Govan.
5th Arkansas.....	Col. L. Featherston.
6th and 7th Arkansas.....	Col. D. A. Gillespie.
8th Arkansas	Col. J. H. Kelly.
13th and 15th Arkansas.....	Col. J. E. Josey.
Mississippi Battery.....	Capt. Charles Swett.

Churchill's Brigade.

Brig-gen. T. J. Churchill.

19th and 24th Arkansas.....	Lieut.-col. A. S. Hutchinson.
6th, 10th, and 15th Texas.....	Col. R. Q. Mills.
17th, 18th, 24th, and 25th Texas.....	Lieut.-col. J. T. Coit.
Texas Battery.....	Capt. J. P. Douglas.

Polk's Brigade.

Brig-gen. L. E. Polk.

1st Arkansas.....	Col. J. W. Colquitt.
3d and 5th Confederate.....	Col. J. A. Smith.
2d Tennessee.....	Col. W. D. Robison.
35th Tennessee.....	Col. B. J. Hill.
48th Tennessee.....	Col. G. H. Nixon.
Calvert's (Arkansas) Battery.....	Lieut. T. J. Key.

STEWART'S DIVISION.

Maj-gen. Alexander P. Stewart.

Johnson's Brigade.

Brig-gen. B. R. Johnson.

17th Tennessee.....	Lieut.-col. W. W. Floyd.
23d Tennessee.....	Col. R. H. Keeble.
25th Tennessee.....	Col. John M. Hughs.
44th Tennessee.....	Col. John S. Fulton.
Jefferson's Artillery.....	Capt. Put. Darden.

*Bate's Brigade.**

Brig-gen. W. B. Bate.

9th Alabama Battalion.....	Lieut.-col. Bush. Jones.
4th Georgia Battalion Sharpshooters.....	Capt. B. M. Turner.
37th Georgia.....	Maj. M. Kendrick.
15th and 37th Tennessee.....	Col. R. C. Tyler.
20th Tennessee.....	Col. Thomas B. Smith.
Eufaula (Alabama) Artillery.....	Lieut. W. J. McKenzie.

* Col. T. B. Smith reported as commanding, July 20.

ADDENDA.*Brown's Brigade.*

Brig.-gen. John C. Brown.

18th Tennessee.....	Lieut.-col. W. R. Butler.
26th Tennessee.....	Col. J. M. Lillard.
32d Tennessee.....	Maj. J. P. McGuire.
45th Tennessee.....	Col. A. Searcy.
23d Tennessee Battalion.....	Capt. W. P. Simpson.
Dawson's (Georgia) Battery.....	Lieut. R. W. Anderson.

Clayton's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. H. D. Clayton.

18th Alabama.....	Lieut.-col. R. F. Inge.
36th Alabama.....	Col. L. T. Woodruff.
38th Alabama.....	Maj. O. S. Jewett.
Arkansas Battery.....	Capt. J. T. Humphreys.

Jackson's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. John K. Jackson.

1st Confederate.....	Maj. J. C. Gordon.
2d Georgia Battalion (Sharpshooters)....	Maj. R. H. Whiteley.
5th Georgia.....	Col. C. P. Daniel.
5th Mississippi.....	Lieut.-col. W. L. Sykes.
8th Mississippi.....	Col. J. C. Wilkinson.
Georgia Battery.....	Capt. E. E. Pritchard.
Georgia Battery	Capt. John Scogin.

CAVALRY CORPS.

Maj.-gen. JOSEPH WHEELER.

WHARTON'S DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. John A. Wharton.

First Brigade.

Col. C. C. Crews.

7th Alabama	Col. J. C. Malone, Jr.
2d Georgia	Lieut.-col. F. M. Ison.
3d Georgia	Lieut.-col. R. Thompson.
4th Georgia	Col. I. W. Avery.

Second Brigade.

Col. Thomas Harrison.

3d Confederate.....	Col. W. N. Estes.
1st [3d] Kentucky.....	Col. J. R. Butler.
4th [8th] Tennessee.....	Lieut.-col. P. F. Anderson.
8th Texas.....	Lieut.-col. G. Cook.
11th Texas	Lieut.-col. J. M. Bounds.

Artillery.

Tennessee Battery	Capt. B. F. White, Jr.
-------------------------	------------------------

MARTIN'S DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. Will. T. Martin.

First Brigade.

Col. James Hagan.

1st Alabama.....Maj. A. H. Johnson.
 3d Alabama.....Lieut.-col. T. H. Mauldin.
 51st AlabamaCapt. M. L. Kirkpatrick.
 8th ConfederateCapt. J. H. Field.

Second Brigade.

Col. A. A. Russell.

4th Alabama.....Lieut.-col. J. M. Hambrick.
 1st Confederate.....Capt. C. H. Conner.

Artillery.

Wiggins' (Arkansas) Battery.....Lieut. A. A. Blake.

MORGAN'S DIVISION.*

First Brigade.

Col. B. W. Duke.

2d Kentucky.....Maj. T. B. Webber.
 5th KentuckyCol. D. H. Smith.
 6th KentuckyCol. J. Warren Grigsby.
 9th KentuckyCol. W. C. P. Breckinridge.
 Ward's (9th Tennessee) regiment.....Col. W. W. Ward.

Second Brigade.

Col. R. S. Cluke.

8th KentuckyCol. R. S. Cluke.
 10th Kentucky.....Col. A. R. Johnson.
 Chenault's regiment.....Col. D. W. Chenault.
 Gano's regiment.....Lieut.-col. J. M. Huffman.

Artillery.

Kentucky Battery.....Capt. E. P. Byrne.

DISTRICT OF NORTHERN ALABAMA.

Brig.-gen. P. D. Roddey.

5th Alabama Cavalry.....Col. Josiah Patterson.
 53d Alabama Cavalry.....Col. M. W. Hannon.
 Roddey's cavalry regiment.....Lieut.-col. W. A. Johnson.
 Unorganized troops.....Capt. W. R. Julian.
 Georgia BatteryCapt. C. B. Ferrell.

* The above appears to have been the composition of Morgan's command when he set out on the raid.

ADDENDA.

FORREST'S CAVALRY DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. NATHAN B. FORREST.

*First Brigade.**

Brig.-gen. F. C. Armstrong.

3d Arkansas.....	Col. A. W. Hobson.
2d Kentucky.....	Lieut.-col. T. G. Woodward.
1st [6th] Tennessee.....	Col. J. T. Wheeler.
McDonald's battalion.....	Maj. Charles McDonald.
Escort company.....	Capt. John Bradley.

Second Brigade.

Col. N. N. Cox.

4th Tennessee.....	Maj. W. S. McLemore.
8th [13th] Tennessee	Lieut.-col. F. H. Daugherty.
9th [19th] Tennessee	Col. J. B. Biffle.
10th Tennessee.....	
11th Tennessee.....	Lieut.-col. D. W. Holman.
Escort company.....	Capt. T. J. Gray.

Artillery.

Tennessee Battery.....	Capt. S. L. Freeman.
Tennessee Battery.....	Capt. J. W. Morton, Jr.

ARTILLERY RESERVE.

Col. JAMES DESHLER.

1st Louisiana.....	Lieut.-col. F. M. Kent.
Alabama Battery.....	Capt. C. L. Lumsden.
Georgia Battery.....	Capt. T. L. Massenburg.
Havis' (Georgia) Battery.....	Lieut. J. R. Duncan.
Missouri Battery.....	Capt. O. W. Barret.
Orleans Guard Artillery.....	Lieut. N. O. Lauve.

MISCELLANEOUS.

ATLANTA, GA.

Provost Battalion.....	Maj. G. W. Lee.
------------------------	-----------------

Engineer Troops.

Sappers and Miners (one company).....	Capt. G. B. Pickett.
---------------------------------------	----------------------

Escorts.

Dreux's company (army headquarters).....	Capt. Guv Dreux.
Holloway's company (army headquarters).....	Capt. E. M. Holloway.
Orleans Light Horse (Polk's headquarters)...	Capt. L. Greenleaf.
Company G, Second Georgia Cavalry (Cheatham's headquarters).....	Capt. T. H. Jordan.
Lenoir's company (Withers' headquarters)....	Lieut. W. J. Lee.
Raum's company (Hill's headquarters).....	Capt. W. C. Raum.
Sanders' company (Cleburne's headquarters)...	Capt. C. F. Sanders.
Foules' company (Stewart's headquarters)....	Capt. H. L. Foules.
Gordon's company.....	Capt. M. L. Gordon.
Texas company.....	Lieut. Isaac Fulkerson.

* Col. G. G. Dibrell reported in command, July 20.

Organization of the Army of the Cumberland, commanded by MAJOR-GENERAL WM. S. ROSECRANS, at the Battle of Chickamauga, Ga., September 19 and 20, 1863.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

1st Battalion Ohio Sharpshooters.....Capt. Gershoni M. Barber.
10th Ohio Infantry.....Lieut.-col. William M. Ward.
15th Pennsylvania Cavalry.....Col. William J. Palmer.

FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

Maj.-gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

Provost Guard—9th Michigan Infantry,* Col. John G. Parkhurst.
Escort—1st Ohio Cavalry, Company L, Capt. John D. Barker.

FIRST DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. Absalom Baird.

First Brigade.

Col. Benjamin F. Scribner.

38th Indiana.....Lieut.-col. Daniel F. Griffin.
2d Ohio.....Lieut.-col. Obadiah C. Maxwell.
Maj. William T. Beatty.
Capt. James Warnock.
33d Ohio.....Col. Oscar F. Moore.
94th Ohio.....Maj. Rue P. Hutchins.
10th Wisconsin.....Lieut.-col. John H. Ely.
Capt. Jacob W. Roby.

Second Brigade.

Brig.-gen. John C. Starkweather.

24th Illinois.....Col. Geza Mihalotzy.
Capt. August Mauff.
79th Pennsylvania.....Col. Henry A. Hambright.
1st Wisconsin.....Lieut.-col. George B. Bingham.
21st Wisconsin.....Lieut.-col. Harrison C. Hobart.
Capt. Charles H. Walker.

Third Brigade.†

Brig.-gen. John H. King.

15th United States, 1st Battalion.....Capt. Albert B. Dod.
16th United States, 1st Battalion.....Maj. Sidney Coolidge.
Capt. Robert E. A. Crofton.
18th United States, 1st Battalion.....Capt. George W. Smith.
18th United States, 2d Battalion.....Capt. Henry Haymond.
19th United States, 1st Battalion.....Maj. Samuel K. Dawson.
Capt. Edmund L. Smith.

* Not engaged; guarding trains and performing provost duty.

† For the composition of the battalions see return of casualties, p. 620.

ADDENDA.*Artillery.*

Indiana Light, 4th Battery (2d Brigade).....	Lieut. David Flansburg.
	Lieut. Henry J. Willits.
1st Michigan Light, Battery A (1st Brigade).....	Lieut. George W. Van Pelt.
	Lieut. Almerick W. Wilber.
5th United States, Battery H (3d Brigade)....	Lieut. Howard M. Burnham.
	Lieut. Joshua A. Fessenden.

SECOND DIVISION.

Maj.-gen. James S. Negley.

First Brigade.

Brig.-gen. John Beatty.

104th Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Douglas Hapeman.
42d Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. William T. B. McIntire.
88th Indiana.....	Col. George Humphrey.
15th Kentucky.....	Col. Marion C. Taylor.

Second Brigade.

Col. Timothy R. Stanley.

Col. William L. Stoughton.

19th Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Alexander W. Raffin.
11th Michigan.....	Col. William L. Stoughton.
	Lieut.-col. Melvin Mudge.
18th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Charles H. Grosvenor.

Third Brigade.

Col. William Sirwell.

37th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. William D. Ward.
21st Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Dwella M. Stoughton.
	Maj. Arnold McMahan.
	Capt. Charles H. Vantine.
74th Ohio.....	Capt. Joseph Fisher.
78th Pennsylvania.....	Lieut.-col. Archibald Blakeley.

Artillery.

Illinois Light, Bridges' Battery (1st Brig.)....	Capt. Lyman Bridges.
1st Ohio Light, Battery G (3d Brigade).....	Capt. Alexander Marshall.
1st Ohio Light, Battery M (2d Brigade).....	Capt. Frederick Schultz.

THIRD DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. John M. Brannan.

First Brigade.

Col. John M. Connell.

82d Indiana.....	Col. Morton C. Hunter.
17th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Durbin Ward.
31st Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Frederick W. Lister.
38th Ohio *.....	Col. Edward H. Phelps.

* Not engaged: train-guard.

Second Brigade.

Col. John T. Croxton.
Col. William H. Hays.

10th Indiana.....	Col. William B. Carroll.
	Lieut.-col. Marsh B. Taylor.
74th Indiana.....	Col. Charles W. Chapman.
	Lieut.-col. Myron Baker.
4th Kentucky.....	Lieut.-col. P. Burgess Hunt.
	Maj. Robert M. Kelly.
10th Kentucky.....	Col. William H. Hays.
	Maj. Gabriel C. Wharton.
14th Ohio.....	Col. Henry D. Kingsbury.

Third Brigade.

Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer.

87th Indiana.....	Col. Newell Gleason.
2d Minnesota.....	Col. James George.
9th Ohio.....	Col. Gustave Kammerling.
35th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Henry V. N. Boynton.

Artillery.

1st Michigan Light, Battery D (1st Brig.)...	Capt. Josiah W. Church.
1st Ohio Light, Battery C (2d Brigade).....	Lieut. Marco B. Gary.
4th United States, Battery I (3d Brigade)...	Lieut. Frank G. Smith.

FOURTH DIVISION.

Maj.-gen. Joseph J. Reynolds.

*First Brigade.**

Col. John T. Wilder.

92d Illinois.....	Col. Smith D. Atkins.
98th Illinois.....	Col. John J. Funkhouser.
	Lieut.-col. Edward Kittell.
123d Illinois.....	Col. James Monroe.
17th Indiana.....	Maj. William T. Jones.
72d Indiana.....	Col. Abram O. Miller.

Second Brigade.

Col. Edward A. King.
Col. Milton S. Robinson.

68th Indiana.....	Capt. Harvey J. Espy.
75th Indiana.....	Col. Milton S. Robinson.
	Lieut.-col. William O'Brien.
101st Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Thomas Doan.
105th Ohio.....	Maj. George T. Perkins.

* Detached from its division and serving as mounted infantry.

ADDENDA.

Third Brigade.

Brig.-gen. John B. Turchin.

18th Kentucky.....	Lieut.-col. H. Kavanaugh Milward.
	Capt. John B. Heltemes.
11th Ohio.....	Col. Philander P. Lane.
36th Ohio.....	Col. William G. Jones.
	Lieut.-col. Hiram F. Duvall.
92d Ohio.....	Col. Benjamin D. Fearing.
	Lieut.-col. Douglas Putnam, Jr.

Artillery.

Indiana Light, 18th Battery (1st Brigade)...	Capt. Eli Lilly.
Indiana Light, 19th Battery (2d Brigade)...	Capt. Samuel J. Harris.
	Lieut. Robert G. Lackey.
Indiana Light, 21st Battery (3d Brigade)...	Capt. William W. Andrew.

TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS.

Maj.-gen. ALEXANDER McD. McCook.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

Provost Guard—81st Indiana Infantry, Company H, Capt. William J. Richards.
Escort—2d Kentucky Cavalry, Company I, Lieut. George W. L. Batman.

FIRST DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. Jefferson C. Davis.

*First Brigade.**

Col. P. Sidney Post.

59th Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Joshua C. Winters.
74th Illinois.....	Col. Jason Marsh.
75th Illinois.....	Col. John E. Bennett.
22d Indiana.....	Col. Michael Gooding.
Wisconsin Light Artillery, 5th Battery.....	Capt. George Q. Gardner.

Second Brigade.

Brig.-gen. William P. Carlin.

21st Illinois.....	Col. John W. S. Alexander.
	Capt. Chester K. Knight.
38th Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Daniel H. Gilmer.
	Capt. Willis G. Whitehurst.
81st Indiana.....	Capt. Nevil B. Boone.
	Maj. James E. Calloway.
101st Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. John Messer.
	Maj. Bedan B. McDonald.
	Capt. Leonard D. Smith.
Minnesota Light Artillery, 2d Battery †.....	Lieut. Albert Woodbury.
	Lieut. Richard L. Dawley.

* Not engaged: guarding supply-train.

† Capt. William A. Hotchkiss, chief of division artillery.

Third Brigade.

Col. Hans C. Heg.
Col. John A. Martin.

25th Illinois.....	Maj. Samuel D. Wall. Capt. Wesford Taggart.
35th Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. William P. Chandler.
8th Kansas.....	Col. John A. Martin. Lieut.-col. James L. Abernethy.
15th Wisconsin.....	Lieut.-col. Ole C. Johnson.
Wisconsin Light Artillery (8th Battery).....	Lieut. John D. McLean.

SECOND DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. Richard W. Johnson.

First Brigade.

Brig.-gen. August Willich.

89th Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Duncan J. Hall. Maj. William D. Williams.
32d Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Frank Erdelmeyer.
39th Indiana *.....	Col. Thomas J. Harrison.
15th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Frank Askew.
49th Ohio.....	Maj. Samuel F. Gray. Capt. Luther M. Strong.
1st Ohio Light Artillery, Battery A.....	Capt. Wilbur F. Goodspeed.

Second Brigade.

Col. Joseph B. Dodge.

79th Illinois.....	Col. Allen Buckner.
29th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. David M. Dunn.
30th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Orrin D. Hurd.
77th Pennsylvania.....	Col. Thomas E. Rose. Capt. Joseph J. Lawson.
Ohio Light Artillery, 20th Battery.....	Capt. Edward Grosskopf.

Third Brigade.

Col. Philemon P. Baldwin.
Col. William W. Berry.

6th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Hagerman Tripp. Maj. Calvin D. Campbell.
5th Kentucky.....	Col. William W. Berry. Capt. John M. Huston.
1st Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Bassett Langdon.
93d Ohio.....	Col. Hiram Strong. Lieut.-col. William H. Martin.
Indiana Light Artillery, 5th Battery.....	Capt. Peter Simonson.

* Detached from its brigade and serving as mounted infantry.

ADDENDA.

THIRD DIVISION.

Maj.-gen. Philip H. Sheridan.

First Brigade.

Brig.-gen. William H. Lytle.

Col. Silas Miller.

36th Illinois.....	Col. Silas Miller.
	Lieut.-col. Porter C. Olson.
88th Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Alexander S. Chadbourne.
21st Michigan.....	Col. William B. McCreery.
	Maj. Seymour Chase.
24th Wisconsin.....	Lieut.-col. Theodore S. West.
	Maj. Carl von Baumbach.
Indiana Light Artillery, 11th Battery.....	Capt. Arnold Sutermeister.

Second Brigade.

Col. Bernard Laiboldt.

44th Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Wallace W. Barrett.
73d Illinois.....	Col. James F. Jaquess.
2d Missouri.....	Lieut.-col. Arnold Beck.
15th Missouri.....	Col. Joseph Conrad.
1st Missouri Light Artillery, Battery G *.....	Lieut. Gustavus Schueler.

Third Brigade.

Col. Luther P. Bradley.

Col. Nathan H. Walworth.

22d Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Francis Swanwick.
27th Illinois.....	Col. Jonathan R. Miles.
42d Illinois.....	Col. Nathan H. Walworth.
	Lieut.-col. John A. Hottenstine.
51st Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Samuel B. Raymond.
1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery C.....	Capt. Mark H. Prescott.

TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS.

Maj.-gen. THOMAS L. CRITTENDEN.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

Escort—15th Illinois Cavalry, Company K, Capt. Samuel B. Sherer.

FIRST DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. Thomas J. Wood.

First Brigade.

Col. George P. Buell.

100th Illinois.....	Col. Frederick A. Bartleson.
	Maj. Charles M. Hammond.
58th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. James T. Embree.
13th Michigan.....	Col. Joshua B. Culver.
	Maj. Willard G. Eaton.
26th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. William H. Young.

* Capt. Henry Hecock, chief of division artillery.

*Second Brigade.**

Brig.-gen. George D. Wagner.

15th Indiana.....	Col. Gustavus A. Wood.
40th Indiana.....	Col. John W. Blake.
57th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. George W. Lennard.
97th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Milton Barnes.

Third Brigade.

Col. Charles G. Harker.

3d Kentucky.....	Col. Henry C. Dunlap.
64th Ohio.....	Col. Alexander McIlvain.
65th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Horatio N. Whitbeck.
	Maj. Samuel C. Brown.
	Capt. Thomas Powell.
125th Ohio.....	Col. Emerson Opdycke.

Artillery.

Indiana Light, 8th Battery (1st Brigade)...	Capt. George Estep.
Indiana Light, 10th Battery * (2d Brigade)...	Lieut. William A. Naylor.
Ohio Light, 6th Battery (3d Brigade).....	Capt. Cullen Bradley.

SECOND DIVISION.

Maj.-gen. John M. Palmer.

First Brigade.

Brig.-gen. Charles Cruft.

31st Indiana.....	Col. John T. Smith.
1st Kentucky †.....	Lieut.-col. Alva R. Hadlock.
2d Kentucky.....	Col. Thomas D. Sedgewick.
90th Ohio.....	Col. Charles H. Rippey.

Second Brigade.

Brig.-gen. William B. Hazen.

9th Indiana.....	Col. Isaac C. B. Suman.
6th Kentucky.....	Col. George T. Shackelford.
	Lieut. Richard Rockingham.
	Maj. Richard T. Whitaker.
41st Ohio.....	Col. Aquila Wiley.
124th Ohio.....	Col. Oliver H. Payne.
	Maj. James B. Hampson.

Third Brigade.

Col. William Grose.

84th Illinois.....	Col. Louis H. Waters.
36th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Oliver H. P. Carey.
	Maj. Gilbert Trusler.
23d Kentucky.....	Lieut.-col. James C. Foy.
6th Ohio.....	Col. Nicholas L. Anderson.
	Maj. Samuel C. Erwin.
24th Ohio.....	Col. David J. Higgins.

* At Chattanooga, and not engaged.

† Five companies detached as wagon-guard.

Artillery.

Capt. William E. Standart.

- 1st Ohio Light, Battery B (1st Brigade).....Lieut. Norman A. Baldwin.
1st Ohio Light, Battery F (2d Brigade).....Lieut. Giles J. Cockerill.
4th United States, Battery H (3d Brigade)..Lieut. Harry C. Cushing.
4th United States, Battery M (3d Brigade)..Lieut. Francis D. L. Russell.

Unattached.

- 110th Illinois (battalion) * Capt. E. Hibbard Topping.

THIRD DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. Horatio P. Van Cleve.

First Brigade.

Brig.-gen. Samuel Beatty.

- | | |
|--------------------|--------------------------------|
| 79th Indiana..... | Col. Frederick Knefler. |
| 9th Kentucky..... | Col. George H. Cram. |
| 17th Kentucky..... | Col. Alexander M. Stout. |
| 19th Ohio..... | Lieut.-col. Henry G. Stratton. |

Second Brigade.

Col. George F. Dick.

- | | |
|-------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 44th Indiana..... | Lieut.-col. Simeon C. Aldrich. |
| 86th Indiana..... | Maj. Jacob C. Dick. |
| 13th Ohio..... | Lieut.-col. Elhannon M. Mast. |
| | Capt. Horatio G. Cosgrove. |
| 59th Ohio..... | Lieut.-col. Granville A. Frambes. |

Third Brigade.

Col. Sidney M. Barnes.

- | | |
|----------------------|------------------------------|
| 35th Indiana..... | Maj. John P. Dufficy. |
| 8th Kentucky..... | Lieut.-col. James D. Mayhew. |
| | Maj. John S. Clark. |
| 21st Kentucky †..... | Col. S. Woodson Price. |
| 51st Ohio..... | Col. Richard W. McClain. |
| | Lieut.-col. Charles H. Wood. |
| 99th Ohio..... | Col. Peter T. Swaine. |

Artillery.

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Indiana Light, 7th Battery..... | Capt. George R. Swallow. |
| Pennsylvania Light, 26th Battery..... | Capt. Alanson J. Stevens. |
| | Lieut. Samuel M. McDowell. |
| Wisconsin Light, 3d Battery..... | Lieut. Cortland Livingston. |

RESERVE CORPS.

Maj.-gen. GORDON GRANGER.

FIRST DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. James B. Steedman.

First Brigade.

Brig.-gen. Walter C. Whitaker.

- | | |
|---------------------|--------------------------|
| 96th Illinois..... | Col. Thomas E. Champion. |
| 115th Illinois..... | Col. Jesse H. Moore. |

* Not engaged.

† At Whitesides, Tenn., and not engaged.

84th Indiana.....	Col. Nelson Trusler.
22d Michigan *.....	Col. Heber Le Favour.
	Lieut.-col. William Sanborn.
	Capt. Alonzo M. Keeler.
40th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. William Jones.
89th Ohio *.....	Col. Caleb H. Carlton.
	Capt. Isaac C. Nelson.
Ohio Light Artillery, 18th Battery.....	Capt. Charles C. Aleshire.

Second Brigade.

Col. John G. Mitchell.

78th Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Carter Van Vleck.
	Lieut. George Green.
98th Ohio.....	Capt. Moses J. Urquhart.
	Capt. Armstrong J. Thomas.
113th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Darius B. Warner.
121st Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Henry B. Banning.
1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery M.....	Lieut. Thomas Burton.

•
SECOND DIVISION.

Second Brigade.

Col. Daniel McCook.

85th Illinois.....	Col. Caleb J. Dilworth.
86th Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. David W. Magee.
125th Illinois.....	Col. Oscar F. Harmon.
52d Ohio.....	Maj. James T. Holmes.
69th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Joseph H. Brigham.
2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery I.....	Capt. Charles M. Barnett.

CAVALRY CORPS.

Brig.-gen. ROBERT B. MITCHELL.

FIRST DIVISION.

Col. Edward M. McCook.

First Brigade.

Col. Archibald P. Campbell.

2d Michigan.....	Maj. Leonidas S. Scranton.
9th Pennsylvania.....	Lieut.-col. Roswell M. Russell.
1st Tennessee.....	Lieut.-col. James P. Brownlow.

Second Brigade.

Col. Daniel M. Ray.

2d Indiana.....	Maj. Joseph B. Presdee.
4th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. John T. Deweese.
2d Tennessee.....	Lieut.-col. William R. Cook.
1st Wisconsin.....	Col. Oscar H. La Grange.
1st Ohio Light Artillery, Battery D (section)....	Lieut. Nathaniel M. Newell.

• Temporarily attached.

*ADDENDA.**Third Brigade.*

Col. Louis D. Watkins.

4th Kentucky.....	Col. Wickliffe Cooper.
5th Kentucky.....	Lieut.-col. William T. Hoblitzell.
6th Kentucky.....	Maj. Louis A. Gratz.

SECOND DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. George Crook.

First Brigade.

Col. Robert H. G. Minty.

3d Indiana (detachment).....	Lieut.-col. Robert Klein.
4th Michigan.....	Maj. Horace Gray.
7th Pennsylvania.....	Lieut.-col. James J. Seibert.
4th United States.....	Capt. James B. McIntyre.

Second Brigade.

Col. Eli Long.

2d Kentucky.....	Col. Thomas P. Nicholas.
1st Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Valentine Cupp.
	Maj. Thomas J. Patten.
3d Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Charles B. Seidel.
4th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Oliver P. Robia.

Artillery.

Chicago (Illinois) Board of Trade Battery.....Capt. James H. Stokes.

*Return of Casualties in the Army of the Cumberland, commanded by
MAJOR-GENERAL WM. S. ROSECRANS, at the Battle of Chickamauga,
Ga., September 19 and 20, 1863.**

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
GENERAL HEADQ'RTERS.							
10th Ohio Infantry	1	1
15th Pennsylvania Cavalry	2	...	3	5
Total General Headquarters	2	...	4	6
FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS.							
Maj.-gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS.							
Staff	1	1
FIRST DIVISION.							
Brig.-gen. Absalom Baird.							
First Brigade.							
Col. Benjamin F. Scribner.							
38th Indiana.....	1	12	3	54	...	39	109
2d Ohio	1	8	3	47	6	116	181
33d Ohio	2	12	4	59	4	79	160
94th Ohio	2	1	21	1	21	46
10th Wisconsin.....	2	9	3	52	13	132	211
1st Michigan Light Art., Bat. A...	1	5	...	7	...	12	25
Total First brigade	7	48	14	240	24	399	732
Second Brigade.							
Brig.-gen. John C. Starkweather.							
Staff	1	1
24th Illinois	1	18	9	67	3	53	151
79th Pennsylvania.....	1	15	5	62	1	41	125
1st Wisconsin	4	23	5	79	4	73	188
21st Wisconsin	2	4	39	9	67	121
Indiana Light Art., 4th Battery...	...	1	...	14	1	4	20
Total Second brigade.....	6	59	24	261	18	238	606

* Losses also sustained by the troops engaged at Chickamauga in the skirmishes at Rossville, Lookout Church, and Dry Valley, Georgia, September 21st, and at Missionary Ridge and Shallow Ford Gap, Tennessee, September 22d, are included.

Return of Casualties in the Army of the Cumberland, etc.—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Brig.-gen. John H. King.							
15th U. S., A, C, E, F, G, and H, 1st Battln., and E, 2d Battln....	...	9	2	47	6	96	160
16th U. S., A, B, D, F, and H, 1st Battln., and B, C, and D, 2d Batt.	1	2	3	16	10	164	196
18th U. S., B, D, E, F, G, and H, 1st Battln., and G and H, 3d Battln.	...	19	4	67	2	66	158
18th U. S., 2d Battalion.....	1	13	3	78	2	48	145
19th U. S., A, B, C, E, F, G, and H, 1st Battln., and A, 2d Battln...	1	2	4	13	6	110	136
5th U. S. Artillery, Battery H.....	1	12	2	16	...	13	44
Total Third brigade.....	4	57	18	237	26	497	839
Total First division.....	17	164	56	738	68	1134	2177
SECOND DIVISION.							
Maj.-gen. James S. Negley.							
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Brig.-gen. John Beatty.							
104th Illinois	2	6	40	...	16	64
42d Indiana	1	3	49	3	50	106
88th Indiana	3	4	29	2	14	52
15th Kentucky.....	...	5	...	42	1	14	62
Bridges' Illinois Battery.....	1	5	...	16	...	4	26
Total First brigade.....	1	16	13	176	6	98	310
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. Timothy R. Stanley.*							
Col. William L. Stoughton.							
19th Illinois	10	4	41	1	15	71
11th Michigan	1	4	4	38	...	19	66
18th Ohio	5	6	49	...	14	74
1st Ohio Light Art., Battery M....	4	4
Total Second brigade.....	1	19	14	132	1	48	215

* Wounded September 20th.

Return of Casualties in the Army of the Cumberland, etc.—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Col. William Sirwell.							
37th Indiana	7	...	2	9
21st Ohio	28	4	80	11	120	243
74th Ohio.....	...	1	...	2	...	6	9
78th Pennsylvania	2	...	3	5
Total Third brigade.....	...	29	4	91	11	131	266
Total Second division.....	2	64	31	399	18	277	791
THIRD DIVISION.							
Brig.-gen. John M. Brannan.							
Staff.....	1	1
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Col. John M. Connell.							
82d Indiana.....	1	19	1	67	2	21	111
17th Ohio.....	1	15	11	103	3	18	151
31st Ohio	13	7	127	...	22	169
1st Michigan Light Art., Battery D	1	6	...	4	11
Total First brigade.....	2	47	20	303	5	65	442
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. John T. Croxton.*							
Col. William H. Hays.							
10th Indiana	2	22	6	130	1	5	166
74th Indiana	2	20	11	114	...	10	157
4th Kentucky.....	...	25	13	144	...	9	191
10th Kentucky.....	1	20	9	125	1	10	166
14th Ohio.....	...	35	8	159	...	43	245
1st Ohio Light Art., Battery C.....	...	4	...	9	13
Total Second brigade.....	5	126	47	681	2	77	938

* Wounded September 20th.

Return of Casualties in the Army of the Cumberland, etc.—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer.							
87th Indiana	7	33	4	138	...	8	190
2d Minnesota.....	...	34	6	101	2	49	192
9th Ohio.....	2	46	9	176	1	15	249
35th Ohio.....	2	19	7	132	1	26	187
4th U. S. Artillery, Battery I.....	...	1	1	20	22
Total Third brigade.....	11	133	27	567	4	98	840
Total Third division.....	18	306	94	1552	11	240	2221
FOURTH DIVISION.							
Maj.-gen. Joseph J. Reynolds.							
Staff.....	1	1	2
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Col. John T. Wilder.							
92d Illinois	2	2	20	...	2	26
98th Illinois.....	...	2	2	29	...	2	35
123d Illinois	1	2	11	1	9	24
17th Indiana	4	2	8	...	2	16
72d Indiana.....	...	3	1	15	...	2	21
Indiana Light Art., 18th Battery...	...	1	...	2	3
Total First brigade.....	...	13	9	85	1	17	125
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. Edward A. King.*							
Col. Milton S. Robinson.							
68th Indiana	2	15	5	103	1	11	137
75th Indiana	17	4	104	2	11	138
101st Indiana.....	...	11	5	85	1	17	119
105th Ohio.....	...	3	4	37	2	24	70
Indiana Light Art., 19th Battery...	...	2	1	15	...	2	20
Total Second brigade.....	2	48	19	344	6	65	484

* Killed September 20th.

Return of Casualties in the Army of the Cumberland, etc.—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Brig.-gen. John B. Turchin.							
18th Kentucky.....	...	7	8	38	4	29	86
11th Ohio.....	...	5	1	35	2	20	63
36th Ohio	1	11	3	62	...	14	91
92d Ohio.....	...	6	6	62	...	17	91
Indiana Light Art., 21st Battery...	12	12
Total Third brigade.....	1	29	18	209	6	80	343
Total Fourth division.....	3	90	47	638	14	162	954
Total Fourteenth army corps	40	624	228	3327	112	1813	6144
TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS.							
Maj.-gen. ALEX. McD. McCook.							
FIRST DIVISION.							
Brig.-gen. Jefferson C. Davis.							
<i>Second Brigade.*</i>							
Brig.-gen. William P. Carlin.							
21st Illinois	2	20	6	64	8	138	238
38th Illinois.....	2	13	8	79	2	76	180
81st Indiana.....	...	4	4	56	2	21	87
101st Ohio.....	3	10	6	76	...	51	146
Total Second brigade.....	7	47	24	275	12	286	651
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Col. Hans C. Heg.†							
Col. John A. Martin.							
25th Illinois	10	11	160	1	23	205
35th Illinois.....	3	14	5	125	...	13	160
8th Kansas.....	2	28	9	156	...	25	220
15th Wisconsin ..	4	9	6	47	2	43	111
Total Third brigade.....	9	61	31	488	3	104	696

* First brigade, Col. P. Sidney Post commanding, not engaged.

† Killed Sept. 19th.

Return of Casualties in the Army of the Cumberland, etc.—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Artillery.</i>							
Capt. William A. Hotchkiss.							
Minnesota Light, 2d Battery	1	1	2
Total Artillery	1	1	2
Total First division	16	108	56	764	15	390	1349
<i>SECOND DIVISION.</i>							
Brig.-gen. Richard W. Johnson.							
Staff.....	1	2	3
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Brig.-gen. August Willich.							
Staff.....	1	1	2
89th Illinois.....	4	10	5	83	2	28	132
32d Indiana.....	1	20	4	77	...	20	122
39th Indiana*.....	...	5	3	32	40
15th Ohio.....	1	9	2	75	...	33	120
49th Ohio.....	...	10	2	57	2	28	99
1st Ohio Light Art., Battery A.....	...	2	1	13	...	4	20
Total First brigade.....	7	56	17	338	4	113	535
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. Joseph B. Dodge.							
Staff.....	1	1	2	5	9
79th Illinois	3	1	20	6	91	121
29th Indiana	2	9	5	87	7	62	172
30th Indiana	2	8	5	50	4	57	126
77th Pennsylvania	3	4	24	9	64	104
Ohio Light Art., 20th Battery	2	...	2	4
Total Second brigade.....	4	23	16	184	28	281	536

* Detached from brigade and serving as mounted infantry.

Return of Casualties in the Army of the Cumberland, etc.—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Col. Philemon P. Baldwin.*							
Col. William W. Berry.							
Staff.....	...	1	1	2
6th Indiana	2	11	6	110	...	31	160
5th Kentucky.....	2	12	6	73	2	30	125
1st Ohio	1	12	3	93	...	33	142
93d Ohio.....	...	15	3	83	2	27	130
Indiana Light Art., 5th Battery....	...	1	1	6	...	1	9
Total Third brigade.....	5	52	20	365	4	122	568
Total Second division.....	17	131	53	887	36	518	1642
<i>THIRD DIVISION.</i>							
Maj.-gen. Philip H. Sheridan.							
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Brig.-gen. William H. Lytle.†							
Col. Silas Miller.							
Staff.....	1	1
36th Illinois.....	3	17	6	95	...	20	141
88th Illinois.....	...	12	7	55	...	14	88
21st Michigan	1	15	4	69	2	15	106
24th Wisconsin.....	...	3	4	69	...	29	105
Indiana Light Art., 11th Battery...	...	3	1	11	...	4	19
Total First brigade.....	5	50	22	299	2	82	460
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. Bernard Laiboldt.							
44th Illinois.....	...	6	5	55	1	33	100
73d Illinois	2	11	4	53	3	19	92
2d Missouri	1	6	2	54	1	28	92
15th Missouri.....	2	9	5	62	...	22	100
1st Missouri Light Art., Battery G	...	1	...	3	1	5
Total Second brigade.....	5	33	16	227	6	102	389

* Killed September 19th.
Vol. IV.—40

† Killed September 20th.

Return of Casualties in the Army of the Cumberland, etc.—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Col. Luther P. Bradley.*							
Col. Nathan H. Walworth.							
22d Illinois	23	5	71	2	29	130
27th Illinois	1	1	4	75	...	10	91
42d Illinois	3	12	4	119	1	4	143
51st Illinois	2	16	3	89	2	16	128
1st Illinois Light Art., Battery C...	4	4
Total Third brigade.....	6	52	16	358	5	59	496
Total Third division	16	135	54	884	13	243	1345
Total Twentieth army corps ...	49	374	163	2535	64	1151	4336
TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS.							
Maj.-gen. THOMAS L. CRITTENDEN.							
Escort	3	3
FIRST DIVISION.							
Brig.-gen. Thomas J. Wood.							
Staff.....	1	1
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Col. George P. Buell.							
100th Illinois.....	...	23	6	111	2	22	164
58th Indiana	2	14	5	114	3	31	169
26th Ohio	4	23	6	134	2	43	212
13th Michigan.....	2	11	6	61	2	24	106
Total First brigade.....	8	71	23	420	9	120	651
<i>Third Brigade.†</i>							
Col. Charles G. Harker.							
3d Kentucky	1	12	8	70	...	22	113
64th Ohio.....	1	7	2	48	...	13	71
65th Ohio.....	2	12	6	65	...	18	103
125th Ohio.....	...	16	3	81	...	5	105
Total Third brigade.....	4	47	19	264	...	58	392

* Wounded Sept. 19th. † The Second brigade was stationed at Chattanooga, and not engaged

Return of Casualties in the Army of the Cumberland, etc.—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Artillery.</i>							
Indiana Light, 8th Battery*.....	...	1	...	9	...	7	17
Ohio Light, 6th Battery†	1	1	7	9
Total Artillery	2	1	16	...	7	26
Total First division	12	120	44	700	9	185	1070
SECOND DIVISION.							
Maj.-gen. John M. Palmer.							
Staff.....	..	1	2	2	1	6
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Brig.-gen. Charles Cruft.							
31st Indiana.....	1	4	2	59	...	17	83
1st Kentucky (battalion).....	...	2	1	25	...	3	31
2d Kentucky.....	1	9	5	59	...	18	92
90th Ohio.....	2	5	2	60	1	14	84
Total First brigade.....	4	20	10	203	1	52	290
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Brig.-gen. William B. Hazen.							
9th Indiana	2	11	8	83	1	21	126
6th Kentucky.....	3	9	7	88	1	10	118
41st Ohio	6	5	95	...	9	115
124th Ohio.....	...	15	5	87	...	34	141
Total Second brigade	5	41	25	353	2	74	500
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Col. William Grose.							
Staff.....	3	3
84th Illinois.....	1	12	2	81	...	9	105
36th Indiana.....	...	13	10	89	...	17	129
23d Kentucky	1	10	3	49	...	6	69
6th Ohio.....	...	13	8	94	1	16	132
24th Ohio.....	...	3	3	57	...	16	79
Total Third brigade.....	2	51	26	373	1	64	517

* Attached to First brigade.

† Attached to Third brigade.

Return of Casualties in the Army of the Cumberland, etc.—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Artillery.</i>							
Capt. William E. Standart.							
1st Ohio Light, Battery B*.....	...	1	...	8	...	4	13
1st Ohio Light, Battery F†.....	1	1	...	8	...	2	12
4th United States, Battery H‡.....	...	5	1	16	22
4th United States, Battery M‡.....	...	2	...	6	8
Total Artillery.....	1	9	1	38	...	6	55
Total Second division.....	12	122	64	967	6	197	1368
. THIRD DIVISION.							
Brig.-gen. Horatio P. Van Cleve.							
Staff.....	1	1
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Brig.-gen. Samuel Beatty.							
79th Indiana.....	...	1	2	42	1	9	55
9th Kentucky.....	...	2	4	41	1	12	60
17th Kentucky.....	1	5	2	103	...	15	126
19th Ohio.....	...	7	2	58	...	23	90
Total First brigade.....	1	15	10	244	2	59	331
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. George F. Dick.							
44th Indiana.....	1	2	9	52	...	10	74
86th Indiana.....	...	1	3	28	...	21	53
13th Ohio.....	2	3	4	43	...	22	74
59th Ohio.....	2	5	1	40	2	28	78
Total Second brigade.....	5	11	17	163	2	81	279
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Col. Sidney M. Barnes.							
35th Indiana.....	...	5	3	20	2	35	65
8th Kentucky.....	...	4	2	45	1	27	79
51st Ohio.....	...	8	1	34	4	51	98
99th Ohio.....	...	3	2	28	...	24	57
Total Third brigade.....	...	20	8	127	7	137	299

* Attached to First brigade. † Attached to Second brigade. ‡ Attached to Third brigade.

Return of Casualties in the Army of the Cumberland, etc.—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Artillery.</i>							
Indiana Light, 7th Battery	8	1	9
Pennsylvania Light, 26th Battery	1	1	1	13	...	1	17
Wisconsin Light, 3d Battery	2	...	13	...	11	26
Total Artillery.....	1	3	1	34	1	12	52
Total Third division.....	7	49	36	568	13	289	962
Total Twenty-first army corps.	31	291	144	2238	28	671	3403
RESERVE CORPS.							
Maj.-gen. GORDON GRANGER.							
Staff.....	1	1
FIRST DIVISION.							
Brig.-gen. James B. Steedman.							
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Brig.-gen. Walter C. Whitaker.							
Staff.....	1	1
96th Illinois.....	...	39	9	125	2	50	225
115th Illinois.....	2	20	9	142	1	9	183
84th Indiana.....	3	20	6	91	...	13	133
22d Michigan*.....	...	32	3	93	14	247	389
40th Ohio.....	2	17	8	94	...	11	132
89th Ohio*.....	2	17	2	61	13	158	253
Ohio Light Artillery, 18th Battery	2	8	10
Total First brigade.....	9	145	40	614	30	488	1328
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. John G. Mitchell.							
78th Illinois.....	1	16	8	69	4	58	156
98th Ohio.....	2	7	3	38	1	12	63
113th Ohio.....	1	20	8	90	...	12	131
121st Ohio.....	2	7	7	76	...	7	99
1st Illinois Light Art., Battery M....	...	2	...	9	...	1	12
Total Second brigade.....	6	52	26	282	5	90	461
Total First division.....	15	197	66	896	35	578	1787

* Temporarily attached.

Return of Casualties in the Army of the Cumberland, etc.—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
SECOND DIVISION.							
Second Brigade.							
Col. Daniel McCook.							
85th Illinois.....
86th Illinois.....
125th Illinois
52d Ohio.....
69th Ohio.....
2d Illinois Light Art., Battery I...
Total Second brigade*.....	...	2	...	14	...	18	34
Total Reserve corps	16	199	66	910	35	596	1822
CAVALRY CORPS.							
Brig.-gen. ROBERT B. MITCHELL.							
FIRST DIVISION.							
Col. Edward M. McCook.							
First Brigade.							
Col. Archibald P. Campbell.							
2d Michigan.....	1	1	...	6	1	2	11
9th Pennsylvania.....	3	3
1st Tennessee.....	1	1
Total First brigade.....	1	1	...	6	1	6	15
Second Brigade.							
Col. Daniel M. Ray.							
2d Indiana.....	...	1	...	4	5
4th Indiana.....	2	...	7	9
2d Tennessee.....	...	1	...	2	3
1st Wisconsin.....	2	...	4	6
Total Second brigade.....	...	2	...	10	...	11	23
Third Brigade.							
Col. Louis D. Watkins.							
4th Kentucky.....	1	4	90	95
5th Kentucky.....	2	18	20
6th Kentucky.....	...	2	1	6	2	120	131
Total Third brigade.....	...	2	1	7	8	228	246
Total First division	1	5	1	23	9	245	284

* Losses in detail are not of record.

Return of Casualties in the Army of the Cumberland, etc.—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
SECOND DIVISION.							
Brig.-gen. George Crook.							
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Col. Robert H. G. Minty.							
3d Indiana (detachment).....	3		3
4th Michigan.....	...	1	1	11	...	6	19
7th Pennsylvania	1	4	...	13	...	1	19
4th United States.....	...	1	...	5	...	1	7
Total First brigade.....	1	6	1	32	...	8	48
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. Eli Long.							
2d Kentucky.....	...	11	5	45	...	2	63
1st Ohio.....	1	1	...	13	...	7	22
3d Ohio.....	...	2	...	7	...	8	17
4th Ohio.....	1	3	...	9	2	19	34
Total Second brigade.....	2	17	5	74	2	36	136
Total Second division.....	3	23	6	106	2	44	184
Total Cavalry corps... ..	4	28	7	129	11	289	468

RECAPITULATION.

General Headquarters.....	2	...	4	6
Fourteenth army corps.....	40	624	228	3327	112	1813	6144
Twentieth army corps.....	49	374	163	2535	64	1151	4336
Twenty-first army corps.....	31	291	144	2238	28	671	3403
Reserve corps.	16	199	66	910	35	596	1822
Cavalry corps.....	4	28	7	129	11	289	468
Total Army of the Cumberland	140	1516	608	9141	250	4524	16179

Organization of the Army of Tennessee, GENERAL BRAXTON BRAGG, C. S. Army, commanding, at the Battle of Chickamauga, Ga., September 19-20, 1863.

RIGHT WING.

Lieut.-gen. LEONIDAS POLK.

CHEATHAM'S DIVISION.

Maj.-gen. B. F. Cheatham.

Escort—2d Georgia Cavalry, Company G, Capt. T. M. Merritt.

Jackson's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. John K. Jackson.

1st Georgia (Confederate), 2d Battalion.....	Maj. J. C. Gordon.
5th Georgia.....	Col. C. P. Daniel.
2d Georgia Battalion (Sharpshooters).....	Maj. R. H. Whitely.
5th Mississippi	Lieut.-col. W. L. Sykes.
	Maj. J. B. Herring.
8th Mississippi	Col. J. C. Wilkinson.

Maney's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. George Maney.

1st and 27th Tennessee.....	Col. H. R. Feild.
4th Tennessee (Provisional Army).....	Col. J. A. McMurry.
	Lieut.-col. R. N. Lewis.
	Maj. O. A. Bradshaw.
	Capt. J. Bostick.
6th and 9th Tennessee.....	Col. Geo. C. Porter.
24th Tennessee Battalion (Sharpshooters)...	Maj. Frank Maney.

Smith's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. Preston Smith.

Col. A. J. Vaughan, Jr.

11th Tennessee.....	Col. G. W. Gordon.
12th and 47th Tennessee.....	Col. W. M. Watkins.
13th and 154th Tennessee.....	Col. A. J. Vaughan, Jr.
	Lieut.-col. R. W. Pitman.
29th Tennessee.....	Col. Horace Rice.
Dawson's Battalion Sharpshooters *.....	Maj. J. W. Dawson.
	Maj. William Green.

Wright's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. Marcus J. Wright.

8th Tennessee.....	Col. John H. Anderson.
16th Tennessee.....	Col. D. M. Donnell.
28th Tennessee.....	Col. S. S. Stanton.
38th Tennessee and Murray's (Tennessee) Battalion	Col. J. C. Carter.
51st and 52d Tennessee.....	Lieut.-col. John G. Hall.

* Composed of two companies from the 11th Tennessee, two from the 12th and 47th Tennessee (consolidated), and one from the 154th Senior Tennessee.

Strahl's Brigade.

Brig-gen. O. F. Strahl.

4th and 5th Tennessee.....	Col. J. J. Lamb.
19th Tennessee	Col. F. M. Walker.
24th Tennessee	Col. J. A. Wilson.
31st Tennessee	Col. E. E. Tansil.
33d Tennessee.	

Artillery.

Maj. Melancthon Smith.

Carnes' (Tennessee) Battery	Capt. W. W. Carnes.
Scogin's (Georgia) Battery.....	Capt. John Scogin.
Scott's (Tennessee) Battery.....	Lieut. J. H. Marsh.
	Lieut. A. T. Watson.
Smith's (Mississippi) Battery.....	Lieut. William B. Turner.
Stanford's Battery.....	Capt. T. J. Stanford.

HILL'S CORPS.

Lieut-gen. DANIEL H. HILL.

CLEBURNE'S DIVISION.

Maj-gen. P. R. Cleburne.

Wood's Brigade.

Brig-gen. S. A. M. Wood.

16th Alabama.....	Maj. J. H. McGaughy.
	Capt. F. A. Ashford.
33d Alabama.....	Col. Samuel Adams.
45th Alabama.....	Col. E. B. Breedlove.
18th Alabama Battalion.....	Maj. J. H. Gibson.
	Col. Samuel Adams.
32d and 45th Mississippi.....	Col. M. P. Lowrey.
Sharpshooters	Maj. A. T. Hawkins.
	Capt. Daniel Coleman.

Polk's Brigade.

Brig-gen. L. E. Polk.

1st Arkansas.....	Col. J. W. Colquitt.
3d and 5th Confederate.....	Col. J. A. Smith.
2d Tennessee.....	Col. W. D. Robison.
35th Tennessee.....	Col. B. J. Hill.
48th Tennessee.....	Col. G. H. Nixon.

Deshler's Brigade.

Brig-gen. James Deshler.

Col. R. Q. Mills.

19th and 24th Arkansas.....	Lieut-col. A. S. Hutchinson.
6th, 10th, and 15th Texas.....	Col. R. Q. Mills.
	Lieut-col. T. Scott Anderson.
17th, 18th, 24th, and 25th Texas.....	Col. F. C. Wilkes.
	Lieut-col. John T. Coit.
	Maj. W. A. Taylor.

ADDENDA.

Artillery.

Maj. T. R. Hotchkiss.

Capt. H. C. Semple.

Calvert's Battery.....	Lient. Thomas J. Key.
Douglas' Battery.....	Capt. J. P. Douglas.
Semple's Battery.....	Capt. H. C. Semple.
	Lieut. R. W. Goldthwaite.

BRECKINRIDGE'S DIVISION.

Maj.-gen. John C. Breckinridge.

Helm's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. Benjamin H. Helm.

Col. J. H. Lewis.

41st Alabama.....	Col. M. L. Stansel.
2d Kentucky.....	Col. J. W. Hewitt.
	Lieut.-col. J. W. Moss.
4th Kentucky.....	Col. Joseph P. Nuckols, Jr.
	Maj. T. W. Thompson.
6th Kentucky.....	Col. J. H. Lewis.
	Lieut.-col. M. H. Cofer.
9th Kentucky.....	Col. J. W. Caldwell.
	Lieut.-col. J. C. Wickliffe.

Adams' Brigade.

Brig.-gen. Daniel W. Adams.

Col. R. L. Gibson.

32d Alabama.....	Maj. J. C. Kimbell.
13th and 20th Louisiana.....	Col. R. L. Gibson.
	Col. Leon von Zinken.
	Capt. E. M. Dubroca.
16th and 25th Louisiana.....	Col. D. Gober.
19th Louisiana.....	Lieut.-col. R. W. Turner.
	Maj. L. Butler.
	Capt. H. A. Kennedy.
14th Louisiana Battalion.....	Maj. J. E. Austin.

Stovall's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. M. A. Stovall.

1st and 3d Florida.....	Col. W. S. Dilworth.
4th Florida.....	Col. W. L. L. Bowen.
47th Georgia.....	Capt. William S. Phillips.
	Capt. Joseph S. Cone.
60th North Carolina.....	Lieut.-col. J. M. Ray.
	Capt. J. T. Weaver.

Artillery.

Maj. R. E. Graves.

Cobb's Battery.....	Capt. Robert Cobb.
Mebane's Battery.....	Capt. John W. Mebane.
Slocomb's Battery.....	Capt. C. H. Slocomb.

RESERVE CORPS.

Maj.-gen. W. H. T. WALKER.

WALKER'S DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. S. R. Gist.

Gist's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. S. R. Gist.

Col. P. H. Colquitt.

Lieut.-col. L. Napier.

46th Georgia.....Col. P. H. Colquitt.

Maj. A. M. Speer.

8th Georgia Battalion.....Lieut.-col. L. Napier.

16th South Carolina *.....Col. J. McCullough.

24th South Carolina.....Col. C. H. Stevens.

Lieut.-col. E. Capers.

Ector's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. M. D. Ector.

Stone's Alabama Battalion.

Pound's Mississippi Battalion.

29th North Carolina.

9th Texas.

10th, 14th, and 32d Texas Cavalry.†

Wilson's Brigade.

Col. C. C. Wilson.

25th Georgia.....Lieut.-col. A. J. Williams.

29th Georgia.....Lieut. G. R. McRae.

30th Georgia.....Lieut.-col. J. S. Boynton.

1st Georgia Battalion (Sharpshooters).

4th Louisiana Battalion.

Artillery.

Ferguson's Battalion *.....Lieut. R. T. Beauregard.

Martin's (Georgia) Battery.

LIDDELL'S DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. St. John R. Liddell.

Liddell's Brigade.

Col. D. C. Govan.

2d and 15th Arkansas.....Lieut.-col. R. T. Harvey.

Capt. A. T. Meek.

5th and 13th Arkansas.....Col. L. Featherston.

Lieut.-col. John E. Murray.

6th and 7th Arkansas.....Col. D. A. Gillespie.

Lieut.-col. P. Snyder.

8th Arkansas.....Lieut.-col. G. F. Baucum.

Maj. A. Watkins.

1st Louisiana.....Lieut.-col. G. F. Baucum.

Maj. A. Watkins.

* Not engaged; at Rome.

† Serving as infantry.

Walker's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. E. C. Walker.

24th Mississippi.....	Lieut.-col. R. P. McKelvaine. Maj. W. C. Staples. Capt. B. F. Toomer. Capt. J. D. Smith.
27th Mississippi.....	Col. James A. Campbell.
28th Mississippi.....	Col. W. F. Brantly.
30th Mississippi.....	Col. J. I. Scales. Lieut.-col. Hugh A. Reynolds. Maj. J. M. Johnson.
34th Mississippi*.....	Maj. W. G. Pegram. Capt. H. J. Bowen. Lieut.-col. H. A. Reynolds.

Artillery.

Capt. Charles Swett.

Fowler's Battery.....	Capt. W. H. Fowler.
Warren Light Artillery.....	Lieut. H. Shannon.

LEFT WING.

Lieut.-gen. JAMES LONGSTREET.

HINDMAN'S DIVISION.†

Maj.-gen. T. C. Hindman.
Brig.-gen. J. Patton Anderson.*Anderson's Brigade.*Brig.-gen. J. Patton Anderson.
Col. J. H. Sharp.

7th Mississippi.....	Col. W. H. Bishop.
9th Mississippi.....	Maj. T. H. Lynam.
10th Mississippi.....	Lieut.-col. James Barr.
41st Mississippi.....	Col. W. F. Tucker.
44th Mississippi.....	Col. J. H. Sharp. Lieut.-col. R. G. Kelsey.
9th Mississippi Battalion (Sharpshooters).....	Maj. W. C. Richards.
Garrity's Battery.....	Capt. J. Garrity.

Deas' Brigade.

Brig.-gen. Z. C. Deas.

19th Alabama.....	Col. S. K. McSpadden.
22d Alabama.....	Lieut.-col. John Weedon. Capt. H. T. Toulmin.
25th Alabama.....	Col. Geo. D. Johnston.
39th Alabama.....	Col. W. Clark.
50th Alabama.....	Col. J. G. Coltart.
17th Alabama Battalion (Sharpshooters).....	Capt. Jas. F. Nabers.
Robertson's Battery.....	Lieut. S. H. Dent.

* 84th Mississippi had four commanders at Chickamauga.

† Of Polk's corps.

Manigault's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. A. M. Manigault.

24th Alabama.....	Col. N. N. Davis.
28th Alabama.....	Col. John C. Reid.
34th Alabama.....	Maj. J. N. Slaughter.
10th and 19th South Carolina.....	Col. James F. Pressley.
Waters' Battery.....	Lieut. Charles W. Watkins.
	Lieut. George D. Turner.

BUCKNER'S CORPS.

Maj.-gen. SIMON B. BUCKNER.

STEWART'S DIVISION.

Maj.-gen. Alexander P. Stewart.

*Johnson's Brigade.**

Brig.-gen. B. R. Johnson.
Col. J. S. Fulton.

17th Tennessee.....	Lieut.-col. Watt W. Floyd.
23d Tennessee.....	Col. R. H. Keeble.
25th Tennessee.....	Lieut.-col. R. B. Snowden.
44th Tennessee.....	Lieut.-col. J. L. McEwen, Jr.
	Maj. G. M. Crawford.

Brown's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. J. C. Brown.
Col. Edmund C. Cook.

18th Tennessee.....	Col. J. B. Palmer.
	Lieut.-col. W. R. Butler.
	Capt. Gideon H. Lowe.
26th Tennessee.....	Col. J. M. Lillard.
	Maj. R. M. Saffell.
32d Tennessee.....	Col. E. C. Cook.
	Capt. C. G. Tucker.
45th Tennessee.....	Col. A. Searcy.
23d Tennessee Battalion.....	Maj. T. W. Newman.
	Capt. W. P. Simpson.

Bate's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. W. B. Bate.

58th Alabama.....	Col. Bushrod Jones.
37th Georgia.....	Col. A. F. Budler.
	Lieut.-col. J. T. Smith.
4th Georgia Battalion (Sharpshooters).....	Maj. T. D. Caswell.
	Capt. B. M. Turner.
	Lieut. Joel Towers.
15th and 37th Tennessee.....	Col. R. C. Tyler.
	Lieut.-col. R. D. Frayser.
	Capt. R. M. Tankesley.
20th Tennessee.....	Col. T. B. Smith.
	Maj. W. M. Shy.

* Part of Johnson's provisional division.

Clayton's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. H. D. Clayton.

18th Alabama.....	Col. J. T. Holtzclaw.
	Lieut.-col. R. F. Inge.
	Maj. P. F. Hunley.
36th Alabama.....	Col. L. T. Woodruff.
35th Alabama.....	Lieut.-col. A. R. Lankford.

Artillery.

Maj. J. W. Eldridge.

1st Arkansas Battery.....	Capt. J. T. Humphreys.
T. H. Dawson's Battery.....	Lieut. R. W. Anderson.
Enfaula Artillery.....	Capt. McD. Oliver.
9th Georgia Artillery Battalion, Company E.....	Lieut. W. S. Everett.

PRESTON'S DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. William Preston.

Gracie's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. A. Gracie, Jr.

43d Alabama.....	Col. Y. M. Moody.
1st Alabama Battalion *.....	Lieut.-col. J. H. Holt.
	Capt. G. W. Huguley.
2d Alabama Battalion *.....	Lieut.-col. B. Hall, Jr.
	Capt. W. D. Walden.
3d Alabama Battalion *.....	Maj. J. W. A. Sanford.
4th Alabama Battalion †.....	Maj. J. D. McLennan.
63d Tennessee.....	Lieut.-col. A. Fulkerson.
	Maj. John A. Aiken.

Trigg's Brigade.

Col. R. C. Trigg.

1st Florida Cavalry †.....	Col. G. T. Maxwell.
6th Florida.....	Col. J. J. Finley.
7th Florida.....	Col. R. Bullock.
54th Virginia.....	Lieut.-col. John J. Wade.

Third Brigade.

Col. J. H. Kelly.

65th Georgia.....	Col. R. H. Moore.
5th Kentucky.....	Col. H. Hawkins.
58th North Carolina.....	Col. J. B. Palmer.
63d Virginia.....	Maj. J. M. French.

Artillery Battalion.

Maj. A. Leyden.

Jeffress' Battery.
Peoples' Battery.
Wolihin's Battery.
York's Battery.

* Hilliard's Legion.

† Artillery Battalion, Hilliard's Legion.

‡ Dismounted.

RESERVE CORPS ARTILLERY.

Maj. S. C. Williams.
 Baxter's Battery.
 Darden's Battery.
 Kolb's Battery.
 McCant's Battery.

JOHNSON'S DIVISION.*

Brig.-gen. Bushrod R. Johnson.

Gregg's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. John Gregg.
 Col. C. A. Sugg.

3d Tennessee.....	Col. C. H. Walker.
10th Tennessee.....	Col. William Grace.
30th Tennessee.....	
41st Tennessee.....	Lieut.-col. J. D. Tillman.
50th Tennessee.....	Col. C. A. Sugg.
	Lieut.-col. T. W. Beaumont.
	Maj. C. W. Robertson.
	Col. C. H. Walker.
1st Tennessee Battalion.....	Maj. S. H. Colms.
	Maj. C. W. Robertson.
7th Texas.....	Maj. K. M. Vanzandt.
Bledsoe's (Missouri) Battery.....	Lieut. R. L. Wood.

McNair's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. E. McNair.
 Col. D. Coleman.

1st Arkansas Mounted Rifles.....	Col. Robert W. Harper.
2d Arkansas Mounted Rifles.....	Col. James A. Williamson.
25th Arkansas.....	Lieut.-col. Eli Hufstедler.
4th and 31st Arkansas Infantry and 4th	
Arkansas Battalion (consolidated).....	Maj. J. A. Ross.
39th North Carolina.....	Col. D. Coleman.
Culpeper's (South Carolina) Battery.....	Capt. J. F. Culpeper.

LONGSTREET'S CORPS.†

Maj.-gen. JOHN B. HOOD.

MCLAWS' DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. J. B. Kershaw.
 Maj.-gen. Lafayette McLaws.

Kershaw's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. J. B. Kershaw.

2d South Carolina.....	Lieut.-col. F. Gaillard.
3d South Carolina.....	Col. J. D. Nance.

* A provisional organization, embracing Johnson's and part of the time Robertson's brigades, as well as Gregg's and McNair's. September 19th attached to Longstreet's corps, under Maj.-gen. Hood.

† Army of Northern Virginia. Organization taken from return of that army for August 31, 1863. Pickett's division was left in Virginia.

7th South Carolina.....	Lient.-col. Elbert Bland. Maj. J. S. Hard. Capt. E. J. Goggans.
8th South Carolina.....	Col. J. W. Henagan.
15th South Carolina.....	Col. Joseph F. Gist.
3d South Carolina Battalion.....	Capt. J. M. Townsend.

*Wofford's Brigade.**

Brig.-gen. W. T. Wofford.
16th Georgia.
18th Georgia.
24th Georgia.
3d Georgia Battalion (Sharpshooters).
Cobb's (Georgia) Legion.
Phillips' (Georgia) Legion.

Humphreys' Brigade.

Brig.-gen. B. G. Humphreys.
13th Mississippi.
17th Mississippi.
18th Mississippi.
21st Mississippi.

*Bryan's Brigade.**

Brig.-gen. Goode Bryan.
10th Georgia.
50th Georgia.
51st Georgia.
53d Georgia.

HOOD'S DIVISION.

Maj.-gen. John B. Hood.
Brig.-gen. E. M. Law.

Jenkins' Brigade.†

Brig.-gen. M. Jenkins.
1st South Carolina.
2d South Carolina Rifles.
5th South Carolina.
6th South Carolina.
Hampton (South Carolina) Legion.
Palmetto (South Carolina) Sharpshooters.

Law's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. E. M. Law.
Col. J. L. Sheffield.

4th Alabama.
15th Alabama.....Col. W. C. Oates.
44th Alabama.
47th Alabama.
48th Alabama.

* Longstreet's report indicates that these brigades did not arrive in time to take part in the battle.

† Did not arrive in time to take part in the battle. It was assigned to the division September 11, 1863.

*Robertson's Brigade.**

Brig.-gen. J. B. Robertson.
Col. Van H. Manning.

3d Arkansas.....	Col. Van H. Manning.
1st Texas.....	Capt. R. J. Harding.
4th Texas.....	Col. John P. Bane.
	Capt. R. H. Bassett.
5th Texas.....	Maj. J. C. Rogers.
	Capt. J. S. Cleveland.
	Capt. T. T. Clay.

Anderson's Brigade.†

Brig.-gen. George T. Anderson.

7th Georgia.
8th Georgia.
9th Georgia.
11th Georgia.
59th Georgia.

Benning's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. H. L. Benning.

2d Georgia.....	Lieut.-col. William S. Shepherd.
	Maj. W. W. Charlton.
15th Georgia.....	Col. D. M. DuBose.
	Maj. P. J. Shannon.
17th Georgia.....	Lieut.-col. Charles W. Matthews.
20th Georgia.....	Col. J. D. Waddell.

CORPS ARTILLERY.†

Col. E. Porter Alexander.

Fickling's (South Carolina) Battery.
Jordan's (Virginia) Battery.
Moody's (Louisiana) Battery.
Parker's (Virginia) Battery.
Taylor's (Virginia) Battery.
Woolfolk's (Virginia) Battery.

RESERVE ARTILLERY ARMY OF TENNESSEE.

Maj. FELIX H. ROBERTSON.

Barret's (Missouri) Battery.
Le Gardeur's (Louisiana) Battery.‡
Havis' (Alabama) Battery.
Lumsden's (Alabama) Battery.
Massenburg's (Georgia) Battery.

* Served part of the time in Johnson's provisional division.

† Did not arrive in time to take part in the battle.

‡ Not mentioned in the reports, but in Reserve artillery August 31st, and Capt. Le Gardeur, etc., relieved from duty in Army of Tennessee November 1, 1863.

ADDENDA.

CAVALRY.*

Maj.-gen. JOSEPH WHEELER.

WHARTON'S DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. John A. Wharton.

First Brigade.

Col. C. C. Crews.

7th Alabama.

2d Georgia.

3d Georgia.

4th Georgia.....Col. I. W. Avery.

Second Brigade.

Col. T. Harrison.

3d Confederate.....Col. W. N. Estes.

1st Kentucky.....Lieut.-col. J. W. Griffith.

4th Tennessee.....Col. Paul F. Anderson.

8th Texas.

11th Texas.

White's (Tennessee) Battery.

MARTIN'S DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. W. T. Martin.

First Brigade.

Col. J. T. Morgan.

1st Alabama.

3d Alabama.....Lieut.-col. T. H. Mauldin.

51st Alabama.

8th Confederate.....Col. W. B. Wade.

Second Brigade.

Col. A. A. Russell.

4th Alabama.†

1st Confederate.....Capt. Conner.

Wiggins' (Arkansas) Battery.

Roddey's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. P. D. Roddey.

4th Alabama †.....Lieut.-col. William A. Johnson.

5th Alabama.

53d Alabama.

Forrest's (Tennessee) Regiment.

Ferrell's (Georgia) Battery.

* From return of August 31, 1863, and reports.

† Two regiments of the same designation. Lieut.-col. Johnson commanded that in Roddey's brigade.

FORREST'S CORPS.

Brig.-gen. N. B. FORREST.

ARMSTRONG'S DIVISION.*

Brig.-gen. F. C. Armstrong.

Armstrong's Brigade.

Col. J. T. Wheeler.

3d Arkansas.

1st Tennessee.

18th Tennessee Battalion.....Maj. Charles McDonald.

Forrest's Brigade.

Col. G. G. Dibrell.

4th Tennessee.....Col. W. S. McLemore.

8th Tennessee.....Capt. Hamilton McGinnis.

9th Tennessee.....Col. J. B. Biffle.

10th Tennessee.....Col. N. N. Cox.

11th Tennessee.....Col. D. W. Holman.

Shaw's (or Hamilton's) Battalion (?).....Maj. J. Shaw.

Freeman's (Tennessee) Battery.....Capt. A. L. Huggins.

Morton's (Tennessee) Battery.....Capt. John W. Morton, Jr.

PEGRAM'S DIVISION.†

Brig.-gen. John Pegram.

Davidson's Brigade.

Brig.-gen. H. B. Davidson.

1st Georgia.

6th Georgia.....Col. John R. Hart.

6th North Carolina.

Rucker's Legion.

Huwald's (Tennessee) Battery.

Scott's Brigade.

Col. J. S. Scott.

10th Confederate.....Col. C. T. Goode.

Detachment of Morgan's command.....Lieut.-col. R. M. Martin.

1st Louisiana.

2d Tennessee.

5th Tennessee.

12th Tennessee Battalion.

16th Tennessee Battalion.....Capt. J. Q. Arnold.

Louisiana Battery (one section).

* From return for August 31, 1863, and reports.

† Taken from Pegram's and Scott's reports and assignments, but the composition of this division is uncertain.

Organization of the United States Forces commanded by MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, engaged in the Chattanooga-Rossville Campaign, November 23-27, 1863.

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND.

Maj.-gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

1st Ohio Sharpshooters, Capt. G. M. Barber.
10th Ohio Infantry, Lieut.-col. William M. Ward.

FOURTH ARMY CORPS.

Maj.-gen. GORDON GRANGER.

FIRST DIVISION.*

Brig.-gen. Charles Cruft.

Escort—92d Illinois, Company E, Capt. Matthew Van Buskirk.

Second Brigade.

Brig.-gen. Walter C. Whitaker.

96th Illinois.....	Col. Thomas E. Champion.
	Maj. George Hicks.
35th Indiana.....	Col. Bernard F. Mullen.
8th Kentucky.....	Col. Sidney M. Barnes.
40th Ohio.....	Col. Jacob E. Taylor.
51st Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Charles H. Wood.
99th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. John E. Cummins.

Third Brigade.

Col. William Grose.

59th Illinois.....	Maj. Clayton Hale.
75th Illinois.....	Col. John E. Bennett.
84th Illinois.....	Col. Louis H. Waters.
9th Indiana.....	Col. Isaac C. B. Suman.
36th Indiana.....	Maj. Gilbert Trusler.
24th Ohio.....	Capt. George M. Bacon.

SECOND DIVISION.

Maj.-gen. Philip H. Sheridan.

First Brigade.

Col. Francis T. Sherman.

36th Illinois.....	Col. Silas Miller.†
	Lieut.-col. Porter C. Olson.

* The First brigade and Battery M, 4th U. S. Artillery, at Bridgeport, Ala.; the 115th Illinois and 84th Indiana, of the Second brigade, and 5th Indiana Battery, at Shell Mound, Tenn., and the 30th Indiana and 77th Pennsylvania, of the Third brigade, and Battery H, 4th U. S. Artillery, at Whiteside, Tenn.

† Temporarily in command of a demi-brigade.

44th Illinois.....	Col. Wallace W. Barrett.
73d Illinois.....	Col. James F. Jaquess.
74th Illinois.....	Col. Jason Marsh.
88th Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Geo. W. Chandler.
22d Indiana.....	Col. Michael Gooding.
2d Missouri.....	Col. Bernard Laiboldt.*
	Lieut.-col. Arnold Beck.
15th Missouri.....	Col. Joseph Conrad.
	Capt. Samuel Rexinger.
24th Wisconsin.....	Maj. Carl von Baumbach.

Second Brigade.

Brig.-gen. George D. Wagner.

100th Illinois.....	Maj. Chas. M. Hammond.
15th Indiana.....	Col. Gustavus A. Wood.*
	Maj. Frank White.
	Capt. Benjamin F. Hegler.
40th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Elias Neff.
51st Indiana †.....	Lieut.-col. John M. Comparet.
57th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Geo. W. Lennard.
58th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Joseph Moore.
26th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. William H. Young.
97th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Milton Barnes.

Third Brigade.

Col. Charles G. Harker.

22d Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Francis Swanwick.
27th Illinois.....	Col. Jonathan R. Miles.
42d Illinois.....	Col. Nathan H. Walworth.*
	Capt. Edgar D. Swain.
51st Illinois.....	Maj. Charles W. Davis.
	Capt. Albert M. Tilton.
79th Illinois.....	Col. Allen Buckner.
3d Kentucky.....	Col. Henry C. Dunlap.
64th Ohio.....	Col. Alexander McIlvain.
65th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. William A. Bullitt.
125th Ohio.....	Col. Emerson Opdycke.*
	Capt. Edward P. Bates.

Artillery.

Capt. Warren P. Edgerton.

1st Illinois Light, Battery M.....	Capt. George W. Spencer.
10th Indiana Battery.....	Capt. William A. Naylor.
1st Missouri Light, Battery G.....	Lieut. Gustavus Schueler.
1st Ohio Light, Battery I †.....	Capt. Hubert Dilger.
4th United States, Battery G †.....	Lieut. Christopher F. Merkle.
5th United States, Battery H †.....	Capt. Francis L. Guenther.

* Temporarily in command of a demi-brigade.

† Between Nashville and Chattanooga *en route* to join brigade.

‡ Temporarily attached.

ADDENDA.

THIRD DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. Thomas J. Wood.

First Brigade.

Brig.-gen. August Willich.

25th Illinois.....	Col. Richard H. Nodine.
35th Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Wm. P. Chandler.
89th Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Wm. D. Williams.
32d Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Frank Erdelmeyer.
68th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Harvey J. Espy.
8th Kansas.....	Col. John A. Martin.
15th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Frank Askew.
49th Ohio.....	Maj. Samuel F. Gray.
15th Wisconsin.....	Capt. John A. Gordon.

Second Brigade.

Brig.-gen. William B. Hazen.

6th Indiana.....	Maj. Calvin D. Campbell.
5th Kentucky.....	Col. Wm. W. Berry.
	Lieut.-col. John L. Treanor.
6th Kentucky.....	Maj. Richard T. Whitaker.
23d Kentucky.....	Lieut.-col. James C. Foy.
1st Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Bassett Langdon.
	Maj. Joab A. Stafford.
6th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Alex. C. Christopher.
41st Ohio.....	Col. Aquilla Wiley.
	Lieut.-col. Robert L. Kimberly.
93d Ohio.....	Maj. William Birch.
	Capt. Daniel Bowman.
	Capt. Samuel B. Smith.
124th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. James Pickands.

Third Brigade.

Brig.-gen. Samuel Beatty.

79th Indiana.....	Col. Frederick Knefler.
86th Indiana.....	Col. George F. Dick.
9th Kentucky.....	Col. George H. Cram.
17th Kentucky.....	Col. Alexander M. Stout.
13th Ohio.....	Col. Dwight Jarvis, Jr.
19th Ohio.....	Col. Charles F. Manderson.
59th Ohio.....	Maj. Robert J. Vanosdol.

Artillery.

Capt. Cullen Bradley.

Illinois Light, Bridges' Battery.....	Capt. Lyman Bridges.
6th Ohio Battery.....	Lieut. Oliver H. P. Ayres.
20th Ohio Battery *.....	Capt. Edward Groeskopff.
Pennsylvania Light, Battery B.....	Lieut. Samuel M. McDowell.

* Temporarily attached from the Artillery reserve.

ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS.*

Maj.-gen. OLIVER O. HOWARD.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

Independent Company 8th New York Infantry, Capt. Anton Bruhn.

SECOND DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. Adolph von Steinwehr.

First Brigade.

Col. Adolphus Buschbeck.

33d New Jersey.....	Col. George W. Mindil.
134th New York.....	Lieut.-col. Allan H. Jackson.
154th New York.....	Col. Patrick H. Jones.
27th Pennsylvania.....	Maj. Peter A. McAloon.
	Capt. August Reidt.
73d Pennsylvania.....	Lieut.-col. Joseph B. Taft.
	Capt. Daniel F. Kelly.
	Lieut. Samuel D. Miller.

Second Brigade.

Col. Orland Smith.

33d Massachusetts.....	Lieut.-col. Godfrey Rider, Jr.
136th New York.....	Col. James Wood, Jr.
55th Ohio.....	Col. Charles B. Gambee.
73d Ohio.....	Maj. Samuel H. Hurst.

THIRD DIVISION.

Maj.-gen. Carl Schurz.

First Brigade.

Brig.-gen. Hector Tyndale.

101st Illinois.....	Col. Charles H. Fox.
45th New York.....	Maj. Charles Koch.
143d New York.....	Col. Horace Boughton.
61st Ohio.....	Col. Stephen J. McGroarty.
82d Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. David Thomson.

Second Brigade.

Col. Wladimir Krzyzanowski.

58th New York.....	Capt. Michael Esembaux.
119th New York.....	Col. John T. Lockman.
141st New York.....	Col. William K. Logie.
26th Wisconsin.....	Capt. Frederick C. Winkler.

* Maj.-gen. Joseph Hooker, commanding Eleventh and Twelfth army corps, had under his immediate command the First division, Fourth corps; the Second division, Twelfth corps; portions of the Fourteenth corps, and the First division, Fifteenth corps. Company K, 16th Illinois Cavalry, Capt. Samuel B. Sherer, served as escort to Gen. Hooker.

ADDENDA.

Third Brigade.

Col. Frederick Hecker.

80th Illinois.....	Capt. James Neville.
82d Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Edward S. Salomon.
68th New York.....	Maj. Albert von Steinhausen.
75th Pennsylvania.....	Maj. August Ledig.

Artillery.

Maj. Thomas W. Osborn.

1st New York Light, Battery L.....	Capt. Michael Wiedrich.
13th New York Battery	Capt. William Wheeler.
1st Ohio Light, Battery I*.....	Capt. Hubert Dilger.
1st Ohio Light, Battery K.....	Lieut. Nicholas Sahn.
4th United States, Battery G*.....	Lieut. Christopher F. Merkle.

TWELFTH ARMY CORPS.†

SECOND DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. John W. Geary.

First Brigade.

Col. Charles Candy.
 Col. William R. Creighton.
 Col. Thomas J. Ahl.

5th Ohio.....	Col. John H. Patrick.
7th Ohio.....	Col. William R. Creighton.
	Lieut.-col. Orrin J. Crane.
	Capt. Ernest J. Kreiger.
29th Ohio.....	Col. William F. Fitch.
66th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Eugene Powell.
	Capt. Thomas McConnell.
28th Pennsylvania.....	Col. Thomas J. Ahl.
	Capt. John Flynn.
147th Pennsylvania.....	Lieut.-col. Ario Pardee, Jr.

Second Brigade.

Col. George A. Cobham, Jr.

29th Pennsylvania.....	Col. William Rickards, Jr.
109th Pennsylvania.....	Capt. Frederick L. Gimber.
111th Pennsylvania.....	Col. Thomas M. Walker.

Third Brigade.

Col. David Ireland.

60th New York.....	Col. Abel Godard.
78th New York.....	Col. Herbert von Hammerstein.
102d New York.....	Col. James C. Lane.
137th New York.....	Capt. Milo B. Eldridge.
149th New York.....	Lieut.-col. Charles B. Randall.

* Temporarily attached to Second division, Fourth army corps.

† The First division engaged in guarding the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad from Wartrace Bridge, Tenn., to Bridgeport, Ala., etc. Maj.-gen. H. W. Slocum, commanding the corps, had headquarters at Tullahoma, Tenn.

Artillery.

Maj. John A. Reynolds.

Pennsylvania Light, Battery E.....Lieut. James D. McGill.
5th United States, Battery K.....Capt. Edmund C. Bainbridge.

FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

Maj.-gen. JOHN M. PALMER.

Escort—1st Ohio Cavalry, Company L, Capt. John D. Barker.

FIRST DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. Richard W. Johnson.

First Brigade.

Brig.-gen. William P. Carlin.

104th Illinois.....Lieut.-col. Douglas Hapeman.
38th Indiana.....Lieut.-col. Daniel F. Griffin.
42d Indiana.....Lieut.-col. Wm. T. B. McIntire.
88th Indiana.....Col. Cyrus E. Briant.
2d Ohio.....Col. Anson G. McCook.
33d Ohio.....Capt. Jas. H. M. Montgomery.
94th Ohio.....Maj. Rue P. Hutchins.
10th Wisconsin.....Capt. Jacob W. Roby.

Second Brigade.

Col. Marshall F. Moore.
Col. William L. Stoughton.

19th Illinois.....Lieut.-col. Alex. W. Raffin.
11th Michigan.....Capt. Patrick H. Keegan.
69th Ohio.....Maj. James J. Hanna.
15th United States, 1st Battalion.....Capt. Henry Keteltas.
15th United States, 2d Battalion.....Capt. William S. McManus.
16th United States, 1st Battalion.....Maj. Robert E. A. Crofton.
18th United States, 1st Battalion.....Capt. George W. Smith.
18th United States, 2d Battalion.....Capt. Henry Haymond.
19th United States, 1st Battalion.....Capt. Henry S. Welton.

*Third Brigade.**

Brig.-gen. John C. Starkweather.

24th Illinois.....Col. Geza Mihalotzy.
37th Indiana.....Col. James S. Hull.
21st Ohio.....Capt. Charles H. Vantine.
74th Ohio.....Maj. Joseph Fisher.
78th Pennsylvania.....Maj. Augustus B. Bonnaffon.
79th Pennsylvania.....Maj. Michael H. Locher.
1st Wisconsin.....Lieut.-col. George B. Bingham.
21st Wisconsin.....Capt. Charles H. Walker.

* During the engagements of the 23d, 24th, and 25th was in line of battle holding fort and breastworks at Chattanooga.

Artillery.

1st Illinois Light, Battery C.....Capt. Mark H. Prescott.
 1st Michigan Light, Battery A.....Capt. Francis E. Hale.
 5th United States, Battery H*.....Capt. Francis L. Guenther.

SECOND DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. Jefferson C. Davis.

First Brigade.

Brig.-gen. James D. Morgan.

10th Illinois.....Col. John Tillson.
 16th Illinois.....Lieut.-col. James B. Cahill.
 60th Illinois.....Col. William B. Anderson.
 21st Kentucky.....Col. Samuel W. Price.
 10th Michigan.....Lieut.-col. Christopher J. Dickerson.
 14th Michigan †.....Col. Henry R. Mizner.

Second Brigade.

Brig.-gen. John Beatty.

34th Illinois.....Lieut.-col. Oscar Van Tassell.
 78th Illinois.....Lieut.-col. Carter Van Vleck.
 3d Ohio †.....Capt. Leroy S. Bell.
 98th Ohio.....Maj. James M. Shane.
 108th Ohio.....Lieut.-col. Carlo Piepho.
 113th Ohio.....Maj. L. Starling Sullivant.
 121st Ohio.....Maj. John Yager.

Third Brigade.

Col. Daniel McCook.

85th Illinois.....Col. Caleb J. Dilworth.
 86th Illinois.....Lieut.-col. David W. Magee.
 110th Illinois.....Lieut.-col. E. Hibbard Topping.
 125th Illinois.....Col. Oscar F. Harmon.
 52d Ohio.....Maj. James T. Holmes.

Artillery.

Capt. William A. Hotchkiss.

2d Illinois Light, Battery I.....Lieut. Henry B. Plant.
 2d Minnesota Battery.....Lieut. Richard L. Dawley.
 5th Wisconsin Battery.....Capt. George Q. Gardner.

THIRD DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. Absalom Baird.

First Brigade.

Brig.-gen. John B. Turchin.

82d Indiana.....Col. Morton C. Hunter.
 11th Ohio.....Lieut.-col. Ogden Street.

* Temporarily attached to Second division, Fourth army corps.

† Detached at Columbia, Tenn.

‡ Detached at Kelley's Ferry, Tennessee River.

17th Ohio.....	Maj. Daniel Butterfield.
	Capt. Benjamin H. Showers.
31st Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Frederick W. Lister.
36th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Hiram F. Duval.
89th Ohio.....	Capt. John H. Jolly.
92d Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Douglas Putnam, Jr.
	Capt. Edward Grosvenor.

Second Brigade.

Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer.

75th Indiana.....	Col. Milton S. Robinson.
87th Indiana.....	Col. Newell Gleason.
101st Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Thomas Doan.
2d Minnesota.....	Lieut.-col. Judson W. Bishop.
9th Ohio.....	Col. Gustave Kammerling.
35th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Henry V. N. Boynton.
	Maj. Joseph L. Budd.
105th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. William R. Tolles.

Third Brigade.

Col. Edward H. Phelps.

Col. William H. Hays.

10th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Marsh B. Taylor.
74th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Myron Baker.
4th Kentucky.....	Maj. Robert M. Kelly.
10th Kentucky.....	Col. Wm. H. Hays.
	Lieut.-col. Gabriel C. Wharton.
18th Kentucky *.....	Lieut.-col. Hubbard K. Milward.
14th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Henry D. Kingsbury.
38th Ohio.....	Maj. Charles Greenwood.

Artillery.

Capt. George R. Swallow.

7th Indiana Battery.....	Lieut. Otho H. Morgan.
19th Indiana Battery.....	Lieut. Robert G. Lackey.
4th United States, Battery I.....	Lieut. Frank G. Smith.

ENGINEER TROOPS.

Brig.-gen. WILLIAM F. SMITH.

Engineers.

1st Michigan Engineers (detachment).....	Capt. Perrin V. Fox.
13th Michigan Infantry.....	Maj. Willard G. Eaton.
21st Michigan Infantry.....	Capt. Loomis K. Bishop.
22d Michigan Infantry.....	Maj. Henry S. Dean.
18th Ohio Infantry.....	Col. Timothy R. Stanley.

* Detached at Brown's Ferry, Tenn.

Pioneer Brigade.

Col. George P. Buell.

1st Battalion.....	Capt. Charles J. Stewart.
2d Battalion.....	Capt. Cornelius Smith.
3d Battalion.....	Capt. William Clark.

ARTILLERY RESERVE.

Brig-gen. JOHN M. BRANNAN.

FIRST DIVISION.

Col. James Barnett.

First Brigade.

Maj. Charles S. Cotter.

1st Ohio Light, Battery B.....	Lieut. Norman A. Baldwin.
1st Ohio Light, Battery C.....	Capt. Marco B. Gary.
1st Ohio Light, Battery E.....	Lieut. Albert G. Ransom.
1st Ohio Light, Battery F.....	Lieut. Giles J. Cockerill.

Second Brigade.

1st Ohio Light, Battery G.....	Capt. Alexander Marshall.
1st Ohio Light, Battery M.....	Capt. Frederick Schultz.
18th Ohio Battery.....	Lieut. Joseph McCafferty.
20th Ohio Battery *.....	Capt. Edward Grosskopf.

SECOND DIVISION.

First Brigade.

Capt. Josiah W. Church.

1st Michigan Light, Battery D.....	Capt. Josiah W. Church.
1st Tennessee Light, Battery A.....	Lieut. Albert F. Beach.
3d Wisconsin Battery.....	Lieut. Hiram F. Hubbard.
8th Wisconsin Battery.....	Lieut. Obadiah German.
10th Wisconsin Battery.....	Capt. Yates V. Beebe.

Second Brigade.

Capt. Arnold Sutermeister.

4th Indiana Battery.....	Lieut. Henry J. Willits.
8th Indiana Battery.....	Lieut. George Estep.
11th Indiana Battery.....	Capt. Arnold Sutermeister.
21st Indiana Battery.....	Lieut. William E. Chess.
1st Wisconsin Heavy, Company C.....	Capt. John R. Davies.

* Temporarily attached to Third division, Fourth army corps.

CAVALRY.*

Second Brigade (Second division).

Col. Eli Long.

98th Illinois (mounted).....	Lieut.-col. Edward Kitchell.
17th Indiana (mounted).....	Lieut.-col. Henry Jordan.
2d Kentucky.....	Col. Thomas P. Nicholas.
4th Michigan.....	Maj. Horace Gray.
1st Ohio.....	Maj. Thomas J. Patton.
3d Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Charles B. Seidel.
4th Ohio (battalion).	Maj. George W. Dobb.
10th Ohio.....	Col. Charles C. Smith.

POST OF CHATTANOOGA.

Col. JOHN G. PARKHURST.

44th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Simeon C. Aldrich.
15th Kentucky.....	Maj. William G. Halpin.
9th Michigan.....	Lieut.-col. William Wilkinson.

ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE.

Maj.-gen. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN.†

FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS.‡

Maj.-gen. FRANK P. BLAIR, JR.

FIRST DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. Peter J. Osterhaus.

First Brigade.

Brig.-gen. Charles R. Woods.

13th Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Frederick W. Partridge.
	Capt. George P. Brown.
3d Missouri.....	Lieut.-col. Theodore Meumann.
12th Missouri.....	Col. Hugo Wangelin.
	Lieut.-col. Jacob Kaercher.
17th Missouri.....	Lieut.-col. John F. Cramer.
27th Missouri.....	Col. Thomas Curly.
29th Missouri.....	Col. James Peckham.
	Maj. Philip H. Murphy.
31st Missouri.....	Lieut.-col. Samuel P. Simpson.
32d Missouri.....	Lieut.-col. Henry C. Warmoth.
76th Ohio.....	Maj. Willard Warner.

* Corps headquarters and the First and Second brigades and 18th Indiana Battery, of the First division, at and about Alexandria, Tenn.; the Third brigade at Caperton's Ferry, Tennessee River. The First and Third brigades and the Chicago Board of Trade Battery, of the Second division, at Maysville, Ala.

† Gen. Sherman had under his immediate command the Eleventh corps and the Second division, Fourteenth corps, of the Army of the Cumberland; the Second and Fourth divisions, Fifteenth corps, and the Second division, Seventeenth corps.

‡ The Third division, Brig.-gen. James M. Tuttle commanding, at Memphis, La Grange, and Pocahontas, Tenn.

ADDENDA.

Second Brigade.

Col. James A. Williamson.

4th Iowa.....	Lieut.-col. George Burton.
9th Iowa.....	Col. David Carskaddon.
25th Iowa.....	Col. George A. Stone.
26th Iowa.....	Col. Milo Smith.
30th Iowa.....	Lieut.-col. Aurelius Roberts.
31st Iowa.....	Lieut.-col. Jeremiah W. Jenkins.

Artillery.

Capt. Henry H. Griffiths.

1st Iowa Battery.....	Lieut. James M. Williams.
2d Missouri Light, Battery F.....	Capt. Clemens Landgraeber.
4th Ohio Battery.....	Capt. George Froehlich.

SECOND DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. Morgan L. Smith.

*First Brigade.*Brig.-gen. Giles A. Smith.
Col. Nathan W. Tupper.

55th Illinois.....	Col. Oscar Malmberg.
116th Illinois.....	Col. Nathan W. Tupper.
	Lieut.-col. James P. Boyd.
127th Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Frank S. Curtiss.
6th Missouri.....	Lieut.-col. Ira Boutell.
8th Missouri.....	Lieut.-col. David C. Coleman.
57th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Samuel R. Mott.
13th United States, 1st Battalion.....	Capt. Charles C. Smith.

Second Brigade.

Brig.-gen. Joseph A. J. Lightburn.

83d Indiana.....	Col. Benjamin J. Spooner.
30th Ohio.....	Col. Theodore Jones.
37th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Louis von Blessingh.
47th Ohio.....	Col. Augustus C. Parry.
54th Ohio.....	Maj. Robert Williams, Jr.
4th West Virginia.....	Col. James H. Dayton.

Artillery.

1st Illinois Light, Battery A.....	Capt. Peter P. Wood.
1st Illinois Light, Battery B.....	Capt. Israel P. Rumsey.
1st Illinois Light, Battery H.....	Lieut. Francis DeGress.

FOURTH DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. Hugh Ewing.

First Brigade.

Col. John Mason Loomis.

26th Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Robert A. Gillmore.
90th Illinois.....	Col. Timothy O'Meara.
	Lieut.-col. Owen Stuart.
12th Indiana.....	Col. Reuben Williams.
100th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Albert Heath.

Second Brigade.

Brig.-gen. John M. Corse.

Col. Charles C. Walcutt.

40th Illinois.....	Maj. Hiram W. Hall.
103d Illinois.....	Col. William A. Dickerman.
6th Iowa.....	Lieut.-col. Alexander J. Miller.
15th Michigan*.....	Lieut.-col. Austin E. Jaquith.
46th Ohio.....	Col. Charles C. Walcutt.
	Capt. Isaac N. Alexander.

Third Brigade.

Col. Joseph R. Cockerill.

48th Illinois.....	Lieut.-col. Lucien Greathouse.
97th Indiana.....	Col. Robert F. Catterson.
99th Indiana.....	Col. Alexander Fowler.
53d Ohio.....	Col. Wells S. Jones.
70th Ohio.....	Maj. William B. Brown.

Artillery.

Capt. Henry Richardson.

1st Illinois Light, Battery F.....	Capt. John T. Cheney.
1st Illinois Light, Battery I.....	Lieut. Josiah H. Burton.
1st Missouri Light, Battery D.....	Lieut. Byron M. Callender.

SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS.

SECOND DIVISION.

Brig.-gen. John E. Smith.

First Brigade.

Col. Jesse I. Alexander.

63d Illinois.....	Col. Joseph B. McCown.
48th Indiana.....	Lieut.-col. Edward J. Wood.
59th Indiana.....	Capt. Wilford H. Welman.
4th Minnesota.....	Lieut.-col. John E. Tourtellotte.
18th Wisconsin.....	Col. Gabriel Bouck.

* Detached at Scottsboro', Ala.

*ADDENDA.**Second Brigade.*

Col. Green B. Raum.

Col. Clark R. Wever.

56th Illinois.....	Maj. Pinckney J. Welsh.
17th Iowa.....	Col. Clark R. Wever.
	Maj. John F. Walden.
10th Missouri.....	Col. Francis C. Deimling.
24th Missouri, Company E.....	Capt. William W. McCammon.
80th Ohio.....	Lieut.-col. Pren. Metham.

Third Brigade.

Brig.-gen. Charles L. Matthies.

Col. Benjamin D. Dean.

Col. Jabez Banbury.

93d Illinois.....	Col. Holden Putnam.
	Lieut.-col. Nicholas C. Buswell.
5th Iowa.....	Col. Jabez Banbury.
	Lieut.-col. Ezekiel S. Sampson.
10th Iowa.....	Lieut.-col. Paris P. Henderson.
26th Missouri.....	Col. Benjamin D. Dean.

Artillery.

Capt. Henry Dillon.

Cogswell's Illinois Battery.....	Capt. William Cogswell.
6th Wisconsin Battery.....	Lieut. Samuel F. Clark.
12th Wisconsin Battery.....	Capt. William Zickerick.

*Casualties in the Union Forces under MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, engaged in the Chattanooga-Rossville Campaign, November 23-27, 1863.**

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND.							
Maj.-gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS.							
FOURTH ARMY CORPS.							
Maj.-gen. GORDON GRANGER.							
FIRST DIVISION.							
Brig.-gen. Charles Cruft.							
Second Brigade.							
Brig.-gen. Walter C. Whitaker.							
96th Illinois.....	...	1	2	12	15
35th Indiana.....	1	10	11
8th Kentucky.....	4	4
40th Ohio.....	1	11	1	15	...	2	30
51st Ohio.....	..	1	1	4	6
99th Ohio.....	...	3	1	12	16
Total Second brigade.....	1	16	6	57	...	2	82
Third Brigade.							
Col. William Grose.							
59th Illinois.....	...	1	4	13	18
75th Illinois.....	2	2
84th Illinois.....	4	4
9th Indiana.....	...	2	1	22	25
36th Indiana.....	...	1	...	10	11
24th Ohio.....	4	4
Total Third brigade.....	...	4	5	55	64
Total First division.....	1	20	11	112	...	2	146

* Includes skirmishes at Orchard Knob (or Indian Hill) and Bushy Knob (23d); engagement at Lookout Mountain and skirmish in front of Missionary Ridge (24th); battle of Missionary Ridge (25th); skirmishes at Chickamauga Station, Pea-Vine Valley, Pigeon Hills, and near Graysville, Ga. (26th); and engagement at Taylor's Ridge, or Gap, Ringgold, Ga. (27th).

VOL. IV.—42

Casualties in the Army of the Cumberland—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
SECOND DIVISION.							
Maj.-gen. Philip H. Sheridan.							
First Brigade.							
Col. Francis T. Sherman.							
Staff.....	1	1
36th Illinois.....	1	2	1	25	29
44th Illinois.....	1	2	...	18	21
73d Illinois.....	...	3	1	23	27
74th Illinois.....	...	3	5	41	49
88th Illinois.....	2	3	5	41	51
22d Indiana.....	...	3	3	39	...	3	48
2d Missouri.....	...	2	4	13	19
15th Missouri.....	...	5	5	17	27
24th Wisconsin.....	2	1	2	24	29
Total First brigade.....	6	24	27	241	...	3	301
Second Brigade.							
Brig.-gen. George D. Wagner.							
100th Illinois.....	...	1	5	26	32
15th Indiana.....	1	23	9	166	199
40th Indiana.....	...	20	8	130	158
57th Indiana.....	...	2	10	79	91
58th Indiana.....	...	5	5	55	65
26th Ohio.....	...	2	5	29	36
97th Ohio.....	...	16	9	124	149
Total Second brigade.....	1	69	51	609	730
Third Brigade.							
Col. Charles G. Harker.							
Staff.....	1	3	4
22d Illinois.....	...	3	3	13	19
27th Illinois.....	2	6	6	64	78
42d Illinois.....	...	4	8	28	40
51st Illinois.....	1	1	1	12	15
79th Illinois.....	...	2	1	5	8
3d Kentucky.....	...	4	7	47	58
64th Ohio.....	1	1	5	25	32
65th Ohio.....	...	1	1	12	14
125th Ohio.....	...	2	1	26	29
Total Third brigade.....	4	24	34	235	297
Total Second division.....	11	117	112	1085	...	3	1328

Casualties in the Army of the Cumberland—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
THIRD DIVISION.							
Brig.-gen. Thomas J. Wood.							
First Brigade.							
Brig.-gen. August Willich.							
25th Illinois.....	...	9	5	53	67
35th Illinois.....	...	6	2	46	54
89th Illinois.....	1	3	1	29	34
32d Indiana.....	1	8	...	35	44
68th Indiana.....	1	2	2	20	...	1	26
8th Kansas.....	...	3	1	23	27
15th Ohio.....	1	3	2	18	24
49th Ohio	3	5	1	47	56
15th Wisconsin	6	6
Total First brigade.....	7	39	14	277	...	1	338
Second Brigade.							
Brig.-gen. William B. Hazen.							
6th Indiana.....	...	13	3	60	76
5th Kentucky.....	2	8	6	46	62
6th Kentucky.....	1	22	23
23d Kentucky.....	...	9	2	34	45
1st Ohio.....	1	10	4	64	79
6th Ohio.....	1	5	2	26	...	5	39
41st Ohio	1	17	5	65	88
93d Ohio.....	1	19	4	64	88
124th Ohio.....	...	5	4	18	...	2	29
Total Second brigade.....	6	86	31	399	...	7	529
Third Brigade.							
Brig.-gen. Samuel Beatty.							
79th Indiana.....	28	28
86th Indiana.....	1	5	2	33	46
9th Kentucky.....	1	4	5	25	35
17th Kentucky.....	5	5
13th Ohio.....	...	2	1	17	...	1	21
19th Ohio.....	...	1	2	10	13
59th Ohio.....	2	25	27
Total Third brigade.....	2	12	12	148	...	1	175
Total Third division.....	15	137	57	824	...	9	1042
Total Fourth army corps.....	27	274	180	2021	...	14	2516

Casualties in the Army of the Cumberland—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS.							
Maj.-gen. OLIVER O. HOWARD.							
SECOND DIVISION.							
Brig.-gen. Adolph von Steinwehr.							
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Col. Adolphus Buschbeck.							
33d New Jersey.....	1	1	2	19	23
134th New York.....	7	...	1	8
154th New York.....	6	6
27th Pennsylvania.....	...	12	6	53	...	13	84
73d Pennsylvania.....	...	14	3	52	8	86	163
Total First brigade.....	1	27	11	137	8	100	284
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. Orland Smith.							
33d Massachusetts.....	4	...	3	7
136th New York.....	...	1	1	9	11
55th Ohio.....	1	2	...	5	8
73d Ohio.....	1	1	...	1	3
Total Second brigade.....	1	3	2	19	...	4	29
Total Second division.....	2	30	13	156	8	104	313
THIRD DIVISION.							
Maj.-gen. Carl Schurz.							
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Brig.-gen. Hector Tyndale.							
101st Illinois.....	3	3
45th New York.....
141st New York.....	1	1
61st Ohio.....	1	1
82d Ohio.....
Total First brigade.....	1	1	3	5

Casualties in the Army of the Cumberland—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. Wladimir Krzyzanowski.							
58th New York.....	1	1
119th New York.....
141st New York.....	2	2
26th Wisconsin.....
Total Second brigade.....	3	3
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Col. Frederick Hecker.							
80th Illinois.....	6	6
82d Illinois.....	...	1	...	1	2
68th New York.....
75th Pennsylvania.....	2	2
Total Third brigade.....	...	1	...	9	10
Total Third division.....	1	1	1	15	18
Total Eleventh army corps.....	3	31	14	171	8	104	331
TWELFTH ARMY CORPS.							
SECOND DIVISION.							
Brig.-gen. John W. Geary.							
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Col. Charles Candy.*							
Col. William R. Creighton.†							
Col. Thomas J. Ahl.							
5th Ohio.....
7th Ohio.....	3	13	10	48	74
29th Ohio.....
66th Ohio.....	1	4	...	10	15
28th Pennsylvania.....	...	4	3	27	34
147th Pennsylvania.....	2	17	19
Total First brigade.....	4	21	15	102	142

* Disabled November 24th.

† Killed November 27th.

Casualties in the Army of the Cumberland—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. George A. Cobham, Jr.							
29th Pennsylvania	3	2	7	12
109th Pennsylvania
111th Pennsylvania	1	2	7	10
Total Second brigade	4	4	14	22
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Col. David Ireland.							
Staff.....	1	1
60th New York.....	...	7	5	38	50
78th New York.....
102d New York.....	1	2	1	10	14
137th New York.....	1	5	...	32	38
149th New York.....	...	10	8	56	74
Total Third brigade.....	2	24	15	136	177
Total Second division.....	6	49	34	252	341
FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS.							
Maj.-gen. JOHN M. PALMER.							
FIRST DIVISION.							
Brig.-gen. Richard W. Johnson.							
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Brig.-gen. William P. Carlin.							
104th Illinois.....	...	4	2	15	21
38th Indiana	1	8	9
42d Indiana	8	2	32	42
88th Indiana	1	3	13	17
2d Ohio	4	2	10	16
33d Ohio.....	...	7	1	29	37
94th Ohio.....	...	1	1	15	17
10th Wisconsin
Total First brigade.....	1	24	12	122	159

Casualties in the Army of the Cumberland—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. Marshall F. Moore.							
Col. William L. Stoughton.							
19th Illinois.....	...	2	2	13	17
11th Michigan.....	1	5	2	26	34
69th Ohio.....	1	7	4	31	...	1	44
15th U. S., 1st Battalion.....	...	1	...	5	6
15th U. S., 2d Battalion.....	...	3	...	6	...	1	10
16th U. S., 1st Battalion.....	1	1	1	7	10
18th U. S., 1st Battalion.....	...	1	...	15	16
18th U. S., 2d Battalion.....	13	13
19th U. S., 1st Battalion.....	1	23	24
Total Second brigade.....	3	20	10	139	...	2	174
Total First division.....	4	44	22	261	...	2	333
SECOND DIVISION.							
Brig.-gen. Jefferson C. Davis.							
Staff.....	1	1
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Brig.-gen. James D. Morgan.							
10th Illinois.....	1	1
16th Illinois.....
60th Illinois.....
21st Kentucky.....	6	6
10th Michigan.....	2	2
Total First brigade.....	9	9
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Brig.-gen. John Beatty.							
34th Illinois.....	1	...	1	2
78th Illinois.....	...	1	...	4	5
98th Ohio.....	...	2	...	6	8
108th Ohio.....	1	1
113th Ohio.....	2	2
121st Ohio.....	3	3
Total Second brigade.....	...	3	1	16	...	1	21

Casualties in the Army of the Cumberland—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Col. Daniel McCook.							
85th Illinois.....	1	...	2	3
86th Illinois.....	...	1	...	1	2
110th Illinois.....
125th Illinois.....	...	1	...	2	...	3	6
52d Ohio.....
Total Third brigade.....	...	2	...	4	...	5	11
Total Second division.....	...	5	2	29	...	6	42
<i>THIRD DIVISION.</i>							
Brig.-gen. Absalom Baird.							
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Brig.-gen. John B. Turchin.							
82d Indiana.....	...	4	...	16	20
11th Ohio.....	2	6	1	42	51
17th Ohio.....	...	2	2	12	16
31st Ohio.....	1	10	2	34	47
36th Ohio.....	...	10	3	59	...	3	75
89th Ohio.....	...	3	1	13	17
92d Ohio.....	2	10	3	43	58
Total First brigade.....	5	45	12	219	...	3	284
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer.							
75th Indiana.....	...	4	1	14	19
87th Indiana.....	...	2	2	11	15
101st Indiana.....	1	1	4	29	35
2d Minnesota.....	1	4	3	31	39
9th Ohio.....	2	12	14
35th Ohio.....	...	6	3	19	...	2	30
105th Ohio.....	3	8	11
Total Second brigade.....	2	17	18	124	...	2	163

Casualties in the Army of the Cumberland—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Col. Edward H. Phelps.*							
Col. William H. Hays.							
10th Indiana.....	11	11
74th Indiana.....	...	2	...	16	18
4th Kentucky.....	...	2	...	9	...	1	12
10th Kentucky.....	...	2	...	10	12
14th Ohio.....	...	3	...	17	20
38th Ohio.....	2	7	3	34	46
Total Third brigade.....	2	16	3	97	...	1	119
Total Third division.....	9	78	33	440	...	6	566
Total Fourteenth army corps..	13	127	57	730	...	14	941
Total Army of the Cumberland	49	481	285	3174	8	132	4129

* Killed November 25th.

Casualties in the Army of the Tennessee.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE.							
Maj.-gen. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN.							
FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS.							
Maj.-gen. FRANK P. BLAIR, JR.							
FIRST DIVISION.							
Brig.-gen. Peter J. Osterhaus.							
First Brigade.							
Brig.-gen. Charles R. Woods.							
13th Illinois.....	1	3	7	51	1	63
3d Missouri	7	7
12th Missouri.....	1	4	19	...	3	27
17th Missouri.	1	4	3	11	1	20
27th Missouri.....	...	2	1	10	13
29th Missouri.....	...	2	5	19	2	26	54
31st Missouri.....	...	1	2	19	...	6	28
32d Missouri.....	2	2
76th Ohio.....	2	16	3	40	...	2	63
Total First brigade.....	5	28	25	178	4	37	277
Second Brigade.							
Col. James A. Williamson.							
4th Iowa.....	1	9	1	36	...	2	49
9th Iowa.....	...	3	...	12	15
25th Iowa.....	7	22	29
26th Iowa.....	4	12	16
30th Iowa.....	...	4	1	22	27
31st Iowa.....	...	2	1	16	19
Total Second brigade.....	1	18	14	120	...	2	155
Total First division	6	46	39	298	4	39	432

Casualties in the Army of the Tennessee—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
SECOND DIVISION.							
Brig.-gen. Morgan L. Smith.							
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Brig.-gen. Giles A. Smith.*							
Col. Nathan W. Tupper.							
Staff.....	1	1
55th Illinois.....	3	3
116th Illinois.....	2	...	1	3
127th Illinois.....
6th Missouri.....	1	1
8th Missouri.....	2	...	1	3
57th Ohio.....	5	5
13th U. S., 1st Battalion.....
Total First brigade.....	1	13	...	2	16
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Brig.-gen. J. A. J. Lightburn.							
83d Indiana.....	3	3
30th Ohio.....	...	5	...	30	35
37th Ohio.....	...	5	5	28	38
47th Ohio.....	3	3
54th Ohio.....
4th West Virginia.....	7	7
Total Second brigade.....	...	10	5	71	86
<i>Artillery.</i>							
1st Illinois Light, Battery A.....	1	1
Total Artillery.....	1	1
Total Second division.....	...	10	6	85	...	2	103

* Wounded November 24th.

Casualties in the Army of the Tennessee—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
FOURTH DIVISION.							
Brig.-gen. Hugh Ewing.							
<i>First Brigade.</i>							
Col. John M. Loomis.							
26th Illinois.....	...	10	6	76	...	1	93
90th Illinois.....	1	9	6	88	...	13	117
12th Indiana.....	1	9	7	43	...	2	62
100th Indiana.....	1	6	7	98	...	2	114
Total First brigade.....	3	34	26	305	...	18	386
<i>Second Brigade.</i>							
Brig.-gen. John M. Corse.*							
Col. Charles C. Walcutt.							
Staff.....	1	1
40th Illinois.....	...	6	3	39	...	1	49
103d Illinois.....	1	14	3	71	89
6th Iowa.....	1	7	4	53	65
46th Ohio.....	1	4	3	24	...	1	33
Total Second brigade.....	3	31	14	187	...	2	237
<i>Third Brigade.</i>							
Col. Joseph R. Cockerill.							
48th Illinois.....
97th Indiana.....
99th Indiana.....	3	3
53d Ohio.....
70th Ohio.....
Total Third brigade.....	3	3
<i>Artillery.</i>							
1st Missouri Light, Battery D.....	2	2
Total Artillery.....	2	2
Total Fourth division.....	6	65	40	497	...	20	628
Total Fifteenth army corps.....	12	121	85	880	4	61	1163

* Wounded November 25th.

Casualties in the Army of the Tennessee—Continued.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS.							
SECOND DIVISION.							
Brig.-gen. John E. Smith.							
First Brigade.							
Col. Jesse I. Alexander.							
63d Illinois.....	1	1	2
48th Indiana.....
59th Indiana.....	1	1
4th Minnesota.....	1	1
18th Wisconsin.....
Total First brigade.....	1	3	4
Second Brigade.							
Col. Green B. Raum.*							
Col. Clark R. Wever.							
56th Illinois.....	...	1	3	15	19
17th Iowa.....	...	12	3	29	1	13	58
10th Missouri.....	1	10	5	48	64
24th Missouri, Company E.....	...	1	1	3	5
80th Ohio.....	2	13	...	33	2	8	58
Total Second brigade.....	3	37	12	128	3	21	204
Third Brigade.							
Brig.-gen. Charles L. Matthies.†							
Col. Benjamin D. Dean.‡							
Col. Jabez Banbury.§							
Staff.....	1	1
93d Illinois.....	1	19	2	44	2	25	93
5th Iowa.....	...	2	2	20	8	74	106
10th Iowa.....	2	10	6	36	1	7	62
26th Missouri.....	2	13	1	33	1	3	53
Total Third brigade.....	5	44	12	133	12	109	315
Total Second division.....	8	81	25	264	15	130	523
Total Army of the Tennessee...	20	202	110	1144	19	191	1686
Grand total.....	69	683	395	4318	26	324	5815

* Wounded November 25th.

† Assumed command November 25th.

‡ Wounded November 25th.

§ Succeeded Col. Dean November 25th.

OFFICERS KILLED OR MORTALLY WOUNDED.

ILLINOIS.

Major Douglas R. Bushnell.....	13th Infantry.
Captain Walter Blanchard.....	13th "
Lieutenant David M. Richards.....	25th "
Lieutenant Herbert Weyman.....	27th "
Lieutenant Hugh M. Love.....	27th "
Lieutenant Sidney M. Abbott.....	36th "
Lieutenant Jacob Y. Elliott.....	42d "
Lieutenant Alfred O. Johnson.....	42d "
Lieutenant George C. Smith.....	42d "
Captain Carl R. Harnisch.....	44th "
Captain George L. Bellows.....	51st "
Lieutenant Joshua M. Fields.....	56th "
Lieutenant Charles H. Lane.....	88th "
Lieutenant Henry L. Bingham.....	88th "
Captain Henry L. Rowell.....	89th "
Lieutenant Erastus O. Young.....	89th "
Colonel Timothy O'Meara.....	90th "
Lieutenant James Conway.....	90th "
Colonel Holden Putnam.....	93d "
Captain William Walsh.....	103d "
Lieutenant Orin S. Davison.....	104th "

INDIANA.

Captain Frank P. Strader.....	6th Infantry.
Captain Frank H. Aveline.....	12th "
Captain Hezekiah Beeson.....	12th "
Captain John F. Monroe.....	15th "
Lieutenant William D. Sering.....	15th "
Lieutenant-colonel Jacob Glass.....	32d "
Lieutenant James M. Hanna.....	40th "
Lieutenant John Reese.....	68th "
Captain Francis M. Bryant.....	75th "
Captain William M. Southard.....	86th "
Lieutenant Burr Russell.....	87th "
Captain James H. Steele.....	88th "
Lieutenant Daniel Little.....	88th "
Captain James M. Harland.....	100th "
Lieutenant Henry T. Waterman.....	101st "

IOWA.

Lieutenant Thomas H. Cramer.....	4th Infantry.
Lieutenant Charles S. Miller.....	5th "
Captain Robert Allison.....	6th "
Lieutenant George H. Conant.....	10th "
Lieutenant Isaac Sexton.....	10th "
Captain Luther F. McNeal.....	17th "
Captain John L. Steele.....	26th "

KENTUCKY.

Lieutenant Gavine D. Hunt.....	3d Infantry.
Captain John P. Hurley.....	5th "
Captain Upton Wilson.....	5th "
Lieutenant William S. Barton.....	9th "

ADDENDA.

671

MICHIGAN.

Major Benjamin G. Bennet..... 11th Infantry.

MINNESOTA.

Lieutenant Samuel G. Trimble..... 2d Infantry.

MISSOURI.

Captain Herman Hartmann.....	2d	Infantry.
Captain William A. J. Russell.....	10th	"
Captain Joseph A. Ledergerber.....	12th	"
Lieutenant Frederick Kessler.....	12th	"
Captain John G. Reis.....	15th	"
Lieutenant August F. Hranitzky.....	17th	"
Lieutenant George Maehl.....	17th	"
Captain Edward H. Stoddard.....	26th	"
Lieutenant Henry P. Harding.....	26th	"
Lieutenant John Wellmeyer.....	27th	"
Captain Henry Justi.....	29th	"
Captain Martin Menne.....	29th	"
Lieutenant Julius Selle.....	29th	"
Captain Francis Doherty.....	31st	"

NEW JERSEY.

Captain William G. Boggs.....	33d	Infantry.
Captain Samuel F. Waldron.....	33d	"

NEW YORK.

Major Gilbert M. Elliott.....	102d	Infantry.
Lieutenant Charles F. Tresser.....	136th	"
Lieutenant George C. Owen.....	137th	"
Lieutenant-colonel Joseph B. Taft.....	143d	"

OHIO.

Lieutenant Christopher Woollenhaupt.....	1st	Infantry.
Major Samuel C. Erwin.....	6th	"
Colonel William R. Creighton.....	7th	"
Lieutenant-colonel Orrin J. Crane.....	7th	"
Lieutenant Morris Baxter.....	7th	"
Lieutenant Joseph Cryne.....	7th	"
Lieutenant Isaac C. Jones.....	7th	"
Captain David K. Curtis.....	11th	"
Lieutenant George E. Peck.....	11th	"
Lieutenant Frank W. Sanders.....	15th	"
Lieutenant James K. Rochester.....	31st	"
Colonel Edward H. Phelps.....	38th	"
Lieutenant John Lewis.....	38th	"
Lieutenant Joseph Newman.....	38th	"
Major Thomas Acton.....	40th	"
Lieutenant Henry S. Dirlam.....	41st	"
Lieutenant William W. Watson.....	41st	"
Lieutenant George Gorman.....	46th	"
Lieutenant Henry F. Arndt.....	49th	"
Lieutenant Jacob C. Miller.....	49th	"
Lieutenant Isaac H. White.....	49th	"
Lieutenant Jacob Wolf.....	49th	"
Lieutenant Edward Bromley.....	55th	"

Captain Henry H. Kling.....	64th Infantry.
Lieutenant Harrison Davis.....	66th "
Lieutenant John S. Scott.....	69th "
Captain Ira P. French.....	76th "
Lieutenant John A. Lemert.....	76th "
Lieutenant John B. Miller.....	76th "
Lieutenant Simeon B. Wall.....	76th "
Captain John Kinney.....	80th "
Lieutenant Francis M. Ross.....	80th "
Captain William B. Whittlesey.....	92d "
Lieutenant Hugh Townsend.....	92d "
Lieutenant George B. Turner.....	92d "
Major William Birch.....	93d "
Captain James H. Frost.....	124th "

PENNSYLVANIA.

Major Peter A. McAloon.....	27th Infantry.
Lieutenant Peter Kaylor.....	28th "
Captain Charles S. Davis.....	147th "

UNITED STATES ARMY.

Lieutenant Peter J. Coenzler.....	16th Infantry.
-----------------------------------	----------------

WISCONSIN.

Captain Howard Greene.....	24th Infantry.
Lieutenant Robert J. Chivas.....	24th "

*Organization of the Army of Tennessee, commanded by GENERAL
BRAXTON BRAGG, C. S. A., November 23, 1863.*

HARDEE'S CORPS.

B. F. CHEATHAM'S DIVISION.

H. R. Jackson's Brigade.

5th Mississippi.....	Col. John Weir.
Company A, 8th Mississippi.....	Capt. W. Watkins.
5th Georgia.....	Lieut.-col. J. F. Iverson.
47th Georgia.....	Capt. J. S. Cone.
65th Georgia.....	Maj. S. F. Williams.
1st Confederate Georgia.....	Maj. J. C. Gordon.
2d Battalion Georgia Sharpshooters.....	Capt. M. G. Hester.

Moore's Brigade.

37th Alabama.....	Lieut.-col. A. A. Green.
40th Alabama.....	Lieut.-col. T. O. Stone.
42d Alabama.....	Lieut.-col. T. C. Lanier.

E. C. Walthall's Brigade.

24th Mississippi }	Lieut.-col. R. P. McKelvaine.
27th Mississippi }	
29th Mississippi }	
30th Mississippi }	Maj. J. M. Johnson.
34th Mississippi }	

Marcus J. Wright's Brigade.

8th Tennessee.....	Lieut.-col. C. C. McKinney.
16th Tennessee.....	Capt. Ben Randals.
28th Tennessee.....	Col. S. S. Stanton.
38th Tennessee.....	Col. John C. Carter.
51st Tennessee }	Lieut.-col. John G. Hall.
52d Tennessee }	

C. L. STEVENSON'S DIVISION.

John C. Brown's Brigade.

45th Tennessee }	Col. A. Searcy.
23d Tennessee Battalion }	
3d Tennessee.....	Col. C. H. Walker.
18th Tennessee }	Lieut.-col. W. R. Butler.
26th Tennessee }	
32d Tennessee.....	Maj. J. P. McGuire.

Alfred Cumming's Brigade.

34th Georgia.....	Maj. John M. Jackson.
36th Georgia.....	Capt. J. L. Morgan.
39th Georgia.....	Capt. T. H. Pitner.
56th Georgia.....	Capt. J. F. Albert.

E. W. Pettus' Brigade.

20th Alabama.....	Capt. J. W. Davis.
23d Alabama.....	Lieut.-col. J. B. Bibb.
30th Alabama.....	Col. C. M. Shelly.
31st Alabama.....	Col. D. R. Hundley.
46th Alabama.....	Capt. G. E. Brewer.

A. W. Reynolds' Brigade.

54th Virginia.....	Lieut.-col. J. J. Wade.
63d Virginia.....	Capt. C. H. Lynch.
58th North Carolina.....	Capt. S. M. Silver.
60th North Carolina.....	Maj. J. T. Weaver.

P. B. CLEBURNE'S DIVISION.

M. P. Lowrey's Brigade.

16th Alabama.....	Maj. F. A. Ashford.
33d Alabama.....	Col. Sam. Adams.
45th Alabama.....	Lieut.-col. H. D. Lampley.
32d Mississippi } 44th Mississippi }	Col. A. B. Hardcastle.
Battalion Sharpshooters.....	Capt. D. Coleman.

St. John R. Liddell's Brigade.

2d Arkansas } 15th Arkansas } 24th Arkansas }	Lieut.-col. E. Warfield.
5th Arkansas } 13th Arkansas }	Col. John E. Murray.
6th Arkansas } 7th Arkansas }	Lieut.-col. P. Snyder.
8th Arkansas } 19th Arkansas }	Lieut.-col. A. S. Hutchinson.

Lucius E. Polk's Brigade.

35th Tennessee } 48th Tennessee }	Col. B. J. Hill.
2d Tennessee.....	Lieut.-col. W. J. Hale.
1st Arkansas.....	Col. J. W. Colquitt.
3d Confederate } 5th Confederate }	Maj. R. J. Person.

James A. Smith's Brigade.

7th Texas.....	Capt. J. H. Collett.
6th Texas } 10th Texas } 15th Texas }	Maj. D. P. Saunders.
17th Texas } 18th Texas }	
24th Texas } 25th Texas }	Maj. W. A. Taylor.

W. H. T. WALKER'S DIVISION.

S. R. Gist's Brigade.

46th Georgia.....	Lieut.-col. W. A. Daniel.
24th South Carolina.....	Col. C. H. Stevens.
16th South Carolina.....	Col. James McCullough.
8th Georgia Battalion.....	Lieut.-col. Z. L. Waters.

George Maney's Brigade.

1st Tennessee }	Col. H. R. Feild.
27th Tennessee }	
6th Tennessee }	Col. George C. Porter.
9th Tennessee }	
4th Confederate.....	Lieut.-col. Lewis.
50th Tennessee.....	Col. C. A. Sugg.
41st Tennessee.....	Col. R. Farquharson.
Maney's Battalion.....	Maj. Frank Maney.

C. C. Wilson's Brigade.

25th Georgia }	Maj. A. Shaaff.
1st Georgia Battalion [Sharpshooters] }	
66th Georgia.....	Col. J. C. Nisbet.
26th Georgia Battalion.....	Maj. J. W. Nisbet.
29th Georgia }	Maj. T. W. Mangham.
30th Georgia }	

Baldwin's Brigade.

4th Mississippi.....	Col. T. N. Adair.
35th Mississippi.....	Col. W. S. Barry.
40th Mississippi.....	Col. W. B. Colbert.
46th Mississippi.....	Col. C. W. Sears.

HINDMAN'S CORPS.

T. C. HINDMAN'S DIVISION.

J. Patton Anderson's Brigade.

7th Mississippi }	Col. W. H. Bishop.
9th Mississippi }	
10th Mississippi }	Col. James Barr.
44th Mississippi }	
41st Mississippi.....	Col. W. F. Tucker.
[9th] Battalion [Mississippi] Sharpshooters.....	Maj. W. C. Richards.

Z. C. Deas' Brigade.

19th Alabama.....	Col. S. K. McSpadden.
22d Alabama.....	Lieut.-col. B. R. Hart.
25th Alabama.....	Col. G. D. Johnston.
39th Alabama.....	Lieut.-col. W. C. Clifton.
50th Alabama.....	Col. J. G. Coltart.
Battalion Sharpshooters.....	Capt. J. F. Nabers.

A. M. Manigault's Brigade.

10th South Carolina }	Col. Jas. F. Pressley.
19th South Carolina }	
24th Alabama.....	Col. N. N. Davis.
28th Alabama.....	Lieut.-col. W. L. Butler.
24th Alabama.....	Capt. R. G. Welch.
Provost-Guards.....	Lieut. E. Malone.

A. J. Vaughan's Brigade.

154th Tennessee }	Lieut.-col. R. W. Pitman.
13th Tennessee }	
12th Tennessee }	Col. W. M. Watkins.
47th Tennessee }	
11th Tennessee.....	Lieut.-col. Wm. Thedford.
29th Tennessee.....	Col. H. Rice.

J. C. BRECKINRIDGE'S DIVISION.*W. B. Bate's Brigade.*

37th Georgia.....	Lieut.-col. J. T. Smith.
20th Tennessee.....	Capt. John F. Guthrie.
15th Tennessee }	
37th Tennessee }	Lieut.-col. R. D. Frayser.
1st Tennessee Battalion.....	Capt. P. Adcock.
10th Tennessee.....	Maj. John O'Neill.
30th Tennessee.....	Lieut.-col. James J. Turner.
Caswell's Battalion.....	1st Lieut. Joel Towers.

W. A. Quarles' Brigade.

48th Tennessee.....	Col. W. M. Voorhies.
4th Louisiana.....	Col. S. E. Hunter.
53d Tennessee.....	Col. J. R. White.
49th Tennessee.....	Col. W. F. Young.
46th Tennessee }	
55th Tennessee }	Col. R. A. Owens.
30th Louisiana.....	Lieut.-col. Thomas Shields.

Joseph H. Lewis' Brigade.

2d Kentucky.....	Col. James W. Moss.
4th Kentucky.....	Lieut.-col. T. W. Thompson.
5th Kentucky.....	Col. H. Hawkins.
6th Kentucky.....	Lieut.-col. W. L. Clarke.
9th Kentucky.....	Lieut.-col. J. C. Wickliffe.

J. J. Finley's Brigade.

1st Florida }	Lieut.-col. E. Mashburn.
3d Florida }	
1st Florida }	Lieut.-col. E. Badger.
4th Florida }	
6th Florida.....	Lieut.-col. A. D. McLean.
7th Florida.....	Lieut.-col. T. Ingram.

A. P. STEWART'S DIVISION.

M. A. Stovall's Brigade.

40th Georgia.....	Lieut.-col. R. M. Young.
41st Georgia.....	Col. W. E. Curtis.
42d Georgia.....	Maj. W. H. Hulsey.
43d Georgia.....	Lieut.-col. H. C. Kellogg.
52d Georgia.....	Maj. John J. Moore.

H. D. Clayton's Brigade.

18th Alabama.....	Col. J. T. Holtzclaw.
36th Alabama }	Col. L. T. Woodruff.
38th Alabama }	
32d Alabama }	Col. Bush Jones.
58th Alabama }	

O. F. Strahl's Brigade.

4th Tennessee.....	Lieut.-col. L. W. Finlay.
5th Tennessee.....	Col. J. J. Lamb.
19th Tennessee.....	Col. F. M. Walker.
24th Tennessee.....	Col. John A. Wilson.
31st Tennessee.....	Lieut.-col. F. E. P. Stafford.
33d Tennessee.....	Lieut.-col. H. C. McNeill.

John Adams' Brigade.

13th Louisiana }	Maj. F. L. Campbell.
20th Louisiana }	
16th Louisiana }	Col. D. Gober.
25th Louisiana }	
19th Louisiana.....	Maj. H. A. Kennedy.
Austin's Battalion (14th Louisiana Bat-	
talion Sharpshooters).....	Maj. J. E. Austin.
4th Louisiana Battalion.....	Maj. S. L. Bishop.

JOSEPH WHEELER'S CAVALRY CORPS.

JOHN A. WHARTON'S DIVISION.

First Brigade.

3d Arkansas.....	Lieut.-col. M. J. Henderson.
8th Texas.....	Lieut.-col. Gustave Cook.
11th Texas.....	Lieut.-col. J. M. Bounds.
65th North Carolina [6th Cavalry].....	Col. G. N. Folk.

Second Brigade.

1st Tennessee.....	Col. J. T. Wheeler.
	Col. James E. Carter.
2d Tennessee.....	Col. H. M. Ashby.
4th Tennessee.....	Col. ———.
11th Tennessee.....	Col. D. W. Holman.

W. T. MARTIN'S DIVISION.

First Brigade.

1st Alabama.....	Lieut.-col. D. T. Blakey.
3d Alabama.....	Lieut.-col. T. H. Maulden.
4th Alabama.....	Lieut.-col. Hambrick.
7th Alabama.....	Col. J. C. Malone.
51st Alabama.....	Capt. M. L. Kirkpatrick.

Second Brigade.

1st Georgia.....	Col. —.*
2d Georgia.....	Lieut.-col. F. M. Ison.
3d Georgia.....	Lieut.-col. R. Thompson.
4th Georgia.....	Col. J. W. Avery.
6th Georgia.....	Col. John R. Hart.

F. C. ARMSTRONG'S DIVISION.

First Brigade.

4th Tennessee.....	Lieut.-col. P. F. Anderson.
5th Tennessee.....	Col. George W. McKenzie.
8th Tennessee.....	Col. —.†
9th [19th ?] Tennessee.....	Col. J. B. Bifle.
10th Tennessee.....	Col. N. N. Cox.

Second Brigade.

1st Kentucky Battalion.....	Lieut.-col. E. F. Clay.
2d Kentucky Battalion.....	Maj. Tenney.
6th Confederate Battalion.....	Maj. A. L. McAfee.
27th Virginia Battalion.....	Maj. S. P. McConnell.

J. H. KELLY'S DIVISION.

First Brigade.

1st Confederate.....	Capt. C. H. Conner.
3d Confederate.....	Col. W. N. Estes.
8th Confederate.....	Lieut.-col. John S. Prather.
10th Confederate.....	Col. Chas. T. Goode.

Second Brigade.

1st [3d ?] Kentucky.....	Col. J. R. Butler.
2d Kentucky.....	Col. Thomas Woodward.
9th Kentucky.....	Col. W. C. P. Breckinridge.
Rucker's Legion.....	Col. E. W. Rucker.
Hamilton's Battalion.....	Lieut.-col. Hamilton.
Allison's Tennessee Squadron.....	Capt. Allison.

P. D. Roddey's Brigade.

5th Alabama.....	Col. Josiah Patterson.
53d Alabama.....	Col. M. W. Hannon.
Johnson's [Cavalry, 4th Alabama].....	Col. W. A. Johnson.
Moreland's [Alabama] Cavalry.....	Lieut.-col. M. D. Moreland.
Ferrell's Battery.....	Capt. G. A. Ferrell.‡

* J. J. Morrison was colonel in October, 1863.

† G. G. Dibrell was colonel in July, 1863.

‡ Was lieutenant in Battery "C," McIntosh's battalion, Virginia Artillery; also in Alabama Battery.

ARTILLERY.

HARDEE'S CORPS.

B. F. CHEATHAM'S DIVISION.

Smith's Battalion.

Maj. M. Smith.

McCants' Battery.....Capt. R. P. McCants.
 Fowler's Battery.....Capt. W. H. Fowler.
 Turner's Battery.....Capt. W. B. Turner.

P. R. CLEBURNE'S DIVISION.

Swett's Battalion.

Swett's Battery.....Lieut. H. Shannon.
 Semple's Battery.....Lieut. R. W. Goldthwaite.
 Calvert's [J. H.] Battery.....Lieut. T. J. Key.

C. L. STEVENSON'S DIVISION.

Carnes' Battery.....Capt. W. W. Carnes.
 Rowan's Battery.....Capt. John B. Rowan.
 Max Van Den. Corput's Battery.

WALKER'S DIVISION.

Martin's Battalion.

Maj. Robert Martin.

Bledsoe's Battery.....Capt. H. M. Bledsoe.
 Ferguson's Battery.....Capt. T. B. Ferguson.
 Howell's Battery.....Capt. E. P. Howell.

HINDMAN'S CORPS.

T. C. HINDMAN'S DIVISION.

Courtney's Battalion.

Maj. A. R. Courtney.

Dent's Battery.....Capt. S. H. Dent.
 Douglass' Battery.....Capt. J. P. Douglass.
 Garrity's Battery.....Capt. J. Garrity.

J. C. BRECKINRIDGE'S DIVISION.

Slocomb's Battery.....Capt. C. H. Slocomb.
 Cobb's Battery.....Lieut. F. J. Gracie.
 Mebane's Battery.....Capt. J. W. Mebane.

STEWART'S DIVISION.

Standford's Battery.....	Capt. T. J. Standford.
(McD.) Oliver's Battery.....	Lieut. Wm. J. McKenzie.
Fenner's Battery.....	Capt. Charles E. Fenner.

RESERVE.

F. H. Robertson's Battalion.

Havis' Battery.....	Lieut. J. R. Duncan.
Lumsden's Battery.....	Lieut. H. H. Cribbs.
Barret's Battery.....	Capt. O. W. Barret.
Anderson's Battery.....	Capt. R. W. Anderson.*

Williams' Battalion.

Darden's Battery.....	Lieut. H. W. Bullen.
Kolb's Battery.....	Capt. R. F. Kolb.
Jeffries' Battery.....	Capt. E. Jeffries.

WHEELER'S ARTILLERY.

Wiggins' Battery.....	Capt. J. H. Wiggins.
White's Battery.....	Capt. B. F. White.
Freeman's Battery.....	Lieut. A. L. Huggins.
Huwald's Battery.....	Capt. G. A. Huwald.

* Capt. Palmer's battalion artillery, Georgia.

Casualties in the Confederate Forces, November 23-27, 1863.

COMMAND.	Infantry.				Artillery.				Total.			Aggregate.
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	
<i>Hardee's Corps.</i>												
Cheatham's division.....	56	371	1237	1664	7	7	56	371	1244	1671
Cleburne's division.....	56	351	12	419	6	16	...	22	62	367	12	441
Stevenson's division.....	86	282	14	332	36	282	14	332
Walker's division.....	13	114	167	294	1	4	23	28	14	118	190	322
Total.....	161	1118	1430	2709	7	20	30	57	168	1138	1460	2766
<i>Hindman's Corps.</i>												
Hindman's division.....	69	463	1088	1620	7	13	36	56	76	476	1124	1676
Stewart's division.....	71	310	960	1341	1	6	5	12	72	316	965	1353
Breckinridge's division.....	44	208	581	833	...	16	10	26	44	244	591	839
Total	184	981	2629	3794	8	35	51	94	192	1016	2680	3888
<i>Reserve Artillery.</i>												
Robertson's battalion.....	1	4	6	11
Williams' battalion.....	2	...	2
Total.....	1	6	6	13
<i>Recapitulation.</i>												
Hardee's corps.....	161	1118	1430	2709	7	20	30	57	168	1138	1460	2766
Hindman's corps.....	184	981	2629	3794	8	35	51	94	192	1036	2680	3888
Reserve artillery.....	1	6	6	13	1	6	6	13
Grand total.....	345	2099	4059	6503	16	61	87	164	361	2180	4146	6667

